The Project Gutenberg eBook of Affairs of West Africa
This ebook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and
most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions
whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms
of the Project Gutenberg License included with this ebook or online
at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States,
you will have to check the laws of the country where you are located
before using this eBook.
Title: Affairs of West Africa
Author: E. D. Morel
Contributor: Sir Ronald Ross
Release date: March 10, 2025 [eBook #75580]
Language: English
Original publication: London: William Heinemann, 1902
Credits: Peter Becker and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images generously made available by The Internet Archive)
*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK AFFAIRS OF WEST AFRICA ***
AFFAIRS OF WEST AFRICA
[Illustration: ON FISHING BENT—SOUTHERN NIGERIA]
AFFAIRS OF
WEST AFRICA
BY
EDMUND D. MOREL
(E. D. M.)
MEMBER OF THE WEST AFRICAN SECTION OF THE
LIVERPOOL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
WITH ILLUSTRATIONS AND MAPS
[Illustration]
LONDON
WILLIAM HEINEMANN
1902
(_All rights reserved_)
TO MY WIFE
PREFACE
Whatever its defects—and, no doubt, they are many and various—the Author
claims for this volume that it is, at least, an honest attempt to deal
with the problems, racial, political and commercial, yearly increasing in
magnitude, connected with the administration of Western Africa by Great
Britain and by the other Powers of Western Europe which participated in
the scramble for African territory. As such it is respectfully submitted
to the thinking Public. The Author considers it advisable to state
that he has no commercial interests in West Africa, and is, therefore,
uninfluenced by considerations of a personal nature, in emphasising
the importance of the part played by the merchant on the West African
stage. He also deems it right to say that the West African Section of
the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce is neither responsible nor answerable
for the opinions expressed herein. The Author hereby acknowledges the
courtesy of the Editor of the _Pall Mall Gazette_, the Editor-Proprietor
of _West Africa_, the Editor of the _Contemporary Review_, and the
Editorial Committee of the _Journal of the African Society_, in
permitting the incorporation of certain matter contributed by himself,
from time to time, to those publications. His sincere thanks are due to
Major Ronald Ross, F.R.C.S., F.R.S., C.B., for the chapter which that
distinguished scientist has specially written at the Author’s request. To
other kind friends and acquaintances who have good-humouredly submitted
to cross-examination, and have allowed themselves to be victimised by the
Author’s importunities generally, grateful appreciation is due, and is
thankfully acknowledged.
HAWARDEN, 1902.
CONTENTS
CHAP. PAGE
FOREWORD—MARY KINGSLEY xiii
PART I
I. FIVE YEARS OF BRITISH TRADE WITH WESTERN AFRICA 1
II. THE OLD AND THE NEW 7
III. THE REAL AND THE IDEAL 11
IV. SOME NECESSARY REFORMS 20
PART II.—NIGERIA
V. THE DISCOVERY OF NORTHERN NIGERIA 35
VI. THE DISCOVERY OF NORTHERN NIGERIA—(_cont._) 43
VII. THE HAUSAS AND THEIR EMPORIUM 52
VIII. THE HAUSAS AND THEIR EMPORIUM—(_cont._) 59
IX. THE NATIONAL INDUSTRY OF SOUTHERN NIGERIA 74
X. THE ADMINISTRATION OF NORTHERN NIGERIA 83
XI. THE FINANCES OF NIGERIA 89
XII. MOHAMMEDANS, SLAVE-RAIDING AND DOMESTIC SERVITUDE 94
XIII. THE PRINCIPAL PRODUCTS OF NIGERIA 110
XIV. RUBBER-COLLECTING IN NIGERIA 119
XV. THE FULANI IN NIGERIA 125
XVI. THE FULANI IN WEST AFRICAN HISTORY 130
XVII. ORIGIN OF THE FULANI 136
PART III
XVIII. SANITARY AFFAIRS IN WEST AFRICA. BY MAJOR RONALD ROSS, C.B. 153
XIX. LAND TENURE AND LABOUR IN WEST AFRICA 170
XX. A COTTON INDUSTRY FOR WEST AFRICA 188
XXI. THE MAHOGANY TRADE 201
XXII. ISLAM IN WEST AFRICA 208
XXIII. ISLAM IN WEST AFRICA—(_cont._) 224
PART IV.—THE FRENCH IN WEST AFRICA
XXIV. ANGLO-FRENCH RELATIONS IN WEST AFRICA 238
XXV. TEN YEARS OF FRENCH ACTION IN WEST AFRICA 249
XXVI. THE COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL CONDITION OF THE FRENCH
POSSESSIONS 265
XXVII. FRENCH AND BRITISH MANAGEMENT IN WEST AFRICA 276
PART V.—MONOPOLY IN WEST AFRICA
XXVIII. THE CONCESSIONS RÉGIME IN FRENCH CONGO 285
XXIX. INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS AND MONOPOLY 297
XXX. THE HISTORY OF THE CONGO STATE 312
XXXI. THE DOMAINE PRIVÉ 327
XXXII. THE “TRADE” OF THE CONGO STATE 343
APPENDIX
SIERRA LEONE (EXPENDITURE, LOANS, EXPORTS, &C.) 355
GOLD COAST (EXPENDITURE, LOANS, EXPORTS, &C.) 356
LAGOS (EXPENDITURE, LOANS, EXPORTS, &C.) 359
DAHOMEY (COMPARATIVE TABLE OF DUTIES) 360
THE DAHOMEY RAILWAY 362
FRENCH GUINEA RAILWAY 364
WEST AFRICAN MAHOGANY TRADE 365
THE GOLD COAST MINING INDUSTRY 367
BRITISH POSSESSIONS IN WEST AFRICA (POPULATION AND AREA) 370
THE RABINEK CASE 371
INDEX 373
ILLUSTRATIONS
_On Fishing Bent, Southern Nigeria_ _Frontispiece_
_Facing page_
*_A Pure-bred Kano Man (Hausa)_ 54
*_A Hausa from Yola_ 56
_Hausa Loom and Spool_ 62
_Hausas Drilling_ 68
_Making Palm-oil_ 74
_Duke-Town, Old Calabar, Southern Nigeria_ 76
_Filling Palm-oil Barrels, Southern Nigeria_ 78
_A Palm-kernel Market in Southern Nigeria_ 80
_A Mohammedan Chief and his Standard-Bearer_ 100
_Mandingo Muslims_ 106
_A Baobab—The Giant of West African Flora_ 116
_Washing Rubber_ 122
_Fulani Sword_ 126
*_Pure-bred Fulani Girl, Adamawa_ 128
_Fulani Chief, Futa-Jallon_ 130
_Half-caste Fulani Girl, Futa-Jallon_ 134
_Low-caste Fulani, Western Sudan_ 136
_Pure-bred Fulani Girl, Futa-Jallon_ 140
_Fulani House, Futa-Jallon_ 142
_Fulani Cattle-pen_ 146
_A Half-caste Fulani Girl and a Susu_ 148
_The Idle Native! Market Scene in West Africa_ 176
_West African “Young Hopefuls”_ 180
_An Ibo Family Group, Southern Nigeria_ 186
_Travelling on the Niger in the Dry Season_ 196
_Felling a Mahogany-tree_ 202
_Squaring the Tree_ 202
_Dragging the Squared Log through the Bush_ 204
_Sapelli, Southern Nigeria’s principal Timber Port_ 204
_A Susu Mallam_ 218
_Fulani Mallam_ 228
_Susu Chief and Staff_ 278
_Ashanti Field Force at Cape Coast ~en route~ for Kumasi_ 280
_Return of Ashanti Field Force_ 282
_The Victim of a Rubber Raid_ 334
MAPS
_Northern Part of Africa_ 38
_Northern Nigeria_ 84
_Sketch Map showing Harbour Improvement Scheme, Ivory Coast_ _page_ 273
_Photographs marked thus * are reproduced from “Adamawa” by kind
permission of Mr. Ernst Vohsen (Dietrich Reimer). The author is indebted
(through the kindness of a friend) to Dr. Maclaud, of the French Guinea
Administration, for several of the photographs here reproduced._
FOREWORD
MARY KINGSLEY
“Mary Kingsley—the heir and sustainer of a great name, one of
the ablest of that remarkable band of wandering writers, men
and women, who are the eyes and ears of our nascent Empire,
who are bringing home to England, that weary Titan, her tasks,
her faults, her problems—Mary Kingsley has gone from us.”—Mrs.
HUMPHRY WARD.
Those who had the honour of knowing Mary Kingsley, and corresponding
with her on West African affairs, who have studied her writings and
her speeches, who realise all that this “good woman with a gigantic
intellect” might have done for the Empire in West Africa had she lived,
can with difficulty reconcile themselves to the inscrutable decree of
Providence which robbed us of her presence. One of her greatest admirers
to whom I was expressing the other day much the same feeling, expressed
a different view. “Miss Kingsley’s work was done”—he said in effect—“she
was the pioneer, she showed the way. That was her allotted task: the
fruit of her labours will come in due season.” It may be so. Indeed,
when we think of what Mary Kingsley accomplished in the few short years
which she devoted to West Africa, the thought arises whether there is
not an element of unconscious selfishness in the desire that she might
have been spared. The nature of the work she had undertaken, the intense
fervour with which she devoted herself body and soul to preaching the
morals it was given her to inculcate, the utter brain weariness which at
times she was fain to admit—no mortal being could have endured for very
long so perpetual a mental and physical strain. It was a passing heavy
load for a weak woman of indifferent health to bear, and in death Mary
Kingsley has perhaps achieved a greater triumph, a success more striking
and profound, than living on she would have attained. Death has had the
effect of rapidly fertilising the seeds she sowed, and from her ashes
have sprung forces gathering daily in power which, united in a common
aim, are taking up her burden and carrying it along the path she pointed
out, assured that every year will bring fresh helpers, be the obstacles
ever so great. _La verité est en marche_, and although the spirit of
the hour is not precisely favourable to that patient investigation of
West African problems which affords the only guarantee of political and
administrative success, the phase is but a fleeting one, and when the
present fashionable policy of force and hurry is found by practical tests
to be even more sterile in useful results than the apathy which preceded
it, the main truths Mary Kingsley taught will appeal to thinking men with
an eloquence all the greater for having been temporarily obscured.
On the personal aspect of Mary Kingsley’s character one would fain dwell
at length. Few women, I believe, have inspired all sorts and conditions
of men with so intense a respect, so wondering an admiration. Few women
are able, as Mary Kingsley was able, to draw forth, by the magic of
her earnest personality, the best in a man. She was so unassuming, so
unaffected, such a womanly woman in every sense of the word, that it
appeared almost incredible she should have grasped the essentialities
of West African politics with such comprehensiveness and scientific
perception; mastered, as no one had done before—in the sense, at any
rate, of being able to impart the knowledge to the world—the intricacies
of native custom and native law, or have affronted the physical
perils she made so light of. Eminent politicians and administrators,
distinguished men of letters, world-renowned scientists, commercial
magnates, were regular visitors at her modest residence, and one and
all drew from her inexhaustible store. The least of those to whom she
extended the privilege of her friendship were always welcome, and
never failed to leave her presence without feeling that her words of
sympathy and encouragement were a fresh incentive to push onward, never
losing hope and fortified against disappointment. The truest, kindest,
staunchest friend that ever breathed—such was Mary Kingsley; and we who
knew her, and have lost her, know also that something has gone out of our
lives which can never be replaced. In a passage of singular beauty, Mrs.
Alice Stopford Green thus closes a tribute[1] to the dead friend whose
work she herself is doing so much to carry on: “She laid her armour down
when she asked to be carried out to the unfathomable Ocean, alone in
death as she had been alone in life, going out with her last wish from
the bitter strife of men to the immensities where she sought the will of
God.”
PART I
CHAPTER I
FIVE YEARS OF BRITISH TRADE WITH WESTERN AFRICA
“West Africa, that great feeding-ground for British
manufactures.”—MARY KINGSLEY.
One still—but too often, alas!—meets with people who wonder why England
should bother about West Africa at all, and pooh-pooh the idea that we
have interests there at the present time worth looking after, while as
for the future possibilities of that huge country as a field for British
enterprise, they simply will not trouble themselves to give the matter a
moment’s consideration.
Now figures are very uninteresting things, no doubt, to the average
reader; but they possess a practical significance superior to any number
of the most glowing dissertations, and I trust my readers will forgive me
if I make, as a basis of justification for inflicting this volume upon
them, a few sets of figures which I would respectfully suggest as worthy
of their attentive consideration. The statistics are compiled from the
Custom House returns, and they show the extent, nature and distribution
of British trade in Western Africa during the last few years. In perusing
them, three facts should be borne in mind: first, that, although
Europeans have been engaged in commercial transactions on the West
Coast for upwards of five hundred and fifty years, those transactions
were, prior to the abolition of the over-sea slave trade, confined,
with very few exceptions[2]—so far as the exports from West Africa were
concerned—to the human cargo, and to gold dust and ivory: that the trade
in palm oil and kernels, which are now the staple articles of export
from West Africa, is therefore of comparatively recent growth, and that
the mahogany trade and the rubber trade have only come into existence—to
any appreciable extent—within the last few years, a fair indication
of the fertility and producing power and almost boundless resources
of West Africa. Secondly, that the extensive business relationship
which has been built up between Great Britain and West Africa, in the
shape of a legitimate commerce, has grown to its present proportions
under circumstances absolutely disadvantageous to development, without
railways, with but few roads, with intertribal wars often preventing
the circulation of trade for months at a time, by merely scratching the
surface of the most prolific region in the world. Thirdly, that the
figures given below do but show the actual volume of Britain’s trade with
West Africa and the wages earned by thousands of English men and women
who directly and indirectly benefit by that trade; the British capital
invested in West Africa in factories, machinery, craft for navigating the
rivers, coaling depôts, surf-boats and lighters, stores and the like, to
which must now be added railway material, dredging apparatus, batteries
and soon, we may hope, cotton gins, not to mention a fleet of some sixty
steamers employed in the carrying trade and passenger traffic—all these
things have to be taken into account in estimating West Africa’s worth to
Great Britain.
The total values of British produce and manufactures[3] shipped to the
_British possessions in West Africa_ in the five years 1896-1900 were
respectively as follows:
1896 £1,828,395
1897 1,763,461
1898 1,999,505
1899 2,116,080
1900 2,148,149
----------
Gross total £9,855,590
Percentage of increase in five years, 17½ per cent.
The total values of British produce and manufactures shipped to the
_possessions of Foreign Powers_ in West Africa in the five years
1896-1900 were respectively as follows:
1896 £970,080
1897 1,002,318
1898 1,247,994
1899 1,490,603
1900 2,145,349
----------
Gross total £6,856,344
Percentage of increase in five years, 121 per cent.
If we add these two totals together, we find that the value of British
produce and manufactures shipped to _West Africa_ in the period mentioned
was £16,711,934, which is a percentage of increase of 138 per cent.
From the British export trade we turn to the British import trade with
West Africa.
The total values of raw produce imported by Great Britain _from British
West Africa_ in the five years 1896-1900 were respectively as follows:
1896 £2,223,925
1897 2,153,412
1898 2,352,285
1899 2,427,946
1900 2,137,023
-----------
Gross total £11,294,591
The total values of raw produce imported by Great Britain from the
_possessions of Foreign Powers_ in West Africa in the five years
1896-1900 were respectively as follows:
1896 £333,803
1897 553,130
1898 622,287
1899 651,043
1900 806,077
----------
Gross total £2,966,340
These two totals added together show that Great Britain imported West
African produce in the period under review to the amount of £14,260,931.
The value of Great Britain’s direct commerce with West Africa in the five
years 1896-1900 was, therefore, £30,972,865. To this might be added a
further sum of £1,750,888, representing foreign and colonial merchandise
shipped to West Africa from British ports in the years mentioned.[4]
It is interesting, and valuable, to see which, among the possessions of
Foreign Powers in West Africa, were the chief absorbers of British goods
and the chief exporters of raw produce to Great Britain. Examination
yields the following knowledge:
Principal possessions of Foreign Powers which absorbed in five years
£6,856,344 of British goods:[5]
French. Portuguese. German. Others.
£ £ £ £
1896 348,258 402,445 68,355 151,022
1897 401,224 360,121 91,320 149,653
1898 531,848 438,320 109,580 178,246
1899 693,255 503,788 126,047 167,513
1900 709,900 1,084,072[6] 120,910 212,175
Principal possessions of Foreign Powers which exported to Great Britain
in five years £2,966,340 of raw produce:
French. Portuguese. German. Others.
£ £ £ £
1896 203,442 33,937 42,001 54,423
1897 312,430 116,554 68,194 55,952
1898 431,192 85,544 35,165 70,186
1899 461,267 68,021 48,736 73,019
1900 534,727 75,037 94,681 101,632
The French possessions are, it will be observed, far and away our
principal markets and our principal suppliers among the possessions of
Foreign Powers. Our exports to and imports from the French possessions
amounted together to £4,627,543, or just under 50 per cent. of our total
export and import trade with the possessions of Foreign Powers together.
The increasing importance of the French possessions in West Africa as a
market for the sale of British goods and as suppliers of British home
markets is a fact which it is of the utmost consequence for British
statesmen to lay to heart. The subject is one which I shall refer to
later on. It is already one of the dominant factors of West African
politics affecting Great Britain, and is destined to become so more
and more as the years go on, for France is in a territorial sense the
mistress of West Africa, and may become so in a commercial sense as well.
The general conclusions to be drawn from a study of these figures are
various. First and foremost there is the clearly established fact
that British trade with West Africa is expanding enormously and has
almost unlimited prospects before it, now that serious and concentrated
efforts are being made on all sides to open up the untapped wealth of
the interior by the means of roads and railways and by the improvement
of navigable waterways, while the cessation of intertribal warfare in
many districts must entail a large increase in the population, and
therefore, in the native capacity for production and purchase. It is
also demonstrated that every year West Africa absorbs a larger quantity
of British manufactured goods: that the exports of British manufactured
goods are steadily increasing to British West Africa and increasing to an
extraordinary degree to the possessions of Foreign Powers in West Africa,
especially to the French possessions: that Great Britain is consolidating
her hold upon the carrying trade of West Africa as testified by the
increased quantity of foreign and colonial manufactures shipped to West
Africa from British ports: that the Continent—Germany[7] chiefly—is
receiving a greater amount of raw produce from the British possessions in
West Africa, a deduction which can be fairly drawn from the stationary
aspect of the importation by Great Britain of such produce from her own
West African possessions. And the final conclusion is this, that, in
view of the restricted extent of the British possessions in West Africa,
compared with the possessions of Foreign Powers in that part of the
world, the latter offer a very much vaster field for the sale of British
goods. Consequently, it is the bounden duty of the British Government
and the British Chambers of Commerce, while in no way neglecting the
brilliant possibilities which the British West African possessions offer
under wise administration for the enterprise of Englishmen, to be ever
on the alert to look to the future and to protect British trade with the
possessions of the Foreign Powers in West Africa against legislation
tending to close the door of those possessions against it; and to insist
that, whenever international treaties guaranteeing freedom of trade to
the subjects of all nations exist in West Africa, they shall be rigidly
adhered to by the signatories. In this respect British diplomacy has
shown itself singularly lax. But the mischief already committed may
even yet be remedied, and further dangers which loom ahead averted, if
the British public will only realise before it is too late the enormous
issues at stake.
CHAPTER II
THE OLD AND THE NEW
“The past has gone with its follies and its waste.... Let us
then face the present and contemplate the future.”
In the previous chapter we discussed in practical fashion the grounds
upon which the British public is called upon to devote more attention
to the affairs of West Africa than it does at present, and an attempt—I
hope a successful attempt—was made to show how very short-sighted and
singularly misinformed is the opinion which would disinterest itself from
a part of the world where the possibilities of commercial development
are so strikingly manifest. There has never been such urgent need for
an intelligent appreciation, on the part of the British public, of the
problems which confront this country in West Africa. In a few short years
the policy of Great Britain in West Africa has undergone a complete
change. Events have followed one another with bewildering rapidity.
Official indifference has been galvanised into life by French activity,
and after a brief but dangerous period of international rivalry, British
political rights have been established over a considerable extent of
territory, not, however, nearly so considerable as a pacific, consistent,
well-thought-out programme adopted some years previously would have
brought, had our merchant-pioneers been listened to, and had successive
Governments been able to throw off the paralysing influence of the
resolution of 1865. There is a story told of a certain Minister in charge
of the Foreign Office—it was related to me by one of those present at the
interview—which illustrates very forcibly the feeling which prevailed in
Government circles in those days. A deputation of merchants waited upon
his Excellency with the request that he would permit the hoisting of the
Union Jack on certain parts of the West African littoral where British
merchants had long been trading, and where the rulers of the country
were genuinely desirous of receiving a British protectorate. _Pro-formâ_
treaties were produced by the deputation between these rulers and the
resident merchants. The merchants asked for no reward. There was no
question of expenditure involved. All that the Government was required
to do was to meet the wishes of the chiefs. The deputation pointed out
that, so far as the relations between the natives and the commercial
representatives of Great Britain were concerned, the acceptance of the
Government would in no wise alter them, but would simply have the effect
of cementing a friendly understanding which already existed. But, urged
the deputation, the treaties, if agreed to by the Government, would prove
an invaluable diplomatic instrument if the time came, as it seemed likely
to do, when England might find herself faced in West Africa by foreign
competition. The Minister flung the treaties across the table.
It was a time of wasted opportunities, when a little political foresight
would have conferred upon this country great future benefit, and it seems
extraordinary, but is unhappily true, that the same failure to look ahead
as regards West Africa appears to afflict our Foreign Office to-day
despite the lessons of the past. Of this, more anon.
But if successive Governments showed unpardonable negligence in
safeguarding British interests in West Africa, for decade after decade,
down to the very time when the French had worked their way so far
southward into the natural _hinterlands_ of our old Colonies that action
became imperative if anything was to be saved from the wreck, the British
press and public were greatly to blame also. I well remember that at the
very height of the recent Anglo-French controversy which culminated in
the Convention of 1898, when rival English and French expeditions were
rushing hither and thither through the territories west of the Niger,
and when British and French efforts were concentrated upon wringing
out of the unfortunate Borgu Chiefs all sorts, kinds, and conditions
of agreements, sowing Union Jacks and Tricolors by the wayside, the
well-known editor of an equally well-known newspaper to which I then
contributed, asked me to show him Nikki[8] on the map, as he had not the
least idea where it was.
Mr. Chamberlain came into power just at the moment when French enterprise
in the West African uplands had reached its maximum of threatening
intensity, and he set himself to vigorously counteract it as far as he
could. The invertebrate policy had, however, compromised the situation
almost beyond remedy, and had it not been for Mr. Joseph Thomson’s
success in obtaining treaty rights with the Emirs of Sokoto and Bornu in
1884 on behalf of the National African Company of Merchants—subsequently
the Royal Niger Company—and, it may be added, for the loyal adherence
of those native States to the treaties passed with the Company, the
magnificent possession of Northern Nigeria would have gone the way of
Futa Jallon, of Mossi, and of so many other countries lying at the back
of our Colonies; that is to say, would have fallen into French hands.
The man who deserves the most credit for saving Northern Nigeria to the
Empire is Sir George Taubman Goldie, and however one may deplore some
of the uses to which he put his Charter—things we are paying for now
in the French Congo and elsewhere—it is but common fairness to assert
that, if it had not been for Sir George Goldie, the possessions of Great
Britain in West Africa would have been reduced by about one half. It is
a matter for some surprise that the Government should not have succeeded
in securing the continuation of Sir George Goldie’s co-operation in West
Africa after the Royal Niger Company’s Charter was cancelled. An old
opponent has lately said of him that “there is no one more competent
to guide our West African Administration on practical, humanitarian,
economical, prudent, and statesmanlike lines, no one more fitted to take
a high position in West African affairs political and commercial,” a
statement which will meet with wide acceptance.
But this, after all, is ancient history, and what we are chiefly
concerned with now, is the present. What we are called upon to seriously
consider is the general trend of England’s policy in West Africa,
administrative, financial, political and commercial. Internationally,
we are secure in the possession of our territories. The only rivalry we
have to fear is the peaceful rivalry of commerce, but commerce is the
explanation of our presence in West Africa: it constitutes the sinews of
our administration, and its requirements demand the constant vigilance,
the most careful attention of the official world.
It is the bounden duty of those who, believing in the immense importance
of West Africa to Great Britain, and similarly believing that the present
policy which is being pursued by Great Britain in West Africa is open on
several grounds to grave objection, to say so, and to give their reasons
for saying so, with the assured conviction that, however unpopular their
arguments may be, the general interest demands that they should be put
forward.
CHAPTER III
THE REAL AND THE IDEAL
“The nature of the natives, the climate, everything is against
precipitate and hasty action. To advance slowly, leaving no
bad or unfinished work behind, to gain the respect and liking
of the natives, and only to use force when compelled as a last
resource to do so, are the means which in my humble opinion
lead to success in West Africa. To quote from the words of a
celebrated French traveller: ‘Do not let us dream of a hasty
transformation of Africa. Let us employ a method, slow but
sure. Let us try and teach the natives what knowledge we have
acquired, and not try and make them learn in a few years
what it has taken us twenty centuries to learn.’”—SIR CLAUDE
MACDONALD in Liverpool, 1892.
“These figures are surprising. One would naturally have
expected that as the trade increased the proportion of
expenditure would have decreased.... From that date, however,
the expenditure has advanced by leaps and bounds, and in 1900
amounted to 28 per cent. of the exports. In other words, the
expenditure has increased more rapidly than the trade....
If, however, the expenditure had been on the basis of former
years ... we could have given over £1,000,000 worth additional
European goods in exchange for the same amount of produce. In
other words, the heavier the expenditure the higher price must
the merchant ask for his European goods, or the less he is able
to give for native produce. This must have the double effect
of reducing the demand for manufactures and diminishing the
energy of the natives in gathering produce. There is another
possibility which should not be lost sight of: our colonies
are hemmed in by our French and German neighbours. If in
consequence of increased expenditure and the resulting heavier
taxes we are unable to offer the natives as large a quantity of
manufactures and as good a price as our competitors are enabled
to do, produce which is grown on the borders of our Colonies
may be diverted to foreign territory with a consequent loss of
trade to this country.”—Mr. ARTHUR HUTTON, President African
Section, Manchester Chamber of Commerce.[9]
A wise man has said that there is no way of conveying a rebuke so
efficiently as upon the back of a compliment, and as a preliminary
to criticism of certain phases of British administration in West
Africa, a measure of praise is both just and needful. To avoid
personalities—whether in the sense of praise or otherwise—should be
the constant endeavour of any critic in approaching the subject under
discussion, because it is primarily the system, and not the agents of
the system, which is in question. Unfortunately the Crown Colony system
being what it is, a despotism—though by no means necessarily a tyrannical
despotism—there is great difficulty, if not actual impossibility, in
altogether avoiding the personal equation.
The revolution in British West African policy is indelibly associated
with the advent to power of the present Colonial Secretary, the
Right Honourable Joseph Chamberlain. His entry upon the scene was
contemporaneous with the culmination of certain events which must
infallibly have modified our previous attitude in relation to West Africa
whoever the statesmen responsible at the time might have been. The point
need not be laboured, but it is often overlooked. Be that as it may,
it is an undoubted fact—a fact redounding greatly to Mr. Chamberlain’s
credit—that no Colonial Secretary before him has displayed so lively and
personal an interest, both publicly and privately, in the affairs of
British West Africa, an interest which has continued unabated during the
entire period of his administration. In specific directions the result
has been all to the good. Railways, the preliminary surveys of which had
been made by direction of Mr. Chamberlain’s predecessor, the Marquis
of Ripon, before he quitted office, have been constructed; others are
commenced; the routes of more have been surveyed. The study of malaria
has received the right honourable gentleman’s warmest support. A general
publicity has been given to British West Africa by its identification
with so powerful a politician as Mr. Chamberlain, which has materially
contributed to remove it from the rut of oblivion and popular ignorance.
It may also be added that the Colonial Secretary’s confident public
declarations in respect to the future of the gold-mining industry in the
Gold Coast has done much to attract capital to that Colony, and that
the damper which he recently felt it wise to apply to the introduction
of the more undesirable elements connected with the revival, under
modern conditions, of gold-mining enterprise in a part of the coast
celebrated for its former export of the precious metal, was entirely
to his honour, although it would perhaps have been more useful had it
come somewhat earlier in the day; while the memorandum he caused to be
drawn up in September 1901 embodying the principle of treating native
labourers on the Gold Coast, is perhaps the most admirable document
ever issued from the Colonial Office.[10] In like manner, it can be
taken for granted that all officials in West Africa are animated by
the best of intentions, and however profoundly one may differ, from
time to time, from certain of their actions, it is always essential to
bear in mind that the system under which they work—the inconvenience of
which not a few of them in private conversation readily admit—leaves
the door wide open to the commitment of errors for which the system is
in the first place responsible, while the climate is most trying to
the constitutions and temper of Europeans. But it is unreasonable, and
subversive of the true interests of the Empire, that the tendency should
be encouraged to denounce honest criticism of a specific act of policy
in West Africa with which this or that official must in the nature of
things be associated, although he need not be, and often is not, the
originator of it, as a personal attack upon an absent man, to be resented
as an outrage and stigmatised almost as a crime, as an offence at any
rate against common decency and fairness. The contention is absurd, and
mischievous and unfair. The autocratic power which the Crown Colony
system confers upon West African Governors, District Commissioners, and
military commandants makes it absolutely essential that independent
criticism, so long as it is legitimate, should be exercised by the public
at home, whether or no full sanction has been obtained by a particular
official from the Colonial Office for the application of measures
giving rise to criticism, or whether the measures have been initiated
by the Colonial Office itself. By public criticism alone can we hope
to avoid the repetition of such deplorable mistakes as led to the Hut
Tax war in Sierra Leone and the last Ashanti outbreak; the framing of
legislation far in advance of the needs of the country and antagonistic
to native feeling, which interest and duty alike imperatively demand,
should be taken into consideration; the constant recurrence of punitive
expeditions, which in another portion of our Tropical African Empire have
worked such incalculable injury; and financial embarrassments, outcome of
mismanagement, extravagance, and errors of policy.
There is always danger in reaction, as in the body physical, so in the
body politic; and it is not altogether astonishing, perhaps, that the
long spell of official apathy in West Africa, being suddenly changed
to precipitate action, should have given rise to some objectionable
features. But it cannot be admitted that the latter, instead of being
a passing phenomenon, should take permanent root, and become part
and parcel of the new order of things. If this be the case, we shall
presently be witnessing yet another reaction in West Africa, and with
embarrassed finances, a yearly expenditure far in excess of any visible
increase in producing power, increased taxation, a native population
alienated and disorganised, and energetic rivals forging ahead while
we continue to struggle painfully in a quagmire of self-imposed
difficulties, the public will lapse once more into its old attitude of
indifference tinged with dislike, until some brilliant gentleman at the
Foreign Office, deeming the moment opportune, hands over a further slice
of British West Africa to a Foreign Power, in exchange for cod-fisheries,
or something equally vital to the Empire’s prosperity.[11] The forward
policy in West Africa has had its uses; it has served its purpose. We
are secure in the possession of a large territory some 700,000 square
miles in extent, unsurpassed in natural wealth by any other region in
the globe, containing a population of probably 30,000,000 to 35,000,000
souls, of whose habits and customs we possess but the haziest knowledge,
whose very languages we are in the main ignorant of; a population
composed of the most diverse elements, the resources of whose widely
scattered habitat are barely tapped, whose willing co-operation, which is
essential to the success of our rule, can only be gained by scientific,
painstaking study and the most tactful, sympathetic treatment. Now should
be a close time for British West Africa. The country needs political
rest. It has been turned topsy-turvy by European rivalry; old landmarks
have been swept away; the boundaries of Native States altered to suit the
exigencies of European diplomacy; immemorial trade roads interfered with.
The native requires breathing space. Official activity should in the main
be limited to the construction, with due regard to method and economy,
of certain indispensable public works, collecting data concerning the
native peoples and respective regions in which they dwell, strengthening
native authority so rudely disturbed by recent events; in protecting
commerce, encouraging capital, fostering native industries—perfecting
those in existence and preparing the ground for others; in short, a work
of gradual, sure, systematic consolidation. It should be our object to
intermeddle as little as possible with native institutions, abide with
scrupulous exactitude to both the spirit and the letter of our treaties
with the Chiefs; develop the native peoples along the lines of their own
civilisation both in the case of Mohammedans and Pagans; use conciliation
in preference to dictation, gold rather than the sword. Administrative
extravagance should be rigidly held in check for fear of burdening new
Colonies with a load of debt; the soldier and the policeman should be
kept in the background, only to be used as a last extremity. Commerce,
good roads, _and statesmanship_ should be our preferable choice of
weapons for mitigating evils, some at least of which the example of
Europe in the past has intensified, others lying in deep-rooted religious
beliefs, requiring careful preliminary investigation and thorough
understanding before being made the object of official action, and then
only of a repressive nature after every pacific inducement had been tried
in vain. Patience, more patience, and again patience. That should be,
ought to be, the corner-stone of British policy in West Africa. It was
the tortoise that won the race; not the hare.
Unfortunately the hare is the more popular beast just now, and the
forward policy is as much in evidence in British West Africa to-day as it
was five years ago, with the result that what may have been justifiable
then bids fair, if it be not stopped in time, to be disastrous now that
the necessity for it has passed away with the close of international
competition. Energy is being misapplied and misdirected. Let it be
conceded that the existing basis of rule in West Africa, the Crown Colony
system, is the worst in the world to stand the strain of a naturally
active directing influence at headquarters; let it be admitted that it
is a clumsy, inelastic instrument which allows the governed no voice
in the government, which places the suppliers of revenue, both direct
and indirect, in the position of having no effective control over the
expenditure of that revenue, which permits of the jeopardising of years
of commercial effort by some ill-considered legislative act—let these
and many other counts against the Crown Colony system be admitted. The
fact nevertheless remains that that system is capable of reform, of
modification, of being moulded in accordance with the requirements of
the case. The task should not be beyond the capacity of statecraft. Is
it to be seriously maintained that British statesmanship has sunk so low
that machinery suitable to a bygone age cannot be improved and brought
more into line with our altered situation: that we must needs cling to
every ancient wheel and rivet though they be clogged with superfluous
matter, and eaten through with rust? If the machine which it was sought
to preserve intact had done yeoman service in past days, there might
be some excuse for hesitating to supply it with new works. But that is
emphatically not so with the West African machine.
And it is positively heart-breaking to see that the last few years, far
from bringing any reforms, far from holding out the hope of reform in
the future, have but accentuated the evil. We cannot, it is true, lose
any more territory, unless we care to give away that which is assured
to us by international agreement. But in almost every other respect the
Crown Colony system, as it prevails in West Africa, and under the new
circumstances in which it is performing its functions, is building up
a legacy of trouble which can only be contemplated with equanimity, or
viewed with indifference, by the thoughtless; by those good people who
refuse to walk save in pleasant places, who constitutionally dislike
criticism as much as a cat objects to a wetting.
Haste and hurry are the order of the day in British West Africa.
Expenditure is going up by leaps and bounds,[12] altogether apart from
expenditure on public works. In the case of public works, large and
costly undertakings are arranged for on the most unpractical lines,
with no effort to benefit by competition, no putting out to tender,
no safeguards without which a business man of ordinary intelligence
will surround himself in order that he may be sure of getting the best
value for his money. An extraordinary theory in economics has become
fashionable. It is that the higher the revenue of a given West African
Colony the more prosperous that Colony must be, quite oblivious of the
effect which every increase of taxation has upon the volume of trade in
the way of reduction, and driving it away to the neighbouring territory
of a foreign rival. If a West African Colony shows in a given year
an increase of £10,000 in revenue, obtained from increased taxation,
jubilation in official quarters is excessive: but either nothing is
heard of the falling off in trade accompanying the increase in revenue,
or it is explained in some other way. The fact that there is a gain
in revenue is held to be proof positive of an abounding prosperity
and wise management. Every fresh increase in revenue is followed by a
corresponding increase in expenditure. The one is made to keep pace with
the other. It does not always succeed, because the expenditure is not
infrequently in excess of the revenue _quand même_. It is also becoming
the usual thing to financially assist these Colonies by “loans” or
“grants-in-aid” or “advances” quite on the West Indian model, while the
official reports invariably lead off with the reassuring statement that
“this Colony has no public debt”: a little farther on, casual reference
to the “grant-in-aid” may be discovered by the aid of a microscope,
tucked away in some obscure corner, a footnote for choice. Lagos, Sierra
Leone, the Gold Coast, Nigeria, are all at the present moment in the
enjoyment of Imperial loans: Sierra Leone for the Railway and the late
Hut-Tax war, Lagos for the Railway, the Gold Coast for the Railway and
Ashanti war, Nigeria for the purchase of the Niger Co.’s treaties with
the natives (the terms of which we have not adhered to), and for raising
an army. Meantime, our neighbours the French are—in their West Coast
Colonies proper, where comparison alone is possible—making their own
Colonies pay a considerable part in the expenses of Railway construction;
taxing their trade less, spending less on administration, governing more
cheaply and quite as well—better by a long way in some cases.
The producing power of our Colonies, that is to say, the export trade,
the only true test of prosperity in West Africa, is either increasing
slowly by comparison with the expenditure, or it is stagnant, or it is
retrogressing. When it is increasing, the increase is much below the
corresponding ratio of increased expenditure. “Large doses”—veritable
purgatives—of European conceived legislation are being thrust down the
throats of the bewildered natives. The number of Ordinances passed in the
British West African Colonies during the last few years, especially in
Southern Nigeria,[13] is simply amazing. Most of them are far in advance
of the times and cannot but remain a dead letter because, thank goodness,
the existing machinery is not yet sufficiently extensive to carry them
out. To make as few Ordinances as possible, and to ensure that such as
are made shall be permanently useful, does not appear to enter into
the official conception; and in the face of the growing objections to
this rapidity and fertility of the official brain in forming premature
legislation, not only on the part of the natives who are getting more
and more confused, and—as the French put it—_déséquilibrés_, but by all
people in affairs on the Coast who would desire that officialdom should
move more slowly, carrying at each step real and understanding consent:
the work of drafting portentous decrees, the exact meaning of which
the very lawyers at home cannot comprehend, or reconcile with avowed
intentions, goes merrily on.
Punitive expedition follows punitive expedition. We have had a war in
Sierra Leone, a war in Ashanti, two expeditions in the Gambia, a big
expedition up the Cross River in Southern Nigeria, together with minor
affrays, while in Northern Nigeria, which so far is producing no revenue
and has not attracted a single merchant (and but one exploring expedition
for possible mining purposes), one punitive expedition succeeds another
at an interval of a few weeks at most. I will not now labour the case of
Northern Nigeria, as that most interesting portion of our West African
dominions is discussed at some length farther on, but it is quite evident
that the attention of Parliament to the expenditure of Northern Nigeria
is becoming increasingly urgent. Lagos alone, under the able guidance
of Sir William MacGregor, has known the blessings of peace. Long may it
continue to do so.
Specific instances and examples of these general statements will be found
scattered throughout this volume. It was, however, necessary to place
them in collective form. In the next chapter, endeavour will be made to
briefly indicate the lines upon which certain reforms might be attempted
and the reasons for those reforms. Official optimism notwithstanding,
it is an undoubted fact that, if something is not very shortly done to
improve the prevailing system, the majority of the British West African
Colonies will drift into a morass of financial confusion paralysing
to their development and progress, while the native population within
them will be comparatively poorer than in the neighbouring Colonies of
commercial rivals.
CHAPTER IV
SOME NECESSARY REFORMS
“It is well known also that this personal system, at its
best, is full of abuses of the worst kind politically; the
Administrators and those who influence them, get to have
favourites, and even chiefs have their legitimate power,
influence and dignity interfered with because they refuse to
pay homage to their views. In consequence of all this, an
apparently successful Administrator is usually and sharply
followed by even worse confusion and more protracted wars than
were known before his advent. It is the history of all weak
despotic systems, having no basis in the country or among
the people sought to be governed or influenced.”—“The Crown
Colonies of Great Britain” (chapter vi. West Africa), by C. S.
Salmon, formerly Colonial Secretary and Administrator of the
Gold Coast, &c.
“The inhabitants of the country and the mercantile community
who provide the whole of the revenues, have no voice at all in
the governing of their Colonies and the expenditure of these
revenues, and I sincerely hope that the day is not far distant
when the African community will rise up and protest against
this Crown Colony system of government”—Mr. ARTHUR HUTTON,
President of the African Section of the Manchester Chamber of
Commerce. (Extract from speech delivered.)
It will, I think, be conceded that, notwithstanding the extraordinarily
important and revolutionising discoveries of Major Ross, to whom the
entire credit of recent demonstrations belongs, the admirable work
performed by the Liverpool[14] and London schools in the study of
tropical disease and sanitary improvements on the West Coast, the chances
of British West Africa ever becoming a possession where English men
and women can flourish and multiply, is excessively remote; so remote,
indeed, as to be outside the sphere of useful discussion. In fact,
with the one possible exception of the Futa-Jallon uplands, when the
Konakry-Kurussa railway line has connected them with the coast, West
Africa as a whole is unsuitable, and will, according to all reasonable
supposition, always remain unsuitable for European _colonisation_. The
dominion of British West Africa must, therefore, be regarded not in the
light of a colony properly so called, but as a vast tropical estate.
From that postulate arises a query, or rather, series of queries. What
are we in West Africa for? What do we hope to do there? What object took
us there? What main purpose keeps us there? The answer is not for a
moment in doubt. Commerce took us to West Africa; commerce keeps and will
keep us in West Africa. It is the _fons et origo_ of our presence in West
Africa. The day that it ceases to be so, West Africa ceases to be of use
to the Empire. It will become a costly plaything, and the British people
is too essentially practical a people to care long for toys of that kind.
As in every other part of the world, commerce in West Africa is the
outcome of supply and demand. There is a demand for the products of West
Africa on the markets of the world, and there is a demand in West Africa
for the products of European industrialism. The increased circulation of
a portable currency in West Africa in the shape of silver coinage will
facilitate the operations of commerce, but will not dislodge or alter the
fundamental nature of that commerce. The development of a mining industry
in this or that portion of West Africa will, while it lasts, modify the
conditions of trade in the portion affected, but commerce will remain the
backbone, as it ever has been, of European intercourse with West Africa.
There is nothing that need occasion regret at the contemplation of the
truth. Commerce is the greatest civilising agent. The steps upward in
the ethical development of the human race have been synonymous with
the spread of commercial relations, and the creation of the means and
measures whereby their promotion has been successively extended. The
most backward peoples to-day are, generally speaking, those whose
secluded habitat renders their commercial transactions with the outside
world scanty and precarious. In these days, when the noble meaning
which attaches to “philanthropy” and “civilisation” is made the cloak
to cover in West Africa so much that is vile, the excuse both sincerely
and hypocritically given to explain away so much that is in painful
contradiction, one needs, perhaps, to be reminded that such commonplace
things as commerce and improved means of communication will do more
to benefit the native than any number of attempts to impose laws and
institutions unfamiliar to him, by violent even if well-meaning measures
of so-called reform.[15] As a nation we should gain much and lose nothing
in frankly admitting to ourselves that it is due neither to a desire
to mend the ways of priestly theocracies, nor to alter the tyranny of
the strong over the weak, which has led to the incorporation within
the Empire of some thirty-five millions of West African natives, but
the belief that West Africa constitutes a vast outlet for the free and
unfettered development of British trade, and an equally vast field for
the cultivation of products of economic necessity to ourselves. Thorough
realisation of the fact would lead to more accurate appreciation and a
truer sense of the direction which our policy should take in West Africa,
if ultimate success and not failure is to attend it.
Commercial development is then in an especial and peculiar degree the
_raison d’être_ of our presence in West Africa.
Now what are the principal factors in British West African commerce, and
how are their claims to consideration in the administration of British
West Africa treated under the Crown Colony system? Obviously the two
principal factors are the European merchant and his customer, the native.
The merchant directly supplies, the native indirectly supplies, the
revenue which pays for the salaries of the officials and the general
up-keep of the government, and if it be true, as it undoubtedly is,
that the burden of taxation ultimately falls upon the native producer,
it is equally true that, without the enterprise of the merchant, there
would be no revenue and consequently no local funds for the support
of administrative machinery. It follows, therefore, as a matter of
simple justice, that the merchant should have a voice in the framing of
legislation calculated to affect the internal politics, and consequently
the commerce of our West African possessions. Apart from its justice,
the claim of the merchant to representation in the affairs of our West
African Empire has many features in its favour. He enjoys an expert’s
knowledge, gained by long years of actual contact with the peoples of
Western Africa. Experience has given him an insight into their customs
and laws; an acquaintance with their peculiarities, with the working
of their minds, with their inbred conservatism, which officials whose
residence in West Africa—broken, as it is, by long intervals of leave—is
usually of a very temporary or flitting nature, cannot hope to attain at
any rate with the same completeness; and a mastery, even if it be only an
instinctive mastery, of certain special characteristics which underlie
native conceptions, and which have to be reckoned with in dealing with
them. The merchant is consequently well fitted to be a most valuable
assistant in the administration of British Western Africa.
The fact is recognised by the French and Germans who share with us the
vast proportion of influence in West Africa properly so called. Ever
practical, the Germans have created an Advisory Board (_Kolonial-rath_)
to their Colonial Office, composed for the most part of the leading
men in the West African trade. The present Colonial Advisory Board has
twelve merchants sitting on its Council.[16] In French West Africa,
but on somewhat different lines, the merchant is similarly treated, and
just recently the representations of the French merchants to M. Décrais,
the then Colonial Minister of France, averted a great evil threatening
the Ivory Coast in the contemplated cession to King Leopold’s nominee,
M. Empain, of a practical monopoly over the whole of the gold-bearing
districts of that dependency, although M. Empain[17] had the most
influential support at his back.
The French system, though far from perfect, is incomparably superior
to anything we have in this country. It differs somewhat in the
various Colonies, but is substantially composed of two Organisms, the
Metropolitan Organism and the Colonial Organism. Under these dual
Organisms, every Colony which is not directly represented in the French
Parliament is represented at the Colonial Office by a delegate elected
by vote of the white inhabitants of such Colony. In French Guinea, where
the administration in force is in advance of that of any other French (or
English for that matter) West African possession, a commercial delegate
is regularly elected, and at the present moment a merchant, M. Gaboriau,
representing the interests of that Colony, is attached to the Colonial
Office. The weak point in the arrangement is, that the officials in the
respective Colonies as well as the merchants have the right to vote in
the election of a representative, with the result that very often the
officials are in a majority. When that happens, a French politician, who
can use his influence in promoting the officials who vote for him, is
appointed. Each colony possesses a “Superior Council” or “Administrative
Council” composed of the Governor, the heads of departments, and two or
more merchants. In Senegal the merchant councillors have always enjoyed
considerable power, and no step affecting the interests of the Colony is
ever taken without the concurrence of the great Bordeaux merchant firms,
which between them centralise the ground-nut trade (they themselves
built it up), the staple industry of Senegal. Moreover, Senegal is
particularly favoured in that it boasts a Deputy in the Chamber and a
local General Council which enjoys large financial responsibility, the
merchants—provided they do not fall out among themselves—being always in
a majority in the said General Council.
With us matters are altogether different. England, which passes for
a country where common-sense is the cardinal virtue, refuses to her
merchants any recognised _status_ in the administrative machinery of
West Africa. It has been accurately asserted that the merchant is the
_uitlander_ of British West Africa. He is seldom, if ever, consulted in
the affairs of the country, and although Mr. Chamberlain has on more
than one occasion given verbal assurances that no legislative acts
affecting the natives (and _de facto_ calculated to influence native
production—or, in other words, trade) would be promulgated without
previously being submitted to the merchants for their opinion, decrees of
the highest importance embodying a kind of revolution in our historical
native policy in regard to the laws of native land tenure have just
become law in Southern Nigeria, not only without the merchants being
consulted, but without their being advised in any other way than by a
perusal of the published Ordinances in the local Government Gazette. From
time to time—and during the last two years with increasing frequency,
consistency, and earnestness—the Liverpool and Manchester Chambers of
Commerce, which between them represent the majority of the commercial
interests of Great Britain in West Africa,[18] have approached the
Foreign and Colonial Offices on their own initiative, sometimes
supported by as many as ten or twelve other leading chambers in the
Kingdom voicing industrial interests more or less directly affected by
specific occurrences. When—I am speaking now of recent times—the Foreign
Office has been either memorialised or waited upon by deputations from
the Chambers, the question at issue has been one of international import,
such for instance as the differential tariff against British goods in the
French West African Colonies (1898), and the violation of the Berlin Act
in the Congo Basin (1901 and 1902). In the first case, the action of the
Chambers was surprisingly successful; in the second case, success has not
yet attended their efforts.
When, as in the majority of instances, the Colonial Office has been
waited upon or written to, the object has referred to some legislation
either contemplated or assented to, or to some measure of internal policy
towards a native tribe or ruler. I cannot find that the Colonial Office
has on any single occasion, in a matter of importance, consented to adopt
the views of the men who, as subsequent events have manifestly proved,
saw clearer than the permanent officials, and whose advice, if taken,
would have avoided the perpetration of serious mistakes. In 1895 the
Manchester Chamber and the local Chamber at Cape Coast strongly advised
“that the King of Ashanti (Prempreh) be allowed to reserve all the rights
that he now exercises over his people,” but that a British resident
should be established at his Court, as the best means of ensuring a
lasting peace with the Ashanti people, who, if they had erred, also
had—as is historically admitted—grounds of legitimate complaint against
the British authorities on various occasions. Prempreh, however, was
arrested and deported, and from that moment the Ashantis never ceased to
intrigue against the British until their discontent, fanned into flame by
the injudicious proceedings of Governor Hodgson, broke forth once more
and led to the last sanguinary expedition, which involved an expenditure
of a quarter of a million of money.
But the most notable instance at once, of the value of the merchants’
expert knowledge and of the fatuity of lightly rejecting their counsel,
is provided in the lamentable chapter in the history of Sierra Leone
which began with the enforcement of the Hut Tax Ordinance in 1898, and
which is not yet closed, whatever officialdom may say to the contrary.
As I propose discussing this subject in some detail later on, it is
sufficient to state here that the merchants almost went on their bended
knees, figuratively speaking, in seeking to turn the Colonial Office
from its purpose; that they entirely failed; that they were met by
official assurances which were afterwards shown to be entirely erroneous;
that their predictions and warnings were fulfilled to the letter; that
their views were subsequently substantiated in every respect by the
Special Commissioner despatched later by the Colonial Office to make
investigations as to the origin of the rising, and that the persistent
refusal of the Colonial Office to abide by the Special Commissioner’s
report has reduced our oldest West African possession to such a
condition that, if the railway now in course of construction through
the eastern district does not—and there appears little or no hope that
it will—entirely alter the present state of affairs, Sierra Leone under
the present _régime_, and with the pressure of French competition in the
neighbouring territories, is irretrievably ruined.
Is it not time that in this respect at least something was done to
bring the management of British West Africa more into line with modern
requirements, and at a period when the commercial position of Great
Britain in West Africa is everywhere threatened by foreign competition,
to establish some working arrangement—call it a West African Council or
Advisory Board or anything you please—whereby the accumulated experience
of the men who are supplying the Government with the wherewithal to
govern, should be used as an auxiliary force for the promotion of the
general interests of Great Britain in West Africa? The nucleus of such a
council or Advisory Board could be at once supplied.
It is said that the merchants cannot agree amongst themselves. The plea
lacks in truthfulness, and it is permissible to doubt whether it is
sincerely put forward. Unquestionably there are rivalries in the West
African trade. What trade is without them? But to argue that competition
in trade is a bar to co-operation in matters affecting the general
welfare of the country is a very narrow-minded position to take up.
It is converting a legitimate, natural, and healthy phenomenon into a
disqualification which nothing justifies. Where should we be in West
Africa to-day but for our merchant pioneers? Suppose they had endorsed
the official resolution of 1865 by withdrawing from the Coast, would the
Union Jack be floating in West Africa except in Sierra Leone to-day? If
the merchant had been devoid of political conception, and content to
let his horizon be confined to those petty but inevitable aspects of
commercialism which consist in under-selling a competitor, would not the
abandonment of the Gold Coast have followed the battle of Katamansu, and
would the richest portion of the Niger Valley be a British Protectorate
to-day? Let those who suggest that the British merchant in West Africa
is incapable of rising above sordid motives of self-interest remember
MacGregor Laird. The merchant has everywhere preceded the administrator
in West Africa. In his case the old adage must be reversed. It has been
the flag which has followed trade, not trade the flag.[19]
It is also said that the merchants are not unanimous with regard to
certain features of West African policy. But can any one single out a
body of men among whom variations of opinion on specific points do not
occur? Do all the members of a Cabinet invariably see eye to eye on a
particular measure to be introduced? Are not the very modifications which
any given Bill must go through before being finally drafted and approved
by the Cabinet as a whole a guarantee that legislation evolved from
the interchange of ideas among the sundry persons concerned—and who,
unless they be devoid of individuality, cannot all think alike on every
point—will be the better for the destructive and constructive criticism
to which it has been subjected? The merchants are in substantial
agreement in what they consider the vital principles of British policy
in West Africa, principles which informed public opinion is at last
beginning to realise the urgency of upholding. No material divergency
of views will be found among merchants as to the absolute necessity of
respecting native land tenure, the need of careful finance, the danger
of constant military operations, the indispensableness of preserving
native institutions. If there be a charge against the merchants, it
is that they have not hitherto sufficiently exercised their power of
influencing successive Governments. They have not risen as they should
have done to the height of their duties and responsibilities. They have
allowed outsiders to perform a difficult and generally ungrateful work,
which they themselves should have taken in hand—that of calling public
attention to the urgency of reforms in West African administration. At
critical moments they have been weak-kneed, and fearful of giving offence
when they should have been resolute in standing by convictions which
they knew to be sound. Their attitude is now happily undergoing a change
which, if maintained, is bound to have lasting results for good.
At no previous period in the history of British West Africa has
the co-operation of the great merchant community in the task of
administration been so pressing a necessity as it is to-day. Never could
better use be made of such co-operation by the department responsible
for West Africa as at present. In the increasing notice which is
being given on all sides to West African affairs consequent upon the
remarkable growth of European relations with that country and with the
birth in West Africa of a modern mining industry, a host of dangerous
advisers is arising. We see old errors creeping back in the guise of
new verities, old misconceptions gaining fresh lease of life, exploded
theories crowding forward to mislead and confuse. Appeals to force as
the solution of all difficulties arising out of contact with a primitive
people, contemptuous disregard of native laws and customs—the “damned
nigger” theory in all its perennial beauty, insistent requests for lavish
expenditure, heedless of plain economic facts, and so forth—these are the
order of the day. Upon elementary errors of geography are grafted the
crudest notions of the political and social condition of the Negro, the
most amazing ignorance of history and past experience in every branch of
West African lore. By a plausible inversion of facts, opponents of the
wild and whirling talk indulged in regarding West Africa are denounced
as sentimentalists, although it so happens that the denouncers draw the
material which serves them as a basis for their contentions from that
very discredited sentimentalism responsible for so many errors in West
Africa, which portrays the native as an abject being, brutish, lazy,
and degraded, greatly honoured by the bestowal of a bible, a suit of
clothes; and a shilling, with a possible extra threepence thrown in as
subsistence-money, for a hard day’s work. No doubt it is possible to
exaggerate the importance of these _ad captandum_ effusions, but their
volume is, perhaps, calculated to momentarily drown the voice of reason.
Parrot-like reiteration, if sufficiently sustained, is apt sometimes to
impress.
At such a time the assistance of a trained body of men thoroughly
conversant with the affairs of Western Africa, in a position to point to
past experiences, to vested interests, to technical knowledge as their
claim to competency, and to the feeding of the administrative machine
as their claim to consideration, ought surely to commend itself to the
Authorities. To persist much longer in the rejection of that assistance
would be equally short-sighted and unjust.
Another and an equally important question connected with the management
of our West African Possessions, is the question of the Crown Agents. If
any one attempted to define the duties of that body, he would be hard
put to it to do so. They are here, there and everywhere, and their
interference puts a premium upon extravagance and waste. The Crown Agents
are an anomaly which ought to disappear. At present they constitute a
sort of half-way house between the Colonial Office and the West African
Governors, and are a positive obstacle to sound finance and good business
methods. Enough examples of the extraordinary ways of the Crown Agents
could be given to fill a volume. The West African Colonies are hampered
right and left by the powers conferred upon this body. The Colonies
are not allowed to purchase what they require in the shape of stores,
equipment, material and so forth on the open market. Everything has to
go through the Crown Agents, with the natural result that the Colonies
have to pay 40 per cent. and 50 per cent. more than they would have to if
allowed to invite tenders on their own account. Look at the way in which
these railways have been and are being built.
The construction is, apparently, the monopoly of one particular firm
(under the direction of the Crown Agents); a firm which, as far as can be
gathered, had had but little experience in railway construction before,
metaphorically speaking, falling upon its feet in West Africa.
The same firm holds the position of “consulting engineers” to the
Colonial Office. Surely it is anomalous, from the purely business
point of view, that a firm retained as “consulting engineers” to a
Government Department in charge of West Africa should also be the actual
constructors of the West African railways! The two parts strike one as
incompatible. Consulting engineers, one would imagine, would be advisers
and arbiters. All contracts should be publicly and openly tendered for.
A very widespread impression prevails that the time and cost expended in
the construction of these railways have been very great. The Gold Coast
Railway was begun in February 1898; it is officially estimated to reach
Kumasi early in 1904. Assuming that it does, it will have taken six years
to build, which works out at about twenty-eight miles per annum—the
distance from Sekondi to Kumasi being 169¼ miles.
It is as yet too early to say definitely what the cost of the line will
average per mile. Official estimates, we know, are not always reliable.
In this case, even the official estimate is very high, viz. £8000
per mile for the Sekondi-Tarkwa section, and £6300 per mile for the
Tarkwa-Kumasi section.
That dissatisfaction with the policy pursued up to the present (that is
to say, the policy of constructing these railways under the “Department
System,” or, otherwise stated, leaving their construction to the
Crown Agents), is not confined to merchants, mine-managers and other
revenue-payers of the West African Colonies, but is held by competent and
highly placed officials, I reproduce the following remarks of Sir William
MacGregor, made on the occasion of a visit to the Manchester Chamber of
Commerce in 1900, and in reply to the following question of Mr. Arthur
Hutton’s[20]:
“Do you think, from what you have seen, it (_i.e._ railway
construction) would be better done by contract?”
SIR WILLIAM MACGREGOR: “I believe at the present moment—and I
have said so to the Secretary of State—_I believe there would
be men living who are now rotting in their graves, if it had
been taken out of the control of the Crown Agents_....”[21]
It is competently estimated that the Lagos railway, begun in 1896, will
have cost £10,000[22] per mile by the time its 125 miles are in full
working order—an enormous rate. The Crown Agents, through whom the
moneys have been advanced to the Colony, exact 5 per cent. interest,
whereas with the security they have to offer, they should easily be able
to get them—and probably have got them—from the Treasury at 3 per cent.
Why should the Colony be saddled with an extra 2[23] per cent. interest
and find its liability for the current year on the railway loan increased
to the enormous total of £54,000, or, say, 22 per cent. of the entire
revenue?[24] Why should all indents be sent through the Crown Agents? The
delays which this ridiculous system entail are only second in point of
importance to the squandering of the public funds which goes on under it.
The Crown Agents appear to think that they know more about the material
needs of the Colonies than the officials in charge of the Colonies
themselves. Two instances have been recently brought to my notice
which would be laughable were they not so deplorably unbusiness-like.
A certain West African Colony required a two-ton engine for a short,
light railway. The request was duly put forward. After months of delay
an eight-ton engine was sent out, too heavy, of course, for the rails to
support it. It was entirely useless. Again, a scheme was drawn up for the
construction of a bridge by the local official responsible. An estimate
was made, and the plans and so forth were forwarded home. The bridge
was urgently required. Months elapsed; then the Crown Agents, who knew
nothing of the local conditions, instead of despatching the materials,
sent out an entirely different counter-scheme, far more elaborate, far
more costly, and totally unsuited to local requirements. The Colony is
still waiting for its bridge.[25] I can only repeat that, whether avowed
or not—in many cases, of course, it manifestly cannot be avowed—the Crown
Agents are looked upon in official and commercial circles in West Africa
as an unmitigated nuisance and a stumbling-block to progress.
The needs of British West Africa at the present time may be resumed thus:
(1) A Council or Advisory Board in which the merchant element shall be
widely represented; (2) Tight control over the military element—fewer
punitive expeditions, and more tact and patience in dealing with native
races, the officials whose administration is virgin of wars to be looked
upon as deserving of prior promotion; (3) Economy in Administration;
(4) Thorough financial overhaul; (5) Elimination of the Crown Agents;
(6) Open tenders for all public works; (7) Sanitation; (8) Scientific
study of native peoples, laws and languages; (9) Scientific study of
native products and improvement of native industries; (10) Maintenance
and not murder of native institutions, upholding and strengthening of
the power of the Chiefs; non-interference with domestic slavery in
the Protectorates; preservation of native land-tenure; (11) A Civil
Service on the lines of the Indian Civil Service; (12) A Civilian
Governor-General.
PART II
CHAPTER V
THE DISCOVERY OF NORTHERN NIGERIA
The nineteenth century will ever be memorable for the exploration of the
interior of the African Continent. It is difficult to realise when we
read in the daily newspapers of steamers plying upon Tanganyika, ocean
steamers of 4000 tons burthen ploughing their way through the brown
waters of the Lower Congo, gun-boats patrolling the Niger, railways
piercing alike the deserts of the Eastern Sudan and the forests of
Equatoria, telegraphs extending in a network of lines across the Western
Sudan and athwart the Great Central Lakes—it seems difficult, I say,
when we read of these things to remember that at the close of the
eighteenth century the interior of Africa was to all intents and purposes
a blank, and that, even within the memory of most of us, the extent of
geographical knowledge we possessed respecting vast regions many times
larger than European Russia had made no progress since the days of
Herodotus and Pliny. What a colossal work it has been, this solving of
riddles which had baffled the world for ages upon ages! What prodigies
of labour, of courage, of self-abnegation have been required to triumph
over the obstacles which nature and man united in opposing to the early
pioneers of African research! How many splendid lives have been immolated
upon the altar of the African Moloch!
Notwithstanding the remarkable progress in medical science and hygiene,
and the potentialities of the modern rifle as a weapon of defence
against the attack of man and beast, the difficulties of the African
traveller at the present day are sufficiently great. Deadly maladies
beset him on every side, and the chance of coming to a sudden and violent
end is ever present. But these difficulties are as dust in the balance
compared with the sufferings and privations which the first explorers
of unknown Africa had to endure. Think of Park, and picture to yourself
the position of a lonely European wandering about inland Western Africa
in a thick blue fustian coat, with gilt buttons, keeping his precious
notes in the crown of a top-hat, and kicked, buffeted, spat upon, treated
with contumely and scorn, subjected to every possible insult, over and
again a slave, exposed for hours at a time in a burning sun without
water, often on the verge of starvation, racked by disease, and in so
miserable a plight upon many occasions that death would have been a
welcome relief—yet triumphing over everything and finally returning,
notes and all, to his own land. Park’s experiences naturally occur to
one in relation to the subject which it is proposed to treat in this
chapter, because Park was the real discoverer of the Niger, which had
been known in a vague manner to the ancients, and also to the Arabs (who,
however, wrongly ascribed to it a westerly course, and identified it
with the Nile),[26] and laid the foundation of that remarkable series of
explorations which ultimately ended in Lander’s supreme success.
In 1805 Park set out once more on his second and fatal journey, with the
firm conviction that he would be able to prove to the world the accuracy
of his own theory, viz. that the Niger and the Congo were one and the
same. The peripatetics of that eventful voyage are known to every student
of Africa. After incredible hardships, Park managed to descend the Niger
as far as Bussa. There, in sight almost of the goal of his ambitions
he perished, victim of a cruel fate, which drove his boat upon those
treacherous rocks, since celebrated for having brought two Christian
nations to the brink of war. There are aspects of Park’s character which
leave something to be desired, but his defects are lost sight of in the
magnificence of his courage, his indomitable will, and the never-failing
optimism with which he pursued his task, undeterred by disappointment and
unshaken by adversity. As an example of human perseverance and fortitude
carried to its highest limits, Park probably holds an unique position
among African explorers.
Park’s tragic end increased the desire of Englishmen to solve the mystery
of the Niger’s course, and in 1816 the British Government organised a
dual expedition on a large scale for this purpose. One section, under
Captain Tuckey, ascended the Congo, and the other, under Major Peddie,
endeavoured to reach the Niger by a more southerly route than that
adopted by Park, the idea being that both sections would ultimately meet
somewhere in Central Africa. How fantastic was the scheme does not need
to be pointed out, but it must be remembered that in those days the
consensus of learned opinion favoured Park’s theory of identification
concerning the Niger and the Congo. The expedition was an utter failure.
The Niger section excited the resentment of the natives, and had to
return after losing its chief. Captain Tuckey ascended the Congo as far
as the first cataracts, which had baffled the Portuguese for 200 years,
and then leaving the River, pushed North, along what used to be the old
caravan route, to the Upper River, now covered by the Matadi-Stanleyville
railway, constructed by Colonel Thys. He managed to strike the Upper
River in the neighbourhood of the modern Leopoldville, but the trying
landmarch had played havoc with his followers. Sickness broke out, and
finally the expedition had to return with a loss of 75 per cent. of
its European members. Several lesser attempts followed. They all ended
disastrously, and it seemed as though the Dark Continent refused to
yield up its secrets. But Englishmen were not to be beaten. The Western
route was indeed given up as impracticable for a time, but what could
not be accomplished from the West might be achieved from the North.
True, the Desert had to be faced and traversed. But where the Phœnician
and the Roman had dared and done, the Englishman might surely follow.
The Desert had not balked the Sectaries of Mohammed, and long caravans,
conducted by Tripolitan merchants, yearly made their way across those
dreary solitudes. Why should not a party of Englishmen attach themselves
to one of these caravans, and, protected by the influence of the British
Government, armed with the authority of the Pasha of Tripoli, succeed
in reaching the fertile countries of the South, whence rich supplies of
ostrich feathers, skins, ivory, gold dust, and slaves found their way to
the ports of the Northern littoral?
[Illustration: SKETCH OF THE NORTHERN PART OF AFRICA]
For many years the African Association had been collecting materials
with a view to a possible penetration by the Northern route. Once the
idea found favour with the authorities, Mr. Lucas was despatched by the
Association to Tripoli. He did very little in the way of exploration, but
brought back many interesting facts confirming Leo Africanus’ description
in respect to the existence of flourishing kingdoms far away to the
South, where arts and crafts had attained a high degree of development.
Ritchie and Lyon followed Lucas. Lyon managed to reach the southernmost
limits of Fezzan, on the borders of the Desert.[27] The Desert itself
remained uncrossed, however, and the mystery of the Niger still unsolved.
Then it was that the British Government determined to make a great effort
to solve the problem, and fitted out an expedition, which did not,
it is true, fulfil all that was expected of it, but which succeeded,
nevertheless, in throwing a vivid light upon unknown Central Africa, and
in disclosing to an astonished world the remarkable civilisation which,
under Arab, Berber, and Fulani influence, had arisen in the heart of that
black “Sudan” the “land of infidels,” and in popular conception,
“Of the cannibals that each other eat,
The anthropophagi, and men whose heads
Do grow beneath their shoulders.”
And so the subjects of this sketch enter upon the scene—three men,
Clapperton, Denham and Oudney, none of them perhaps conspicuous for
ability, or qualified to make the most of their discoveries, yet animated
all three with the ardent love of adventure for which their race has
ever been famous, and whose united exertions enabled Western Europe to
estimate the political and social conditions prevailing in the richest,
most populated, most fertile, and undoubtedly most interesting portion
of the Dark Continent. It is peculiarly fitting that the region which
these Englishmen were the first Europeans to visit, and which we now
designate by the name of Northern Nigeria, should have been ultimately
incorporated with the British West African Empire by the foresight of
another Englishman, Sir George Taubman Goldie, and the diplomatic ability
of the gallant Joseph Thomson. A word now as to the three companions. Of
Denham and Oudney, we know little beyond what can be gathered from their
own writings; Oudney was a medical man, and Denham held the rank of Major
in the army. Oudney was the real leader of the expedition, with which
he had been entrusted by Earl Bathurst, then Secretary of State for the
Colonies; but his untimely death had the result of depreciating the part
which he personally played during its first two years’ work. Clapperton
has written of him that he was “A man of unassuming deportment, pleasing
manners, steadfast perseverance and undaunted enterprise; while his mind
was fraught at once with knowledge, virtue and religion.” Major Denham’s
action in joining a raiding party into Mandara (Eastern Bornu) has
somewhat tarnished his reputation, in my humble opinion very unjustly,
although it is quite true that his action in this respect was the
cause of serious embarrassment to Clapperton later on. In criticising
Denham’s conduct on this occasion, we must bear in mind in the first
place that the Empire of Bornu, at that period, owing to various
dynastic revolutions, and to the pressure of its powerful enemies on the
East—Baghirmi and Wadai—was in a state of more or less constant warfare
both within and without, and that warlike expeditions were constantly
taking place, faction fighting against faction and tribe against tribe,
warfare being in fact a more or less permanent institution in the social
life of the country. And in the second place, we must also recollect that
the members of the expedition had been instructed to examine and report
upon all the various phases of life in the countries which they might
traverse. Now it was impossible for Denham to obtain a thorough knowledge
of the habits of the people without personally investigating the manner
in which they waged war upon their neighbours. Apart, therefore, from the
natural predilections of his soldierly instincts, which would lead him
to find particular interest in matters of this kind, it may be assumed
that Denham considered it his duty to act as he did. Years afterwards,
Barth found himself in much the same predicament. As it happened, the
adventure nearly cost Denham his life. The raided proved too strong for
the raiders, and, assisted by the Fulani cavalry, completely defeated the
latter. Denham’s escape was a marvellous one. He lost everything, and was
wounded in three places.
An account of Clapperton’s life is contributed by Lieut.-Colonel
Clapperton in the preface to Clapperton and Lander’s journal of the
second expedition to Sokoto, published by Murray in 1829. Hugh Clapperton
was born in Dumfriesshire in 1788. At the age of thirteen he went to sea
as an apprentice, and subsequently entered the Royal Navy. He served in
the _Renommée_ and _Venerable_, and visited the East Indies. He then
went to the Canadian Lakes, and participated in the American War of
Independence. In 1816 he got his commission. A year later the British
vessels on the Canadian Lakes were paid off and laid up, and Clapperton
returned to England on half-pay. In 1820 he met Dr. Oudney in Edinburgh,
and struck up a friendship which resulted in his accompanying the
latter to Africa. Of intellectual attainments he had none, but he was
large-hearted, generous, and tolerant; courageous in the extreme, gifted
with an iron constitution, and of great physical strength. So much for
the personal characteristics of the trio. We may now examine the nature
of their work. The narrative of the expedition in which all three took
part is chiefly contributed by Denham. While Denham was compiling their
joint notes, Clapperton started for Africa again, and reached Sokoto
from Badagry on the West Coast. The story of Clapperton’s second journey
was written by himself, and afterwards published by his faithful servant
Richard Lander, who was destined ultimately to follow the Niger down
to the sea, thus finally solving the great problem in the attempted
elucidation of which Park, Tucker, Clapperton and many others perished.
The primary, and in many respects the main, obstacle which had to be
overcome by Oudney and his companions, was the crossing of that portion
of the Sahara which lies between Murzuk and Bornu, and which, to use
Denham’s words, “Is made up of dark frowning hills of naked rock, in
interminable plains, strewed in some places with fragments of stone and
pebbles, in others of one vast level surface of sand, and in others,
again, the same material rising into immense mounds, altering their form
and position according to the strength and direction of the winds.”
Caravan routes across the desert had existed for many centuries, and
the commerce of the Central Sudan, with the parts of North Africa, was
still an important one. The route which the travellers hoped to take, in
company with a party of merchants, was the shortest and safest one, that
which starting from Tripoli passes through Murzuk and Bilma to Kuka, then
the capital of Bornu, situated on the shores of Lake Chad. The expedition
arrived at Tripoli in November 1821, but did not reach Murzuk, capital
of Fezzan, until the 8th April 1822. Here the Englishmen met with such
a discouraging reception from the Sultan that on the 12th May, finding
no chance of making any progress whatever, Major Denham started back to
Tripoli to interview the Pasha, by whom the British Government had been
promised every possible assistance. The Pasha proving as lethargic as his
prototype at Murzuk, Denham left Tripoli in a white heat of indignation
to report his conduct to the British Government. This did not suit the
Pasha at all, and he sent three despatches after the irate Englishman
begging him to return, as he had arranged for an escort to accompany the
expedition to Bornu. The despatches reached Denham while the boat he had
taken passage in was quarantined outside Marseilles, and he forthwith
set sail once more for the Barbary shore. On the 29th November 1822, or
a year after landing at Tripoli, the expedition left Murzuk, and set
out upon its way to Bornu under the guidance of Bu-Kalum, a merchant
of repute, much enamoured of pomp and show, and not over energetic in
his movements. Within a few weeks’ march from Murzuk the members of the
expedition were able to appreciate all the horrors of the trans-Desert
slave trade in the sight of “more than 100 skeletons, scattered over the
line of route, some of them with the skin attached to the bones.”
On the 13th January they reached Bilma, famous for its salt pans, and
on February 4th the discomforts they had endured in the desert received
ample compensation by a view of “the great Lake Chad, glowing with the
golden rays of the sun in its strength.” The natural emotion of the
travellers is thus expressed by Denham, whose descriptions in the general
way certainly do not incline to the picturesque:
“It conveyed to my mind,” he writes, “a sensation so gratifying
and inspiring that it would be difficult for language to convey
an idea of its force and pleasure.... My heart bounded within
me at the prospect, for I believe this lake to be the key to
the great object of our search, and I could not refrain from
silently imploring heaven’s continued protection, which had
enabled us to proceed so far in health and strength, even to
the accomplishment of our task.”
CHAPTER VI
THE DISCOVERY OF NORTHERN NIGERIA—(_cont._)
On the borders of the Lake the travellers observed the cotton shrub
growing well and innumerable flocks of waterfowl disporting themselves.
So tame were the latter that when approached they “merely changed their
position a little to the right or left.” Following the Western shore of
the Chad, the travellers pushed on to Kuka. Within a few days’ march
of that once-flourishing city they began to realise how erroneous were
the popular ideas of the “Sudan.” Instead of “ragged negroes armed with
spears,” who, with the assistance of a few Arabs, managed to terrorise
the country, the travellers were astonished to see a dense cloud of
cavalry riding towards them, the guard of honour sent by the Sheik of
Bornu to bid them welcome. With loud cries of “Blessing, blessing!
Welcome! welcome!” the black warriors, clad “in coats of mail, composed
of iron chain,” bore down upon them in orderly array, waving swords and
spears. Surrounded by this imposing mass of horsemen they entered Kuka,
and were received in audience by the Sheik. After a short residence in
Kuka the companions separated, Denham going off with Bu-Kalum on the raid
which turned out so disastrously for all concerned in it.
The energetic Major subsequently visited a large portion of the Eastern
parts of Bornu, located and ascended the Shari as far as Logon, then the
capital of an important kingdom, and explored a considerable portion
of the Eastern shores of the Lake. The information he collected in the
course of his peregrinations and the maps of the district which he
compiled were of very great value. The Southern and Eastern shores of
the Lake were entirely unknown, the Lake itself practically unlocated,
and the existence of the Shari unsuspected. It has always appeared to
me that Denham never received the credit which was due to him for his
exploring work. In view of his unscientific training, he was unable to
turn his discoveries to the best advantage, but all things considered,
his investigations proved in the main surprisingly accurate. His
ignorance of African history, too, was very much against him. He was
distinctly an unlettered man, neither possessed of a ready pen nor
imbued with much imagination. The natural result of these shortcomings
is apparent in every page of his Journal. We find him recording the
most trivial incidents, and almost neglecting the social, political and
ethnological problems with which he came daily in contact. The same lack
of study and intelligent research—of education, really—is visible, but
perhaps to a lesser extent, in Clapperton’s writings.
It was in a sense a new world which the explorers had entered, a
world of absorbing interest, where Eastern magnificence and barbaric
display mingled with the naked barbarism of Africa; where semi-Arabised
potentates went a-warring with mail-clad knights, and powerful Barons
brought their contingent of retainers to assist their liege lord
in his campaigns of plunder and conquest. The travellers had left
nineteenth-century England, had plunged into the Desert, and had emerged
therefrom amid a feudalism which recalled in many ways that of their own
land in the Middle Ages. What an opportunity was theirs in this region,
which for centuries, by reason of its fertility, had proved a magnet
to attract the migration of races from the North, West, and East! Some
twenty years later a man with a truly scientific mind went over the same
ground, and then, and only then, did people realise all that Denham and
Clapperton had left untold. But, although it was reserved for the genial
and cultured German who succeeded Denham to show how profound is the gulf
between a character such as Barth’s, studious and observant, replete
with historical lore and scientific attainment, and men like Denham and
Clapperton, notable only for their courage, dogged perseverance, and
love of adventure, yet the prestige of the former, which increases rather
than diminishes as our knowledge of these regions in question becomes
more extensive, can never rob the Englishmen of the right of priority of
discovery. They were the first white men to reach the Chad, to discover
the Shari, to explore Bornu, Sokoto, and part of Kanem, and to describe,
however indifferently, the wonderful social fabric, the picturesque
civilisation, teeming with energy and industrialism, which existed, and
exists, in the upper portion of the Niger Basin.
While Denham bent his steps eastwards, Clapperton and Oudney left Kuka
in a westerly direction with the intention of entering the Empire
of Sokoto, founded by Othman Fodio (the Fulani reformer during the
first years of the nineteenth century) out of the heterogeneous and
mutually antagonistic Hausa States. Of this Empire and the remarkable
race which created it, the travellers had heard a great deal while in
Bornu. The two States were for the time being at peace, and the Sheik
Mohammed-el-Kanemy, the virtual, and subsequently the absolute ruler
of Bornu, made no opposition to the Englishmen’s visit. Shortly after
leaving Katagum, at the small village of Murmur, Dr. Oudney, who had
been ailing for many months, died, much to Clapperton’s distress. The
sad event did not, however, deter his companion from pushing onwards,
noting as he went the extraordinary beauty and fertility of the country,
the numerous plantations of cotton, tobacco and indigo, the rows upon
rows of date-palms, the splendid cattle, the luxurious foliage, and the
industry of the inhabitants, tending their flocks and herds, toiling in
the fields, carrying fruit and butter to the markets, weaving and dyeing
their handsome cotton cloths. On January 19, 1824, Clapperton reached
Kano, the great Emporium of the Central Sudan, his first feeling being
one of disappointment, which was not diminished by the circumstance that,
although he had donned his naval uniform, no one took the slightest
heed of him, “but all intent on their own business, allowed me to pass
by without remark.” This little incident, trivial in itself, throws an
interesting sidelight upon the character of the gallant sailor, who was
imbued with a proper sense of the dignity befitting his position and
never failed to uphold it, as witness the following conversation which
took place between him and the Governor of Kano. There is, by the way, a
passage in this short dialogue which may be commended to the attention of
certain missionary enthusiasts at the present time:
“‘How do you do, Abdullah (Clapperton’s native name)? Will you
come and see me at Hadyja on your return?’ I answered, ‘God
willing,’ with due Moslem solemnity. ‘You are a Christian,
Abdullah?’ ‘Yes.’ ‘And what have you come to see?’ ‘The
country.’ ‘What do you think of it?’ ‘It is a fine country,
but very sickly.’ At this he smiled, and again asked, ‘Would
you Christians allow us to come and see your country?’ I said,
‘Certainly.’ ‘Would you force us to become Christians?’ ‘By no
means; we never meddle with a man’s religion.’ ‘What,’ said he,
‘and do you ever pray?’ ‘Sometimes; our religion commands us to
pray always; but we pray in secret, and not in public, except
on Sundays.’ One of his people abruptly asked what a Christian
was? ‘Why a Kaffir,’[28] rejoined the Governor. ‘Where is your
Jew servant?’ again asked the Governor; ‘you ought to let me
see him.’ ‘Excuse me, he is averse to it, and I never allow my
servants to be molested for their religious opinions.’ ‘Well,
Abdullah, thou art a man of understanding, and you must come
and see me at Hadyja.’”
Clapperton came very satisfactorily out of that interview, but he did not
fare quite so well in a later colloquy with Sultan Bello, the ruler of
the Sokoto Empire, who asked him one day whether he was a Nestorian or a
Socinian. The puzzled Englishman, who probably had never heard of either
sect, excused himself by replying that he was a Protestant. The fact of
having such a question put to him thousands of miles in the interior of
the Dark Continent, supposed to be the abode of primitive savagery, was
sufficient evidence of the intelligence of the inhabitants, of which
he received abundant proof every fresh day he prolonged his stay in
the country. Under the able guidance of Bello, Othman’s successor and
“a noble-looking man,” as Clapperton calls him (with the aristocratic
and finely cut features peculiar to the Fulani), the statesmanlike
qualities of the ruling race and the wonderful commercial and industrial
activity of the Hausa population, reached their full development,
and law and order reigned throughout that portion of the new States
which had accepted the Fulani dominion. The country had been divided
into Provinces, to each of which Governors were appointed. Trade was
encouraged, industries protected, and manufactures promoted. Prosperity
was everywhere apparent, and, to quote the words used by Clapperton in
the course of one of his interviews with Bello:
“The people of England could all read and write, and were
acquainted with most other regions of the earth; but of this
country alone they hitherto knew scarcely anything, and
erroneously regarded the inhabitants as naked savages, devoid
of religion, and not far removed from the condition of wild
beasts; whereas, I found them, from my personal observation, to
be civilised, humane, and pious.”
Clapperton very much desired to continue his westward journey, and, if
possible, strike the Niger, follow it to its mouth, and thus attain the
supreme object of the mission; for the information which the traveller
had obtained in Sokoto made it a practical certainty that the Niger
discharged itself somewhere in the Atlantic Ocean. But Bello objected,
alleging the disturbed condition of the westward country, which had not
yet been subjected. Much to his disappointment, therefore, the Englishman
was compelled to forego his plans. He, however, parted on the best of
terms with his enlightened host, who gave him a letter to the King of
England, and begged him to return at the earliest possible opportunity.
The letter is worth reproducing here:
“BELLO TO KING GEORGE IV.
“In the name of God, the merciful and the clement. May God
bless our favourite prophet Mahommed and those who follow
his sound doctrine. To the head of the Christian nation, the
honoured and the beloved among the English people, George
the Fourth, King of Great Britain. Praise be to God who
inspires, and peace be unto those who follow the right path.
Your Majesty’s servant, Rayes Abdullah, came to us, and we
found him a very intelligent and wise man; representing in
every respect your greatness, wisdom, dignity, clemency, and
penetration. When the time of his departure came he requested
us to form a friendly relation and correspond with you, and to
prohibit the exportation of slaves by our merchants to Ataghar,
Dahomi, and Ashanti. We agree with him upon this, on account
of the good which will result from it both to you and to us;
and that a vessel of yours is to come to the harbour of Racka,
with two guns and the quantities of powder, shot, &c., which
they require; as also a number of muskets. We will then send
our officer to arrange to settle everything with your consul,
and fix a certain period for the arrival of your merchant
ships, and when they come they may traffic and deal with our
merchants. Then, after their return, the consul may reside in
that harbour, viz., Racka, as protector, in company with our
agent there. May God be pleased. Dated, 1st of Rhamadan, 1239
of Hejra. April 18, 1824.”
Furnished with this letter, which he might well regard as a signal proof
of success, and which augured a promising development of relations in
the future, Clapperton travelled back to Kuka, where Denham joined him
in due course, after his return from the Chad. The homeward journey was
accomplished without mishap, and on January 25, 1825, the survivors of
the mission reached Tripoli, after four adventurous years, replete with
interest to their country and to the world.
As already stated, Clapperton, when he parted company with Sultan Bello,
did so with the full intention of returning at the earliest opportunity.
Bello had shown himself most eager to establish durable relations with
Great Britain, and had suggested that a British vessel should go to
“Racka,” there to deliver the warlike stores which were to cement the
understanding between his Christian Majesty King George IV. and the
Fulani Ruler. Clapperton found the British Government eager to profit
by the opportunity of concluding an alliance with so influential a
potentate, and lost no time in giving Clapperton (who was raised to the
rank of commander) authority to organise another expedition. Clapperton
himself was all enthusiasm. On the 27th August 1825 he left England in
H.M.S. _Brazen_, in company with his trusted servant, Richard Lander,
and attended by three companions, Mr. Dickson, Captain Pearce, and Dr.
Morrison. Dickson, for some unexplained reason, landed at Whydah with
the intention of reaching Sokoto alone, and was never heard of again.
Disappointed at not meeting any of Bello’s messengers at Lagos, which
it appears had been arranged, Clapperton started his inland march from
Badagry, after trying the Benin route and being dissuaded from adopting
it by an English merchant established in that river. Shortly afterwards
both Captain Pearce and Dr. Morrison contracted fever and died.
Clapperton and Lander pushed safely onwards through Yoruba and Borgu, and
arrived without further calamity at Bussa. The river was crossed below
the rapids, and the expedition duly reached Kano by way of Zeg-Zeg. At
Bussa, Clapperton gathered valuable information with regard to Park’s
untimely end, fully confirming the previous information which had reached
England.
Everything seemed to promise well for the ultimate success of the
mission. Unfortunately, however, there were a number of causes at work
destined to wreck the sanguine hopes of its leader. As Clapperton neared
his destination, a doubt of the reception awaiting him at Sokoto appears
to have weighed heavily upon his mind. In the first place, Bello’s
messengers had not put in appearance at Lagos; then the seaport of
“Racka,” mentioned in Bello’s map, did not exist as such, which latter
circumstance caused Clapperton to entertain serious misgivings as to
his former host’s good faith. The absence of the messengers can easily
be explained in view of the disturbed state of the country between
Yoruba and the Niger, for the Fulani were then extending their conquests
southwards, and the entire region was in a state of effervescence; but
the misunderstanding about “Racka” is certainly strange. It is difficult
to believe that Bello purposely intended to mislead. Bello had spoken
of the “harbour” of Racka, but as is pointed out in the introduction to
Clapperton’s journal, the Arabic word Bahr, used in the manuscript, does
not necessarily signify sea, but any collection of water, whether lake
or river.[29] On Bello’s map the Niger is designated as the “sea.” It
is probable, therefore, that Bello was perfectly honest in describing
“Racka” as a “harbour,” and that the _bahr_ of the manuscript should
more correctly have been translated by “river” instead of “sea.” Racka,
however, turned out to be an inland town, and the fact strengthened
Clapperton’s suspicions. How the confusion arose it is impossible, on the
documentary evidence available, to determine, but it seems obvious that
Racka must have been meant for Rabba, an important town on the banks of
the Niger, some distance below Bussa, and at one time the capital of the
kingdom of Nupe.
To this error of interpretation and geography was really due Clapperton’s
subsequent misfortunes, because, had the suspicion that Bello was
playing him false been absent from his mind, the intrepid Englishman
would hardly have adopted the unwise attitude which he subsequently did
in his negotiations with the Fulani monarch. That attitude proved his
undoing, and the direct cause of his death. His mental condition did not
enable him to grasp the fact that the entire state of affairs had changed
since his first visit. Sokoto was then at peace with Bornu. But in the
interval war had broken out again. Now, in addition to the presents that
Clapperton had brought to Bello, his baggage also contained a number of
presents, including war-stores, for the Sheik-el-Kanemy, ruler of Bornu,
who had become Bello’s deadly enemy. It was manifestly impossible for
Bello to allow these presents to pass through the country at such a time,
and he wrote to Clapperton to that effect. To this Clapperton rejoined
that he had been instructed by his Government to go to Bornu, that he
had a letter from Earl Bathurst to the Sheik-el-Kanemy, and that he was
in duty bound to carry out his mandate. This insistence aroused Bello’s
mistrust, which seems to have been intensified by reports, doubtless
spread through the instrumentality of Arab merchants dreading commercial
competition, that Clapperton was a spy sent on behalf of the English
Government to obtain information with the idea of facilitating a future
invasion of the country by the British. Clapperton repeatedly, and with
growing exasperation, pressed his wishes upon the Sultan, and Bello, with
increasing distrust, as repeatedly declined to entertain them. The strain
and the mortification were too great, even for Clapperton’s splendid
constitution, and when Bello, yielding to his own suspicions, and to
the advice of his counsellors, demanded the production of the presents
intended for the Sheik, Clapperton fell seriously ill. After hovering
between life and death for many days, he finally expired in the arms of
his devoted servant, Lander.
Thus terminated a career of unbounding usefulness. To England and to
science Clapperton rendered great services, and had his intellectual
capacity equalled his courage and determination, those services would
have been even greater than they were. Of him we may truly say that he
was a fine type of the English gentleman of the old school, without
much erudition, but simple, God-fearing, honest, manly, a credit to his
country and to his race.
CHAPTER VII
THE HAUSAS AND THEIR EMPORIUM.
“The province of Kano is the garden of Central Africa.”—Dr.
BARTH.
It has been said of the Hausas that they are “superior both
intellectually and physically to all the natives of Equatorial Africa.”
The statement strikes one as being exaggerated. The intellectual average
of the Hausa is undoubtedly lower than that of the Fulani, who, thanks to
their genius for combination, administrative capacity, religious fervour,
fighting superiority, and moral influence, completely defeated and
subdued their former masters, although the numerical odds were greatly in
favour of the latter. Again, the physique of the Hausas, though usually
good, is certainly inferior to that of several of the Senegalese races,
the Krus, the Kaffir stock, and probably also to one or two of the Bantu
offshoots now inhabiting the basin of the Upper Congo. Much has been made
of the fact that 500 Hausas trained by British officers beat off several
thousand Fulani at Bida. But what chance have Fulani horsemen against
Maxim guns and repeating-rifles? The Baggara Arab, universally reputed
the bravest of the brave, fared no better against Macdonald’s trained
Sudanese.
These remarks are by no means put forward to depreciate the Hausa race,
which is undoubtedly a very fine one, but by way of protest against the
somewhat hysterical estimates concerning this people which find favour
among those who profess to look upon them as excellent material for
proselytising purposes, and are ever representing them to us as cruelly
oppressed, groaning under the tyrannical sway of the wicked Fulani. The
fact is, that a great deal of sentimental nonsense has been said and
written, principally by the missionary element, about the Hausas, who
are generally content with their lot, and having accepted Islam do not
suffer from the predatory incursions of the conquering race. Fulani and
Hausas grow up side by side: unions are frequent among them, and the
well-to-do Hausa enjoys a somewhat similar position in relation to the
ruling class as represented by the Fulani, as did the merchant classes in
the old days in our own country in relation to the nobility and governing
classes.
It seems fairly well established that at least a portion of the Hausa[30]
race inhabited the beautiful and mountainous region of Air or Asben, at
the time (about 700 A.D.) when the Berbers—the modern Tuareg—driven south
by Arab invaders, crossed the desert into Air and made themselves masters
of that region.[31] These Asben Hausas belonged to the family or clan of
Gober. They were the Goberawa, who claim to be the oldest and noblest
branch of the Hausa race. This claim is very generally admitted by Arabic
historians, and is expressly mentioned in the curious Fulani history
of the Sudan communicated to Clapperton by Sultan Bello, son of Othman
Fodio, in 1828.[32] Bello says of the people of Gober that they are “free
born, because their origin was from the Copts of Egypt who had emigrated
into the interior of the Gharb or Western countries.” This statement
is particularly interesting as regards the possible Semitic or Eastern
origin of the Gober family of the Hausas. Dr. Barth, whose authority in
all matters relating to the ethnology of Western Central Africa still
remains uncontested, although fifty years have now elapsed since his
wonderful series of travels was accomplished, attributed to the Goberawa
an original relationship with North Africa. The theory is borne out by
the traditions of the Hausas themselves, who trace back their descent
to a Diggera mother, the Diggera or Deggara being a Berber tribe which,
at some remote period, was predominant in the city of Daura, one of the
oldest centres of Hausa influence. To this day some of the Hausa Mallams
speak vaguely of a former relationship with the East, and Canon Robinson
during his stay in Kano was informed by “the most learned man in that
city” that the Hausas migrated in early times from the Far East, beyond
Mecca.[33] It is much to be deplored in this connection that the national
records of the Hausas should have been destroyed by the Fulani at the
taking of Katsena. Nevertheless, we may reasonably hope, now that the
relations of Northern Nigeria with the outside world are bound to become
more frequent, some further light may be shortly forthcoming which will
help to elucidate a problem fraught with great attraction to all students
of West Africa.
After their expulsion from Air by the inflowing tide of Berber
immigration, the Hausas gradually spread west and south, and in course
of time formed themselves into seven states, viz. Gober, Daura, Biram,
Kano, Rano, Katsena and Zeg-Zeg.[34] In Hausa mythology each of these
States represented one of the seven legitimate children, offspring of
the Diggera mother already alluded to, to each of whom was respectively
given a task to perform. Thus Gober was the warrior _serki-n-yaki_
(_serki_, Prince: _n_, of: _yaki_, fighting); Kano and Rano the dyers
_saraki-n-baba_ (from the abundance of indigo _marinas_ or dyeing
pits which represent one of the most considerable national industries
of the Hausas); Katsena and Daura the traders _saraki-n-Kaswa_, and
Zeg-Zeg the purveyor of slaves _serki-n-bay_ which, by the way, affords
incidental proof, if any were needed, that in the matter of slavery the
Hausas can hardly claim superior moral characteristics over their Fulani
conquerors. Disputes between these various States were frequent, and
although peopled by the same race, they were constantly in open warfare
against one another. So great, indeed, was their mutual antagonism, that
when the Fulani uprising took place in Gober, a considerable number of
Hausas, principally from the province of Zanfara, rallied round Othman’s
standard, fighting shoulder to shoulder with the Fulani against their own
compatriots.
[Illustration: A PURE-BRED KANO MAN (HAUSA)]
Prior to their more or less forced conversion by the Fulani early in
the nineteenth century, the Hausas were Pagans. True, the Hausa King
of Katsena embraced Islam about the seventeenth century, Katsena at
that period being the most flourishing city of Hausa—the “Florence of
the Hausas,” as Richardson[35] calls it—in regular communication with
Arabs from the East, and where the Hausa language attained its greatest
richness and purity of form. But the great mass of the Hausa people were
unaffected by the event. The precise nature of their rites before the
conquest remains obscure. It appears possible however that, at one time,
the Hausas, Songhays, and other tribes of the Niger Basin were snake
worshippers. The Arabic historians Ahmed-Baba, Edrizi and El-Bekri state
that in the time of the first Songhay king—placed at 679 A.D. by Dr.
Barth, at 776 A.D. by others—the natives rendered homage to serpents.
Colonel Frey,[36] in his interesting and ingenious study, suggests that
this worship may have extended to the _manatus_ or _manatee_, that
curious and somewhat uncanny creature being an inhabitant of the Niger
River.
Be that as it may, with the dawn of the nineteenth century a higher
ideal and a purer faith rose up in Hausaland, and gained ground with
marvellous rapidity. No doubt the result was not obtained without
bloodshed, without cruelty, without what Joseph Thompson called “the
terrible clamour and dread accompaniments of war.” Nevertheless, it was
accomplished, and none but the wholly fanatical will deny that the Hausas
have greatly benefited thereby. To an unbiased mind it must appeal as
little short of marvellous that, in a period comparatively so short,
a whole race should not only have been converted to Islam, but have
remained devoted to its precepts when a lapse into Paganism would have
been easy and, in a sense, natural. Apart from the added dignity which
the acceptance of Islam imparts to individuals in their intercourse with
their fellows in a pagan country, the explanation is probably to be found
in the fact that, after the Fulani had unquestionably established their
political domination over the Hausas, they none the less persistently
continued their religious propaganda by peaceful means, and that,
although a sense of security seems to have temporarily dulled their
political instincts, it has had, on the contrary, a vivifying effect upon
their religious ideals. It is, in any case, notorious that Islam, through
the medium of Fulani preachers, is steadily sweeping down the River
Niger, penetrating into pagan villages, amid the swamps and forests. The
pagan Igarras whom the Niger Company long thought would constitute a
solid bulwark and a sort of buffer-state against the invading tide, are
now being fast won over to Islam, and Fulani _fikis_ are even met with
behind Akassa, a few miles from the seaboard itself.
It is no easy matter to correctly estimate the Hausa population in
Nigeria, but of true Hausas there must probably be five or six millions,
besides the numerous half-breeds of mixed Hausa and Fulani, Hausa and
Kanuri, Hausa and Songhay, or Hausa and Tuareg blood, the latter of whom
are chiefly to be met with in the northerly districts of the Sokoto
Empire, and are of less muscular build than the true Hausas. The Hausas
are incontestably the traders of Africa. Their commercial aptitude is
renowned from the borders of the Mediterranean to the Gulf of Guinea;
from the Gulf of Guinea to the Shari; from the Shari to the Red Sea.
They are great travellers and have even been met with on the Sangha,
the Ubanghi, and the Congo. Every North African port has its colony of
Hausas. The same may be said of the West African Coast ports. There is
not an important trading centre in the Niger bend but shelters a family
or two of Hausas. Every year numerous Hausa caravans leave Nigeria for
the countries lying at the back of the Gold Coast, the Ivory Coast,
and Liberia, to gather the far-famed Kola or _guro_ nut, the fruit of
_Sterculia acuminata_, which they convey with infinite care—delicately
wrapped in leaves—and sell at an enormous profit in Kano, Gando, Zaria,
&c., from whence the nuts are again transported to Bornu, Wadai, and even
as far as Khartoum.
[Illustration: A HAUSA FROM YOLA]
If the trading instincts of the Hausas are remarkably developed, their
industrial enterprise is still more so. It may with safety be declared
that the product of their looms and dye-pits constitutes the most
extensive article in the internal commerce of the Dark Continent. Kano
is the head and centre of this intrinsically native industry, which
is unparalleled in Africa, and Kano is, and in all human probability
will continue to be, Manchester’s great rival for the African interior
markets. Kano has been termed the Manchester and Birmingham of the
Sudan, and having due regard to local circumstances and conditions, the
comparison is strictly just.
The number of Europeans who have visited Kano may still be counted upon
the fingers of both hands. Arab merchants from North and East Africa
have, however, been regular frequenters of the city since the conquest
of Hausa by Othman Fodio, and for some considerable time past Kano
has sheltered an Arab Colony with a recognised “Consul” who enjoys
considerable influence. Its resident population has been variously
estimated at thirty thousand to sixty thousand and its floating
population at sixty thousand to two millions,[37] including the most
varied elements, Hausas, Fulani, Kanuri, Baghirmis, Wadaiens, Arabs,
Tuaregs, and Jews; merchants from Egypt, Tunis, Tripoli and Fezzan,
from the Niger Bend, Adamawa and the Eastern Sudan. The city itself is
of enormous extent, containing within its encompassing wall, which is
reputed to be no less than fifteen miles in circumference, large tracts
of land under cultivation. This immense wall played an important part
in the periodic wars with Bornu at the beginning and middle of the past
century. If the citizens of Kano did not think themselves sufficiently
strong to meet their aggressors in the open, they simply shut the
gates of the city and lined the walls, and the Bornuese hosts, deeming
discretion the better part of valour, never attempted an assault. The
situation of Kano is fairly elevated and otherwise good, but is unhealthy
owing to the presence of large pools of stagnant water into which refuse
of all kinds is indiscriminately pitched. The city is divided into
different quarters, the Fulani quarter, Arab quarter, Hausa quarter, and
so forth. The market is held daily and the most bewildering diversity of
articles are always on sale: native cloths, silk embroidered _tobes_,
leather and brass ware, ivory, weapons, rough agricultural implements,
silver and brass ornaments and trinkets, antimony, ostrich feathers,
live stock—cattle, horses and sheep—and foodstuffs innumerable. Long
files of asses pass through from the distant Chad laden with natron for
Nupe, and arrive from the Niger Bend weighed down with kolas. Camels
are permanently in evidence, whether carrying on their sturdy backs
salt-cakes from Bilma or European merchandise from Tripoli. Brilliantly
attired Ghadamseen and Arab traders caracole on gaily caparisoned steeds,
and the fierce-eyed, black-lithamed Tuareg of the desert (many of whom,
by the way, are extensive property owners in Northern Nigeria) scowls
darkly from the back of his swift-footed _mehari_. In this great city
throbs and vibrates an industrial vitality unequalled in Africa.[38]
CHAPTER VIII
THE HAUSAS AND THEIR EMPORIUM—(_cont._)
“Travellers who have been in the country tell us that Kano,
which is the Manchester of Nigeria, has an attendance annually
at its market of over one million persons.”—_Extract from a
speech by_ Mr. CHAMBERLAIN.
The reputation of Kano as a manufacturing city is of comparatively
recent growth, and although the Hausas have manufactured cotton for a
considerable time (how long is uncertain, but we do know that their
leather-ware[39] was widely sought after as far back as the beginning
of the sixteenth century), the importance of Kano as a trading and
manufacturing emporium only dates from the Fulani conquest and the
destruction of Katsena by Bello. The Hausa cottons of Kano are in demand
throughout the whole of the Islamic world of North, West, and central
Africa. Lieutenant-Colonel Monteil, one of the few Europeans who have
visited Kano, gives it as his opinion that the inhabitants of two-thirds
of the Sudan, and nearly all the inhabitants of the Central and Eastern
Sahara, clothe themselves in Kano cottons; while Dr. Barth estimated the
annual export of cotton from Kano to Timbuctoo alone to amount in value
to some £5000. The principal cotton articles manufactured by the Hausas
at Kano are the _Tobe_ or shirt for men; the _Turkedi_ or women’s dress;
the _Zenne_ or plaid; and the black veil or litham invariably worn by
the Tuareg and very often by the Fulani, Kanuri, and Arab. The _tobes_
are dyed various colours, while the _turkedi_ are always of that deep,
dark blue obtained by repeated washings in indigo-pits for which the
province of Kano is famous. Of the plaids a large selection is produced,
varying in colour and in texture, some being composed of a mixture of
silk and cotton, others of cotton only, others again of pure silk. Dr.
Barth, speaking of this cotton industry of Kano, and remarking that the
Province which produces it is also able to supply the corn necessary for
the sustenance of its population, and possesses besides splendid pasture
land, says: “In fact, if we consider that this industry is not carried
on here as in Europe, in immense establishments, degrading man to the
meanest conditions of life, but that it gives employment and support to
families without compelling them to sacrifice their domestic habits,
we must presume that Kano ought to be one of the happiest countries in
the world; and so it is, so long as its Governor, too often lazy and
indolent, is able to defend its inhabitants from the cupidity of their
neighbours, which, of course, is constantly stimulated by the very wealth
of their country.” What the lazy Fulani Governor of Barth’s days could
not do, British power can, and indeed has; and having done so, is also
able to ensure that by judicious management the national, social life of
this interesting country shall continue in that state of happiness which
struck the great German traveller.
In addition to its cloths, Kano produces excellent leather work,
principally sandals, sword-scabbards, riding-boots, shoes, despatch-bags,
water-bottles and saddles, and annually exports large quantities of
tanned hides. The people of Kano also produce iron weapons, rough
agricultural implements and sword-hilts for German blades, which are, or
used to be, imported from the north. The following estimate of the total
trade of Kano, carefully compiled from Dr. Barth’s calculations, will
give some idea of its extent and value at the time (1851) of the German
explorer’s stay in the city. The sterling is arrived at by reckoning one
million _kurdi_ or cowries—the chief currency in Kano—at £100.
EXPORTS.
Cloths £30,000
Slaves 20,000
Sandals 1,000
Miscellaneous leather-work 500
-------
Total £51,500
=======
IMPORTS.
Kola nuts (from West Coast hinterlands) £10,000
Ivory (from Adamawa) 10,000
Salt (from the interior) 8,000
Coarse silk (_viâ_ Tripoli) 7,000
Arab dresses (from Tunis and Tripoli) 5,000
Beads (Italy, _viâ_ Tripoli) 5,000
Sword-blades (from Germany, _viâ_ Tripoli) 5,000
Manchester goods (_viâ_ Tripoli) 4,000
Muslins (England, _viâ_ Tripoli) 4,000
Rose oil (_viâ_ Tripoli) 5,000
Copper (from Wadai and Bahr-el-Ghazal) 2,000
Woollen cloths (_viâ_ Tripoli) 1,500
Spices and cloves (_viâ_ Tripoli) 1,500
Sugar (from France, _viâ_ Tripoli) 1,200
Tin 1,000
Egyptian dresses 1,000
Needles (from Germany, _viâ_ Tripoli) 800
Common paper, ditto 500
Razors (from Syria) 300
-------
Total £71,800
=======
To which might be added a transit trade in natron, passing through Kano
from Bornu on its way to Nupe, yielding about £1000 “passage-money.” The
remarkable total of £123,300 is thus arrived at.
Of late years the trade of Kano, both in respect to imports and exports,
has undergone some change, and is bound to become still more modified
as time goes on. For instance, the buying and selling of slaves is a
thing of the past, or soon will be. The imports of ivory from Adamawa
are nothing like what they were in Barth’s time. The internal salt
trade has largely been extinguished, the native article being unable to
compete with European salt. But with this exception—salt—the increased
importation of European goods into the Niger and Binue since 1880, that
is to say, since the spread of British commercial enterprise in the
Upper River and its tributary, does not appear to have affected the
caravan trade of Kano with the Tripolitan ports, _viâ_ the oases of
Bilma, Fezzan, and Murzuk. In 1897, for instance, the British Consul for
Tripoli estimated the goods sent to Sokoto (for Sokoto read the State
of Sokoto, of which the city of Kano is the commercial and industrial
centre and the terminus of the Tripoli caravans, the trade of the city
of Sokoto being insignificant) by caravan across the desert at £46,000.
These figures compared with Barth’s tables of Tripoli imported goods are
actually more considerable than the total value as estimated by Barth
half a century ago. This is a very important fact, and by bearing it well
in mind we shall avoid falling into an error which might have unfortunate
consequences. Then, again, a comparison of the articles imported in 1851
and 1897 is instructive as affording proof of the conservatism of the
African and the old-established nature of this trade.
DR. BARTH’S ENUMERATION, 1851.
Coarse silk, Arab dresses, sword-blades, Manchester goods,
muslins, rose oil, woollen cloths, sugar, spices and cloves,
needles, paper.
FOREIGN OFFICE REPORT, 1897.
Cotton and woollen cloths, silk waste, silk yarn, box rings,
beads, amber, paper, sugar, drugs, tea.
We may go even farther back than this. According to the exceedingly
interesting and minute accounts of “Shereef Imhammed” and “Ben Ali, a
Moorish trader,” given in the first published proceedings of the African
Association in 1791, the trade between Tripoli and the Kingdom of
“Cashna,” _i.e._ Katsena (Katsena being then in its prime), consisted of
the following articles:
IMPORTS TO KATSENA FROM TRIPOLI.
Red woollen caps, check linens, light coarse woollen cloths,
baiza, cowries, barakans or alhaiks, small Turkey carpets, silk
(wrought and unwrought), tissues and brocades, sabre-blades,
Dutch knives, scissors, coral beads, small looking-glasses.
EXPORTS FROM KATSENA TO TRIPOLI.
Cotton cloths, slaves, goatskins “of the red and yellow dyes,”
ox and buffalo hides, gold dust, civet.
The “slaves” item is another proof that the Hausa Kings of those days
were extensive slave dealers. It is curious to notice that in the map
attached to this old work, a reproduction of which faces page 38, Kano
does not even appear, which shows that at that period it had little or no
importance as an industrial centre.
[Illustration: HAUSA LOOM AND SPOOL]
The articles imported in 1897 were, therefore, substantially the same as
in 1851 and even in 1791. Then as now, English cotton and woollen goods
figured prominently amongst them, and it is evident that up to 1897 large
profits were to be earned by Europeans (indirectly) and Arabs (directly)
in the caravan business between North Africa and Nigeria. Seven years
after the opening in regular form of the Western fluvial route, Northern
Nigeria is seen to have been importing from Tripoli more goods than in
1851.
It is not due then to commercial development from the south, but to
another reason, that the caravan traffic with Tripoli has fallen off
since 1897. That reason is to be found in the internal political
convulsions of which the Chad basin has been the scene for the last
eight years, and to the external political confusion brought about by
the action of European Powers, or rather of one European Power—France.
When Rabah conquered Bornu in 1893-94, the Ghadamseen merchants suffered
heavy losses through the sacking of Kuka, and trade was entirely stopped
for a time. Rabah saw his mistake, and endeavoured to remedy it by
liberal promises of future support and protection. He kept his word,
and trade revived. Then came the advance of the French down the Shari,
followed by a renewed period of anarchy in Bornu, as Rabah hurriedly
flung himself across the river into Baghirmi to arrest the march of the
invaders. Under Fad-el-Allah, Bornu became a cockpit of internecine
strife. With the consolidation of French influence in a portion of the
Chad region the merchants of the north took heart of grace once more, but
the recent pillage of sundry rich caravans by the Kanem Arabs, various
confederations of Tuareg and other adherents of the Sheik-Senussi, has
demonstrated that at present the French are unable to ensure the safety
of caravans, however desirous they may be to do so. These repeated
blows have played havoc with the Nigerian-Tripoli caravan trade, and
those merchants who are still bold enough to face the risks favour the
Wadai route. In 1900 the caravan trade with Wadai was still important,
amounting in the aggregate, according to the French Consul at Tripoli, to
£210,000, imports and exports included. But it is quite certain that 1901
and 1902 will show a notable decrease of those figures.[40]
Are we to conclude, therefore, that Kano’s internal trade with the
north and east has gone never to return, and that the caravan traffic
is a thing of the past? That is the view which appears to be generally
adopted.[41] I confess that I do not share it, and it would certainly
be an immense misfortune for Kano and Northern Nigeria generally if such
were, indeed, the case. The main sources of Kano’s wealth and prosperity
do not depend upon the influx of trade from the south, but upon the
industry of its inhabitants in catering for the requirements not of
Europe but of Africa. It is a great _dépôt_ of Negroland for Negroland,
and if Kano could no longer find purchasers for her cotton and her
leather work, her prosperity must needs decrease and her wealth decline.
Now it is obviously in our interest that this should not happen. It
should be the object of our policy to maintain, strengthen and assist the
commercial and industrial position of Kano, the centre of Hausa activity,
the magnet which attracts a flow of internal commerce from all points of
the compass. How can that best be done?
In the first place, it is necessary to understand the main caravan system
of North-West Central Africa. The accompanying map (facing p. 84) shows
the principal routes, and a broad survey of the subject induces the
belief that it is the interest of both England and France to encourage
the revival of the caravan traffic between Kano (or, in other words,
Nigeria) and Kano’s interior markets, or, at any rate, to do nothing to
still further curtail it. The wider the stream of internal trade both
in and out of Nigeria the greater the prosperity of the country, and it
would be as equally pedantic for us to object if the French, who are in
more or less theoretical possession of the majority of Kano’s markets,
succeed in eventually diverting _in toto_ the caravan traffic from the
Tripoli route towards Timbuctoo and In Salah, as it would be for the
French to interfere with a possible re-opening of the long-abandoned
eastern route (not marked in the map) towards the Nile. But there should
be an understanding between the two Powers on the subject of this
internal trade, which is centuries old, and which certainly cannot be
displaced in a day; in fact, never can entirely be displaced, except by
oppressive and selfish interference, either on the part of the French or
ourselves. Any action tending to compel a diversion of trade in such
or such a direction would prove in the long run to be anything but
advantageous to the Power which attempted it. For instance, if France
were to start putting prohibitive taxes on exports and imports to and
from Kano over the frontier in order to forcibly confine the circulation
of trade to certain channels, it would lead to serious trouble with the
natives, which would cost more to cope with than any prospective profit
to be derived from such action. Similarly, if the authorities of Northern
Nigeria were to actively discourage Kano’s trade with the territories
under French protection, in order to develop Kano’s trade with the south,
it would only lead to a decrease in the productive capacity of Kano, and
consequently lessen the prosperity of Northern Nigeria as a whole.
Economic changes are bound to occur, especially when the British and
French railway systems proposing to tap the Niger valley are more
advanced, but there is plenty of scope for both to earn an honourable
livelihood, and the central fact to be borne in mind is that Kano’s
trade is, and must be, as previously stated, more of an internal than an
external one. Before Kano can purchase such cottons, woollens and other
articles as it absorbs, from the south, that is to say, from European
merchants, it must be in a position to give, in return, articles of
African produce that will pay the European merchant to buy. To suppose
that Kano will be able to do so until the iron horse has penetrated well
over the Kano side of the Niger, or until a carriage-road the model of
the one the French are building from Conakry to Futa-Jallon connects
a navigable point on the Niger with Kano, is to cherish an illusion.
Transport charges would kill any chance of profit in a transaction which
differs in every particular from the nature of Kano’s internal trade. The
one would be a direct transaction, to stand or fall on its merits; the
other can best be described as a multiplicity of transactions with the
purchasing commodity represented by native cloth, a useless article so
far as export to Europe is concerned. In fact, it is no easy matter to
determine how Kano will be able to feed a railway from the coast without
the creation of some great industry suitable for European export,
corresponding with the oil-palm industry of the coastwise regions. One
thing at least is certain, that if through extravagance in construction
and working, or other causes, the section of an eventual railway from the
coast to Kano, which passes through the oil-palm bearing regions cannot
be made to pay, the economical outlook for the railway when it leaves the
oil-palm zone is anything but cheerful. Of course, where the main purpose
is strategic, considerations other than commercial come into play, and
the matter assumes a different aspect.
To resume, it would seem really desirable that a mutual arrangement
between England and France should be arrived at as regards freedom
of circulation for the internal traffic of the Chad region. I urged
that course in the _Pall Mall Gazette_ when the negotiations for the
Convention of 1898 were pending. Recent events suggest that the proposal
might still be adopted with advantage to both parties concerned, and as
a measure both just and wise in the relation it bears to the legitimate
interests of the natives.
It remains to be said in this connection that the principal articles
imported into the Upper Niger by the Niger Company, which up to the
present has enjoyed the monopoly of the Upper Niger trade, are salt,
brass, copper and iron rods, white damask cloths, white brocaded cloths,
indigo-dyed cloths (in imitation of, but inferior to, the cloth produced
from native looms and dyed in Kano), cowries, rice, yarn and gunpowder.
The salt which is imported chiefly from England has a large sale, being
greatly superior to native manufactured salt from Bilma and the shores
of Lake Chad. The copper, brass and iron rods are chiefly used for
conversion into arrow-heads. As for the cloths, they do not equal the
products of the Kano looms, and unless of the finest white damask, are
rejected by the Mohammedans. They find, however, a ready sale among
the Pagans. These cloths are, as a rule, exchanged against ivory, gum,
bees-wax or rubber, bought by Hausa traders, who in turn take them to
Kano and there exchange them for native-made cloth.
I have entered rather fully into the trading and industrial statistics
of Kano because, apart from the interest naturally attaching to the
commercial life of one of the most flourishing cities of Africa, the
centre of a great industrial and agricultural district, a knowledge
of these particulars enables one, I think, the better to realise what
are the distinctive characteristics of the Hausa race—Kano being
pre-eminently Hausa. The Hausa is primarily and essentially the business
man of Africa. He is not and never will become a governing personality.
His aims are commercial, and he neither seeks nor desires any other
state. Of political ambition he has none, and although strongly attached
to the Mohammedan faith, and good-humouredly contemptuous of his pagan
customers, he is quite content that they should remain pagans to the
end of the chapter, willingly resigning the attractions of proselytism
into the hands of the Fulani. Withal he is a cheerful, happy-go-lucky
sort of person, generally kind to his slaves, and content to gang his
own gait in his own way. That is the natural state of the Hausa. If we
take him away from his business habits and fashion him into a soldier,
we perforce place him in the midst of artificial conditions of life,
where his individuality become lost. He is then merely interesting in the
sense that our other African levies are interesting, that is, from an
exclusively military point of view.
The Hausa can be drilled into a good soldier, and under decent treatment
will show much patient endurance and bravery. Like all Negroes, if
adequate supervision be lacking, he will take advantage of the prestige
attaching to his uniform to tyrannise over the aborigines among whom he
is quartered.
In his military capacity the Hausa has rendered good service in the Benin
and Ashanti campaigns; in the course of innumerable skirmishes on the
lower Niger, throughout the operations so admirably carried out by Sir
George Goldie against Nupe and Ilorin, and so on. It should, however, be
remembered that on those occasions where the Hausa soldier has fought
under the British flag, he has gone into battle with the consciousness
of possessing weapons which gave him an incontestable superiority over
his antagonist. He has never been called upon to face a native force
officered by Europeans, and armed with quick-firing rifles similar to
his own. His capacity to rise to the occasion if necessity demanded it
need not be queried. That is a matter upon which military men personally
acquainted with the Hausa’s qualities and defects as a fighting unit are
alone competent to give an opinion.[42] But until the Hausa has been put
to the test, it may be well not to found too high an estimate of his
military abilities, bearing in mind that, unlike the French West African
recruits, he does not come of a fighting stock.
[Illustration: HAUSAS DRILLING]
As already stated, it is in his natural sphere of commerce and industry
that the Hausa shines. In that respect he stands without a rival on
the continent in which he lives. His manufacturing skill is not only
remarkable for Africa: it puts Europe to the blush. For closeness,
durability and firmness of texture, the products of his looms and
dye-pits eclipse anything that Manchester can produce. In a land of
reputed indolence, his activity is as conspicuous as his enterprise. He
makes an ideal commercial traveller, peddling his wares over enormous
distances, and seldom failing to secure a considerable profit on his
transactions.
The Hausa has so identified himself with the commercial requirements
of a vast region that his language has, throughout it, been adopted as
the necessary vehicle of inter-communication for all that appertains to
trade and commerce. The Hausa language is _per se_ specially well fitted
for extensive propagation among African races. Reclus[43] has said of
it that by its fine sonorousness, the richness of its vocabulary, the
simplicity of its grammatical structure, and the graceful equilibrium of
its phrases, Hausa deserves to rank among the foremost languages of the
Dark Continent; and Sir Harry Johnston includes it with English, French,
Italian, Portuguese, Arabic and Swahili among the great languages of New
Africa.[44]
The first vocabulary of Hausa was compiled by Mr. James Richardson, who,
in company with Dr. Barth and Dr. Overweg, crossed the desert to Lake
Chad in 1850-51.[45] Upon his return from Africa, Dr. Barth himself
published a work upon the Hausa, Fulfulde and Kanuri[46] languages.
Messrs. Schön[47] and Krause subsequently devoted much study to the
subject, and the former issued a remarkable book on the Hausa language
in 1876, of which there appeared a revised edition in 1885. Later on,
Mr. John A. Robinson, M.A., a scholar of Christ College, Cambridge, made
further researches into Hausa during his stay at Lokoja. After his death
the Hausa Association was formed (1891) with the object of continuing
his labours, and in 1894 the Reverend Charles Henry Robinson, M.A.—now
Canon Robinson of Ripon—was despatched by the Association to Kano.
Canon Robinson and his companions Dr. Tonkin and Mr. Bonner spent three
months in Kano, and in due course the former published an account of his
experiences[48] which excited much attention, coming as it did so soon
after Lieutenant-Colonel Monteil’s remarkable journey from St. Louis
to Tripoli through Kano had revived the world’s interest in the famous
Hausa city. Since then the Hausa Association has published four works
on the Hausa[49] language. In 1897 the Cambridge University appointed a
University Lecturer in Hausa, and the authorities of Christ’s College
established a Hausa scholarship open to graduates of the University or
others who have passed an examination in at least one Semitic language.
The initiative thus displayed by the Hausa Association[50] and by Canon
Robinson is worthy of all praise, and it is greatly to be hoped that
further efforts may be forthcoming which will extend so useful a field of
inquiry to the other great languages of Northern Nigeria, Fulfulde and
Kanuri.
The Hausa language appears to belong to the Hamitic group, although
it contains numerous Semitic idioms, and also a large number of words
borrowed from the Arabic.
Some controversy exists as to whether Hausa can be properly considered a
written language or not. Canon Robinson stoutly maintains that it is, and
even goes so far as to assert that there is no race north of the Equator,
nor indeed in all Africa outside Egypt and Abyssinia, which has reduced
its language to writing, or made any attempt at the production of a
literature.[51] That is, as Americans say, a tall order, and I beg leave
to doubt the accuracy of the statement. Sufficient interest attaches to
the point to merit a cursory examination.
In the introductory remarks to his “Magana Hausa” already referred to,
Mr. Schön speaks of himself as the writer of a “previously unwritten
language”—meaning, of course, Hausa. Commenting upon that passage in
the preface to the “Hausa-English Dictionary,” Canon Robinson infers
that, when Schön wrote the words quoted above, he was probably unaware
that the Hausa possessed any kind of literature at all. That seems to
me a gratuitous assumption, for Barth, who came before Schön, and whose
works Schön would naturally have consulted, more than once declares
categorically that the Hausa language is _not_ a written language.
Yet Barth knew perfectly well that the Hausa had possessed historical
manuscripts, since he lamented their destruction by the Fulani at the
capture of Katsena, which was then, as Kano is to-day, the seat of
culture of the Hausa race. It may therefore be asserted with every
probability of exactness that Schön spoke _en pleine connaissance
de cause_ when he referred to himself as the writer of a previously
unwritten language. Now, can the existence of a certain number of
manuscripts in the Hausa language, and written in Arabic characters, be
considered sufficient proof that Hausa itself is a written language?
If so, then Fulfulde is a written language, because Bello committed
to writing in the language of his race, and in Arabic characters,
a history of the Sudan; and Kanuri is a written language, because
Koelle[52] published in 1854 a Kanuri grammar founded upon a collection
of manuscript literature in the tongue of the Kanuri and in Arabic
characters. In that case it follows that, contrary to what Canon Robinson
affirms, the Hausas are not the only African people north of the Equator,
outside Egypt and Abyssinia, who have reduced their language to writing
or aimed at producing a literature. If the first claim is tenable, if,
that is to say, Hausa is a written language, then the second claim put
forward is not tenable. I do not propose to continue this appreciation
into more technical channels, which would probably be wearisome to the
reader, and will content myself with quoting from a letter received by
me some little time ago from a British Officer then in charge of the
Military Intelligence Department of Northern Nigeria, whose knowledge
of Hausa has been officially declared to be “unique.” Being unable to
reconcile Canon Robinson’s statements that it was a written language,
with the facts as they presented themselves to me, I finally turned to my
correspondent, whose competency I was well aware no one would venture to
dispute. This is what he says:
“Robinson’s Hausa Grammar was universally pronounced a failure
by all officers of the West African Frontier Force, and they
could make no progress by using it. I have already told you
that the natives say they could not understand him. Moreover,
one hardly talks the same class of Hausa to any two Hausas
consecutively; but after a couple of minutes’ conversation
with a native one knows his dialect, and what words to use,
and how to pronounce those words, the pronunciation varying
considerably.[53] The Hausa writing, very little of which
exists, is simply Hausa written phonetically in Arabic
characters, there being no recognised way of spelling one
word, which fact alone proves how little the written language
is used. Nowadays Hausa is scarcely ever written, except
isolated words, such as ‘Sariki’ and ‘bature.’ The Hausa
writing is called ‘Ajumi,’ and when such words are used in
an Arabic letter, it is usual to prefix the word ‘Ajumi,’ in
order to warn the reader that the following words are Hausa,
not Arabic. The Arabic used is primitive, but correct. As the
Hausa vowel sounds cannot always be correctly represented by
the Arabic vowel marks, there is only the context to guide
one in many Hausa written words, and the task of spelling out
every word phonetically is a laborious one, especially when
the proper sound cannot in all cases be represented. I have
seen some of the most learned Mallams in Nigeria experience
great difficulty in reading Canon Robinson’s specimens of Hausa
literature. Canon Robinson attaches much too much importance to
the Hausa writing. The few specimens that exist are interesting
as curiosities, but the language is useless as a means of
communication.”
CHAPTER IX
THE NATIONAL INDUSTRY OF SOUTHERN NIGERIA
The palm-oil tree is the staple product of the whole of the coastwise
regions of West Africa from Sierra Leone[54] right down to the Lower
Congo. The Niger Delta may be considered as the central region of its
production. Since regular administration was set up in the rivers,[55]
the output of the oil and kernels of the palm-oil tree has been as
follows:
OIL.
Year. Quantity. Value.
1892-93 10,079,039 gallons £482,803
1893-94 12,207,658 ” 637,625
1894-95 Not ascertainable 505,637
1895-96 10,672,106 gallons 514,303
1896-97 9,350,559 ” 465,583
1897-98 8,476,955 ” 410,134
1898-99 8,113,820 ” 397,870
1900[56] Not stated in C. O. report 491,131
The great majority of the oil is sent to England, but France takes a
considerable quantity (£70,880 out of the total of £491,131 in 1900), and
Germany also purchases a fair amount (£28,094 in 1900).
KERNELS.
Year. Quantity. Value.
1892-93 34,710 tons £301,483
1893-94 39,224 ” 334,144
1894-95 Not ascertainable 295,313
1895-96 36,640 tons 296,397
1896-97 38,043 ” 290,125
1897-98 39,529 ” 295,545
1898-99 40,528 ” 305,791
1900[57] Not given in C. O. report 430,016
The output of kernels seems to be steadily on the increase. Germany is
far and away the largest purchaser of Nigeria’s kernels. In 1900 she
took more than two-thirds—to the value of £346,997—of the total for that
year.[58] Thus in eight years the fruit of the palm-oil tree in Nigeria
is seen by these figures to have yielded no less than £6,453,900. The
production has certainly been greater, as the Niger Company’s exports of
oil and kernels are only included for 1900, the quantities and values for
the preceding years not being publicly accessible.
[Illustration: MAKING PALM-OIL]
The chief centres of palm-oil production in the Niger proper as distinct
from the Delta, or, in other words, in the territories formerly under the
administrative sway of, and still almost entirely tapped in a commercial
sense by, the Niger Company are Ogute Lake, Atani, and Onitsha. The Ogute
Lake produces about 4500 casks of oil annually; it is connected by the
Orashe River, for small craft drawing four feet in the dry season and
eight feet in the rainy season, with Degama, but is only open from the
Niger River during the rainy season (for craft drawing seven feet) or say
from August to the end of December. It is about seventy hours distant
from Burutu. Atani yields about 6000 casks per annum. It is open from the
sea _viâ_ Burutu or Akassa all the year round. Distance from Burutu about
two and a half days. Onitsha will probably exceed before long the other
two districts mentioned as a productive centre, the population being very
dense; distance from Burutu, three days. For kernels, Assay is the chief
centre, producing about 6000 tons annually. It is open all the year round
from Burutu for craft drawing about five to five and a half feet, and
between July and October the rains permit of navigation for craft drawing
up to twelve feet; passage from Burutu, twenty-four hours. Illushi, Idah,
Lokoja, Egga, Jebba, and Shongo are other important centres.
The commerce derived from the oil-palm tree, apart from its paramount
importance in a commercial sense, has many and varied features of
interest. It was, for example, so far as the oil is concerned, the
trade which first took the place of the slave traffic. The beverage
extracted from it is mentioned in some of the oldest references to the
Dark Continent—thus we know that Cambyses “delighted” in its flavour,
and Herodotus tells us that amongst the gifts with which he despatched
the mission of the Ichthyophagi to Ethiopia was “a cask of palm-wine.”
Collecting the palm-tree’s fruit may also be said to be the national
industry of the West African Negro almost all along the coast—certainly
in Southern Nigeria.[59] It is an industry which permanently employs
hundreds of thousands of Negroes, men, women, and children, and gives
work to many thousands of white men, from the merchant to the steamship
owner, from the manufacturer to the chemist. Often in watching the long
files of carts conveying the bulky barrels in which palm-oil is shipped
home from the west coast, passing along the Liverpool streets, or the
rows upon rows of these casks and heaps of palm-kernel bags piled up
on the dock’s side, have I marvelled at the ignorance of those persons
who inform us that the native of West Africa will not _work_. Not work,
with this testimony to his labours! Not work, when hundreds of English
workmen are busy unloading, rolling and carting these proofs of the
Negro’s industry every month in the year, every week in the month, every
day in the week almost! Not work, when it is borne in mind that this
brilliant yellow stuff with the penetrating smell, shipped in hundreds of
thousands of gallons from West Africa, is brought down to the coast bit
by bit, in small receptacles, often from considerable distances inland,
on the heads of these idle and lazy people; that the kernels in those
greasy, dirty-looking bags have each been extracted with infinite trouble
from an extremely hard shell, that 400 of them are required to make a
single pound of kernels, and that the market value in Southern Nigeria
of those 400 kernels, to the native, is the maximum sum of one penny! A
stone-breaker’s job in this country is not looked upon as a sinecure, but
I beg leave to doubt whether the stone-breaker would be content with one
penny per every 400 stones he breaks.
[Illustration: DUKE-TOWN, OLD CALABAR, SOUTHERN NIGERIA]
There is not another tree in the whole world which produces money with so
little expense as this particular crop. In Nigeria the oil is prepared
usually in small quantities, in the small villages scattered over the
country. After being prepared, it is in many instances carried by women
and children to some central native market, situate as a rule on the
edge of a waterway. There it is bought by the middlemen so called, who
are really the carriers of the country, and put by them into the casks
previously supplied by the European merchants. The casks are packed
away in canoes, and the middlemen paddle down through the creeks for
distances varying with the length and character of the waterways, to the
merchant’s factory at the mouth. The merchant then pays for the oil,
gives the middleman an empty cask in exchange for the full one, and
ships the latter by the first steamer that comes along, the middlemen
coopering it up and making it as sound as possible before starting off
on their homeward journey. Palm-oil is used in the manufacture of soap
and candles.[60] It is also employed in South Wales and the States in
the preparation of tin plates, the plates when white hot being dipped in
palm-oil, which gives them their smooth and glassy surface. The demand
for palm oil increases annually, and for many years to come is likely to
keep up with the supply.
The transaction which takes place between the merchant and the middleman
native is the simplest feature of the trade. Before that stage has
been reached there are ramifications innumerable. A middleman chief,
for instance, will send ten or twelve canoes up the creeks with goods
which he has purchased on trust[61]—a large proportion of the trade is
still carried out on the trust system, credit being given as between the
merchant and the middleman, the middleman and the producer, and again
the producer with other producers further afield, the nearest producer
becoming thus a middleman or carrier for his more distant countrymen—each
of the canoes being in charge of one of his “boys,” with enough men to
convey the craft to a certain market. There that particular canoe remains
until the goods it has got on board are sold and the canoe is full of
oil. The same thing occurs in the case of every market in the district,
and so on all over the country, the canoes sometimes remaining several
weeks away.
Apart from the porterage, purchase, putting into casks, conveying by
water, final sale and shipment, which employs such numbers of natives in
their respective _rôles_, there is the collection and preparation to be
taken into account before a complete idea can be formed of the varied
stages the palm-oil industry goes through until the product is landed
on our shores. There is, first of all, the process of climbing the tree
to get the fruit, which, of course, is at the top. After removing the
fruit the natives are able, when the nut is properly ripe, to shake it
out of the spiky casing in which it grows. The nut is something like a
plum-stone, only bigger, and contains the oil to the thickness of about
one-eighth of an inch. Inside is the kernel, itself enclosed in a very
hard shell. To extract the oil the outer skin or shell has to be split
or peeled off. The nuts are usually flung into an old canoe, the natives
trampling upon and crushing the outer skin, and then put into boiling
water, which brings the oil to the surface. But there are a good many
ways of preparing the oil, and its different characteristics were at one
time supposed to be due to different ways of preparation on various parts
of the coast. That does not appear to be the opinion now, for the theory
is hardly sufficient to account for the extra quantity of glycerine such
as is met with in Bonny and Old Calabar oil, and the larger proportion of
stearine[62] which exists in the hard kinds of Brass and New Calabar. We
have now come to an end of the history of the collection of palm-oil, and
the second use to which the oil-palm lends itself arrives upon the scene.
[Illustration: FILLING PALM-OIL BARRELS, SOUTHERN NIGERIA]
With the breakage of the nut and the extraction of the oil, there
is left the kernel in its covering. The kernel trade did not become
general[63] until a few years ago, the kernel being usually either left
to decay or to reproduce, and for a considerable time it was pointed
out that hundreds of thousands of pounds were annually lost in this
way. But within a comparatively recent time the natives have been
induced to break the hard shell in which the kernel is enclosed, and the
latter are shipped home in yearly increasing quantities from Nigeria
by the merchants, who dispose of them to the African Oil Mills[64] or
some other seed-crushing establishment in Liverpool, or send them to
Hamburg: Germany, as already stated, being the largest buyer. The kernel
yields an oil which in its concrete form is white in contrast with the
yellowy-red or deep red or ochre colouring of the oil in the nut itself,
and is the principal ingredient in Sunlight and other soaps of a similar
character. In its chemical properties it is almost identical with the oil
pressed from the inside of the cocoa-nut—_i.e._ copra—which is known as
“cocoa-nut oil.” It is exclusively used in the manufacture of soap.
Owing to the very great labour entailed in cracking the shells, a task
generally performed by putting the nut on a stone and breaking it with a
stone or stick, and the immense amount of time wasted by so primitive a
method, it cannot but be a matter for astonishment that some mechanical
contrivance has not been devised and put to general usage whereby the
process might be accelerated and facilitated. It is certainly not due to
any fear of exhausting the supply by too rapid production, for, so far
as any conclusions can be based upon the quantity of oil brought down to
the factories, Nigeria is still a long way off producing anything like
the full quantity of kernels available. The fact is that several attempts
have been made in this direction, but with one exception[65] they have
failed, and the failure has discouraged further efforts. Cracking
machines of various kinds have been imported, but through neglect, the
deadly effect of the West African climate upon machinery of any kind—more
especially perhaps in so very humid a part as the Niger Delta—and other
causes, they have speedily become “old iron.”
[Illustration: A PALM-KERNEL MARKET IN SOUTHERN NIGERIA]
Although it may seem presumptuous for an outsider to make such a
suggestion, I cannot but think that something more might be done, in
a systematic and concentrated way, to bring about so great a reform
as the cracking of the kernel-shells by machinery could not fail to
be; quadrupling as it would the total production, and releasing a
large amount of labour, which could be turned into other channels. In
view of the very meagre remuneration which the native is willing to
accept per pound’s weight of kernels cracked by hand, it is difficult
to understand how any real trouble, that decent wages and tactful
management were capable of overcoming, could be apprehended in the
utilisation of sufficient labour to keep the requisite steam-power at
work, more especially as, it is known, the shells would provide a fairly
efficient fuel ready to hand. Moreover, would machinery elaborate enough
to necessitate steam-power be absolutely essential? Could nothing be
invented in the way of importing automatic hand-cracking machines, the
cracking taking place under white supervision at the factories, and the
middlemen carriers bringing in the undecorticated nut, instead of, as at
present, the kernel itself?[66]
There seems to be much need in this great oil-palm industry, as in other
native industries in West Africa, of co-operation among the official
and commercial classes, which make up the white population—missionaries
excepted—for the adoption of some thorough and comprehensive plan of
teaching the natives more scientific methods of production. It is no use
saying the thing cannot be done. It can be done, and has been done. The
most notable example is provided in the history of ground-nut cultivation
in Senegal, which has by no means reached perfection,[67] or anything
like it, and yet is now realising a million sterling per annum. That
striking result was attained by patient, continuous and unflagging
perseverance on the part of the Bordeaux merchants, coupled with the
friendly support and assistance of the Government, without coercion of
any kind. It took some time, of course, but the results have thoroughly
justified the policy pursued, and Senegal to-day[68] is the foremost
vegetable-oil producing country in the world. We hear a great deal about
technical education in West Africa, carpentering, brick-making, and so
forth, all very admirable in their way, but the time and money spent
in these directions could be more profitably engaged by perfecting the
_existing native industries_ of West Africa, and by creating new ones,
which would do more than anything else to increase the prosperity of
the country, and at the same time be based upon sound science, for
the natural instincts and aptitude of the Negro are pre-eminently
agricultural. Far more lasting good could be achieved thus.
Officials and merchants working side by side for a common aim, and
science—that is what West Africa needs. What a reflection it is upon our
Administration in West Africa, that the commercial position of Sierra
Leone, for instance, should be declining, year by year, largely owing to
a passion for keeping up a form of taxation which is repugnant to the
natives, and does not even pay the cost of collection, when thousands of
pounds annually are wasted in the Sherbro district alone by the natives
merely collecting the kernels, leaving the oil to rot off—all for want
of encouragement, and the teaching of scientific methods of production,
while acres upon acres of rubber-producing land in Lagos have been
impaired by a similar absence of preliminary common sense. Perhaps the
most curious feature of the whole business is that which consists in
turning round and blaming the native for wilful destruction which—in the
latter case mentioned—he was never taught how to avoid. If the oil-palm
industry were taken in hand in practical fashion, there is no possible
doubt that an enormous development would ensue. But while the want of
sympathy and combination, one might almost say the latent opposition,
between the official and merchant class continues, I cannot see that
matters will be different to what they are. The remedy lies very largely
with the Authorities.
CHAPTER X
THE ADMINISTRATION OF NORTHERN NIGERIA
The Empire has few more experienced servants in the Tropical African
field than Sir Frederick Lugard. Like every other man who has become
prominent, he possesses critics, and no doubt, like every one else, has
made mistakes, but, speaking generally, he is very highly thought of.
Whether General Lugard, with his military instincts and training, is the
right man in the right place, is a matter upon which opinion may differ.
Among military men who have served England in Equatorial Africa, no one
more distinguished could have been chosen. The only reflection which
his appointment gave rise to was an impersonal one. Nobody doubted his
capacity, but it was suggested that the delicate problems of internal
politics existing in Northern Nigeria required civilian rather than
military habits of mind to cope with.
Those problems are infinitely complex. Seldom did a situation call for
greater display of tact, sympathy and wise discernment. Seldom was there
a more abundant supply of combustible material ready to take fire upon
the initiation of a policy which should lack these qualities. Never a
field more promising of desirable results to reward a just and humane
stewardship, whose highest aim should be the contentment and prosperity
of the people committed to its charge, and whose guiding spirit should
be patience, and, as Sir Andrew Clarke puts it, “use of the power of
imagination.”
Northern Nigeria, it need hardly be observed, differentiates absolutely
from the southern province, in the nature of its soil, configuration,
altitude, vegetation: in its ethnologic material, in religion, culture,
social condition, political organisation. We have passed out of the pagan
belt, and are in contact with a more advanced type of civilisation; we
have left the forest and merged into the plain, into open park-like
country, sparsely timbered as a rule when compared with the southern
regions; pasture land, agricultural land covered with fields of waving
millet and _masara_, peopled by splendid herds of cattle, where horses
and long-nosed sheep are reared. Animism or fetishism no longer
predominates; a revealed religion has replaced it. Semitic infusion is
now everywhere apparent. It is a new world we have entered—a strange
jumbling of two continents, an amalgam of cross-migratory currents
severally attracted by the fertility of the soil; an industrialism
at once remarkable, deeply interesting and of great promise. A rough
feudalism, a loose central authority, a barbaric splendour in the midst
of primitive surroundings, a system of rule superior to anything we have
yet encountered, and of which the strongest binding cord is religious
faith; large cities, extensive cultivations, tanneries, dye-pits,
looms. A number of States, owning allegiance—more religious and racial
than political—to a supreme chief, and appointing their own district
governors, treasurers, war ministers, judges; controlling their own
armies, managing their own exchequers. Society divided into two distinct
classes—the aristocrats and the plebs—which correspond to divergencies of
race, each class confined to its own quarter, rarely mingling in licit
intercourse, perhaps more so than formerly, yet perpetuating a strain of
pure stock which must have existed in Africa for at least two thousand
years. Away from the towns, in favoured districts, herdsmen of Semitic
blood; planters, agriculturists. In the towns, statesmen, warriors on
the one side; on the other, manufacturers and traders. Riven through the
country, highways of commerce, centuries old, branching to north, east
and west, over which the tramp of feet and hoofs resounded when Rome held
North Africa, and built her forts to the desert’s edge—aye, and beyond
what man and nature have made the desert’s edge—oxen and mules carrying
natron, and asses bearing kola, camels with salt, Eastern spices, and
bales of cotton from far-off Benghazi, cotton brought from Manchester,
silks from France, needles and writing-paper from Germany, beads and
looking-glasses from Venice; richly caparisoned steeds with their
gaily-clad riders, _meharas_ swift of foot, with the _lithamed_ Tuareg
bestriding them; the Fulani shepherd driving along his flocks. Over there
by the lake, herds of elephants roam untroubled, while the Shuwa, with
his hair trimmed _à l’Egyptienne_, wanders restlessly, as though seeking
to pierce the mystery of his origin.
[Illustration: SKETCH MAP OF NORTHERN NIGERIA SHEWING DIVISION INTO
PROVINCES]
Into that country the white man has come in accordance with the ancient
prophecy, descendants of the white man who first visited it. The same
race, the dominating race, which ever aspires after empire, and which,
on occasion, forgets that the sword untempered by the plough has proved
disastrous to many Empires.
As before stated, two years elapsed between the advent of the Crown
Colony system in Northern Nigeria and the publication of the first report
by Sir Frederick Lugard. With no official data available whereby the
Commissioner’s policy or the Government’s intentions could be gauged, the
public were only able to judge of the trend of both one and the other
through the scanty information communicated by the news agencies, or
by the vehicle of private letters from Europeans resident in Northern
Nigeria. It cannot be said that such news as did filter through the
thick veil in which Northern Nigeria lay wrapped prior to the belated
publication of Sir Frederick Lugard’s report in February 1902 was of a
reassuring nature. On the contrary, while necessary police-work in Bornu
was so entirely neglected that the French found themselves compelled by
a combination of local circumstances to practically run that country
for us, to give sanctuary to its lawful ruler, to beat off and finally
track to his lair the man who, following his father’s evil way, was
creating a desert wherever he passed; events in Sokoto, which had been
in constant treaty relations with Great Britain’s representatives since
1884, seemed to justify the worst fears, and to corroborate the late
Mary Kingsley’s prediction that “three months of Crown Colony form of
government in the Niger Territories will bring war, far greater and
more destructive than any war we have yet had in West Africa, and will
end in the formation of a debt far greater than any debt we now have in
West Africa, because of the greater extent of territory and the greater
power of the native States, now living peacefully enough under England,
but not England as misrepresented by the Crown Colony system.” The news
received was exclusively of a military nature. It recorded the exploits
of numerous expeditions against native rulers, the “smashing” of this
Chief and the other, foreshadowed a large increase in the Frontier Force,
and a further extension of the area of punitive undertakings. Every
steamer for Burutu had its complement of officers on board for Nigeria,
and the military element appeared to reign supreme. At the same time the
propagandist efforts of Bishop Tugwell at Kano, which should never have
been allowed, resulted in what was predicted of them when started, viz.
failure, utter and complete. Disappointment had its inevitable sequel
in the shape of a strengthening of the repressive theory for Nigeria by
the apostles of peace. Bishop Tugwell’s chief assistant, the Rev. J.
A. E. Richardson, on his return hastened to get himself interviewed by
Reuter, described “the Emir of Sokoto and the King of Kano as the chief
opponents of civilisation in this part of the world,” and expressed
his hope that the former would be speedily “dealt with.” In the same
interview, this youthful and enthusiastic reformer was fain to admit the
existence in the territories of the aforesaid “opponents of civilisation”
of “fields upon fields of cultivated land,” houses “splendidly made,”
“broad thoroughfares,” “big, beautiful gardens,” &c. The existing
“civilisation,” although not of the Exeter Hall pattern, had at least
something to recommend it! The theme was taken up at home by another
bishop, who delivered a sermon which was simply an appeal to brute force
in Northern Nigeria, and provoked a good deal of comment. Observers
noted an almost exact parallel between Northern Nigeria and East Africa,
where the havoc wrought by the unchecked forces of militarism and
religious bigotry is of public notoriety.
When Sir Frederick Lugard’s report appeared its pages were eagerly
scanned, and it was with intense relief that a clear, definite line of
action was traced therein, and that an apparently determined intention
was noted to make a stand against certain undesirable features of policy
which had already become conspicuous. In fact, so outspoken were some of
Sir Frederick Lugard’s remarks that it was permissible and legitimate
to suppose that many of the things which had occurred did not meet with
his approval. Another reflection suggested itself from a perusal of the
report, viz. that the Commissioner was being hampered in the pursuance of
his task by the absence of the right type of political assistants. Events
subsequent to the report have tended to confirm rather than weaken that
impression, which, however, is, after all, but an impression, and cannot
at present be asserted as a fact.[69]
The chief points to be gathered from the report, as bearing upon
the Commissioner’s policy, were (1) maintenance of Fulani rule, (2)
necessity of taking in hand the affairs of Bornu, (3) advisability of
accepting with great caution mere accusations of slave-raiding, (4) harm
perpetrated by crude information, (5) recognition that more good can be
effected “by getting into touch with the people” than by “a series of
punitive expeditions and bloodshed,” (6) no compulsory religious training.
A programme such as this cannot fail to command universal approval, and
if Sir Frederick Lugard is determined to unflinchingly carry it out he
can count upon the thorough-going support of every single person in this
country who takes a lively interest in British West Africa. Nay more, he
can rely with confidence upon receiving the most strenuous backing should
it at any time become apparent that, in his attempt to get his own way,
he is not being sufficiently seconded by the Home Authorities, or that
the policy of Downing Street in specific directions makes the attainment
of that programme difficult if not impossible. Having said so much, it
is to be hoped that any criticism directed to the affairs of Northern
Nigeria may not be misunderstood in the quarter where one would greatly
desire it to be looked upon in the light of a friendly attempt to assist,
and not as criticism is so often regarded on West African matters, as
being due to a carping desire to find fault on the part of those who,
while fully entitled to speak their minds, are distant from the scene of
action, and have none of the worry and trouble involved in actual contact
with, or direct responsibility for, the questions upon which they write.
CHAPTER XI
THE FINANCES OF NIGERIA
On June 30, 1899, a Treasury Minute informed the Royal Niger Company of
the intention of her Majesty’s Government to revoke their charter. At the
end of 1899 Sir Frederick Lugard proceeded to Africa to take over the
Niger Company’s territories in the name of Great Britain. On January 1,
1900, Crown Colony Administration was established in the Niger Company’s
territories, following its similar establishment in the Delta, which had
taken place some years previously.[70] In February 1902 the Government
condescended for the first time—in the face of public pressure—to
publish a report by Sir Frederick Lugard, _dated London, May 1, 1901_.
The report, which is very interesting, but in many respects incomplete,
notably as regards finance, only brings us down to March 31, 1901, so
that, although we are now well on in the third year of Crown Colony
Administration in Northern Nigeria, this single report is the measure of
the confidence which the Government sees fit to repose in the British
people, concerning the direct responsibilities they have acquired over
some twenty-five million natives of Africa.
There are several reasons why the public should not rest content with
such meagre information. The first reason is financial. The expenditure
of the two Protectorates—Northern and Southern Nigeria—is assuming very
large proportions, a heavy load of debt weighs over them, and not only
is there not the slightest sign of an effort to wipe off that debt, but
almost every month that passes sees an extension of liabilities. The
present condition of our national finances does not justify a continued
attitude of indifference towards the expenditure of public funds on an
increasing scale in Nigeria. On the other hand, our main object in West
Africa being what it is, viz. commercial in nature, there is extreme
unwisdom, from the ordinary business point of view, in neglecting to
ascertain how the largest and most important of our estates in West
Africa is being managed, and if the outlay is giving now, or is likely
to give in an appreciably near future, those returns which the public is
justified in expecting.
What, then, are the facts as to the financial situation of Northern and
Southern Nigeria? In the first place, there is the debt of £865,000
incurred by the Government in buying out the Niger Company. This debt is,
while it exists, a bar to progress, and at a Conference held in London
on September 20, 1900, we find Sir Ralph Moor, Commissioner for Southern
Nigeria, admitting the fact. When a speaker at that Conference urged that
more should be spent on technical education in the Protectorate, and
that the necessary amount might be paid out of the surplus revenue, Sir
Ralph Moor quickly retorted that they had no surplus revenue, but were
“in the unenviable position of owing her Majesty’s Treasury £800,000.” So
much for the debt, and the obstacle to desirable improvements which its
existence entails.[71]
The debt notwithstanding, the administrative expenditure of Southern
Nigeria steadily increases. In the year 1899-1900[72] it reached the
figure of £176,128,[73] being an increase of £29,383 over the preceding
year, and exceeded the revenue by £12,000. No figures are yet available
of the expenditure of Northern Nigeria since the substitution of the
Crown for the Niger Company in the _rôle_ of Administrator, but a
reference to the estimates of March 31, 1902, shows that Northern Nigeria
received a grant-in-aid of £88,800 in 1900-01, and another of £280,000 in
1901-02, which includes the provision of £200,000 for the West African
Frontier Force voted in 1900-01. We are, therefore, confronted with
a minimum expenditure for Northern Nigeria in two years of £368,800.
At this rate it is difficult to see how Nigeria is ever to become
self-supporting. Such an enormous expenditure could only be warranted by
an extraordinary development in trade, or by the creation of means of
communication for that development, to be looked upon in the light of
expenditure on capital account. It is all very well to call it “Imperial
expenditure.” Of course it is “Imperial” expenditure, and so is every
penny spent in the furtherance of British trade abroad “Imperial.” What
we have to try and form an opinion upon is whether the administrative
expenses of Nigeria are in any way proportionate to the interests which
the Administration is supposed to be promoting there. If it is, well and
good; if it is not, reform is required.
The relation of the expenditure to the trade of Nigeria is comparatively
easy to establish. The total trade (excluding specie) of the Niger Coast
Protectorate in 1898-99 amounted to £1,477,398, and the total trade of
Nigeria—that is, the Niger Coast Protectorate plus the territories of the
Niger Company—in 1900 (excluding specie) was £2,113,878. If we deduct,
therefore, the one set of figures from the other we can arrive at a close
approximation of the trade done in the former Niger Company’s territories
included since 1900 in the Protectorate of Nigeria. The trade of the
Niger Company’s territories in 1901 was, therefore, roughly £650,000, of
which it is quite safe to assume that Northern Nigeria did not produce
more than one-third, if it produced that, the bulk of the trade being
confined to the Niger Company’s territories in the Lower River. The
trade of Northern Nigeria would thus be represented by some £216,660
out of the total of £650,000. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that
it rose in 1901 to £250,000, the total for the two years 1900 and 1901
would be £466,660. Now Northern Nigeria, as already stated, received
for the same period £368,800 from the Imperial Exchequer. Pursuing the
same method of illustration for the export trade as for total trade,
the export trade of the Niger Company’s territories works out at some
£360,000, of which, say, one-third from Northern Nigeria, or £120,000.
Putting it down at £140,000 in 1901 gives a total of Northern Nigeria’s
export trade, or, in other words, Northern Nigeria’s producing capacity
for the two years mentioned of £260,000, so that Northern Nigeria is in
the disastrous financial situation of spending more than it produces. The
one-third basis of calculation is a large and generous one, and Northern
Nigeria’s share of responsibility in the debt is not included in the
reckoning. The position then, so far as Northern Nigeria is concerned,
is unmistakably clear. Northern Nigeria is at present a financial burden
to the Empire. Eight years’ experience of Crown Colony Administration in
the Niger Delta, where the machinery set up is not nearly so elaborate
as in Northern Nigeria and where the natural exploitable riches are far
greater, is hardly calculated to cause feelings of confidence as to what
eight years of a similar system will lead to in Northern Nigeria. In the
three years ending December 1899 the Niger Delta (excluding therefrom the
Niger Company’s territories) produced a trade which averaged in value
£1,800,000, of which over £1,000,000[74] represented exports. Under
the Crown Colony system, with its expensive machinery necessitating
taxation to keep up, its military expenditure, and the absence of all
commercial co-operation in the Administration, the value of exports has
only once (1893-94) managed to rise above £1,000,000, while with that one
exception the highest and lowest figures have been £844,333 and £750,223
respectively, and the total volume of trade for any given three years
has never reached the average figure of £1,800,000. The totals of the
three years prior to 1900 were respectively £1,441,383, £1,389,922, and
£1,507,288. Making every allowance for the fall in the market price of
certain products during recent years, which, by the way, has been to
some extent counterbalanced by the increased export of new articles, the
conclusion to be derived from these figures is that the Crown Colony
system in Southern Nigeria has not yielded results which the country has
the right to expect, and the moral is that, whatever may be the position
of affairs in other British possessions in West Africa, Englishmen should
really pull themselves together and seriously consider whether the
brilliant future which Nigeria should have in store for it is to run the
risk of being compromised just for want of a little courage in facing the
facts as they are.
CHAPTER XII
MOHAMMEDANS, SLAVE-RAIDING, AND DOMESTIC SERVITUDE
It has been truly remarked that more permanent good can be accomplished
“by tact and gold with Mohammedan chiefs in West Africa than by the
Maxim and the rifle.” That is a policy which has had much to do with our
great and striking success in India. Its application to Afghanistan has
within recent years been amply justified by results. Why should it not be
followed in Northern Nigeria? Which is cheaper, an output of £5000 per
annum in subsidies, or the expenditure of much larger sums in military
operations? What is more likely to conduce to the prosperity of a vast
densely populated tropical estate where the white man cannot settle, to
gain your own ends peaceably, albeit not so speedily as might be desired,
or to use force and face the dislocation of the existing social system
which violent measures entail? Few people, if they will but calmly
consider the matter, can fail to endorse the quotation given above. In
Northern Nigeria the question is not merely one of expediency; it affects
the honour of England.
When MacGregor Laird started on his pioneering expedition up the Niger
which laid the foundations of British trade in the Upper River, his
instructions from the Government ran as follows: “It is most desirable to
impress upon the chiefs that you are there as traders, not as colonists,
not as acquirers of land, but simply as traders and for the protection of
trade.” When Lord John Russell despatched Captain Trotter and Commander
William Allen up the Niger in 1840, he recognised the advisability of
subsidising the native chiefs: “he himself (the chief) shall have for
his own share, and without any payment on his part, a sum not exceeding
one-twentieth part value of every article of British merchandise brought
by British ships and sold in his dominions.” When Mr. Joseph Thomson
concluded in 1884, on behalf of the National African Company, a treaty of
amity and friendship with Umoru, Emir of Sokoto, “King of the Mussulmans
of the Sudan,” he undertook on behalf of the Company to pay the Emir 3000
bags of cowries (roughly £1500) per annum. When that treaty was confirmed
with the Emir on behalf of the Royal Niger Company (the designation of
the National African Company when it received its charter) in 1890,
and again with the Emir’s successor in 1894, the payment of the annual
subsidy was confirmed. It was distinctly stipulated in those treaties
that the Royal Niger Company “received” its power from the Queen of Great
Britain and that “they (the Company) are her Majesty’s representatives
to me.” In the eyes of the Emir, therefore, the Company was just as much
“Great Britain” as a consular representative, or a High Commissioner.
In exchange for this annual subsidy, the Emir of Sokoto transferred “to
the above people (the Company) _or other with whom they may arrange_,
my entire rights to the country on both sides of the River Benue and
rivers flowing into it throughout my dominions for such distance from its
and their banks as they may desire.” The Emir also bound himself not to
“recognise any other white nation, because the Company are my help.” In a
letter dated April 27, 1894, the Prime Minister of Sokoto repudiated any
intention of treating “with any other from the white man’s country except
with the Royal Niger Company, Limited.” Separate subsidies were also
paid by “her Majesty’s representatives (the Niger Company)” to Gandu,
as well as to the rulers of Nupe, Adamawa, and other important vassals
of the Emir of Sokoto. That, at any rate, was a well-defined political
relationship. By it the Royal Niger Company were able to secure this vast
and populous country to Great Britain, and by it peace was, with the
exception of Nupe[75] and Ilorin, preserved. Whatever may be said of
the merits and demerits of the Royal Niger Company as an administrative
body, it must be readily granted that a coherent policy was here applied,
and that its results were, from the Imperial standpoint, exceedingly
satisfactory. The nature of the bargain was precise. The Emir of Sokoto
and his vassals conferred extensive rights upon England’s representatives
and agreed to treat with no other country but England on the basis of a
subsidy of £1500 per annum in the case of Sokoto, and sums varying in
importance in the case of Sokoto’s vassals. The bargain was—according
to the terms of the treaty—binding upon the Niger Company and its
successors. The Emir of Sokoto kept to his share of it, and at a time
when France endeavoured, through Colonel Monteil, to upset the Company’s
treaty, the Emir loyally observed his obligations.[76] The Company no
less loyally observed theirs. It is humiliating to have to confess it,
but the British Government has been less loyal than the Company, and less
loyal than the African chief whose loyalty enabled England at a critical
moment to uphold the claims of her representatives to political influence
over Sokoto. The Crown, it seems, has declined to fulfil the obligations
imposed on England by these treaties, while reaping to the full the
advantages which the existence of the treaties confers. The first public
intimation that the Imperial Government had broken faith with the Emir of
Sokoto was made by the Rev. J. A. E. Richardson, already alluded to. His
statement ran as follows: “The yearly payment in form of gifts which was
made to the Emir of Sokoto by the Niger Company has not been continued
by the Imperial Government, and quite recently the Emir flatly refused to
allow the erection of a British telegraph line.” No official announcement
has been made on the subject, nor has any member of Parliament taken the
trouble to inquire. But there is not, I think, any doubt whatever that
the Imperial Government has, in point of fact, done this thing. I have
made careful inquiries in quarters likely to be well informed, and it
seems that it was considered _infra dig._ for a Government to politically
subsidise a West African chief. That is an extraordinary doctrine. Since
when has it been considered _infra dig._ for Englishmen to keep their
word with native potentates? Since when has it been thought a criterion
of Imperial rule to show native rulers that England’s promise is not
worth the paper upon which it is written? Is that what has been called
the “new Imperialism”? Is it astonishing that the Emir of Sokoto should,
in the face of such a repudiation of treaty obligations, “flatly refuse”
to allow the erection of a telegraph-line or anything else? Is it not a
terrible handicap upon the professed intentions of the most well-meaning
administrator, to be confronted at the outset with so powerful a cause of
native suspicion and hostility?
Let us observe, for a moment, how the successive stages of British action
on the Niger must appear to the native rulers of the country. We start
off by saying that we have come to the country as merchants and nothing
more, not as acquirers of land, but simply as traders. In 1870 the Emir
of Nupe, Maroba, is found co-operating with Bishop Crowther—an earnest
and godly man—to facilitate the operations of merchants at Lokoja. In
1884 Mr. Joseph Thomson is able, without any show of pomp or power,
to induce the Emir of Sokoto, supreme ruler of the whole country, to
sign a treaty of enormous importance, which practically amounts to a
Protectorate, in exchange for a yearly subsidy. Sixteen years later a
British Government ceases the subsidy, and follows up that performance by
initiating a policy of active interference in the Emir’s dominions. As
this costs money, the next step will very probably be that the Emir and
his subjects will be expected to contribute towards the up-keep of the
Administration, and England, having agreed through her representatives to
subsidise the Emir in return for advantages conferred, will end by making
the Emir pay for permission to remain in his own country. “It seems
really incredible,” remarked the _Morning Post_ the other day, commenting
upon the fighting with the Emir of Kontagora,[77] “that a great Empire
administering savage countries should have no other weapon save an
appeal to arms.” It has other weapons, and the most potent of them is
the one upon which the Indian Empire has been reared. That weapon may be
described thus, “Keep to your plighted word.”
The cause of the repeated military expeditions of which Northern
Nigeria is the scene, is said to be slave-raiding. “Slave-raiding” is
an evil which no one can possibly defend. It leads to great misery, to
depopulation and devastation. Its agency is violence. To suppress it is
the duty of every European Government. On those points there can be no
difference of opinion. The difference comes in when the means adopted
to do away with “slave-raiding” are examined. At present but one remedy
has been devised and put into practice in Nigeria. It consists in
opposing violence by violence. It has the merit of simplicity, but at
best it is but a crude way of procedure, and its efficacy as a reforming
agent is open to doubt. “The very foundation,” says Carl Schurz, “of
all civilization consists in the dispensation of justice by peaceable
methods, instead of the rule of brute force,” and he adds a sentence
well worth thinking over: “Although a course of warlike adventure may
have begun with the desire to liberate and civilise certain foreign
populations, it will be likely to develop itself, unless soon checked,
into a downright and reckless policy of conquest with all the criminal
aggression and savagery such a policy implies.” It is impossible not to
feel the force and the truth of this sentence when the history of British
East Africa is studied. These “nigger hunts,” to use the term, not of
a “deluded philanthropist” or “impracticable sentimentalist,” two of
the many choice epithets with which people who do not believe in the
practical advantages of “nigger hunts” are consistently assailed, but of
a specially gifted officer, have worked incalculable mischief, and have
put back the hands of the clock for many years. “Some of the wars and the
punitive expeditions of the past few years,” remarks Professor Gregory
in his admirable and impartial work,[78] “have been no doubt inevitable
and just. They have been the ‘Cruel wars of peace.’ But some of the
military expeditions in East Africa have been simply criminal in their
folly and thoughtlessness.” Yet the Home Authorities defended all these
expeditions, and covered the perpetrators of blunders with its sheltering
wing, to the detriment not only of the general interests of the Empire,
but of the efficiency of the public service, by discouraging officials
who had a different conception of the duties of their position, but who
saw, by experience, that to get up a row with the natives, to fight some
brilliant action and get their “heroism” talked about, was the surest way
to obtain promotion. That, I am afraid, is in West Africa also a motive
power to advancement.
In his report Sir Frederick Lugard shows that he is alive to the abuses
which a too constant “appeal to arms” may give rise to, and how the
designation of “slave-raiding” can be converted into a mere excuse to
justify acts of injustice and oppression. “Though force,” he says, “must
be occasionally applied to bands of recalcitrant robbers, I am convinced
that a few such lessons will suffice, and that the district officer,
with tact and patience, aided by sufficient civil police, can achieve
the pacification of the country effectively, and that parsimony in the
appointment of these officers, and of their native staff of police, &c.,
would be a policy of false economy, resulting in unnecessary bloodshed.”
And again, “It is my conviction that throughout Africa—East and West—much
injustice and oppression have been unwittingly done by our forces acting
on crude information, and accusations of slave-raiding, &c., brought by
enemies of the accused to procure their destruction.”
What is the genesis of this slave-raiding we hear so much about? In the
first place, it must be obvious to all who have studied the history
of inland Western Africa with any degree of attention, that a great
deal of what is called “slave-raiding” is not “slave-raiding” at all,
but military operations undertaken by the rulers of Mohammedan States
for the suppression of risings against their authority, rendered
weak by ineffective organisation, and by the absence of adequate
means of communication. Sir Frederick Lugard has thrown useful light
upon other circumstances which may lead to wrongful accusations of
slave-raiding.[79] But, taking the first case, how often may not an
expedition entered upon by a Mohammedan Emir against his pagan subjects
in West Africa be as justifiable, if reckoned by the same standard, as
the chastisement of a tribe by the representatives of a European Power
for resisting a tax enforced by that Power, and considered by the tribe
excessive and unjust? The only fair and rational interpretation of
slave-raiding, properly so-called, is the incursion of an armed band,
without previous provocation of any kind, into a peaceful district,
followed by the capture of a number of prisoners of war who are
subsequently sold into slavery by the victors. That is a condition of
affairs by no means peculiar to West Africa. It prevailed in Europe
and in Great Britain at a period when civilisation was infinitely more
advanced than it is at present in West Africa.
The motive forces to which slave-raiding is due in Nigeria are: (1)
economic necessities, or, in other words, the revenue needs of native
rulers, requiring many prisoners of war who, as has been well said, serve
the double purpose of cheque-book and beast of burden; (2) the incidental
effect of conquest; (3) the direct incitement given to intertribal wars
by white men on the West Coast of Africa for a period extending over
several centuries, a system which, by the way, prevailed not farther back
than slightly over fifty years ago on the Niger; witness Richardson’s
and Barth’s representations to the Government of the day. Those three
causes are common to, or have been common to, West Africa as a whole. To
them must be added, in the case of Northern Nigeria and other countries
in West Africa converted to Islam by the sword, religious zeal. Let us
take those causes severally one by one and examine them.
[Illustration: A MOHAMMEDAN CHIEF AND HIS STANDARD-BEARER]
With regard to the first, it must be patent to all who can look at the
matter with unprejudiced eyes that, until native rulers in Northern
Nigeria are able to count upon a source of revenue replacing that which
they lose by the disappearance of raiding operations for slaves, and
until a portable currency can be introduced into the country to take
the place of the human currency—that is, slaves—the economic _raison
d’être_ of raids will remain; and that is why, apart from any other
considerations, a subsidy to the native rulers on the part of the
European “over-lord” cannot but prove itself an instrument for good,
pending the slower but certain modifications which the creation of
roads, railways, the development of trade which should ensue from their
creation, and the introduction of an easily portable currency—such as
silver coinage—cannot fail to bring with them. When in course of time
such development takes place, matters should be so arranged that the
rulers of the country benefit by the growth of trade in their respective
districts, or, in other words, that a portion of the revenue derived
by the Administration from trade in a given district should accrue to
the ruler of that district, and be expended in the improvement of that
district.
In all communities where the ethical standard of the people has not
been influenced by the Christian ideal, the enslavement of prisoners of
war has existed from time immemorial. The moral standard of the Fulani
Chieftains of to-day is not lower than that of Imperial Rome, and for
many, many centuries after the tragedy of Golgotha, men enslaved one
another in England and in Europe as the natural sequel to warfare.
As for the heavy load of responsibility which England shares—and to a
very large extent—with other Powers towards the native of West Africa in
her actual _rôle_ of inculcator of the higher principles of morality, it
cannot too often be called to mind. It is not so very long ago—a mere
nothing in the history of nations—that Englishmen hounded on these native
chiefs against one another, supplied them with arms and ammunition,
excited their fiercest passions, pandered to their worst vices, and all
for what? To secure, under circumstances of cruelty more aggravated
because more protracted, those very slaves which Englishmen to-day are
but too ready to liberate, by killing the descendants of the chiefs who
formerly supplied them with the objects of their desire!
Religious fanaticism has ever been attended with outrages upon humanity,
sometimes directly, sometimes indirectly. In considering the case of
the Fulani conquerors of Nigeria, we must, if we are just, recollect
how relative good and evil are in matters of this kind, how dependent
upon those hundred and one things which make up hereditary instincts and
environment. Have the Fulani committed more atrocities than Christian
Europe (although far behind Christian Europe of those days) perpetrated
upon the Jews? Can we turn over the pages of Gibbon and condemn to the
death penalty these wanderers in Darkest Africa, when we read of the
deeds of Christians amid “civilised” surroundings, where art and crafts,
the ease and luxuries of life, culture and refinement had reached,
comparatively, so high a stage—a stage which West Africa had never known?
Are the episodes of Saint Bartholomew and the persecutions of “bloody”
Mary not vividly within our recollection? Do not the lessons of history
suggest that “civilisation” would best fulfil its mandate, and rise to
the level of its claims, by drawing upon an abundant store of patience
in dealing with the evil of “slave-raiding” in Nigeria and elsewhere in
West Africa? And if there be a fair prospect, as there undoubtedly is,
of removing the causes, economical and otherwise, which produce slave
raids, by peaceful methods, to employ the ways of peace rather than the
sword, although the process be a slower one, we can have made but very
few real strides in the last two thousand years if statesmanship be not
equal to the task. This is sentimentalism, you will say. Well, it is
easy to call names, but the following passage indicates, at least, that
a British Government was not ashamed once upon a time to preach much the
same doctrine:
“While you describe the power and wealth of your country, you
will, in all your interviews with the African chiefs and with
other African natives on the subject of the suppression of the
slave trade, abstain carefully from any threat or intimidation
that hostilities upon their territory will be the result of
their refusal to treat.... You will allow for any hardness of
feeling you may witness in them on the subject of the slave
trade, a hardness naturally engendered by the exercise of that
traffic, and in some cases increased by intercourse with the
lowest and basest of Europeans. You will endeavour to convince
them by courtesy, by kindness, by patience, and forbearance of
your most persevering desire to be on good terms with them.”[80]
At what period, and under what circumstances, has this persevering desire
to establish friendly terms, as a basis upon which to work to do away
with the internal slave-trade of Nigeria by the exercise of courtesy,
kindness, patience, and forbearance been consistently applied, or been
given a fair chance? We should be hard put to it to supply even one
instance, in a given district.[81]
So much for the moral aspect of the question. There is another aspect to
which the most unsentimental of mortals will not deny the attributes of
severest practicability. I refer to the effect of these wars, nominally
undertaken for the suppression of slave-raiding and the upsetting
of priestly theocracies in West Africa, upon the well-being of the
inhabitants and upon the prosperity of the Colonies themselves. Those who
may be inclined to look into the matter may peruse with advantage that
very able volume, “Ashanti and Jaman,” by Dr. Richard Austin Freeman, one
time Assistant Colonial Surgeon and Anglo-German Boundary Commissioner of
the Gold Coast.[82] Sir Frederick Lugard in his report writes: “Already,
with the removal of the fear of the Fulani, each petty village is
claiming its ancient lands, or raiding those of its weaker neighbour, and
interminable feuds are the result.” That passage entirely confirms Dr.
Freeman’s opinion with regard to the forcible splitting up of the Ashanti
confederation after the Wolseley expedition. The latter part of it is
almost word for word that of a letter which lies before me at the present
moment, and which I received from an Englishman in the Niger shortly
after Sir George Goldie’s brilliant but inconclusive campaign against
Nupe. “The whole country is confused”—wrote my correspondent—“the central
authority having been suppressed; each man raids on his own.” In point
of sober fact, almost every war waged in West Africa has a deteriorating
effect, unless it be followed immediately by constructive action, which
in the vast majority of cases is impossible owing to the vastness of the
country. We read of a chief falling foul of the British Authorities and
being deposed. If captured, he is marched off to the coast and deported;
if he succeeds in escaping, the chances are he will rally some followers
round him and prove a source of trouble for a considerable time. However
that may be, he is at any rate replaced by some other individual who may
or may not have, according to local custom, a right to the chieftainship.
A resident with a small escort may or may not be left in the capital.
Now, bearing in mind that in Nigeria a district over which a particular
chief holds at least a nominal sway is sometimes as large as Wales or
larger, no great amount of imagination is required to picture what but
too often happens. Let us, for the sake of argument, consider Wales an
inland kingdom, and imagine it under the feudal system, the King aided
by his barons ruling the country, with many abuses no doubt, but still
ruling it after a fashion and able to make his power felt. At a given
moment the King quarrels with a neighbour. The neighbour enters the
country, defeats the King’s armies, marches on the capital, captures
it and the King together. The King is taken away a prisoner and the
conqueror remains in the capital with a small force, ignorant of the
language of the people, of their history, traditions, customs and laws.
He will not be attacked because it is known that his soldiers possess
weapons which kill easily at 300 yards, which mow down men in heaps, and
which it is as futile to attempt to face as it is to stand against the
roaring tornado hurtling through the forest. But for obvious reasons
it is also known that he cannot effectively hold the country. Result
number one: all semblance of authority within gun-shot of the capital has
disappeared. Result number two: every ambitious baron develops schemes of
aggrandisement, starts foraging in the property of his neighbours, who
do ditto with religious unanimity; another party remains faithful to the
deposed King and intrigues to get him back; another may take the part of
the dummy appointed by the conqueror, presuming that step to have been
adopted. Sequel: disorganisation, widening of area of disturbance, social
chaos, impoverishment of the country.
This is not, indeed, the exception but the rule in West Africa. The
facts are on record. I have quoted two eminent authorities in specific
instances and mentioned one other case. But the examples are numerous,
and were it necessary one might amplify them considerably. Sometimes
the effect is chiefly commercial, as in the case of Nana, ex-chief of
Lower Benin.[83] Since his removal after the war in that district the
volume of trade has fallen considerably, which has been a bad thing,
of course, all round, from the point of view of both revenue and
commerce. Speaking generally, the only logical outcome of a punitive
expedition in West Africa is the replacing of what has been pulled down
by something else which shall answer to the needs of the people in the
same way, or a military occupation of every yard of the country. West
Africa being what it is, the thing cannot be done, and the consequence
of punitive expeditions in that part of the world, no matter what the
motives, alleged or real, may have been, is ninety times out of every
hundred reactionary, sterile, and morally destructive. Hence, whether it
be a matter of slave-raiding or fetishism, or disputes about land, or
difficulties about trade, punitive expeditions are things to be avoided,
and the Administrator who avoids them is the type of man which West
Africa needs most.
A reference to the question of slave-raiding in Nigeria would be
incomplete without mention being made of domestic slavery, or more
properly termed domestic servitude. I remember assisting, not so
long ago, at a lecture by a missionary on Northern Nigeria. With
great impressiveness the lecturer announced that a large proportion,
four-fifths I think he said, of Hausas in Nigeria are slaves. There was
no doubt of the effect of the statement upon the audience, composed
of benevolent, well-meaning people, who conjured up at once the
most horrible visions. The mere enunciation of the fact, or alleged
fact—because, from what I have been able to ascertain, the estimate
is widely exaggerated—is calculated to horrify a public ignorant of
the nature and characteristics of domestic slavery in West Africa, and
there can be as little doubt that such is the deliberate and perfectly
sincere intention of the individuals who make these bald statements, as
that their after consequences upon the public mind are harmful. All are
agreed that the intestine warfare which results in the capture of many
prisoners and their conveyance over large distances always involves great
hardships and sorrow, and very often fearful sufferings upon the victims.
But the weight of evidence is decidedly against the supposition, still
so widely entertained, that domestic slavery in West Africa is what the
unscientific advocates of its hasty abolition, regardless of the obvious
political objections to such a course, would have the public believe.
[Illustration: MANDINGO MUSLIMS]
Nay more, while it may be fully admitted that a condition of servitude
is indicative of a state of society which we happily have grown out
of, and which in itself is essentially opposed to the moral law, no
impartial student will be prepared to deny that the condition of tens of
thousands of toilers in this country is infinitely worse than anything
which prevails under the West African native system, where poverty at
least is normally non-existent. The latter, it is true, are technically
free, but to them actual freedom would, if exercised, lead to starvation
pure and simple. They are bound in chains more enduring than any forged
by native blacksmiths in Nigeria. The “White Slaves of England” was an
appropriate title to a series of terrible articles published a short time
ago in a popular London magazine, the absolute accuracy of which has
since been acknowledged. “The West African slave”—a celebrated French
explorer and administrator has said—“is not so unhappy as many people
who live round us and whom _we will not see_.” That is the simple truth.
Between the domestic servitude of Nigeria—where any form of paid labour
is unknown as a native institution—and plantation slavery under European
supervision there is all the difference in the world. Compared with the
latter, the former is relative bliss. Degradation was the keynote of
the one. The other permits and frequently leads to equality between the
owner and the servant. Under the European system the slave was a dog and
worse than a dog; under the West African system the slave is part and
parcel of the social life of the people, a member, and not unfrequently
an honoured member, of the family.[84] With the second generation, the
distinction between the owning and serving class in West Africa is less
pronounced, and with the third generation, if it has not already been
practically effaced, the distinction is simply theoretical. Slaves then
own slaves of their own, while still theoretically remaining slaves
themselves. Once a slave is incorporated in a household he usually
remains a fixture, is decently treated, and, if his conduct is good,
his material prosperity rapidly increases. It is the commonest thing in
the world for a slave to rise high in his master’s favour, and even to
hold lucrative and responsible positions. All the relations of domestic
life in three-fourths of the Niger territories are based upon the system
of domestic slavery, and there is no question which requires to be
approached by the authorities with greater breadth of comprehension, with
greater largeness of views, with a more sincere resolve to resolutely
set aside all appeals, by whomsoever uttered, to bigotry, passion, or
prejudice.
The harm which hasty legislation tending to violently interfere with the
entire social fabric of a people and with a custom centuries old entails
cannot be exaggerated. It spells utter disorganisation, and has already
worked incalculable mischief in the British West African possessions by
destroying the authority and influence of the chiefs and breaking up the
whole labour of the country. The lesson has been learned rather late in
the day, and there is hope that it will bear fruit, but the influences on
the side of error are very strong at home, and it never seems to occur to
those amongst us whose profession in life is the inculcation of the moral
virtues, that we have no greater right to destroy or abolish domestic
slavery without compensation of some sort, if only that of substituting
railway transport and portable currency in West Africa, than we had in
the West Indies or in South Africa. Why should West Indian planters and
Cape Colonists receive compensation for the loss of their slaves, and
the African chief nothing—except bullets? The policy of the sword and
the application of twentieth-century legislation to twelfth-century
conditions, however good the intentions, are, in the main, Imperial
mistakes, for which England may indirectly pay, but whom the present
generation of natives and the generations which come afterwards do—and
will—suffer in their persons. “It is understood”—cabled Reuter’s agent on
the Binue on September 21, 1901, subsequent to the capture of Yola—“that
Government will not interfere for the present with domestic slavery, the
evil effects of such a policy being still felt in the provinces of Nupe
and Ilorin. It upset the internal economy of the whole country, and the
male slaves, instead of working on their master’s farms, became rogues
and vagabonds, and the women something worse.” What a biting satire upon
the notion that immemorial customs can be changed by a stroke of the pen
without breeding disorder and social chaos! The question of domestic
slavery in Nigeria may best be approached by once again recalling
that great truth, “God’s design in the perfecting of man’s mind is
evolutionary and not revolutionary.”
CHAPTER XIII
THE PRINCIPAL PRODUCTS OF NIGERIA
The difficulty in estimating the producing capacity of the enormous
territory of Nigeria is not in stating what _natural_ products of
economic value grow there, but what do not. Nigeria is the tit-bit of
West Africa, and practically every form of vegetable growth peculiar
to West Africa, or shared by West Africa with other and less favoured
tropical portions of the globe, is to be found within its extensive
limits. A soil of surpassing richness; numerous waterways, a prolific,
industrious population—all the elements are there to make of Nigeria
under wise management a second if smaller India, but an India unvisited
by drought, or those fearful scourges which are so terrible a drawback to
the internal prosperity of India; perchance a happier, richer India.
With the exception of the oil-palm industry, everything is in its
earliest stages in Nigeria. Development is rudimentary. Deducting palm
oil and kernels, the value of the whole of Nigeria’s exports in 1900—the
only year available—amounted to the relatively small sum of £212,457.
Rubber, ivory, timber, ground-nuts, fibres, coffee, cocoa, gum copal
and shea butter are amongst the other products exported. The white
sweet-smelling flowers of the rubber vine are one of the commonest sights
in the forests of Nigeria. The tree, shrub and vine rubber are all met
with. The value of rubber exported from Nigeria in 1900 was £137,289.
It may increase to almost any figure if the authorities will but take
warning by the sad experience of Lagos, enlist a brigade of trained
rubber-workers to instruct the chiefs in the science of collecting,
and prevent—which they can easily do—grossly adulterated rubber from
leaving the country, and so preserve a high standard of quality, for,
in the present sorry condition of the rubber market, low-class rubbers
are almost unsaleable. Here, again, one is compelled to preach, if it
be for the fiftieth time, co-operation between the officials and the
merchants. In French Guinea, the evils of adulteration (for which, by
the way, the merchants were, I am afraid, primarily responsible) have
been successfully combated by a working partnership, so to speak. It is
not necessary to impose restrictions upon the freedom of the native in
collecting this product in his forests, but it is essential to maintain a
_permanent_ staff of native rubber-collecting instructors. It would cost
very little, and the experiment, if patiently and intelligently pursued,
would give magnificent results.
Next in importance to rubber comes ivory, which, however, must be
regarded as a temporary commerce. Almost the whole of the ivory trade
of Nigeria hails from the Binue region, and for many years Yola was the
principal buying depôt of the Niger Company, as much as forty tons being
sometimes purchased there in the course of the year. The consequences of
the Anglo-German Agreement of 1893 and the Franco-German Convention of
1894 are calculated to greatly diminish the trade. The ivory business
is entirely in the hands of Hausa traders, who make, or used to make,
most of their purchases in the famous markets of Banyo, N’Gaundere, and
Tibati, carrying the teeth overland to the Binue and then conveying them
across the river, to dispose of either at the Niger Company’s pontoon at
Yola or factories at Ibi, Lake Bakundi, Lau, and Amageddi, or at Kano,
where it was sold for cloth and found its way eventually to Europe,
_viâ_ the desert route and Tripolitan ports. This is still done, but,
for the reason stated, the volume of trade is almost certain to diminish
as the years go on. When the ivory is sold to the Niger Company, English
manufactured cloths are purchased in exchange, and this again is bartered
by the Hausa traders against the superior article of native make in Kano.
Sometimes salt, tobacco, copper-rods, and gunpowder are in request
by the ivory traders, instead of cloth. It is always an open question
with Hausa traders which pays them best, the single transaction if they
sell direct at Kano, or the double transaction involved by sale to the
Niger Company. The chief currency of these regions is now the cowry
shell, and cowries have a native market price just like anything else;
for example, a hundredweight of salt will equal 25 heads of cowries, or
roughly 12_s_. 6_d_. When a tusk is brought to the factory it is weighed
on a butchers’ steelyard. The tariff per pound is 10 heads of cowries.
If the tusk weighs, say, 28 lb., it fetches 280 heads of cowries, about
£7, or £560 per ton in barter goods, but the price actually paid for
mixed ivory in the Binue has been under £500 per ton for many years past.
The arrival of an ivory caravan is always the occasion for a great deal
of excitement. Some of these caravans stretch over a mile in length.
First comes the trader and his friends on horseback, followed by the
trader’s wives and the various members of his household. Behind them
come the slaves, weary and footsore (slaves of Hausas be it noted—not of
Fulani), struggling under their valuable loads. The tusks are carried
sometimes on the heads and sometimes upon the shoulders. Of course, these
caravans can only travel in the dry season, for during the rains the long
marches would be attended with enormous difficulty. There are plenty of
tricks in the ivory trade, and our Hausa friend is very fond of putting
heavy substances in the hollow of the tusks, knowing well that if he is
undetected the increased weight will add to his profit. The Hausas call
ivory “owry”[85] and elephants “giwa.” They very often bring the flesh of
the animal, which fetches higher prices in the native markets than beef
or mutton.
Gums, of which there exist many different kinds in Nigeria, also
constitute a source of future riches. There is gum arabic (_Acacia
senegalensis_) which oozes from the bark—much like sap from a venerable
cherry—and the “copals” found in solidified, translucent lumps, by
digging at the roots of acacias, and which sometimes fetch as much
as £80 per ton on the European markets. Very beautiful some of these
specimens are, varying in colour from pale lemon to deep orange-yellow,
and clear as the finest amber. These graceful gum-trees form in many
places a notable feature of Binue scenery, and abound in many parts of
Bornu, and it is not an unusual circumstance for a Bornuese cavalcade,
including several individuals wearing the old-world surcoats of chain
armour which has so excited the interest and curiosity of travellers in
that country, to arrive at a trading-station on the Upper Binue with a
load of gum arabic for sale. The natives of Hamarua (Muri), too, are
noted gum-collectors. As in the case of almost all Nigerian products,
the absence of competition among European purchasers (the Niger Company,
it must always be remembered, has been the sole trader in these regions)
has hitherto prevented the natives from bringing in very large quantities
of gum, and where ivory is to be got, it is hard to induce Hausas to
go in for laborious gum collecting and picking. There can be little
doubt whatever that the gum trade is susceptible of being increased to
thousands of tons per annum. The supplies must be almost inexhaustive.
After many years of assiduous collection, the Kauri pine forests of New
Zealand still furnish 8,000 to 10,000 tons per annum of fossil gum, more
or less similar to the West African “copals.” It can be said without
fear of exaggeration that there are hundreds of thousands of tons of
this valuable product in West Africa waiting to be dug up. One fine
day the fact will be better realised than it is at present, and we may
then expect to see a remarkable development in the product. Among other
valuable trees freely growing in Nigeria, but of which the economic
aspects have not yet been thoroughly studied, two at least deserve
special attention. They are the Kedenia (Kedenya) or Shea-butter tree
(_Butyrospermum_ or _Bassia parkii_[86]—the _beurre de Karité_ of the
French), sometimes, and erroneously, called the tallow-tree, and the
papain or paw-paw (_Carica papaya_). Shea butter has of late appeared as
a regular if small export from the Niger.[87] Large forests of it are to
be found in the Lagos hinterland, and also in Dahomey, where the French
hope to exploit it when their railway enters the zone of production.
Shea butter fetches about £24 to £26 per ton in Europe. It contains
certain medicinal properties of a purgative nature, I believe, and is
said to form a component part of the well-known Elliman’s Embrocation.
By the inhabitants of Nigeria the butter of the Kedenia is held in high
esteem, and is put to a number of varied uses: medicinally, for cooking
purposes, &c. The Fulani dose their horses internally with it, and
also rub it on the sores which the cumbrous high-peaked saddles of the
country frequently produce on the backs of their steeds. The Kanuri, or
Bornuese, use it to light their lamps with, and other tribes believe
it to be a sure cure for rheumatism. There seems to be a possibility
of the shea-butter tree being put to a second use; recent experiments
have shown that the latex furnished by this tree contains properties
similar to gutta-percha.[88] The butter- or tallow-tree (_Pendatesma
butyracæ_), which is often confounded with the shea-butter tree, is an
entirely different tree, belonging to the genus _Guttifera_, whereas the
shea butter is of the genus _Sapotacæ_. The French appear to have been
the first to make any economic use of this tree, and for the first time
last year, when a trial shipment of nuts was forwarded from Conakry to
Marseilles by the leading French firm of merchants in the former place.
The nuts when crushed were found to yield a valuable oil possessing
ingredients which render it particularly applicable for the manufacture
of candles. That wise and brilliant administrator, the late Dr. Ballay,
Governor-General of French West Africa, left a legacy of priceless worth
behind him in the shape of officials reared in his school and imbued with
his sentiments, and M. Cousturier, the present very able Governor of
French Guinea, has taken up this subject of the tallow-tree nut—“lamy”
as it is called—most energetically, in co-operation with the council
of merchants established in that Colony. My latest information on the
subject is that further shipments of “lamy” nuts from French Guinea have
taken place to Marseilles, Hamburg, and Bremen, and that the prospects of
disposing of the nuts to seed-crushers at remunerative prices is assured.
It remains to be seen whether the nut can be produced in adequate
quantities in French Guinea. I have not been able to positively ascertain
whether the tallow-tree occurs in Nigeria, but there is every probability
that it does, and if so, it will be another vegetable product of value to
be added to Nigeria’s long list.[89]
Seldom is it that on village market-days in Nigeria the golden
pear-shaped fruit of the _paw-paw_ does not appear for sale. The natives
look upon paw-paw fruit in the double light of a delicacy and article
of considerable utility. The juicy milk of the fruit, and the large,
handsome leaves contain the singular property of making hard meat tender,
a peculiarity which has given rise to many “travellers’ tales” on the
coast. The toughest steak is rendered soft and agreeable to the palate
by being rubbed with the juice of the paw-paw, or wrapped round in its
leaves. The active principle of the dried juice of the paw-paw is
somewhat akin in nature to pepsin, and is regularly used as a substitute
for the latter in France and Germany. So far, the demand is small, but
there seems every likelihood that it will increase. In connection with
the future development of the paw-paw in Nigeria, it is interesting to
note that a small factory for the preparation of pepsin from this fruit
has been established within recent years in the Island of Montserrat.
In addition to the trees already mentioned, the kola (_Sterculia
acuminata_, sometimes termed the _Sterculia cola_), the gutta-percha,
the giant baobab (_Adansonia digitata_) or monkey bread-fruit tree, and
the bamboo palm (_Raphia vinifera_) must be briefly touched upon. The
kola-nut is to the Fulani, the Hausa, the Kanuri, the Songhay, &c., what
coffee is to the Arab and opium to the Chinese—a never-failing panacea.
So indispensable is the kola to the daily existence of the native of
Northern Nigeria, so enormous the demand, that the Hausa journeys
thousands of miles to the districts of the Niger bend (the Gold Coast
hinterland chiefly), and even to the Gambia hinterland and the valley of
the Senegal, to barter his blue cottons for this much-sought-after fruit.
European science will, no doubt, eventually succeed in so improving the
quality of the Nigerian kola as to make these long journeys yearly less
necessary. Kola plantations should then become a lucrative feature of
Nigerian industry.
Gutta-percha is as valuable an article of commerce, and as greatly
in demand for European manufactures, as rubber itself. In Nigeria
gutta-percha is collected immediately the rainy season is over, the sap
at that time of year flowing more freely from the tree. In coagulating,
the milk assumes a reddish tinge.
The baobab has been aptly termed the monarch of the African vegetable
kingdom. From the bark of the _kuka_, as the Hausas call it, excellent
ropes and strings for musical instruments are fashioned, while the
fruit, when crushed and dried, furnishes the natives with an excellent
substitute for sponges.
[Illustration: A BAOBAB
THE GIANT OF WEST AFRICAN FLORA]
Vast groves of the bamboo palm (_R. vinifera_) exist in many parts
of Southern Nigeria, and although but little utilised at present,
experiments have demonstrated that the fibre derived from the branches
of this palm is capable of producing an excellent and durable bass[90]
somewhat similar in quality to that which is obtained from the allied
spices, the _Raffia ruffia_ of Madagascar, the demand for which on the
European market is already extensive.
Date palms, dum palms, and cocoa-nut palms, lemons, bananas, plantains,
sweet potatoes, yams, sugar-cane, hemp, tobacco, benni seed,[91] pepper,
cassada, castor seed, capaiva—Nigeria produces all these in more or less
abundance, according to the locality, and also ground-nuts and large
quantities of capsicums (red pepper). The valuable indigo plant is widely
cultivated by Hausas and Fulani, and Kano owes much of its wealth to the
dyeing industry carried on by the natives. The native-woven Kano cloth,
dyed a deep indigo blue, is renowned all over Northern, Western and
Central Africa. With European skill, the cultivation of indigo in Nigeria
may possibly have a future before it, although the present outlook is not
encouraging.
The cotton shrub grows luxuriantly in Northern Nigeria, and the cloth
manufactured from it by the natives can favourably compare, for
durability and fineness of texture, with the best Manchester article.
There may yet be a great cotton industry in Nigeria, but the subject of
cotton cultivation in West Africa is sufficiently large to justify a
special chapter.
Ebony, mahogany and other valuable cabinet woods abound in the enormous
untapped forests of Southern Nigeria, and if no peddling restrictions are
placed upon the development of the timber industry, it should reach large
proportions. Sapelli is beginning to have some importance as the foremost
port of shipment for Southern Nigeria timber.
Nigeria also produces cereals in plenty, such as maize or Indian corn,
millet, rice, barley, guinea corn, gero, &c., and on the high plateaux
coffee, tea, and perhaps vanilla could be grown.
As far as minerals are concerned, silver,[92] tin, antimony and stone
potash[93] are known to exist in several parts of Nigeria, but none
of them, save the latter, have been worked. When the country has been
better explored and surveyed, gold and copper may also be found (small
quantities of gold dust are sometimes sold by the Kanuri to Fezzan and
Ghadamseen merchants), but their presence in any extent is at present
problematical.
Tin is known to exist up the Binue, and an English Syndicate has been
formed to explore and report upon the tin-bearing possibilities of
certain districts. The Niger Company are about to start prospecting
operations, and the Germans are also said to be studying the same subject
at Garua.
Such, briefly enumerated, are the chief natural products of Nigeria,
the most fertile and prolific portion of the Central African Continent,
towards which has gravitated a commercial movement from north, east and
west for centuries past. Such eminent authorities, in their respective
ways, as Barth, Nachtigal, Monteil, Thomson, &c., speak in terms of
unbounded admiration of the fruitfulness and the beauty of these regions,
and all the information brought by travellers and explorers of lesser
importance only tends to confirm the assertion of the great geographer
Reclus, that the countries of the Chad Basin are the richest in Africa.
CHAPTER XIV
RUBBER-COLLECTING IN NIGERIA
I have already briefly alluded to the vegetable products of Nigeria. The
collection of rubber, however, presents many features of interest, and
deserves more extended treatment.
Of late years the West African rubber industry has grown enormously. In
some cases the increase has been phenomenal. The Niger Coast Protectorate
and the Gold Coast have within the space of six years more than doubled
their rubber exports. The performance of Lagos has been still more
remarkable, although unfortunately the wastefulness, or perhaps it would
be fairer to say the lack of scientific knowledge on the part of the
natives in tapping the trees and vines, has led to a notable falling off
in production during the last three years. It seems evident that Western
Africa may in time rival Brazil as the rubber-producing country of the
world.
The rubber found in West Africa is of various kinds. The place of honour,
so far as our own Colonies are concerned, may be given to the rubber-tree
properly so-called, _Kickxia Africana_ (the “Ere” or “Ireh” of the
natives), and a beautiful tree it is, springing up clean and smooth to a
height of sixty feet. Then come various species of _Ficus_, and last, but
not least, the _Landolphias_, or rubber-vines.
In Nigeria rubber is found, roughly speaking, from Abutshi, 120 miles up
the river Niger, as far as Jebba on the Niger and Yola on the Binue. We
will suppose that a rubber-collecting expedition has been decided upon by
the inhabitants of some village fifteen or twenty miles from the river
side (rubber in Nigeria is scarce on the actual river banks).
Soon after dawn all the available men and women gather together—a
light-hearted, jabbering crowd. Extraordinary animation reigns throughout
the village. The ground is strewn with the implements necessary to the
rubber-collector’s art, and with the victuals essential to the sustenance
of his body while the work is being pursued. They include such varied
articles as calabashes, “matchets,” knives, dried yam in bags, and fresh
water in bottles which once contained that delectable, throat-peeling
liquid known as Hamburg gin. Mingled with them, in apparently hopeless
confusion, numerous spears and flint-lock guns lie scattered. There
is generally something or other on the prowl in an African forest in
the shape of leopards, or “humans,” or spirits—and it is just as well
to be prepared for any emergency. Hence these warlike accompaniments,
calculated to deceive the inexperienced into a belief that raiding and
not rubber is in question.
Through the village and beyond it, passing plantations of millet, yams,
Indian corn and cassava, winds the caravan, until the fringe of the
forest looms near. Then, abruptly parting with the bright sunlight and
the waving fields, we plunge headlong into an atmosphere of gloomy,
fantastic weirdness, and disappear amid the silent shadows of the giant
trees. By this time the caravan is reduced to single-file formation. It
has stretched out for a mile or more along the narrow curling path, which
often takes the form of an almost complete circle, those who compose its
extreme rear being within hailing distance of the leaders, while between
the two extremities and the centre is a broad belt of impenetrable bush.
And what a solemnity broods over all! Everything is hushed. The bare
feet of the natives sink noiselessly on generations of fallen, rotting
leaves. The air is damp, humid, and enervating. We glide along in the
semi-religious light as though oppressed by some vast, undefined, awesome
presence. It is a world of great black shadows and mysterious depths; and
within it the soul shrinks and falters beneath a weight of indescribable,
all-potent, unnerving melancholy. A hot breath, laden with sickly and
overpowering perfume, rises in stifling gusts till the brain reels, and
you long with a great yearning for air and light and waving fields.
And then, suddenly, a glimpse of Paradise. Shattered by lightning, or
perchance, riddled by the larvæ of some monstrous coleoptera, a forest
giant has tumbled headlong, tearing by the impetus of his fall a great
rent in the sombre dome above, through which, though chastened and
subdued, the sun’s rays filter down upon the path beneath. There, in that
temporary clearing, Nature seems to have lavished all her gifts. Festoons
of glorious orchids stretch out their capricious blooms, asking to be
plucked. The wild tamarind, with its exquisite, plum-coloured, plush-like
fruit, invites the touch. Round flowers and fruit flutter countless
brilliantly coloured butterflies, and the glimpse of a deep tropical
blue, far, far overhead, completes the fairy sight. No palm-fringed oasis
among shifting sands can be more blessed to the traveller than these
gem-like clearings amid the sullen gloom of the tropical forests of
Western Africa.
But to return, with apologies for this digression, to our
rubber-collectors. No sooner has the member of a caravan—every one acts,
as a rule, independently of his fellow—pitched upon a spot which seems
propitious, than down comes the load off his head. A little preliminary
in the shape of refreshment is ever conducive to good labour, so recourse
is had to the _ci-devant_ gin-bottle and the dried yams. These inner
cravings having been satisfied, the rubber-collector makes with his
“matchet” a number of transverse incisions in the bark of an adjacent
rubber-tree, or vine,[94] as the case may be; hangs his calabashes (empty
gourds) beneath the cruel rent, sees that the sap is running; looks
round for more trees, makes more incisions, hangs up more calabashes;
and then, feeling fully satisfied with his labours, casts himself down
upon the ground and lies there awhile, heedless of the crawling legions
of the insect fraternity. Every now and then he will lazily rise and
make the round of the trees he has tapped, to assure himself that the
sap is flowing freely into the calabashes. A really good workman will
collect three or four pounds of rubber a day, so that, taking an average
of, say, two pounds for each individual, a caravan numbering one hundred
and fifty souls will gather a considerable quantity of the stuff in a
comparatively short time. The sap is then boiled in an iron pot to make
it coagulate, salt and lime being sometimes added to help the process of
solidification. It is then rolled into balls. When the calabashes are
full the homeward march begins.
The home-coming of the caravan is marked by congratulations on the part
of those who stayed behind, and every proud owner of a calabash or two
of rubber recounts to the members of an admiring household the wild and
terrible adventures (in the shape of spooks, leopards, and what not)
which have befallen him in the forest.
The last stage in the business, so far as the native is concerned, has
then to be carried out. The rubber having been collected, it must be
sold. So off goes the collector to the nearest trading station with the
spoil. Now, if the commercial ways of the Heathen Chinee are dark, the
ways of the Heathen son of Ham are much the same on occasion. The rubber,
he knows, is bought by weight. Primitive reasoning convinces him that if
he rolls his rubber round a stone or bullet, not only will the ball weigh
more, but he will be able to make more balls out of the rubber he has
collected. The consequence is that the European trader, when he cuts the
rubber ball in two (being used to these little pranks), frequently comes
across a stone, bullet, or other heavy substance embedded in the centre,
to the unbounded astonishment, needless to remark, of our friend the
collector, who cannot for the life of him understand who placed it there,
and asserts, with much emphasis and gesticulation, that only a ju-ju or
spirit of the most depraved character could have played an honest man so
low-down a trick.
[Illustration: WASHING RUBBER]
When the rubber has finally passed into the white trader’s hands, after
the preliminary native preparation, it is still found to contain a
large proportion of water (about 10[95] per cent.) and emits a most
disagreeable odour. This water has to be ejected before the rubber is
fit for the European market. The balls or cakes are therefore placed in
a pressing machine, resembling an ordinary mangle, then cleaned of the
impurities which may still remain, and finally cut into strips, soaked in
sea-water to prevent “sweating,” and shipped in wooden casks.[96]
The rubber trade of Nigeria is only in its infancy, and the advent of
competitive private enterprise into the Niger territories should have the
effect of stimulating the industry to a notable extent.
The unfortunate destruction of the rubber trees and vines in the Lagos
forests has been instrumental in producing a _furor_ of restrictive
legislation on the part of the authorities. There is grave doubt as to
whether this method of approaching the subject is not mistaken and likely
to defeat its own ends. It is incongruous, to say the least of it, to
first of all encourage the native to exploit a new product, to give him
no scientific instruction or training in the process, and then, when
the inevitable happens, to express great indignation at his villainous
capacity for mischief, and frame legislation calculated to interfere
with his free use of his own property! It is not the general custom of
the native to destroy a product out of which he makes money. In the case
of the oil-palm, in the usage of which they have been long accustomed,
the native chiefs themselves legislate against over-tapping, witness the
“porroh” of the Mendis. It is a matter of instruction. It is notorious
that the crisis in the Lagos rubber industry is entirely attributable
to the gross foolishness displayed by the authorities in the first
instance in not taking the necessary means to teach the natives the art
of rational production. What is wanted is the creation of small centres
of instruction in every district, where the natives could come for
information, where various products could be shown, tested and commented
upon. The official in charge would have no powers whatever conferred
upon him in a political sense, but would be connected, of course, with
the Government. His duty would be that of instructor, supervisor, guide,
and assistant. He would certainly be welcomed by the chiefs, so long as
they were assured that his _rôle_ was entirely divorced from political
designs. The experience would cost very little, and the benefits accruing
therefrom, both as regards the perfecting of existing native industries
and the stimulation of new ones, would be considerable, and would do away
with the necessity, or alleged necessity, of subsequent legislation of an
irritating character. A little more of that sort of thing and a little
less blood-letting and “murder of native institutions,” as Miss Kingsley
used to put it, in order to improve them, would be very desirable.
CHAPTER XV
THE FULANI IN NIGERIA
“Remember that Paradise is found under the shadow of swords.
These wretches are come to fight for an impious cause. We have
called them into the right way, and to reward us they threaten
us with arms. Meet this attack with courage and be certain
of victory for the Prophet has said, ‘Even if a mountain is
guilty against another mountain, it is swallowed up in the
earth.’”—The speech of OTHMAN, the Fulani conqueror of Hausa,
to his soldiers on the outbreak of war.
“The King of Gober took many of their cows. The Phulas said nothing. He
returned again to seize their cows. The Phulas said, ‘Is it right on us
to take vengeance?’ But the King of Gober took some of their cows and
returned them to them, saying, ‘Let there be peace between us; you leave
this place and return to some place near me.’ They replied they would not
go. In the morning he commenced fighting with them, with one thousand
horse soldiers to seize the Phulas; but they drove him back with great
force. From that time he did not make open war with them again; but he
brought poison, put it into the water, and all who did drink of it died.
After this the Phulas made war with him, and when they had conquered
his people, they caught many of them and made them slaves; in this way
it was that the Phulas got possession of Gober. In the same way it was
that they sent their people to all parts of Hausa and fought with the
Pagans.”[97] Thus does a native version explain the origin of the great
Fulani uprising in the Hausa States in the early part of last century
which started a great wave of Muslim conquest, sweeping southwards from
the Chad Basin almost to the ocean. “We will dip the Koran in the sea,”
swore the conquering host of white-clad horsemen, and but for the
concentration of the agricultural Yorubas, which checked their advance
and led to their overthrow, by a night surprise, outside the walls of
Osogbo,[98] they would have fulfilled their vow.
The story of the Fulani revolution—misnamed by some “invasion”—in Hausa
has been often told, sometimes correctly,[99] sometimes with obvious
bias against the reformers, and _minus_ several important facts, such,
for instance, as the co-operation which the revolutionists sought and
found among the Hausas themselves. To describe it once again would be
superfluous. Suffice it to say that “victims of persecution,” as their
own records assert and as Barth confirms, and as we are at least as
warranted in believing as those other accounts which make them out to
be the oppressors rather than the oppressed; in much the same position
of social and political inferiority to men whose intellectual superiors
they are, as their compatriots find themselves to-day in Borgu, the
pastoral Fulani of Northern Nigeria, remembering the performances of
other of their brethren when similarly situated, and acting under the
influence of their mallam Zaky, or Othman Dan Fodio, to give him his
European appellation, flung aside the crook, took to the sword, and with
the name of “Allah” on their lips completely subjugated in a few short
years the mutually antagonistic Hausa States, made themselves masters of
the principal cities, converted the natives to Islam, and so ably and
justly administered the country,[100] that, in Clapperton’s words, “The
whole country, when not in state of war, was so well regulated that it
was a common saying that a woman might travel with a cask of gold upon
her head, from one end of the Fellatah[101] dominions to the other.”[102]
From cattle rearers and herdsmen the Fulani temporarily became warriors,
administrators and statesmen, a minority retaining these attributes to
this day, while the bulk of the people continue their usual avocations.
Their capacity for combination enabled them to overcome the Hausa States,
perpetually engaged in intestine quarrels; their statesmanship induced
them to foster and encourage the caravan trade with the Tripolitan ports;
their administrative genius was observable in a hundred ways, not the
least in obtaining their revenue by the maintenance of existing forms of
taxation.[103] Their intense religious zeal has been so communicative
that the Hausas have never even fractionally relapsed into Paganism.[104]
When we contemplate the achievements of the Fulani in Nigeria we are lost
in wonder, and there is no difficulty in endorsing what Sir Frederick
Lugard has said of them—and what many French administrators and officers
have said before him—“they are born rulers and incomparably above the
negroid tribes in ability.” What potent allies these men can be to the
wise administration which makes use of their services in Western Africa,
which gains their confidence and enlists their sympathies!
[Illustration: FULANI SWORD]
The wholesale manner in which the Fulani have succeeded in stamping
their individuality upon the races with whom they have come in contact
is astonishing. Everywhere in their wonderful _trek_ from east to west,
and from west to south, from the valley of the Senegal to the valley of
the Binue, new and more virile generations have sprung up beneath their
fertile tread, destined in the course of time to found for themselves
separate kingdoms, almost to become separate nationalities. Thus in
Futa Jallon, that mountainous region abounding in the fine cattle the
Fulani themselves introduced in the sixteenth or seventeenth centuries,
and which before the French occupation supplied the Freetown markets
with fresh meat, we find the Fulani powerfully affecting the ethnic
elements of the country by their unions with the indigenous Jalonkes and
Mandingoes. In Senegambia, a well-nigh distinct race has arisen in the
Tukulors, Fulani crossed with Joloff and Mandingo. Hausas and Kanuri of
Bornu, Tuareg of the southern confederations, and Susus from the Northern
Rivers[105] have all received an infusion of Fulani blood. And yet the
pure Fulani element has preserved itself, and while absorbing countless
tribes and becoming itself greatly modified in certain districts,
has succeeded in perpetuating the parent strain which has never been
absorbed.[106] At the present time may be found, scattered throughout the
Western Sudan, in the Futa Jallon highlands, and in the regions abutting
upon Lake Chad—in Adamawa notably—the same type of nomadic herdsmen,
refined, hospitable and courteous in demeanour, simple and patriarchal in
his habits, with clear-cut features and copper-coloured or olive-tinged
complexion, who tended his hump-backed cattle and roman-nosed sheep a
thousand years ago in the oasis of Tuat and the plains round Timbuctoo.
And by his side, his wives, rejoicing in a greater degree of liberty and
authority in the household than any of their African sisters, with the
charm of another land upon them, soft-eyed, spice-loving daughters of the
East, from whence they came in those dim and distant days shrouded in
impenetrable mist.
[Illustration: PURE-BRED FULANI GIRL, ADAMAWA]
The history of the Fulani is not confined to Nigeria. Their rise to power
in the old Hausa States, and the foundation of the Sokoto Empire is, as
we have seen, quite a modern event, and it is only partially accurate
to say that their dominating influence in inland Western Africa dated
from the Jihad of Othman. The latter’s successes certainly inspired the
Fulani (but perhaps more especially the cross races of Fulani blood)
west of the Niger to warlike deeds. The Fulani revolution in Hausa was
followed by the Fulani uprising in Segu against the pagan Bambarras
and Soninkes. Timbuctoo fell into their power in 1826. Mohammed Lebo
started a crusade in Massina, directed as much against the pagans as
against his co-religionists and compatriots, for their lack of zeal and
the impurities which had crept into their religious observances. After
Mohammed Lebo, the great Tukulor chief, El-Haji-Omar, a man of remarkable
ability, belonging to the fanatical sect of the Tijaniyah, gathered
an immense host around him, by means of which he waged war on all and
sundry, showing particular animosity towards the parent stock from which
he sprang. But his religious zeal was untempered by political purpose,
his constructive powers appear to have been small, he fought entirely for
his own hand, and his collision with and subsequent defeats by the French
resulted in the revolt of those who had suffered from his excesses. It
is a curious fact that he should have finally been driven to desperation
and suicide, and his power extinguished, by the Fulani themselves,
notwithstanding the ties of blood which bound them to the Tukulors, from
among whom Omar naturally obtained most of his recruits. Nevertheless,
El-Haji-Omar is still a name to conjure with in the Western Sudan, and
other adventurers of his type have from time to time given the French
a deal of trouble. But the Fulani had been masters in a considerable
portion of Western Africa long before Othman raised his standard in
Gober of Hausa. In the next chapter endeavour will be made to search
the earliest records throwing light upon the presence of the Fulani in
Western Africa. This will help us to approach the problem of the origin
of a race which constitutes the ruling factor in the foremost, in point
of size and importance, of the British Protectorates in West Africa.
CHAPTER XVI
THE FULANI IN WEST AFRICAN HISTORY
“In every kingdom and country on each side of the river there
are some people of a tawny colour called Pholeys.... They live
in hoards or clans, build towns, and are not subject to any
kings of the country, though they live in their territories:
for if they are ill-treated in one nation they break up their
towns and remove to another. They have chiefs of their own, who
rule with so much moderation that every act of government seems
rather an act of the people than of one man.... They plant near
their houses tobacco, and all round their towns they open for
cotton, which they fence in together; beyond that are their
corn-fields, of which they raise four kinds.... They are the
greatest planters in the country, though they are strangers in
it. They are very industrious and frugal, and raise more corn
and cotton than they consume, which they sell at a reasonable
price, and are very hospitable and kind to all; so that to have
a Pholey town in the neighbourhood is by the natives reckoned a
blessing.... As they have plenty of food, they never suffer any
of their own nation to want; but support the old, the blind,
and lame equally with the others; and, as far as their ability
goes, assist the wants of the Mandingoes, great numbers of whom
they have maintained in famines.”—FRANCIS MOORE on the Fulani
of the Gambia (1734).
“A race in which self-reliance and colonising instincts are
prominently developed. Education and mental training are
carefully attended to. In every town and village are men who
devote themselves to the instruction of youth. Nearly every man
and woman can at least read Arabic. Under the enlightened rule
of Alimami Ibrahim Suri, life is held in reverence, property
is sacred, robbery committed in the highway is punishable with
death.... There is a woman in Timbo who knows the whole of the
Moallaket by heart, an accomplishment in Semitic lore which
many an Oriental scholar in Europe might envy.”—DR. BLYDEN on
the Fulani in Futa-Jallon.
“They occupy a high place in the scale of intelligence.”—BAIKIE
on the Fulani of Northern Nigeria.
The earliest mention we have of an Empire existing in West Africa is
contained in the _Tarik_,[107] a history of the Western Sudan, written
in the seventeenth century by one Abderrahman ben Abdallah ben Imran
ben Amir Es-Sa’di, and apparently ascribed by Barth in error to the
celebrated _savant_ of Timbuctoo, Ahmed Baba. That Empire was the Empire
of Ghanata, so called from its capital Ghana, which has been identified
with Walata or Biru. The spread of the Empire was enormous and extended
to the Atlantic, embracing the valleys of the Senegal and the Gambia.
Ghana was situate in the central province of the Empire, by name Baghena,
the modern Bakunu according to Commandant Binger. The _Tarik_ states
that twenty-two kings had reigned in Ghanata prior to the Hejira. Barth
approximated the foundation of Ghanata to 300 A.D. It was attacked and
defeated in the eighth century[108] by a Berber tribe (Zanaga, Senhaja?),
the invaders subsequently succumbing, at what period is obscure, to
the Mandingoes—or Mandingo-Fulani, _i.e._ Tukulors—who from its ruins
constructed another Empire which grew to even larger proportions, that
of Melli, Melle,[109] or Mali, as it is variously spelt. Who were the
original founders of the Ghanata or Walata Empire?
[Illustration: FULANI CHIEF—FUTA JALLON]
Dr. Robert Brown, in his most admirable edition of Pory’s translation of
Leo,[110] says: “Walata is the Arab and Tuareg name, while Biru is the
one applied to it by the Negro Azer, a section of the Aswanek, who are
the original inhabitants of the place.” At the time the above was written
no complete copy[111] of the _Tarik_ was obtainable, and Dr. Brown was
unable consequently to consult the work, and to observe how closely
it corroborates Barth’s famous chronological history of the Songhay.
Had he done so the passage in question would, no doubt, have undergone
modification, for the _Tarik_ distinctly tells us that the name of the
original founder of the Ghanata (Walata) dynasty was Quaia-Magha,[112]
and Magha, as M. O. Houdas points out, is a Fufulde word meaning “great.”
Thus it is legitimate to assume, in view of the absence of rebutting
evidence, that the original founders of probably the oldest Empire in
West Africa, of the first Empire at any rate of which record is left
to us, were of Fulani blood. In any case, it would appear to point
conclusively to the existence of the Fulani language, and therefore to
the presence of the Fulani in the Senegal region of West Africa from the
very earliest times.
It may be argued that a single word is a slender basis upon which to
construct a theory. But when it is borne in mind (1) that the ensuing
historical record of the very same region, 1500 years later, viz.
the arrival at the court of the Bornuese king Biri of two religious
chiefs _of the Fulani of Melle_, proves the presence of the Fulani in
the country which the _Tarik_ asserts was ruled over by a king with a
Fulfulde[113] affix to his name; (2) that every successive account,
both Arabic and European, referring to the same region corroborates the
circumstance, it will be conceded that the assumption goes far beyond
mere plausibility. There is every reason to believe that the Fulani
were numerous in the Empire of Melle[114] (if, indeed, the rulers of
that Empire were not of mixed Fulani blood, which seems probable[115]),
sometimes in the ascendant, sometimes the under-dogs, according as their
political fortunes rose and fell.[116] In the middle of the fifteenth
century they were certainly the ruling race in Baghena (the central
province, as already stated, of the Ghanata Empire, which seems to have
preserved its name subsequent to the Mellian conquest), having succeeded
apparently in getting the upper hand. We know this from the Songhay
records, which tell us that at that period Askia, the powerful Songhay
king, “conquered Baghena and slew the Fulani chieftain Damba-Dumbi.”[117]
Thirty years before that event the chief of Baghena was also a Fulani,
as is testified by the records of Askia’s predecessor. About 1450
Ca-de-Mosto speaks of “el rey dos Fullos” on the banks of the Senegal.
Later on, John II. of Portugal sends an embassy to Tamala, “powerful
king of the Fulas.” De Barros, the Portuguese historian, refers to a
great war, “incendia de guerra,” in the Senegal country (1534). Masses of
Fulani, says de Barros, left the country of “Futa”—probably Futa-Toro—in
a southerly direction. So numerous was the host, he continues, that
“it dried up the rivers in its passage.” Marmol also refers to this
southward movement. The Fulani, “who had raised so formidable an army
in the southern parts of the province of ‘Fura’ (Futa) which borders
on Mandingo, which they were marching against, that they pretended it
dried up rivers.”[118] No doubt that was the beginning of the Fulani
migration into Bondu and Bambuk, to be followed at a subsequent period
by a continuation of the movement into Futa-Jallon. The _Tarik_ gives us
the story of the foundation of the Fulani State of Toro by Salta Tayenda,
“the false prophet,” in 1511.[119] According to the _Tarik_, the Fulani
were ruling as far eastward as Masina in the fifteenth century, and
Barth’s chronological table of the Songhay mentions an expedition by a
Songhay king against the Fulani of Gurma, still farther east.
Coming to a later period, we have Jobson (1628) talking of the Fulani
as oppressed by, and in subjection to, the Mandingoes in the Gambia
region. In 1697 the Sieur de Brüe pays his first visit, on behalf of
the French Senegal Company, to the court of the Fulani ruler on the
Senegal River. Labat’s description of the event is most picturesque.
They were the days when African monarchs were treated with respect by
the European who desired to trade with their subjects. Even the cynical
prelate to whom we are indebted for the relation of Brüe’s voyage, and
who chuckles over the small villainies practised upon the Fulani by
the Company, expresses astonishment with the Fulani institutions, the
judiciary and administrative systems, the agricultural and commercial
aptitude of the inhabitants. “As far as the eye could reach,” he says,
quoting from Brüe’s papers, “not an inch of ground was left uncultivated
or neglected.” Farther on he speaks of “vast plains covered with cattle.”
“They”—the Fulani—he continues, “cultivate the soil with care and make
abundant harvests of large and small millet, cotton, tobacco, peas and
other vegetables, and they rear prodigious quantities of cattle.” In
short, we find the same well-defined characteristics in the Fulani Empire
in the Senegal of the seventeenth century as are observable in their
Empires of more recent date. Herdsmen and agriculturists by nature, they
produce, when circumstances have placed the government of the countries
in which they have settled into their hands, a class of statesmen and
administrators.
[Illustration: HALF-CASTE FULANI GIRL—FUTA-JALLON]
I have quoted a considerable number of authorities—the list might easily
be extended—to show that the Fulani have lived in the Senegal and Gambia
region from remote times, and that their identification by the _Tarik_,
and by Barth, with the Ghanata Empire, estimated by the latter to date
back to A.D. 300, is, therefore, inherently probable. From the region
in which they have alternately been rulers and ruled, and where they
reside to-day under French domination, the Fulani have gradually spread
themselves south and east, throughout almost the entire region of inland
Western Africa. The movement continues and is one of the most interesting
ethnological factors in Western Africa. On the west, the forest belt has
prevented the Fulani from reaching the ocean, although on two occasions
they were very nearly doing so, from behind Lagos in the middle of last
century, as mentioned in the previous chapter; from behind Sierra Leone
about thirty years before their defeat at Osogbo, their cavalry (as in
Yoruba) being ineffective against the opposition of the forest dwellers,
Sulimas and others—the free Negroes of the Sierra Leone Protectorate,
upon whom Downing Street in its wisdom imposed a property tax in 1898.
Ashanti tradition mentions the advent of “red men” from the interior as a
contributive cause of their migration southward.[120] To-day the Fulani
have reached the borders of the great Congo forest, and according to some
accounts are present in very large numbers on the Sangha River.[121] Will
they seek to penetrate the forest or will they turn aside, oblique to the
north,[122] once more and, as though impelled forward by an inscrutable
decree of Providence, gravitate imperceptibly towards the spot where they
crossed into the Dark Continent from Asia, and first set foot upon that
African soil which for some four thousand years has been their home?
CHAPTER XVII
ORIGIN OF THE FULANI
“The most interesting of all African tribes.... A distinct
race.”—DR. BARTH, “Travels in Central Africa” (5-volume
edition).
Of all the mysteries which lie hidden, or but half unveiled, within the
bosom of the still mysterious Continent of Africa, there is none that
presents a more absorbing or more fascinating interest than the origin of
the race which has infused its individuality throughout inland Western
Africa, and whose fertilising influence is visible from the banks of the
Senegal to the Chad.
In the previous chapter it has, I venture to believe, been fairly
established that the Fulani are indubitably associated with our earliest
available records of Western Africa, and that, with the exception of
Hanno’s narrative (touched upon presently), every important reference,
spread over many centuries, to the portion of Western Africa between the
tenth and twentieth parallels of North latitude, bears witness, directly
or indirectly, to the presence of the Fulani within that region at a
remote period.[123] Whence came this people, which differentiates so
radically in colour, form, habits, customs and manners from the Negroes
among whom they have settled, and which dominated in the valley of the
Senegal as far back as the fourth century?
Their own legends; their complexion and structure; their mental
development and physical characteristics, all point emphatically to the
East as the cradle of the Fulani race; a “distinct race,” as Dr. Barth
truly says, and not the bastard product which some would make out.
[Illustration: LOW-CASTE FULANI, WESTERN SUDAN]
Before attempting to piece together the various threads which in the
aggregate amount, in my humble opinion, to a virtual demonstration, it
may be well to state that the Eastern theory numbers opponents who,
from their position and attainments, compel our attention. There are
those who entertain the belief that the Fulani belong to the Berber
stock. There are others who think—and this I cannot but regard as wildly
improbable—that the Fulani are of Nigritic extraction. M. Marcel Dubois,
the brilliant author of “Timbuctoo the Mysterious,”[124] whose treatment
of the Fulani is anything but impartial, categorically denies the Eastern
theory. “It was from the West,” he says, “from the Senegalese Adrar
(Aderer of British maps), from the land of sand extending north of the
Senegal that they came.” “The Foulbes,” he continues, “had been driven
towards the Sudan, very probably when the Moors, expelled from Spain,
invaded Adrar.” M. Dubois finds corroboration of his views in a passage
of the _Tarik_ (which, being written by an Arab, is necessarily biased
against the Fulani) to the effect that the “Foulbes originated in the
country of Tischitt.” I venture, very respectfully, to differ from M.
Dubois. According to Leo, the Moors or Berbers conquered Ghanata in the
eighth century, the ruling caste at that time, as both the _Tarik_ and
also Barth’s records lead us to infer, being of Fulani blood, which in
itself casts doubt upon M. Dubois’ assertion. But the more one endeavours
to reconcile M. Dubois’ contention with existing records, the less sound
does it appear. The Moorish power in Spain was not finally extinguished
until towards the close of the fifteenth century. Nevertheless, it may be
said that the Moorish cause was lost in Europe, and that their expulsion
commenced with the defeat of Salado in 1340.[125] We can, therefore,
for the sake of argument, take the middle of the fourteenth century as
the period, approximately, when the Moors began to be “expelled from
Spain.” This would be about the time when, in M. Dubois’ view, the Moors
were driving the pastoral Fulani towards Aderer, “the land of sand.”
Now, apart from the self-evident contradiction of a people whose wealth
has ever been in their flocks and herds, originating in an arid district
(sand not usually being associated with pastures), the Fulani were in
point of fact already considerably farther south. Was not the market of
Jenne (on which M. Dubois has himself thrown such a glamour of interest)
attended as early as 1260 by Fulani?[126] Did not the King of Bornu
receive a Fulani deputation from Melle between 1288 and 1306?[127] Is it
conceivable that the Fulani, compelled to evacuate Aderer in the middle
of the fourteenth century, would have ruled over vast tracts of territory
as far south as Gurma, only one hundred years later? M. Dubois will have
to bring forward a great deal of evidence—certainly something more than
his own assertion, and an obscure passage in the _Tarik_—to upset the
Eastern theory of Fulani origin.
Of native traditions among the Fulani attributing an Eastern origin
to their race we have no end, and although too much significance need
not be attached to them, they must not on that account be overlooked.
There is generally a foundation of truth in native legends of this
kind. Anthropometrical studies, or rather craniological studies, are,
however, extremely valuable. Although carried out to a small extent
so far, they appreciably strengthen the Eastern theory. Dr. Verneau,
whose reputation as an anthropologist is well known, has recently
published[128] the results of an examination of five skulls of Fulani
chiefs from Futa-Jallon. The first three belonged to individuals known,
when alive, to the French authorities of that Colony. The other two were
brought home by Dr. Maclaud, who has travelled extensively among the
Fulani, and to whom I am indebted for several of the photographs here
reproduced. None of the originals were Fulani of the pure type. The one
approaching nearest to purity was Alfa-Alliu, who was condemned to death
for an unprovoked attack upon a French convoy. Of this individual’s
skull, Dr. Verneau reports: “Alfa-Alliu belongs by his cranial and
facial characteristics to the sur-based (vaulted) pentagonal type which
enters into the composition of the present population of Erythria and
the ancient population of Egypt.” Of two other skulls out of the five
examined, Dr. Verneau remarks: “Their owners, no doubt, had a certain
amount of negro blood in their veins, which resulted in a thickening of
the osseous frame and in a notable prognathous accentuation....[129]
Nevertheless, these two chiefs were not negroes; the width of the
forehead, the prominence of the bones of the nose, the proportions of the
nose itself, and the form of the chin, preclude any connection.” Of the
two remaining skulls, Dr. Verneau concludes thus: “I will not further
insist upon the cephalic character of these two deeply crossed Fulani.
I would merely observe that, notwithstanding the mixed breed, they
present two cranial forms which we find wherever the influence of the
Ethiopians has been felt.” It is necessary to add that by “Ethiopian,”
Dr. Verneau—as he is careful to explain in the opening lines of his
paper—designates the Abyssinian type, holding that the synonymy given to
the terms “Negro” and “Ethiopian” is a popular confusion. Élisée Reclus,
in his great geographical work, also states that the formation of the
Fulani cranium has affinities with the Egyptian type. To this testimony
may be added, that the most recent studies in Berber anthropometry
tend to divorce the Berbers from the ancient Egyptian and the Eastern
stock.[130]
Dr. Blyden, who visited Timbo (the capital of Futa-Jallon, one of the
most important Fulani centres in West Africa) in the seventies, and who,
like Dr. Bayol and others, was immensely impressed with what he saw,
remarks in a report to the Government of the time (to which I have been
able, through the doctor’s kindness, to have access): “On entering a
Fulah town the first thing which strikes a stranger is the Caucasian cast
of features, especially among the older people; yet every now and then,
in the children of parents having all the physical traits of the Semitic
family, there recurs the inextinguishable Negro physiognomy.”[131] “It
is evident,” the doctor goes on to say, “that while there is a large
infusion of foreign blood among the people, there is still the influence
of a powerful race-stock which has thoroughly assimilated the alien
elements, and this may be judged from the strong pride of ancestry which
they possess, their respect for the past and their care for posterity.”
D’Eichtal sought to trace in the Hovas of Madagascar a relationship with
the Fulani, which would, obviously, connect them with the Malays—the
object of d’Eichtal’s treatise. The sole basis of the theory was a chance
similarity in certain words; but were d’Eichtal right, we should have
to admit a complete reversal of the cycle of Fulani migration, which is
quite impossible. Fulfulde cannot as yet be definitely classed among
the languages, but, so far as our knowledge extends, it has Semitic
antecedents. When we endeavour to find some other links, connecting the
Fulani with the East, several circumstances arrest our attention. The
first is provided in a passage of Hanno’s “Periplus”; the second, in
the invasion of Lower Egypt by the Hyksos; the third, in the Hebraic
tendencies and peculiar familiarity with Hebrew legends observed among
the Fulani; the fourth, in an attachment to their cattle so remarkable
as to suggest a far-off bovine worship. These points may be severally
examined.
[Illustration: PURE-BRED FULANI GIRL—FUTA-JALLON]
When, towards the close of the sixteenth century B.C., the rulers of
Carthage conceived a scheme of over-sea colonisation which should
redound to the glory of the Empire and free it at the same time from a
portion at least of the undesirable elements of the population, they
despatched an armada of sixty ships containing some thirty thousand
souls, under the command of a worthy magistrate of the name of Hanno,
with instructions to pass through the Pillars of Hercules (the Straits of
Gibraltar) and to lay the basis of a colony somewhere beyond them. The
fleet appears to have navigated the West Coast of Africa until it reached
the Senegal, the Carthaginians proceeding for some little distance up
that river, subsequently pushing southward to the Gambia and farther
still to the “Southern Horn,” which it has been sought to identify with
Sherbro Sound.[132] This meeting of Phœnician culture with aboriginal
primitiveness on the West Coast was, as Sir Harry Johnston has strikingly
put it, “The first sight that civilised man had of his wild brother since
the two had parted company in Neolithic times.” And yet in one respect
this general statement is open to doubt. It was not only Negroes with
whom the Carthaginian navigator came in contact.
On his return, Hanno wrote an account of his wanderings, in the Punic
tongue, termed a Periplus or circumnavigation, which he dedicated to
Moloch, the deity of the Carthaginians, in the Temple of Cronos. Through
the enterprise of Greek scientists, the relation of Hanno’s voyage
has been preserved to us. About three centuries after its completion,
Ptolemæus Claudius, a Greek geographer and historian, published eight
volumes of geographical research. The portion relating to Africa was
mainly founded upon Carthaginian material and included a translation of
Hanno’s “Periplus.” From Ptolemy’s description, we gather that in the
neighbourhood of the Gambia (Stachir) the Carthaginians came across a
people of a lighter hue than the Negroes. These people the author calls
“Leucæthiopes.” Pliny also speaks of the “Leucæthiopes,” placing them,
however, a couple of degrees farther north. Thus five hundred years B.C.,
Carthaginian navigators reported in West Africa the existence of a people
to whom the epithet of “black” did not apply, in the same region in which
eight hundred years later—that being the first reference to West Africa
which has come down to us—we hear of an Empire whose rulers were “white,”
founded by a monarch with a Fulfulde affix to his name.
Who could those light-complexioned “Africans” have been? Not, assuredly,
Arabs; still less Bantus. With the Berber tribes the Carthaginians were
in touch everywhere, in Mauritania, Numidia, Cyrenaica. From the Berbers,
Carthage drew her mercenaries, who often enough proved more dangerous
than useful. The colonists would have recognised the type had they met
with it in West Africa, and if the “Leucæthiopes” had been Berbers they
would have been differently described in the “Periplus.” Indeed, there
is some ground for believing that the colonists numbered Berbers among
their ranks. Moreover, the Berber occupation could not at that time have
extended as far south, by at least fifteen degrees, as the Senegal-Gambia
region. There is not, so far as I am aware, any record extant suggesting
the presence of the Berbers in the valley of the Senegal until the eighth
century A.D. To what race, then, could the “Leucæthiopes” have belonged?
To what race but the Fulani, to whom the description given by Hanno could
alone—bearing in mind the period of the expedition—by any possibility
apply? That is link one.[133]
[Illustration: FULANI HOUSE—FUTA-JALLON]
The invasion of Lower Egypt by the Hyksos or Shepherd Kings from the
East is one of the obscurest stages of Egyptian history. Professor
Lepsius believed that the invasion of the Shepherds occurred during the
thirteenth dynasty (which, according to the same authority, began in 2136
B.C.), and ended about 1626 B.C. with the expulsion of the Shepherds.
About 2000 B.C. then—a little earlier or a little later, according to
other authorities—Egypt, being at that time under the Theban dynasty,
was invaded by vast hordes of Asiatics, who brought with them enormous
quantities of cattle and sheep.[134] It would seem as though some great
internal convulsion, the cause of which can only be conjectured, had
precipitated into the fertile valley of the Nile a number of nomadic
pastoral tribes, by nature herdsmen, shepherds and agriculturists, but
converted for the time being either through famine, scarcity of pastures,
pressure of other tribes behind them, or spontaneous race-expansion,
into a warlike and conquering people which swept onward in irresistible
strength until they reached a land suitable for their herds—their only
wealth. The distinctive character of their occupation is preserved in
their name—Hyksos or Shepherd Kings. After a sanguinary struggle, the
invaders succeeded in fairly establishing themselves in Lower Egypt, and
gradually extended their influence over Upper Egypt, where, however, they
were unable to gain complete mastery. Their supremacy lasted about five
hundred years. They were finally overthrown and driven out of the country
by the representatives of the old Theban dynasty under Misphragmuthosis
and Thoutmosis, somewhere about 1636 B.C., if we adopt the estimate of
the celebrated Egyptologist, Professor Lepsius. What became of them? The
Egyptian scribe, Manetho, contends that they crossed back into Asia,
but the statement is very doubtful, and his further assertion that they
occupied Judea and founded Jerusalem is scouted by the learned.
Is it not legitimate to suppose that a portion, at any rate, of
so enterprising and courageous a people, which must have been
extraordinarily numerous to have held sway over Egypt for so considerable
a period, should have preferred to plunge into the unknown West, in
search of fresh territories where their herds might find sustenance,
rather than ignominiously return in the direction from whence they came?
For five hundred years Africa had been their home. Africa offered them
extensive pastures for their cattle. They must have largely mingled and
intermarried with the Egyptians. Family and historical ties bound them
to the African soil. They had become adopted children of that Continent,
which in all ages has exerted a peculiar fascination over the various
immigrant peoples that have entered it. History, I believe, contains not
one single instance of a people which, having once settled in Africa,
has left it again. The Shepherds had risen in Africa to a position of
paramountcy. Out of the undisciplined host which spread itself like a
torrent over the Nile Delta, a race of statesmen had evolved capable
of ruling what was perhaps the mightiest Empire of the then civilised
world. It is incredible to imagine that a whole people could have been
driven in a fixed direction, as Manetho would have us believe. Tens of
thousands must have been employed, as their compatriots the Hebrews were
employed, by the victorious Thebans, in raising those mighty monuments of
stone whose ruins to-day provoke the wonder of all men. Many more must
have escaped westwards, and gained with their belongings the fertile
plains of inland Cyrenaica, and, through the ages, pushed on and on,
ever seeking pastures new, until in the course of a thousand years the
Carthaginians found their descendants in the rich valleys of the Senegal
and Gambia—with their national characteristics preserved, their “powerful
race stock” unimpaired, their “strong pride of ancestry” remaining, their
ways adapted to their new environment.
Others again may have migrated south and have largely influenced
the composite ethnic elements of Erythria, of which the nomadic
cattle-rearing Wahuma of Uganda would appear to be an offshoot—the
Asiatic origin of the latter being generally admitted. So much for link
number two.
The advent of the Hyksos in Lower Egypt was approximately contemporaneous
with Hebrew emigration from Mesopotamia to Palestine. Three hundred years
later, in 1700 B.C. according to Biblical records, when a grievous famine
lay upon the land, the famous Israelitish _trek_ into Africa began, upon
the direct invitation of Egypt’s ruler, in whose employ Joseph had risen
to a position of great influence. The new-comers established themselves
in the fertile province of Goshen,[135] east of the Nile, where the
river branches as the prongs of a fork. Who was the reigning Pharaoh
at the time? The gap in Egyptian history unfortunately prevents an
answer. But that, unless the most competent Egyptologists are hopelessly
wrong, he was one of the Shepherd Kings, cannot be doubted. And, apart
from the similarity of dates, there are inherent reasons which still
further fortify what may almost be said to be a certainty. The Hyksos
were a conglomeration of Asiatic herdsmen whom circumstances had forced
into the valley of the Nile. The _rôle_ of warriors and administrators
which they assumed was probably an accident, the result of finding a
powerful nation in occupation of the land they coveted, and whom they
had to subdue before being able to occupy. That they succeeded is proof,
not only of their courage but of their political genius and power of
organisation—qualities for which the Fulani are to-day conspicuous,
notwithstanding the demoralising tendency of contact with intellectually
inferior races. It was their political genius which led the Hyksos to
invite an influx of Israelites, Asiatics like themselves, of the same
Semitic origin and the same Monotheistic leaning. The wisdom of the
policy is apparent. The Hyksos knew well that their rule was unpopular,
that the Princes of the overthrown Theban dynasty were continually
intriguing against their domination in the southern provinces, and that
their hold upon the country depended upon the number of their adherents
in the north. They set themselves, therefore, to encourage Asiatic
immigration. Inversely, it was but natural that, when the representatives
of the old Theban dynasty once more came into their own, the Israelites
should have been specially marked out for resentment.
The administrative seat of the Hyksos was Memphis, the city sacred to
the worship of the bull Apis. At first the Hyksos replaced the worship
of Apis, incarnation of the divine Osiris, by their own divinity Set,
but they were compelled by the pressure of public opinion to allow the
revival of the national cult. After suffering a temporary eclipse,
bull-worship continued as before. It is, indeed, open to question whether
the Shepherds themselves, and their compatriots the Israelites, did not
end by adopting, partially at least, the divinities of the conquered. Can
we not trace, for instance, in the incident of the golden calf erected by
Aaron in the wilderness, and the employment of golden calves by Jeroboam,
in order to symbolise the deity, the strong hold which bull-worship had
taken upon the imagination of those pastoral Semites, the Israelites,
whom the Hyksos, pastoral Semites like themselves, had invited to reside
with them in the land of Goshen? What more natural that, being herdsmen,
and taught by long years of experience to look upon cattle-rearing as
their natural avocation, the Semitic invaders of Egypt and their allies
should have been predisposed, and insensibly drifted, towards the
adoption of the religion which they found existing in the country they
had conquered, and of which the chief symbolical deity was a bull?
[Illustration: FULANI CATTLE-PEN]
Now is it not a very singular fact that the Fulani should be the only
people in Western Africa whose former religious beliefs have been
associated, by those who have lived amongst them, with an ancient
bull-worship, the former cult of Egypt? The unusual regard they have for
their cattle, even after Islam has been established among the great bulk
of them for upwards of nine centuries, is singled out for special notice
on the part of numerous observers. Reclus deems the circumstance to be
worthy of notice: “The scrupulous care,” he says, “which they devote
to their cattle-pens has something in it of a religious nature.” Here
and there, in the Western Sudan, tribes of Fulani are met with, whose
members have remained pagan, and their paganism, in so far as it has been
observed, consists in a superstitious reverence for their cattle, almost
amounting to adoration. Among the Mohammedan Fulani the _bororo_[136]
is still pre-eminently the national representative of the race, and the
purest types are found among the _bororoji_, rather than amidst those
of their countrymen who have become over-lords, administrators and
land-owners on a large scale. “The Foola nation,” says Winterbottom, “is
the only one in this part of the coast to whom the title of _armentarius
afer_ can be justly applied.”[137] Many and various are the stories told
by French officers serving in the Western Sudan of the curious affinity
between the Fulani and their cattle, an affinity which is a perpetual
subject of comment among their Negro neighbours.[138] Clapperton tells us
how the cattle respond at long distances to the shrill cry of the Fulani
herdsman, who, by the way, is said never to employ a dog.[139] One of the
most remarkable French stories is that related by an officer operating in
the Baol district of the Western Sudan. In the course of a day’s work the
officer had commandeered some cattle from the natives; among the animals
was a fine black bull obtained from a group of wandering Fulani herdsmen.
When night fell, the cattle were duly penned and a _Spahis_[140] posted
as sentry over them. Towards midnight the officer was roused from sleep
by the _Spahis_ informing him with much solemnity that it would be
necessary to slaughter the black bull at once. “Are you mad?” cried
the astonished Frenchman. “Not at all, Lieutenant,” replied the soldier
imperturbably; “it is the cattle that are mad, for the Fulani are calling
the bull—listen.” Stepping out into the moonlight the officer listened.
Presently from a neighbouring hill came the sound of a plaintive chant.
At the same moment a violent disturbance took place among the cattle.
The officer hurried towards the pen followed by the sentry, the chant
meanwhile continuing in a cadence of inexpressible melancholy. The
commotion in the pen increased, and before the Frenchman could reach it,
one of the beasts was seen to clear the enclosure at a bound and crash
through the bush, following the direction of the sound and bellowing
loudly the while. It was the black bull. He had broken the halter which
bound him and leapt a palisade five feet high! With the disappearance of
the bull the chant abruptly ceased. Next morning the Fulani were nowhere
to be found.[141]
The Hebraic flavour—if one may put it so—which seems to permeate many of
the Fulani customs, especially among the less contaminated elements of
the race, has been recorded by careful observers. A friend, an officer
in the employ of the Northern Nigeria administration, who was intimately
acquainted with the Fulani, whose language he spoke, and who possessed
considerable erudition, had prepared a number of notes for me on the
subject, which, unfortunately, I never received, owing to his death while
serving in Africa. One custom which had specially impressed him among
the pure Fulani was the habit of setting aside the firstborn. He found
that the Fulani woman of unmixed blood in the Binue region never suckled
her firstborn, but consigned it to the care of friends, and completely
disinterested herself from its future career, while bestowing upon the
second child, and subsequent children, the usual motherly solicitude.
He connected this singular custom with a distorted rendering of the
punishment visited upon the Egyptians in the time of the Captivity.
[Illustration: A HALF-CASTE FULANI GIRL AND A SUSU]
The lecture delivered in 1886 by Captain de Guiraudon (who published a
Fulfulde manual, and who resided for several years in the Fulani country
in Senegambia) before the seventh Congress of Orientalists contains some
interesting references to the subject under discussion. In the course
of his relations with the Fulani, De Guiraudon was particularly struck
with their peculiar knowledge of Jewish history. So familiarly did they
speak of the chief Hebrew personalities of the Old Testament, and so well
posted were they with the principal events related in it, that they could
not, argued De Guiraudon, have acquired their knowledge merely through
Arabic sources. They referred to those times as though dealing with their
own national records. Moses and Abraham might have been individuals of
the same race as themselves. “In their oral legends Moses plays a very
important part, and although certain passages of the Scriptures are
transformed or rather assimilated, they have so intense a Biblical and
Hebraic tone as to exclude all Arabic influence.” De Guiraudon noted,
however, that their Israelitish chronicles ceased after Solomon. “What
they knew of the miracles of our Saviour was so distorted and erroneous
as to prove that the New Testament had reached them from afar, in a vague
and fragmentary condition.” De Guiraudon’s conclusions are best given in
his own words. “It would seem as if the Puls (Fulani), if they themselves
did not profess the Jewish faith, which I would rather be disposed to
affirm than deny, were at least in permanent contact with the Jewish
people in remote times, and that, influenced at one time or another by
the Israelites, they received Old Testament legends directly from them.”
Dr. Blyden also testifies in an indirect way to the close acquaintance
of the Fulani with the history of ancient Hebraic personalities. “They
hold the language of the Koran,” he remarks, “in the greatest veneration,
affirming that it is the language which was spoken by Adam, Seth, Noah,
Abraham, and Ishmael. The descendants of Ishmael, they contend, have
never been in bondage to any man; and that during the bondage of Isaac’s
descendants in Egypt the language lost its purity and copiousness.”
It is significant that the son and successor of Othman Dan Fodio, sultan
Bello of Hausa, second Fulani ruler over the Hausa States, in the history
of the Sudan written in Arabic characters which he gave to Clapperton,
describes the “Tow-rooths,” who may, I think, be identified with the
Torodos (a sect of Fulani greatly looked up to), as “having originated
from the Jews.”[142] Mungo Park, when writing of his experiences among
the Mandingoes—who appear to have been converted to Islam by the Fulani,
with whom they have been in close relationship, amiable and the reverse,
for many centuries—observed a similar widespread knowledge of incidents
in Old Testament history, such as the death of Abel, the lives of the
Patriarchs, Joseph’s dream, and so on. Winterbottom is equally emphatic.
“The customs of these people (the Fulani),” he says, “bear a striking
resemblance to those of the Jews described in the Pentateuch, and after
Mohammed, Moses is held by them in the highest estimation.” There is some
uniformity, too, between the following descriptive passages. The first is
from Kenrick (American edition), the second from Laing’s history of the
Sulima people and their relations with the Fulani:
“The Jews were commanded, on the day of the Atonement, to
provide a goat to carry the sins of the people, and the
high-priest was to lay his hand on the head of the goat and
confess the national sins. So among the Egyptians whenever a
victim was offered, a prayer was repeated over its head, if any
calamity was about to befall either the sacrifices or the land
of Egypt, ‘it might be averted on this head.’”
“Musah Bah (a Fulani chief), shortly after his installation,
ordered a great feast to be held, and, inviting to it all the
head-men of Jallon Kadoo, explained to them the nature of the
Mohammedan faith and told them that the Foulahs had come to
settle in their country with a desire only to do them good and
to show them the true road to happiness. He then ordered a
large wafer of country bread and a bleeding sheep to be placed
before him, and invited all those who wished to be instructed
by the priests of Futa-Jallon to place their hands upon the
bread and touch the sheep, which all the head-men did.”
The motives were different, but the Fulani ceremonial savours greatly of
the Old Testament. So much for the remaining links.
Enough has been said, I think, to show that there is a vast field open
to systematic inquiry and investigation, which may possibly lead to
discoveries of a most interesting and important kind. Having examined the
links one by one, let us see how they look when riveted together and what
conclusions they suggest. The straight-nosed, straight-haired, relatively
thin-lipped, wiry, copper or bronze complexioned (“pale-gold” as one
writer puts it) Fulani male, with his well-developed cranium, and refined
extremities; and the Fulani woman, with her clear skin, her rounded
breasts,[143] large eyes,[144] antimony-dyed eyebrows, gracefulness of
movement, beauty of form, coquettish ways and general attractiveness—are
Asiatics. They are the lineal descendants of the Hyksos, having migrated
westwards with the overthrow of the Shepherd conquerors. Their customs
bear record to their progenitors having been influenced both by the cult
of ancient Egypt and by the Israelites, whose presence in the Nile Delta
was contemporaneous with Hyksos rule. Their presence in West Africa
dates back at least 2500 years. To dogmatise on such a subject would be
foolish; to claim having evolved an original theory would be impertinent.
But I am not aware that the Eastern theory of Fulani origin has been
hitherto worked out with any attempt at consecutiveness, or an endeavour
made to amalgamate and give in connected form—however imperfectly—the
chief factors for further study which may be usefully followed up by
some one more competent than the author.
And what is to be the policy of Great Britain, of France and of Germany
towards this wonderful race? Surely it should be dictated in the first
place by a desire to preserve. With their faults—and what race is devoid
of faults?—the Fulani have admirable qualities which can fit them to be
worthy and reliable co-builders and assistants in the task which the
Powers have undertaken in Western Africa. Their virility has hitherto
been equal to all the calls upon it. They retain “the strong pride of
race.” They possess in the highest degree the attributes of rulers.
It would be a misfortune indeed if, with the advent of the European,
possessed of those swift engines of destruction he is at times so prompt
to use in the name of civilisation, the Fulani should disappear from the
regions they have leavened with their intelligence.
PART III
CHAPTER XVIII
SANITARY AFFAIRS IN WEST AFRICA
(By Major RONALD ROSS, F.R.C.S., F.R.S., C.B., Liverpool School of
Tropical Medicine.)
The first question which any one who has studied the history of West
Africa will ask, is this—Why has the country developed so slowly?
It is actually nearer to Europe and more accessible than several
tropical countries, which have certainly progressed far more towards
civilisation—such as the West and East Indies, Central America and the
seaboard of China; it is, generally speaking, a rich country; with a
fertile soil, sufficient rainfall, large rivers, good harbours, fine,
well-watered plains, a vast population, and a climate not excessively
hot. One would expect to find here flourishing settlements, large cities,
a prosperous agriculture and a great commerce; but what we really have is
a series of second-rate, if not third-rate, settlements which are just
able to hold their own in the midst of the forests and marshes which
surround them; and a native population which can scarcely be considered
other than barbarous beyond a short distance from the settlements
referred to. The discrepancy between the expectation and the fact is
remarkable. India, for example, with her vast tracts of well-cultivated
lands, her cities, her ports, her universities, her thousands of miles
of railway, her society, and her well-organised Government is far indeed
above West Africa. If the best West African province could be transferred
bodily to the East and placed alongside even such outlying parts of
India as Assam and Burma it would look very shabby in comparison. The
principal West African towns seen by me, Lagos, Accra, and Freetown,
cannot for a moment be compared with the great Indian capitals and
stations such as Calcutta, Bombay, Madras, Rangoon, Secunderabad,
Allahabad, Delhi, Benares, Pindi, Lahore. In general appearance,
construction, and style of living they are on a level with such
“benighted” spots as Moulmein in Burma, Nowgong in Assam, or Masulipatam
in Southern India. West Africa possesses no Simla, Bangalore, Darjeeling
or Ootacamund.
The whole country reminds one chiefly of the derelict Coromandel Coast
minus its principal city. Yet it may perhaps be doubted whether in
extent, fertility and natural resources West Africa is really far below
India. Europe has been trading with West Africa for centuries; it has
long drawn from it many valuable commodities; it has explored it and
made settlements in it which have lasted for hundreds of years. Why has
not Europe done more for it, then? The question is really one of great
importance in the philosophical history of civilisation, especially in
these days when civilisation tends so strongly to overflow from the
temperate climates into the tropical ones. Here we have two countries
equally gifted with natural resources and equally exposed to the
civilising irradiance of Europe. Yet, while India is of itself already
one of the great Powers of the world, the other still remains in the
condition of a newly discovered continent, to be opened up in the future.
Of the three reasons usually assigned for this curious fact, the first
generally given is that in India Europe found a certain degree of
civilisation already existing before her advent; while in West Africa
she started to work upon a completely barbarous country. No doubt
this has much to do with the result; but we must remember that many
countries now far ahead of West Africa were little or no less barbarous
than West Africa a few centuries ago—such as many portions of tropical
America, Burma, and the Islands of the Pacific. It can scarcely be
said that the antecedent semi-civilisation of India and China has been
always favourable to progress, nor that a basis of complete barbarism
is always fatal to it. Another reason, perhaps more frequently given,
is that the natives of West Africa are incorrigibly indolent. Yet it
is by the labours of these very people, controlled by Europeans, that
the prosperity of the Southern States of America has been established.
In my humble opinion the West African should be very good material
for civilisation. Compared with the East Indian, he is perhaps not so
patient, laborious, or thrifty; but, on the other hand, he is much more
vivacious and virile; he is not hampered by the restrictions of caste;
he is physically strong and healthy; he is capable of producing men who
are intellectually not a whit inferior to the average European; and above
all, instead of adhering obstinately to his own customs as the Indian
so often does, he always shows a remarkable desire for the customs and
culture of Europe. In fact, I personally feel, though I may be wrong,
that these people are better material for civilisation than East Indians,
and I do not think that the backwardness of West Africa can be wholly or
even largely assigned to defects in their character.
To many of us the real reason for this backwardness appears to be
undoubtedly the so-called unhealthiness of the West African “climate” for
Europeans. It is impossible to deny the fact that the European cannot
live on the West African Coast in the same security against disease as he
enjoys in the East and West Indies; and in my opinion it is this fact,
and not the original barbarism of the natives, or their indolence, which
retards progress here. The agent of civilisation dies on the threshold of
the country which he comes to develop.
It would require a large volume to deal adequately with this important
subject, and I can only attempt an outline here. We shall first ask what
is the cause of this unhealthiness, and secondly, what is the remedy.
I shall not attempt to give any statistics of mortality among Europeans
or natives, because what statistics exist are not at all reliable.
But the fact that the country is extremely unhealthy for Europeans is
universally accepted; and is, moreover, demonstrated by the high rates
for life-insurance, by the large amount of leave which Government grants
to its employés, and by the difficulty which all employers experience in
obtaining European agents for West African work, even for high pay. In
fact, the country is so notorious in this respect that it is unnecessary
to labour the point farther.
What are the causes of the unhealthiness of West Africa for Europeans?
The first series of causes are undoubtedly a group of infectious
diseases, certainly or probably due to parasitic invasion of the body.
These are principally what is known as malarial or intermittent fever,
with its most dangerous variety, blackwater fever; various other fevers,
dysentery, and according to many physicians, yellow fever. The first
attacks the European with greater force than it attacks the habituated
native, but nevertheless produces great havoc among native children. It
is so prevalent that new-comers frequently succumb within a few weeks
after arrival, while old residents often suffer from relapses during
the whole of their stay in the country. In addition, epidemics either
of this fever, yellow fever, or some allied disease, sweep through the
settlements, causing great mortality among the Europeans; dysentery
and bowel complaints are scarcely less to be feared in some parts. The
records of West Africa are blackened by these terrible plagues, which
time after time have blotted out the names of the most daring travellers,
the most capable governors, and the most enterprising traders; which
mutilate the lives of those whom they do not kill; and which hamper every
political or commercial enterprise by striking down or intimidating the
agents who are sent out to execute it.
But we must not imagine that these are the only factors of the total
result. The heat and moisture of the climate are most enervating to
Europeans. The general absence of good food—good meat, bread, vegetables,
and milk—tends to produce dyspepsia and melancholy. The absence of most
of the comforts and amenities to which Europeans are accustomed in their
own home—good houses, good servants, society and exercise, not to mention
the absence of wives and children—depress the mind; and when this general
outline is filled in by such details as the ever-present dread of serious
sickness, the constant stings of insects, the unsavoury surroundings of
a squalid native population, it must be confessed that the colonist has
much to depress him. What wonder if, in such circumstances, alcoholism
and debauchery sometimes complete the sketch! The fact is, that what we
call the “unhealthiness” of West Africa is a complex due to many causes
which assist each other. People are apt to fall into a vicious circle
from which it is hard to escape. I may say, indeed, that the whole of
West Africa has fallen into this vicious circle and has not yet escaped
from it. Let us consider the point farther.
When we find much sickness in a given country we are too inclined to
think that the sickness is entirely due to certain natural conditions
which are present in that country and which render it unhealthy. We
forget that the sickness may be due, not to the country itself, but to
the fact that the inhabitants do not take proper precautions against the
diseases which persecute them. Now the whole trend of sanitary science
has been to show in a convincing manner that the great infectious
diseases are preventable, if only the proper precautions are taken.
Time after time we have witnessed the entire disappearance, or at least
the partial disappearance, of such diseases from whole countries. For
example, small-pox and typhus have almost vanished from the great States
of Europe—at least we may say so when we compare their prevalence in the
past with their prevalence at the present day. Typhoid and diphtheria
are diminishing daily. Malarial fever and dysentery, which were formerly
scourges of parts of Britain, have almost entirely gone from the country.
Even in the tropics we shall find numerous instances of the same kind.
Calcutta was once a hot-bed of fever and cholera, and was probably as
fatal to Europeans as West Africa is now said to be. Rangoon was deadly
when the British first went there. A century ago cholera often swept away
whole regiments in India. We now look in vain for this state of things.
As a whole, India is perhaps as healthy for Europeans as England is—at
least if we exclude the enervating effects of mere heat; and, indeed, I
think that in some respects, in the absence of colds and chest complaints
and in the benefits of open-air life and exercise, Europeans in India are
more fortunate than their brothers at home.
Such facts alone clearly demonstrate that many diseases are not dependent
upon natural factors beyond human control; but science has reinforced
the argument by showing that a number of infectious diseases are due to
microorganisms which spring from previously diseased persons and not
from the air, soil, or water of localities. When, therefore, we speak
of a given place being unhealthy, we merely mean that from some cause
or other infectious disease is readily propagated from the sick to the
healthy in that place. This may in part be due to the local conditions
as regards heat, moisture, and so on being especially favourable to the
transmission of the disease germs; but it may also be due to the fact
that no precautions are taken to check this transmission.
Thus in the case of West Africa we may ask, Is the local sickness really
due to the climate being specially favourable to the transmission of
disease; or is it due to the neglect of proper precautions? I would
not be prepared to say that as regards heat, moisture, and profuse
vegetation—conditions long known to be particularly favourable to
malaria—West Africa differs much from Calcutta or Rangoon. So far as
nature goes I can see little difference between West Africa and other
tropical regions which I have visited. On the other hand, I see the
greatest difference in the mode of life adopted by Europeans in West
Africa and in India; and I am convinced that the excessive mortality
amongst them is due largely, if not principally, to this cause, added to
the imperfect condition of public sanitation in the country.
My own visits to West Africa have been short and limited. I have thrice
lived in Freetown for brief periods, and have paid flying visits to
Bathurst, Accra, Lagos, and Ibadan. But though my experiences of the
country were thus brief enough, I was always in a position to see a good
deal in the time at my disposal, and my powers of sanitary observation,
so to speak, were previously exercised by eighteen years’ employment in
the Indian Medical Service. Moreover, for the last three years I have
been in constant communication with many old residents on the Coast,
and I have also learned much from the members of several expeditions
sent there by the Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine, and by reading
numerous reports on the sanitation of the country. I state these facts
simply in order to enable the reader to judge of the value of my
testimony on the points under consideration. I do not pretend that a
greater experience would not have increased that value; but at the same
time it should be remarked that a sanitarian of any experience, like a
trained physician, can often make a correct diagnosis in a comparatively
short time; and that it is not necessary to examine every town in a
country in order to arrive at a general conception of its sanitary
condition. Moreover, the towns which I have seen are the capitals of four
out of the six British Colonies on the Coast.
In my experience, such as it is, the mode of life of Europeans in West
Africa is not suited to the tropics.
Take the houses to begin with. They are not generally good. It is
absolutely essential in the tropics to have good roofs and large airy
rooms. Our wise forefathers recognised this early in India, and built the
great solid structures which are such a prominent feature of Calcutta
and Madras and many Indian stations. I have seen nothing of the kind in
West Africa. Even in Lagos and Accra the houses can be described only as
second-rate. In Freetown they are simply execrable; and it is monstrous
that Englishmen, much more ladies, should be compelled to live in them.
It should be remembered that many of these West African hovels are built
by Government. In Ibadan I saw a magnificent iron house which I was told
cost the Government £6000, but which is so ill-designed and ill-placed
that in the heat of the day the inmates are compelled to go outside and
sit under leaf shelters! Then again, in India the Europeans and some of
the better class natives live in a separate quarter; but in West Africa
this seems to be the case only to a limited extent; while in Freetown
the Europeans often live over native shops. Remembering that infectious
diseases are communicated from the sick, we shall easily understand
why the absence of a separate quarter is so dangerous to health. Those
absolute essentials to comfort in the tropics, punkahs and mosquito-nets,
which are invariably used in India, are often the exception in West
Africa, or were so until quite recently.
As regards food, we find little efforts made to help the African
colonists to obtain good provisions. Fresh milk and butter often cannot
be got at all, even where cattle exist in plenty. Government sometimes
maintains, at considerable cost, botanical gardens for various economical
purposes. I was told that these gardens used to grow vegetables for the
Europeans until stopped by a mandate from England, on the ground that a
Government botanist is not a vegetable gardener!—a type of the hopelessly
unpractical spirit which has crept into all British administration. As a
result the colonist has to fall back upon native vegetables, to which he
is not accustomed. The meat is generally poor and coarse, and no proper
effort is made to improve it. Ice—another essential in the tropics—cannot
generally be obtained. I was gravely informed that ice-machines will not
work in West Africa. It is difficult to see why this is the case, because
they will certainly work in the hottest and dampest parts of India.
Aerated waters have to be imported and cost about sixpence a bottle; I
suppose that they, too, “cannot be made” in West Africa. In India they
are made everywhere and cost about a penny a bottle. Singular effect of
the West African climate!
What are more necessary anywhere than exercise, recreation, and society?
In India the smallest station has its gymkana; its polo, tennis, cricket,
and even football; its dinners, its afternoon parties, its balls;
its shooting and riding. As for West Africa, though, owing to the
intelligent encouragement of the Governors, much attention is now being
given to this subject, things are very different. A resident of Sekondi
told me that their “only amusement is to drink.” So it seemed. In many
places horses do not exist, because it is said they do not live there. So
far as I know, Government has never attempted the slightest scientific
inquiry into this most important matter, although probably the disability
is due merely to some easily preventable parasitic disease. In Freetown
many people take no exercise at all and are carried about even for short
distances in hammocks. In up-country places, I hear, the dulness of life,
owing to the absence of recreation and exercise, is often intolerable and
heart-breaking.
Turning now to affairs of state sanitation, let us first ask, what
would have been the logical and business-like course for adoption by
Government from the earliest days of these Colonies? Seeing the obvious
fact that all development of the country was being retarded by the
sickness and mortality among the European Officials and traders, a
practical Government would from the first have strained every nerve
to remedy this state of things. It would have spent every available
penny in the sanitation of the coast towns, which are, in fact, the
portals of the continent. It would have kept these scrupulously clean,
swept and drained. It would have housed its employés thoroughly well
in quarters removed from the infectious vicinity of the poorer native
locations. It would have encouraged the traders to do the same for their
agents. It would have organised farms for the purpose of producing good
fresh food—meat, milk, butter and vegetables. It would have created
or endowed places of exercise and recreation. It would have attempted
to add in every possible way to the comfort of the Europeans, who are
the backbone of the Colonies, knowing that reasonable comfort is half
the way to health and happiness, and that senseless and unnecessary
discomfort is more than half the way in the other direction. It would
have taken scrupulous care of the water supply; of the conservancy; of
the drainage of swamps. It would have insisted on the adequate sanitation
of native locations near European locations, in the interests both of
natives and Europeans. It would have maintained an up-to-date medical and
sanitary department, provided with sufficient powers and funds for its
work. It would have kept accurate statistics of sickness and mortality,
especially among the Europeans. It would have ordered numerous scientific
investigations into the causes of the most disastrous West African
diseases, both among men and domestic animals. Above all, it would have
put the direction of sanitary affairs into the hands of the ablest
scientific men it could procure.
Now I do not wish to take the _rôle_ of the fault finder; but I must
say, so far as I know—and I hope I may be mistaken—the Colonial Office
and the West African Governments and municipalities can scarcely be
said to have given adequate attention to a single one of the items in
this programme—at least until quite recently. Consider the question of
surface drainage for instance. It has been well known, since the time of
the Romans, that surface-drainage removes malaria; and malaria is the
principal enemy of the West African Colonies. Surely, then, the most
obvious considerations should have induced Government to reclaim the
large marshes existing in the vicinity of the principal settlements. A
small annual expenditure, if persisted in, would have gradually done the
work; and, as Sir William MacGregor once observed, the local Governments
have had at their disposal for years large gangs of gaol prisoners who
could, with advantage, have been employed on such useful labours instead
of shot-drill. But no; the marshes have been allowed to exist as they
were. It is only quite recently that the swamps of Lagos and Bathurst
have been touched. In Freetown the swamps existed in almost every street
in the native quarters during the rains, and were, in fact, actually
made by incompetent engineering efforts and maintained by the grossest
sanitary neglect—the roadside drains being generally nothing but series
of deep pools full of stagnant water seething with insect life. Yet
this town was called the white-man’s grave; and Heaven was blamed for
causing a disease which man could easily have prevented if the most
elementary teaching of sanitary science had been attended to. Even after
the connection between stagnant water and malaria was fully verified
and explained by the discovery (completed in 1899) that the disease is
carried from the sick to the healthy by certain kinds of mosquitoes which
breed in stagnant puddles, no spontaneous effort was made by Government
to improve the surface-drainage in Freetown.
In 1899 the Liverpool School took the trouble to send out an expedition
which made a complete map of the mosquito-breeding puddles in the
town; and next year the Commission of the Royal Society extended our
observations. Two years later, however, another expedition of the
Liverpool School found that everything had been left in exactly the
same old state, except that the salary of the chief sanitary official
had been largely increased. Not a puddle, not a ditch had been drained;
not a single effort worth mention had been made, to act upon the new
discovery which was of such importance to these Colonies; and it was not
until the advent of the new Governor, Sir Charles King-Harman, assisted
by the Liverpool School, that any adequate attempt was made to clear and
drain Freetown. In the other Colonies progress was equally slow, until
Sir William MacGregor and Dr. Strachan commenced their anti-malarial
campaign in Lagos. The central authority, the Colonial Office, instead of
forcing on measures in a brisk, business-like way, contented itself with
publishing good advice which every one had heard a dozen times before.
The Governments of the Gold Coast (Sir Matthew Nathan), of the Gambia
(Sir George Denton), are now pushing on in this direction; and we can
only hope that the progress will be maintained in the future in all the
Colonies.
The other items of the programme mentioned above have also received
little attention. The medical and sanitary services have not been kept in
an up-to-date condition.
For instance, in 1880, Laveran discovered the parasite which causes
malarial fever; but even twenty years later there were few doctors who
used the discovery for the proper diagnosis and treatment of the fevers
prevalent on the Coast. In most cases they were not even provided with
microscopes for the work. In these respects the West African medical
services were only on a par with the other State medical services; which,
while they often contain exceedingly smart men, are generally wanting as
a whole in scientific ability and push, and in the influence which they
should exercise in the government of the countries to which they belong.
A high official once informed me that of all the men under his orders
the doctors had the least sense of duty. This is little to be wondered
at, since, in my experience, efficiency does not lead to advancement in
these services, and the most perfunctory men reach promotion as readily
as the most meritorious. I have noticed a dozen instances of the almost
complete indifference to science shown in these public medical services.
For example, when the first Liverpool expedition reached Sierra Leone
in 1899, the principal medical officer of the R.A.M.C. forbade us to
feed mosquitoes upon his cases of malarial fever for experiment, though
neither he nor his subordinates took the smallest trouble to prevent
their men from being bitten night and day by the insects in the barracks
and hospitals. We were convinced that this order was given simply out of
wilful desire to obstruct us. Similarly in India a military doctor once
forbade me even to prick the fingers of his patients in order to study
their blood. The manner in which the R.A.M.C. authorities interrupted
the researches of Colonel Bruce, F.R.S., on tsetse-fly disease and
horse sickness in South Africa, and in which the Madras Government
persecuted Dr. King for his small-pox work, is well known. It would be
folly to expect that services administered in this manner could ever
take a leading part in organising great campaigns against disease in the
colonies; and I fear that, until Sir William MacGregor led the way in
Lagos, the West African medical services, even though they have possessed
many able men, have done little to improve sanitation in that country.
The fault is entirely with the chief offices of Government, which too
often appoint and retain as heads of their medical departments men who
have no scientific status or even scientific knowledge, and at the
same time take no trouble to promote the deserving. I have known many
instances of this. It would be much better, in my opinion, to fill such
offices from the ranks of able civil practitioners or scientists at home,
rather than to select men who have no other claim to the post than long
official service.
One of the greatest defects in the sanitary administration of West Africa
has lain in the constant refusal of Government to investigate the causes
of sickness by making use of the services of experts. Government argues
that it is not its duty to investigate disease; but is it not? It admits
the duty of maintaining expensive medical services, but not that of
helping those services to increase their knowledge of their business!
A logical position truly! In my own humble opinion the Colonial Office
ought to have spent at least £5000 per annum during the last fifty years
for investigation of the causes of sickness in West Africa alone. Do
not talk to me of want of funds. There are plenty of funds, but they
are thrown away on military expeditions; on the salaries of useless
legal officials—chief justices and attorney-generals of little villages;
and on building houses such as the one I referred to at Ibadan, which
cost £6000, enough to pay for sanitary researches for years, and is
uninhabitable! It is a case illustrating that peculiar form of mind which
looks upon all research and investigation as idling and waste of time
and money, a frame of mind which seems to be specially a British one. We
have yet to learn the obvious fact that, if we wish to get a thing done,
we must first make suitable inquiry as to how it should be done. Disease
cannot be removed from a continent merely by establishing a medical
service; we must also help the service to perfect its knowledge. The hand
is not the same thing as the brain. In West Africa we have long possessed
the hand, but the brain has been wanting.
The truth is that the defects of the West African sanitation are really
due to the fact that the colonial councils are almost entirely in the
hands of certain castes which are not scientific castes, and which
care little for sanitary matters. I mean the politicians, soldiers,
tax-collectors and legal people. To these it is a matter of little
moment to cleanse streets, to purify towns, to banish disease from
thousands of homes. It is not given to them to stand powerless by the
side of death-beds and to hear the cries of the bereaved at the moment
of bereavement. If they have money to spend, do they spend it for the
purposes for which it was really chiefly taken from the tax-payer—for
conservancy and hygiene? The filthy condition of most native towns in the
British tropical possessions gives the answer. No, it is a finer thing
to build a grand new post-office or law-court, or to conduct a forward
military policy which will find its place in the home papers and delight
the heart of the British greengrocer (and voter) at his breakfast table.
Well, after all, it is human nature—each man for his own caste. As for
me, I have been too long an official myself not to understand these
little matters.
I have said that West Africa has fallen into a vicious circle, and the
nature of this vicious circle will now be apparent. The unhealthiness
of the Coast for Europeans tends to check their activities in all
directions; and in return this detrimental effect on their activities
tends to check their efforts towards ameliorating sanitary affairs. The
two conditions work hand in hand. It is impossible to remain blind to the
disastrous economical effect of the unhealthiness. It leads to a constant
change in the working staff of the country, not only in consequence of
death and sickness, but also in consequence of the frequent furlough
which is rendered necessary. From the highest to the lowest, few
Europeans remain in West Africa for more than two or three years at a
stretch; and many Government officials are entitled to leave after one
year. This has the effect of rendering all business discontinuous. As
soon as a man has started a piece of work he is called away from his
efforts, and is obliged to leave everything to a successor. In India
the period of residence in the country before furlough can be demanded
is five years at least, and even then the break in the business which
occurs during the furlough is often very mischievous. How much more so
must be the interruption which occurs in West Africa every year or two!
The same thing prevents people in West Africa from taking sufficient
interest in the homes of their exile. Many of them have told me that all
the time they are in the country they are indifferent to what happens,
that they simply live from hand to mouth, careless of their surroundings
and longing only for the day when, if fate spares them, they can escape
once more for a brief interval to Europe. It is this feeling which
makes them indifferent to the houses in which they live, to the food
they eat, to their surroundings—and sometimes, I fear, to their duties.
The danger, discomfort and _ennui_ of life are so great that a chronic
condition of callousness inimical to all serious effort is frequently
arrived at. We must remember these facts when we are inclined to blame
them. What wonder then that a matter like sanitation, which requires
such constant endeavours, is apt to be neglected. Thus the circle comes
“full round” again; and the neglect of sanitation leads to the paralysing
unhealthiness which leads to the neglect of sanitation. I have observed
the same thing elsewhere—notably in the unhealthy planting districts of
India.
What must we do to mend this state of affairs? Well, the vicious circle
must be broken at all costs.
But how? I think that there is really only one way in which it can be
done, and that is by the introduction of a new force into the vortex. I
mean public opinion and public effort at home in Europe. These must be
roused for the sake of our countrymen in West Africa. This country should
be made to understand that it has something more to do than to watch
processions of colonial troops and to brag of its Empire. It is its duty
to see that the Empire which it boasts of is properly administered, and
that our countrymen who are sent to carry on the affairs, both official
and commercial, of that Empire are not left to die there unnecessarily.
This duty has certainly been most grossly neglected in the past. It
should be the work of all of us, especially of those who govern the
country, of the wealthy merchants who trade with it, of the rich people
who do not know what to do with their money, and of men like myself, who
are hired to study and teach tropical sanitation—it should be the work of
all of us to see that it is not neglected in the future.
As every one knows, this new force has already come into being. Every day
sees some notice of West African affairs in the Press. The able Governors
of the Colonies are, I think, doing all for the cause which their limited
means allow. The merchants of Liverpool and London have come forward most
handsomely with their tropical schools, which I make bold to say are
doing well also. A single philanthropist has actually drained and cleaned
the houses in Freetown _pro tempore_, at his own expense, and last, but
by no means least, many young pathologists have given their time and
risked their health for the cause.
But what are the exact steps which should be taken? I have already
indicated these above. It is the duty of the Government to see that
the principal settlements are kept scrupulously clean and drained; to
construct and publish proper statistics of sickness and mortality among
the Europeans; to appoint whole-time health officers; to enforce sanitary
laws; and to encourage the building of good houses and the establishment
of dairies, settlement farms, gymkanas and other institutions or trades
which are likely to conduce to the comfort and health of the colonists.
Thus Government has a great deal to do. It has only begun as yet.
But it is not Government alone which must act. Sir William MacGregor
recently pointed out to the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce that men who
carry on business on the Coast have much to do for their employés—to
give them good houses, to force them to take proper precautions against
malaria, and to add to their comfort in every possible way.
Then there is the philanthropist millionaire. I wish that we could
get hold of him in earnest. Sir Charles King-Harman once told me that
£100,000 would reform the West Coast if presented as a free gift, by
enabling Government to start gymkanas, dairies, and such like for the
Europeans. So it would; and the money ought to be obtained.
Lastly, the Colonial Office ought to do one thing—a thing which was
recommended by a deputation which waited upon the Colonial Secretary some
time ago. That is, it ought to appoint a Sanitary Commissioner on the
Indian model, to make constant inspections of sanitary matters in the
West African Colonies, and to report directly to the Colonial Office.
We were told, however, that the scheme was too costly, and otherwise
impossible. But shortly afterwards a gentleman with a large salary was
appointed in order to inspect the knapsacks, &c., of the black troops—a
much more important matter than any sanitary business!
I may mention here an opinion which I frequently heard expressed on the
Coast, namely, that the West African Colonies have now outgrown the
present system of control by small detached Governments placed under
an office in London. It is contended that the whole country should be
administered by a Governor-General on the Indian lines. I fancy that
sanitation would not lose by the change.
Such are my humble opinions on sanitary matters in West Africa. They are
given in response to an invitation from the author of this book; and, of
course, exigencies of space have prevented my dealing with many points
which should be dealt with in a complete survey of the subject—which
would require a book for itself. I have thought it best to say exactly
what I think without much reservation; but, of course, my views may,
perhaps, not be so sound as I imagine. It would be the grandest thing in
the world if sanitary science could give to civilisation such a glorious
gift as West Africa; and I believe that it will. But the thing will be
done only by straight speaking, hard hitting, and the most indomitable
action.
CHAPTER XIX
LAND TENURE AND LABOUR IN WEST AFRICA
“In dealing with the natives, one must never touch their rights
in land.”—SIR WILLIAM MACGREGOR.
“The so-called labour problem is, in my opinion, created by
the people who complain of it, and not by the natives, who are
perfectly willing to work when fairly treated.”—Mr. J. A. DAW,
of the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation.[145]
“I know the Gold Coast natives well, and I repeat, you can
get all you want out of them, if people will only realise
that the native is a human being, and not an animal or a
machine.”—Captain DONOVAN, late of the Gold Coast Police.[146]
“Nothing in all the history submitted on this subject is more
misleading, untrue, and unjust than the reiterated statement
that the chiefs and people of Western Africa are unfitted for
peaceable self-government. It is not pretended they will reach
for the present any Western European ideal, but they will not
lag behind some people who claim to be better. The people do
not want war; the very facility with which their disputes are
temporarily adjusted serves to show this disposition. The Coast
is far from having recovered from the dire effects of the slave
trade. The chiefs are weak, and much of their power is taken
from them by the very British Administration which scolds them
for their non-success.”—C. S. SALMON, “The Crown Colonies of
Great Britain.”
If there is one thing more than another upon which the most competent
students of West Africa are agreed, it is the tenaciousness of the West
African Negro to his landed rights. Land tenure in West Africa has been
properly described as a “cult.” The most experienced English, French and
German observers have noted this characteristic. Wherever it has been
adequately studied, the system of native land tenure, in its tribal,
family, individual and commercial aspects, is found to be at once simple
in its broad lines, elaborate in its details, and approaching in many
respects to the most advanced democratic conceptions of Western Europe.
Before the torchlight of scientific inquiry, the old idea of the Negro
being more or less of an animal, incapable of evolving any rational
or consistent policy; too backward to frame anything approaching an
unwritten code of law; his every act of life being merely the outcome
of natural instinct, can no longer be entertained. And to the knowledge
that these beings, who were thought irrational, and inconsequent to the
extent of being the half-devil, half-child of popular imagination, has
been added the conviction that the commercial and political success of
the Powers of Europe in their West African Possessions depends for its
attainment upon the recognition of native law in respect to property.
But although the testimony to this effect is shared by those who have the
largest experience of West Africa, and although evidence is accumulating
on all sides which corroborates in the most ample manner the statements
of Ellis, Sarbah and Mary Kingsley,[147] it is nevertheless unhappily
true that the tendency on the part of the European Powers, not only to
interfere with the native law of land tenure, but to frame legislation
without regard whatever for its importance in the relationship between
the European and the Negro, is increasingly manifest. It would seem as
though, having discovered that the West African Negro is not a brute
but a man, evidence which establishes the discovery is deliberately set
aside; because it is so much easier to go on treating the native as a
brute, that is to say, as a being deprived of the faculty of reasoning,
and who, on the principle of “a woman, a dog and a walnut-tree, the more
you beat ’em the better they’ll be,” will come fawning to our feet in
abject humility upon every fresh exhibition of our superiority.
It is very curious to observe this conflict of forces; painstaking
research, its published results, and the influence it wields, _versus_
impatience and disinclination to investigate on the one hand; and selfish
material interests on the other. The future of European political and
commercial enterprise in West Africa is largely bound up with the
struggle for the capture of Public Opinion which is going on in this
country and on the Continent. At present, the purely materialistic
notion, assisted by its twin-brother Indifference, is in the ascendant.
Apparent success having been secured in that part of tropical Western
Africa where, under the tuition of his white masters, the native has
become a mere machine for the production of dividends to European company
promoters, a great impetus has been given to the conception, popular
in so many quarters, that the _raison d’être_ of West Africa and the
West African is their exploitation by Western Europe, on such lines and
in such fashion as the peoples of Western Europe see fit. The European
Governments are alternately allowing themselves to be dragged along this
perilous path whose ultimate destination is the abyss called Failure, or
are hanging back from it, beset with doubts. But the danger is acutely
realised by many, and as it gathers in extent and consistency, is being
energetically opposed. The merchants, English, French and German, are,
as a body, unanimous in condemnation. The exceptions to the rule are
exceedingly few and far between. The best type of Colonial Administrator
in West Africa also is utterly antagonistic, and amongst the still
restricted but daily growing section of the Public which follows the
affairs of West Africa with intelligent interest a strong feeling of
protest gathers volume every day. These forces are numerically inferior,
but they carry great weight, and if they can succeed in combining they
must ultimately win the day. But the struggle will be long and bitter.
An attempt has been made in this volume to show (1) the unwisdom of
interfering too rapidly, and without sufficient care and thought, with
native customs generally, and (2), as regards the evil of slave-raiding,
the advisability of seriously considering whether force is the only
weapon which a great Empire can forge to suppress it. In the latter
case, the Powers are able to put forward a plea justifying interference,
insomuch as the evil is an active one. The only difference of opinion,
as already stated, is the form which such interference should take. In
the former case the evils, if some of them are evils—a matter which
admits of a good deal of qualification—are of a kind that patience,
tact, and time—time above all things—will prove the most efficient
means of combating. But in respect to native law of land tenure, we are
not confronted with any evil. On the contrary, the system of native
land tenure is essentially just, thoroughly adapted to the needs of
the country and its people, a striking refutation of the “arrested
development” theory as applied to the Negro, and _per se_ an eloquent
vindication of the Negro’s claim to consideration at the hands of
the European invaders of, and settlers in, his country. There can be
no justification whatever for the break-up of land tenure, or for
the alienation of native property, under any pretext. It is morally
indefensible, and what is morally indefensible is seldom politically wise.
In West Africa, the circumstances being what they are, interference with
native property is bound to affect, not in theory but in practice, the
interest of every single individual in the country. In the coastwise
regions of West Africa proper, as far south, that is to say, as the
Rio del Rey, where Bantu culture begins, it may be accepted as a rule
(whatever differentiation may exist in the system of land tenure in
widely removed districts), from which the departures are extremely
rare,[148] that every square yard of the country is _owned_. Sarbah for
the Gold Coast; Clozel and Delafosse for the Ivory Coast; Ellis for
Yoruba; Mary Kingsley for the Rivers; Bohn for French Guinea; Fabre for
Dahomey, have borne witness in their respective fields of observation to
this fact—that there is no land without an owner. There is also a vast
amount of untabulated corroborative information from almost every part
of the Coast. South of Rio del Rey the land customs of the natives have
not been the object of so much inquiry as north of it, and there the
population is not in the main so dense, but what gleanings are available
to us appear to be conclusive on the same point: in all inhabited
districts land is never without an owner, whose claims, whether tribal or
family, are as sacred in native unwritten law as they would be if duly
set forth in a legal document, in accordance with the full requirements
of European jurisprudence.
It is easy to understand why this should be so. The native lives on
the produce of his land. He not only lives upon it, it is also his
wealth, his currency, his medium of exchange for European goods. The
products which he gathers in his forests, the plantations he makes in
the clearings and the plains, these are at once his sustenance and his
cash. Is it astonishing, therefore, that he guards his land and all that
grows therein, or is built thereon, with passionate jealousy; and that,
whereas he can be induced without difficulty to lease his property rights
under certain conditions to Europeans for even a long term of years, he
can seldom be brought, save by physical compulsion, to alienate them for
ever? Ought it to be matter for surprise that legislation calculated to
hinder his free use of the products of his land, or action of which the
logical consequence is to reduce him from the position of land-owner to
tenant, either provokes him to pit his spears and flintlocks against the
repeating-rifles of the despoilers, or breeds in him such utter confusion
of mind, such bewilderment and terror, that,
Fleeing to the forest’s dim recess,
He broods in sullen unproductiveness,
Plunged in deeper savagery,
Witness to the high morality
Of Christian peoples?
Strange, indeed, does it seem, with the burden of historical proof to
the adaptability of the Negro; with the abundant and cumulative evidence
of his willingness to trade, to learn, to take on new industries, to
everywhere follow up his natural profession of agriculture; with the
actual and daily evidence of his enterprise and producing capacity in the
existing oil-palm, ground-nut, mahogany and rubber industries; strange,
indeed, that European statesmen worthy of the name should for a moment
entertain the idea, or lend ear to the suggestion, that in a country
like West Africa, where the white element compared with the black is as
a grain of sand on the sea-shore, and where the European can attain
nothing that is permanent or lasting without the willing co-operation
of the Negro, the spontaneous production of the Negro as a free man,
in the enjoyment of the fruits of his own land, can be replaced by the
forced production of a serf deprived of his lands, his freedom, and his
individuality!
If in one sense the question of native land tenure in West Africa is
distinct from that of native labour, it is in another way closely allied
to it, and to treat of one without referring to the other is difficult,
if not impossible. But it is equally difficult, when once the labour
problem is raised, to confine oneself to West Africa only; for the theory
of “assimilation” is very much to the fore just now, and although the
conditions prevailing in West Africa differentiate absolutely from those
in Central, East, and South Africa, the same general arguments are made
to apply more or less to all four. I must, therefore, crave the reader’s
indulgence if I wander somewhat afield.
There is not the least shadow of doubt that the tendency to go past the
law of native land tenure in West Africa owes its origin in large measure
to the oft-repeated statement that the Negro will not work. Numbers of
people have for some time past been assuring the Public that West Africa
can only be developed by compelling the native to work.[149] It is, of
course, assumed _à priori_ that the native of West Africa does not work.
How the contention can be justified in the face of demonstrable and
easily accessible facts to the contrary, we need not pause to inquire.
It suffices that the contention exists, and that there is not a paper
dealing with African affairs in Great Britain, or the Continent of
Europe, which does not contain in almost every issue some reference to
the matter. Nor is discussion limited to such papers. In the speeches of
public men whose interests are associated with Africa; in conferences, in
books, pamphlets, and not infrequently in the daily press, the subject
crops up again and again. The refrain is usually much after this style:
“The native will not work. We have to work and pay income-tax. Why should
not the native? What is the use of Africa to us if the native refuses to
work? It is intolerable. He must be made to work.”
It must be admitted that the spirit of the hour is admirably suited to
act the part of receiver to these laments. The signatory powers of the
Berlin Act have allowed the gradual establishment and consolidation in
Western Central Africa of an institution the existence of which is based
upon repudiation of the inherent right of the native to his land or the
fruits thereof; and upon forced labour on the part of the dispossessed
for their despoilers. What wonder that the public of France and Germany,
observing the enormous profits derived by people immediately connected
with this institution, and led astray by the apathy of their statesmen
to the evil, should put down to political ability what is merely
outrage; and impatient at the comparatively slow progress of their own
possessions, should begin to loudly call for the adoption of a similar
system therein? “The King of Belgium has succeeded in making the natives
work. He and his coadjutors are reaping a huge harvest. Belgian industry
is the gainer. Antwerp has become the first rubber market in the world.
Why not imitate the King of Belgium?”
[Illustration: THE IDLE NATIVE! MARKET SCENE IN WEST AFRICA]
It would be grossly unfair to describe this mental attitude on the part
of public opinion in France and Germany as having been due, or as being
due, to a natural callousness. At one time, indeed, the proceedings
of the Congo State were severely condemned in both countries, and not
farther back than 1895 Count Alvensleben, German Ambassador in Brussels,
was carrying on a correspondence with the then principal Secretary
of the Congo State anent the payment of rubber premiums by the Congo
State to its agents and the trading operations of that State, couched
in such language as would have brought about between two European
Powers an immediate rupture of diplomatic relations. But wealth commands
great power, and its rapid acquisition is a blunter of conscience.
The Belgian financiers who control the two great Trusts in the Congo
State—the _annexes_ of the Domaine Privé Trust and the Thys Trust—were
desirous for their own ends of still further extending their power.
They managed to obtain the co-operation of many highly placed persons
in France and Germany, and to secure the assistance of an important
section of the Colonial Press in the two countries. The result is seen
in the creation of what is known as the Concessionnaire _régime_ in the
Colony of French Congo; its partial adoption in the French Colony of
Dahomey; its attempted establishment in the auriferous French Colony
of the Ivory Coast; and its introduction into German Cameroons, where,
however, experience has led to a revulsion of feeling as healthy as it
is encouraging. In other words, the indifference of the Powers to the
violation of the Berlin Act by the Sovereign of the Congo State has
involved the application of the new slavery to another vast tract of
territory in Africa. Public opinion has been worked to such good purpose
that the lucubrations of a Carl Peters or Camille Janssens are not only
listened to with patience, but are regarded by many as the embodiment
of a rational colonial policy; while in France, open appeals have for
the past year and more been uttered every day in favour of a _régime_
of forced labour at the point of the bayonet. The theory that the Negro
will not work and must be compelled to do so has, therefore, made strides
rapid enough among the Western nations on the Continent of Europe to
satisfy the fondest hopes of its promoters.
In England the modern school of thought in African affairs shows a like
tendency. We hear in various forms how essential it is to inculcate
the African with the notion of the “dignity of labour.” As we are here
dealing with West Africa, it would be out of place to discuss at any
length the labour questions connected with South Africa. But it is only
too obvious that the financiers of the Rand and their friends at home
are the leading spirits through whom British public opinion is being
influenced towards coercion in the matter of native labour in Africa
as a whole, just as the Brussels and Antwerp financiers who run the
Congo State are the instruments whereby similar notions are propagated
on the Continent of Europe. As already stated, special conditions, as
well as the nature of the native population and, indeed, nearly all
attendant circumstances, differ profoundly in West Africa and South
Africa, but it is necessary to indicate the prevalence of a common
shade of thought which it is sought to apply in practice wherever the
European has secured a sufficiently strong hold upon the Dark Continent.
In a fascinating volume of African travel recently published by a
brilliant young explorer, Mr. H. S. Grogan, can be found embodied, in
a style distinguished for its honest vulgarity, frank brutality and
entire absence of those hypocritical sophistries so much in vogue, the
views of the “modern school” as to what is, or what ought to be, the
inter-relationship of European and Hamite in Africa.
Here are a few samples of his arguments:
“But few people at home,” he writes, “realise what an alarming
and ever-growing difficulty has to be faced in the African
native problem. It is a difficulty that is unique in the
progress of the world.... Under the beneficent rule of the
white man he thrives like weeds in a hot-house.... What is to
be done with this ever-increasing mass of inertia? We have
undertaken his education and advancement, as we have carefully
explained, by the mawkish euphemisms in which we wrap our
land-grabbing schemes. When we undertake the education of a
child or beast we make them work, realising that work is the
sole road to advancement. But when we undertake the education
of a nigger, who, as I have endeavoured to show, is a blend
of the two, we say; ‘Dear Nigger, thou elect of Exeter Hall,
chosen of the negrophil, bread-and-butter of the missionary,
darling of the unthinking philanthropist, wilt thou deign to
put thy hand to the plough, or dost prefer to smoke and tipple
in undisturbed content? We, the white men whom thy conscience
wrongly judges to be thy superiors, will arrange the affairs
of state. Sleep on, thou ebony idol of a jaded civilisation,
may be anon thou wilt sing ‘Onward, Christian Soldiers.’ ... A
good sound system,” proceeds Mr. Grogan, “of compulsory labour
would do more to raise the nigger in five years than all the
millions which have been sunk in missionary efforts for the
last fifty.... Why should not other peoples be called upon to
work for the cause of progress? Throughout Africa the cry is,
‘Give me labour.’ There is a sound maxim in the progress of
the world: ‘What cannot be utilised must be eliminated.’ And
drivel as we will for a while, the time will come when the
negro must bow to this as to the inevitable. Why, because he
is black and is supposed to possess a soul, we should consider
him, on account of that combination, exempt, it is difficult
to understand, when a little firmness would transform him from
a useless and dangerous brute into a source of benefit to the
country and of satisfaction to himself.”
What a typical passage is this! The Negro lazy and degraded, useless
and dangerous: the European doing all the work while the Negro smokes
and drinks—whether imported European liquor or liquor manufactured
locally is not stated: narrow-minded visionaries at home preventing the
salvation of Africa in the shape of compulsory labour on the Rand mines
which constitutes “education”: the perfection of morals that result from
such education, and so forth! The crowning folly is conveyed in the
words “what cannot be utilised must be eliminated,” which, I suppose,
means a “thinning-out process”—such as Professor Gregory tells us has
been accomplished only too successfully in Unyoro, where “it has been
estimated that in the four years following the establishment of British
rule the population was reduced to a fourth”—in order to prevent the too
rapid propagation of these “hot-house weeds!” And yet what Mr. Grogan
says is repeated by many and believed by more—the mass who swallow
this tainted diet as though ’twere nectar, and absorb these grotesque
distortions as if they were gospel truths.
Let us endeavour to examine this question in a practical, temperate, and
impartial spirit. According to ethnologists, the true, uncontaminated
Negro is only found in West Africa, roughly from Senegal to the Rio
del Rey. He inhabits the coastwise regions and the forest belt. The
innumerable creeks and forests of the Niger Delta shelter the purest
specimens, ethnologically, of his race. South of Rio del Rey the Bantu
stock begins, and predominates as you work southward. Behind the forest
belt the true Negro stock has become changed and modified by infusion
of Berber and Fulani, and also, but to a lesser degree, of Arab blood.
In the Niger bend, in the regions round about Lake Chad, in Northern
Nigeria this blending of races has created a bewildering variety of mixed
types, while here and there both the invaded and invading elements have
preserved their purity—for instance, among the Negroes, the Bambarra
of the Upper Niger; among the Berbers, the noble Imosagh; among the
Arabs, the Shuwa; among the Fulani, the Pullo herdsmen of Futa Jallon,
Adamawa, Bondu, and of many other parts of the Western Sudan. Leaving
west for east, you have the Shoa, Galla, Somali, and Jew in Abyssinia
and its confines; then the Bantu—product, as Dr. Voight thinks, of
Semitic and Negro mixture—spreading southwards, inwards and westwards;
universal everywhere, right down to the Cape—the Masai, Wahuma, Pigmies,
Hottentots; and, in the French Congo, the Fans, presenting small channels
of ethnic divergence in a vast sea of Bantu stock.
[Illustration: WEST AFRICAN “YOUNG HOPEFULS”]
Throughout all this huge expanse of territory the soil is in the main
so fertile that it produces with little trouble everything which the
native requires for his subsistence and his comfort, where his sense of
what constitutes comfort has not expanded as the result of intercourse
with a higher ethical development—a “higher civilisation,” to use the
hackneyed term. The climate being mostly hot, it militates against great
physical energy, which, moreover, is not, and has not been, economically
necessary for the African for countless generations. The degree of
development of the native depends upon the extent of his contact with,
or remoteness from, influences tending to create in his mind fresh
ideas; a higher conception of arts and crafts—influences which may
have filtered through to him either by the medium of trade, successive
migration, conquest by a more advanced race, or the infiltration of a
revealed religion. The more inaccessible the region, the further inland
the people, the wider removed from highways of commerce their situation,
the more primitive their state. That is logical, although there are, of
course, exceptions. But that in his primitive state the African is the
“useless and dangerous brute” which the shallow materialism, the frenzy
for expansion, the unthinking, rather blatant callousness of the hour
would make him out to be, is one of the many fictions which pass for
truths about Africa. The Wa-Kavirondo are the most primitive people in
the Uganda Protectorate. They go absolutely naked, are more moral than
their partly clothed neighbours, and are agriculturists. “Wherever they
settle, the jungle around them is soon converted into fruitful fields,
yielding sweet potatoes, or various forms of corn. Those who can afford
it keep goats and sheep, and the wealthy have herds of cattle,” says
Dr. Ansorge, adding that among them, “where the European villain with
his lies and frauds has not yet made his appearance, the white man’s
simple word is equal to a solemn and a binding oath.” In most parts of
Africa, south of the equator—in the huge central portion at any rate—in
the Upper Nile valley, the region traversed by Mr. Grogan, the native
has never had the motive, the spontaneous impetus to produce more than
his needs required or his fancy led him to. Yet he works in iron, moulds
pottery, has in many cases a highly developed artistic instinct,[150]
manufactures cloth and ingenious and elaborate weapons of offence, has
some notions of harmony, and often enough a vein of true poetic instinct.
When local conditions have been favourable to the evolving of important
social agglomerations, a native state form has grown up which was a cause
of abundant astonishment to the early European travellers in Central
Africa. Yet, as far back as we are able to plunge in the dim recesses
of the past, these millions of natives—this “mass of inertia”—were
entirely cut off from intercourse with the outside world, isolated from
all contact with the “superior” races. A few stray Egyptian traders
probably penetrated to the head waters of the Nile and the Great Lakes.
Later on, a handful of Arabs wandered inwards from Zanzibar, but until
Burton, Speke and Grant, Livingstone (working from the south), Baker,
Emin, and Stanley revealed the interior of Africa, its inhabitants had
been innocent of all communication with the higher culture. One need not
inquire whether the lot of these people has been much brighter since
the advent among them of the half-caste Arab slave-trader, the Belgian
ivory and rubber hunter, the over-zealous European missionary, and the
land-grabbing fever of the Powers. An estimate on that point must be
largely a matter of opinion. But to expect that these natives are going
to willingly emigrate _en masse_ to the Rhodesian mines, hire themselves
out for the performance of arduous labour, dig, delve, undertake
plantation work and the like with the zeal of a European workman anxious
to earn a living wage, is a piece of consummate folly. They can only
be induced to do so by the most tactful treatment; by the payment of a
decent wage; by the selection of European agents possessing some sense
of proportion, and at least a rudimentary knowledge of the teachings
of history. To attempt to revolutionise these peoples’ conceptions in
a few years is madness, and to try and drive them by coercive measures
constitutes a policy at once immoral, short-sighted, and disastrous.[151]
Until quite recently British West Africa remained unaffected in any
material sense by the gradual gravitation of European public opinion
towards the use of coercion in dealing with the African, together with
the non-recognition of native land tenure and the various concomitants of
the “exploitation” policy. The birth of a scientific gold-mining industry
in the Gold Coast, however, has let loose a flood of ignorant talk
about West Africa, and raised up a whole host of evil advisers who are
busily intent in introducing South African methods in the West African
goldfields. Constant complaints are being raised about the scarcity of
labour, the indolence and the slothfulness of the native. Experienced men
like Mr. Daw, of the Ashanti goldfields, have not hesitated to speak out
boldly against these views; and so far the Colonial Office,[152] to its
honour be it said, has refused to yield to the clamour, and has declined
to repeal the law on the acquisition, extent, and registration of mining
concessions whereby the rights of the native owners of the soil are amply
safeguarded. In that respect the Concessions Ordinance must rank as the
most equitable legislative measure for the protection and preservation of
native land tenure which exists in West Africa. It is true that of the
numerous complaints which the Ordinance has given rise to, those that
refer to the actual working of the measure are justified. The machinery
for registration is hardly complete enough, and in that and some other
respects matters might be improved. It is also true that cases have
occurred where native chiefs have, knowingly or unknowingly, sold their
properties twice over, and thus perpetrated a fraud which, no doubt, is
exceedingly reprehensible; but certainly not more so than the numerous
frauds deliberately consummated by sundry Gold Coast company promoters in
foisting upon the British public bogus concerns, causing pecuniary loss
to hundreds and thousands of English men and women. The African chief who
indulges in sharp practice can be punished in the Gold Coast, but his
European prototype generally manages to escape the clutches of the law.
It is to be hoped that the Colonial Office will maintain the Concessions
Ordinance in its integrity, while perfecting the machinery to administer
it, for the law, as a law, is a credit to British justice in West Africa.
On the other hand, it is much to be regretted that the Colonial Office
should have framed a code of laws and regulations in respect to the
development of forest products and the attribution of forest reserves,
in Southern Nigeria, which have given rise to grave objection, and must
continue to do so. The effect of these regulations in the aggregate is
to authorise the High Commissioner to issue any rules he chooses with
regard to all kinds of forest produce, not excepting the produce of the
palm. No proper distinction is drawn between so-called “waste”[153]
lands and forest lands at the disposal of the native and the Government
respectively. Natives are to be compelled to take out licences to enable
them to do what they have hitherto done without restriction. The licences
are to be granted by the Government officials. Half the money goes to the
local treasury, the other half to the native owner, but only if he can
show that he is entitled to it! The native is tried, under the penalties
provided by the proclamation, by the European officer and not by his own
local court. All this is bad and short-sighted policy. It must inevitably
tend to suggest to the native mind that the Government is taking entire
possession of his land. His rights of land tenure are being treated as
though they had ceased to exist, and had been vested in the Government.
We are officially assured that the native chiefs are satisfied that
this is not the case, and that they welcome these regulations. It is
impossible to regard these assurances otherwise than with scepticism. In
Southern Nigeria the Crown Colony Government is a despotism absolute and
entire. There is no legislative council; there are no native newspapers.
The native has no means of ventilating his grievances. The powers of
the High Commissioner are more sweeping than that of the Tsar of all
the Russias. There is no check upon him, no control of any kind. He
does exactly what he likes, and “force” in Southern Nigeria, in other
words, punitive expeditions are but of too frequent occurrence. For
upwards of three-quarters of a century the natives of Southern Nigeria
have been encouraged by successive British Governments in the belief
that they were free to utilise the products of their own forests. I
defy any jurist to say what amount of freedom they will enjoy if these
regulations are carried out to the letter. I have sought the opinion
of English lawyers not unversed in native law on this matter, and they
have been anything but impressed with the justice or legality of the
measure. The regulations have been compared to a retrogression “to the
days of William the Conqueror.” “The interpretation of the Commissioner’s
powers, under this Ordinance”—I am quoting from the letter of a lawyer
to whom I submitted the measures in question—“are far too arbitrary.
What privileges are left to the native who, you will remember, is the
owner of the soil? It seems that he is in the unfortunate position of
being the owner of his land without being able to obtain the slightest
advantage from that land, and if he attempts to deal with the products
thereof, even with the very best intentions, he is liable at the will
of the Commissioner to imprisonment or fine as provided by the Bill.
This is surely not the intention of the framer of the Bill; at least I
hope not.” The Chambers of Commerce on the one hand, and the Aborigines
Protection Society on the other, have protested against this reactionary
legislation, which shows that both in commercial and philanthropic
circles a similarity of feeling exists in regard to its tenour. It is one
thing “to protect the forests from destruction,” which is understood to
be the motive of these regulations, and no reasonable being would object
to the framing of common-sense rules for the preservation of rubber trees
and vines (although it is not rules but _instruction_ which is required)
and certain young hardwood trees of slow growth; but it is quite
another thing to introduce a series of cast-iron laws of this wholesale
character, of doubtful legality, of still more questionable expediency,
inevitably calculated to lead to friction and distinctly prejudicial
to the development of legitimate commerce. The Crown Colony system in
the Rivers has not been such a brilliant success that it can afford to
deliberately run such risks! These proclamations, it may be added, were
passed into law in Southern Nigeria without the merchants who supply the
whole revenue of the country being advised or even consulted. Such is the
business-like method with which we conduct our affairs in West Africa!
[Illustration: AN IBO FAMILY GROUP—SOUTHERN NIGERIA]
In Lagos, where a similar measure was introduced (it should be stated
that the law is of home manufacture), it met with considerable native
opposition, and passed through several stages of amendment before
becoming law. In Lagos there is a legislative council on which natives
sit—in a minority it is true—and there are local newspapers. Channels
exist, therefore, through which native opinion can make itself heard.
There is also, happily, a Governor of the widest sympathies, of great
and extensive knowledge and experience. Under his auspices we may feel
assured that nothing will be wittingly done to alienate native rights in
land. The Bill, as amended, provides that it shall be open to the duly
constituted Native Councils, or Governments, of the inland protected
States, to construe its clauses in accordance with native custom and
usage; and as the chiefs are just as interested in preserving their
forests as the legislators or the merchants, we may feel tolerably sure
that the objects aimed at will be secured. Moreover, it is further
provided that the Native Councils shall themselves issue licences
when required, the proceeds of which shall come to their own local
treasuries entirely; and shall themselves inflict fines under their own
law, and in their own courts; and the Governor is further recommending
that the Government reserves shall be conveyed under lease.[154]
There you observe the difference between the two procedures. The one
arbitrary, dogmatic, despotic—the other such as it is seen to be. If
any difficulties arise in Lagos in the course of the working of the
Bill,[155] it will not be for the want of doing everything possible
to avert them, of surrounding the rights of native land tenure with
safeguards which, so long as they are adhered to, will be sufficient
to protect them, of imbuing the native mind with the feeling that
the Administration intends to conform to the traditions of native
usage; but they will be due to the principle involved in the Bill, the
principle, that is, of a _primâ facie_ right of interference, directly
or indirectly, on the part of the Government, in the affairs of native
States, whose internal independence in contradistinction to their
external relations is guaranteed by treaty. On that point opinion will
differ, and some of us will continue to think that, in all matters
affecting native industries, instruction is better than restriction.[156]
CHAPTER XX
A COTTON INDUSTRY FOR WEST AFRICA
Within the past few months a subject of the greatest possible moment to
West Africa, and of vital importance to no inconsiderable section of the
inhabitants of Great Britain, has been discussed in concrete fashion, and
there is every reason to hope—nay more, to feel assured—that practical
results will follow. I refer to the movement for the promotion of
cotton-growing in West Africa.
What has already been done may be stated in a few words. On May 8 a
memorable meeting was held at the Albion Hotel, Manchester, under the
auspices of Mr. Arthur Hutton, the President of the Manchester Chamber of
Commerce. The Chambers of Commerce of London, Liverpool, and Oldham were
represented at the meeting, together with the managing director of the
British West African Steamship Lines, Sir Alfred Jones,[157] the Oldham
Cotton Spinners Association, the Manchester Cotton Spinners’ Association,
various other associations of a similar character from Blackburn and
other Lancashire towns, the West African merchants, cotton merchants,
brokers, weavers and manufacturers, &c. The object of the meeting was
to widen the area of cotton cultivation under the British flag, more
especially in West Africa, and before the close of the proceedings a
“British Cotton Growing Association” had been formed with a preliminary
capital of £10,000, to be exclusively devoted to experimenting in West
Africa and other over-sea possessions. This meeting was followed by
another held in Manchester in June, in the course of which the decision
arrived at previously was confirmed and enlarged, and it was decided to
raise a fund of £50,000. The resolutions passed at this second meeting
were as follows:
RESOLUTIONS.
“(1) That, in the opinion of this meeting, the continued
prosperity of the British cotton industry depends on an
increased supply of cotton, and it is desirable that our
sources of supply should be extended.
“(2) That in order to attain this end an association be formed,
to be called the British Cotton Growing Association.
“(3) That its principal object be the extension of the growth
and cultivation of cotton in British colonies, dependencies,
and protectorates.
“(4) That a guarantee fund of £50,000 be raised, to be spread
over five years, no guarantor being required to contribute more
than one-fifth of his total guarantee in any one year.
“(5) That this association shall have power to form a
subsidiary company, or companies, and to dispose of any of
its assets to any company thus formed, on conditions that
subscribers to this association have the first option of
taking up shares in any such company in proportion to their
subscriptions.
“(6) That a general committee should be appointed.
“(7) That this general committee should appoint from their
number members to form the executive committee.
“(8) That the executive committee shall immediately collect
all the available information on the subject and despatch
expert expeditions to report on the best methods of procedure,
and shall have power to (_a_) acquire land on which to make
experiments and to establish plantations; (_b_) distribute seed
among the natives to encourage them by advice and assistance to
grow cotton on their own land, and to engage experts for this
purpose if necessary; (_c_) establish stations to buy and sell
cotton, or any of its by-products, animals, implements, or any
other articles or goods necessary for the expeditions; (_d_) to
adopt any other means that may suggest themselves from time to
time to attain the object in view.
“(9) That the general committee issue a report once each
half-year of the work which has been done.”
A third meeting took place at the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce on July
14, in the presence of Sir William MacGregor, Governor of Lagos, and Sir
A. King Harman, Governor of Sierra Leone, when practical ways and means
of promoting the cultivation of cotton in their respective Colonies for
export to Europe were debated.[158]
Having thus briefly indicated the various measures adopted, we may
profitably inquire into the origin and causes of the movement. That
inquiry cannot fail to impress the thinking public with the importance
of the issues. With every year that passes Great Britain is becoming
more than ever dependent upon the United States for her cotton supply,
and with every year that passes the increase in the cotton production of
America accentuates itself by comparison with the production of other
countries. Thus in the decades 1870-80, 1880-90, and 1890-1900 America
has produced 4½, 6½, and 9½ millions of bales, while India has produced
2, 2½, and 2 millions; Egypt 384,000, 400,000, and 700,000; and Brazil
600,000, 300,000, and 380,000 in the same period. The gradual position
assumed by America as controller of the world’s cotton is, therefore,
clearly apparent, and although the production of Egypt and India is
increasing, the ratio of increase when compared with America is trifling,
while the production from countries outside India and Egypt is decreasing.
That is one consideration. Another consideration is this. Forty years ago
England took the bulk of American cotton. To-day the Continent, thanks to
the growth and to the marvellous success of Continental spinners, takes
one-third of the entire American crop.
Yet another factor is the increase in the American consumption of cotton.
A few years ago the American _consumption_ of cotton was almost _nil_.
America now consumes a third of her produce. In the opinion of some
experts—although in some quarters a contrary opinion is held—America
will consume by the end of next year at least one-half of her production.
Now these are very serious facts for industrial Lancashire. The terrible
distress which visited Lancashire in the days of the American Civil
War is still sufficiently recent to be remembered, and one shudders
to contemplate the consequences which would ensue if anything should
again prevent Lancashire from obtaining her share of the cotton crop of
America, with nothing but the existing inadequate supplies from other
parts of the world to fall back upon. The danger is a very real and
pressing one. As matters stand at present, Great Britain is practically
at the mercy of the United States, and in a position of almost entire
dependence upon the market manipulations of American speculators, in
whose power it is to regulate the price to suit their own convenience.
So unsatisfactory is the actual condition of affairs, that for the past
three years it has hardly paid importers to ship cotton to Liverpool. The
fear of an American syndicating of cotton is not, perhaps, altogether
groundless in these days of vast trusts and combinations, while the
competition from Continental spinners, and, above all, increased
American consumption, make the outlook as gloomy as it well can be. It
is therefore imperative that something be done to increase the area of
cotton production under the British flag. So much for the wider aspect of
the question.
Those to whom this matter specially appeals have naturally enough
turned their eyes towards West Africa, and it is in connection with the
possibilities of the development of an export cotton industry in that
part of the world that some remarks may fittingly be made in this volume.
I say an “export” industry, because, as we know, a native industry to
supply local wants has existed in West Africa for centuries past. We
have seen, for example, the paramount part which the cotton industry
plays in the prosperity of Kano and Northern Nigeria generally, where,
in addition to supplying local wants, manufactured cotton cloths are an
article of barter; in some regions indeed a veritable currency, sent
far and wide to countries of inland Western Africa where the excellence
of the Kano article is in perpetual demand. But what is true of Kano is
true of many other portions of West Africa. The cotton shrub (_Gossypium
herbaceum_)[159] is met with in a wild state all over West Africa, and
cultivated very extensively. Wherever Islam has spread, cultivation has
increased, but in pagan communities the manufacture of cotton cloths
is indulged in to no inconsiderable extent. The pagan tribes of Sierra
Leone, of the Gold Coast and Liberia, turn out the most beautiful cloths.
Their excellence and felicity of design are such that no one who has seen
them can fail to be impressed with the capacity of the races, with their
primitive appliances, which produce them. The endeavour to promote cotton
cultivation on a larger scale in West Africa will not be, therefore, a
new thing, and what might have been an initial difficulty is happily
non-existent.
Nor will West Africa be called upon for the first time in its history to
supply Europe with raw cotton. When the American Civil War broke out,
high prices were offered for West African cotton, which was universally
pronounced by experts to be of excellent quality. Cotton was exported
in its raw state from the Gold Coast, Fernando Po, Lagos, the Gambia,
and Angola. Indeed the export was continued long after that, and between
the years 1878 and 1885 raw cotton to the value of £56,501 was shipped
home to Europe from the Gold Coast and Lagos. Even before the American
War, as was recently recalled to memory by Mr. Elijah Helm,[160] himself
a Quaker, the constitutional objections of the Quakers to utilise the
products of slave labour led to the formation of a small association,
which imported cotton from West Africa of a quality so good, and in
quantities so considerable, as to provide for the not very extensive
wants of the Quaker fraternity.
But with the close of the war, and the considerable fall in price since
those days, the West African export cotton industry has become virtually
extinct. A very little, I believe, still finds it sway to Europe from
the banks of the Volta and from Angola, but that is all, with the
exception of the Togoland experiment of last year, of which I shall speak
later.
The four main requirements for the successful cultivation of cotton are:
(1) a suitable soil, (2) adequate irrigation or a regularly recurring
rainfall, (3) sufficient labour, (4) transport facilities. British West
Africa can, in the main, give the first three, in some places better than
in others. British West Africa’s capacity to furnish the fourth depends
upon whether the grassy upland plains of the interior may be considered
more fitting or less fitting than the swampy, better-watered regions of
the coast. If the former be thought the most likely, the country behind
Lagos alone affords the necessary qualifications at present. Lagos,
moreover, is particularly fitted in respect to the third requirement,
that of labour. A railway 125 miles long runs up from Lagos town to the
interior, passing through the naturally rich and productive belt of
forest, where it is hopeless to expect, and where it would be dangerous
to attempt to promote, cotton cultivation. But beyond the forest belt
a park-like country opens out of an area of some 10,000 square miles
in extent, the greater proportion of which would be suitable to the
cultivation of cotton, and would go far to justify and hasten, if
taken up in earnest, the extension of the existing railway line to the
Niger. If, therefore, it be a question of experimenting in a region of
grass-covered plains—similar to those of Texas—Lagos, by reason of its
railway, is the only British colony where such experiments can at present
be undertaken. The intelligence of the Yorubas, their agricultural and
industrial capacity, the dense agglomeration of population met with in
the country, the need of providing or strengthening the _economic_, as
opposed to the strategic, argument for a continuation of the line (let
us fervently trust under different conditions) to the Niger; all those
factors render it in the highest degree to be hoped that Lagos may be
chosen as a centre of activity for the new movement. Lagos, let it never
be forgotten, is one of the doors of Northern Nigeria.
If, on the other hand, the consensus of expert opinion favours the
low-lying coastwise regions, where fluvial transport to the actual port
of shipment is relatively easy, the Gambia and Southern Nigeria primarily
suggest themselves. Those possessions seem to me to offer advantages
over Sierra Leone and the Gold Coast. The present condition of Sierra
Leone is not encouraging. The railway, if it achieves anything at all,
which is doubtful, can only do so by increasing the yield of the fruit
of the palm, and by bringing the interior oil-palm districts into closer
touch with the coast markets. This may enable that unfortunate Colony
to bear the heavy burden under which it is now staggering. To cut down
the forests in the Eastern districts of Sierra Leone in order to plant
cotton would be suicidal. In the Gold Coast, again, there is an opposing
factor in the shape of the gold-mining industry. The mining companies are
perpetually grumbling about the scarcity of labour, for which in many
cases they have themselves to thank. Their demands upon the population
have already resulted in drawing away a number of people from their usual
avocations, with the result that the export of timber is decreasing; and
any further deviation of available labour, such as the cultivation of
cotton would necessitate, would seriously affect the producing capacity
of the country, not only as regards timber, but in respect to other
natural and cultivated products, such as palm oil and kernels in the
first category, and cocoa in the other.
For the Gambia, on the other hand, the advent of a new industry would be
a boon. The Gambia entirely relies for its existence upon the ground-nut.
It is always a bad thing to have all your eggs in one basket. When an
article like the ground-nut is in question, it is very bad, because
you are at the mercy, as it were, of the seasons. The ground-nut is
necessarily a fluctuating article on that account, and one year may
produce a fine crop, to be followed the next by an indifferent one. Sir
George Denton—the genial and popular Governor of the Gambia—intended, I
know, to try and start a better system of irrigation in certain parts of
that Colony, in order to widen the extent of ground-nut producing land,
and any such project would be all to the good, of course, for cotton
cultivation. The population of the Gambia being mostly Mohammedan and
largely composed of those most enterprising people the Mandingoes, and
Mandingoes crossed with Fulani blood—remnant of the old empire of Melle—a
cotton industry (to which they are long inured) could be started with so
much greater hope of success from this fact.
In Southern Nigeria[161] the field is vast. You can march for miles on
either bank of the main river through a cotton-growing country. The
density of the population varies, of course, in different districts.
Fluvial means of transport abound. The people, it is true, are not
blessed, or cursed, with many wants; but there is no valid reason
why, with a little painstaking care and sympathetic treatment; with
improvements in the production of kernels which, as already suggested,
would release a considerable amount of native labour for other pursuits;
with a greater display of combination between the official and mercantile
class; with a good deal less blood-letting, fewer punitive expeditions,
“clearing away of the refuse of the population,” “drastic measures,” and
so forth; the natives of Southern Nigeria should not be induced to take
up cotton cultivation for purposes of export.
Granted the necessity; given the soil, irrigation rainfall, labour and
transport, as specifically mentioned above; admitted an experience in
cotton growing, spinning and weaving among the natives; what remains to
be studied in this great enterprise destined, let us hope, to make of
British West Africa a great cotton-producing country on which England can
count in case of need; to assist in freeing us to a large extent from
a position of dependence upon America, and so prevent the accumulating
dangers of the hour, and of which the creation cannot fail to confer the
greatest benefit upon the British West African possessions?
Obviously the first consideration is one of price. Can a cotton industry
in West Africa be made to pay? Can sufficient inducement be offered
to the native to encourage him to produce cotton for export? Can West
African cotton compete with any degree of success against the American
product in the matter of price? On what lines can a cotton industry in
West Africa be promoted? Based upon the data available, which are not, of
course, by any means complete, the general consensus of opinion amongst
experts appears to be that, with the inculcation of scientific methods of
cultivation, the treatment of the cotton shrub as an annual instead of a
perennial, the introduction of the necessary implements and of ginning
and compressing machinery it will be possible to make cotton-growing
profitable. In this respect the experiments of the Germans in Togoland
are particularly interesting. To Germany belongs the credit of initiating
the new cotton movement. From the German Colony of Togo came last
year, for the first time in its history, fifteen thousand marks worth
of cotton. The conclusions of the German Agricultural Committee were
precise. The absence of adequate transport facilities alone prevented the
complete financial success of the first experiment. Further, it was shown
upon analysis that, of the various types of cotton raised from American,
Egyptian, Indian and native seed, the type raised from the native seed
produced, as a whole, the best staple, equal in quality to average
American. This absence of transport is likely to be remedied in time,
as a survey is now being made for a railway from the coast to Misahöhe.
Meanwhile the Germans are so far from being discouraged that a company
is, I understand, about to be brought out for the express purpose of
developing the cotton industry in Togo[162] with a capital of £37,500.
[Illustration: TRAVELLING ON THE NIGER IN THE DRY SEASON]
The French are also devoting a great deal of attention to the subject
just now. Some years ago the then military Governor of the French Sudan,
Général de Trentinian, took the matter up. Nothing came of his efforts,
but M. Roume, the new Governor-General of French West Africa, has
now adopted it as one of the planks of his platform, so to speak. He
is anxious to establish a cotton industry in Senegal, which, like the
Gambia, lives upon ground-nut production. More ambitious schemes are
vaguely mooted, and some enthusiasts already speak and write as though
the valley of the Upper Niger were about to be converted, as it were by a
flash of the magician’s wand, into a rival of the Southern States. That
with its magnificent soil and splendid natural irrigation the valley of
the Upper Niger may some day fulfil the aspirations of the French is,
perhaps, more than possible.[163] But we are a long way off that yet.
It seems difficult, then, to believe that this simultaneous impulse on
the part of competent men in England, Germany and France can be founded
upon a miscalculation in respect to working expenses, and I think we may
feel tolerably certain that, if cotton costs an average per lb. of 2⅛
_d._ to produce in Texas, such parts of West Africa as can be endowed
with similar facilities in respect to machinery, and where transport,
either by rail or water, is available, will be able to produce cotton at
a lower figure; and as the interest of the West African shipowners is to
fill their ships homeward bound from the West Coast, we may also presume
that they will make reasonable concessions to encourage the industry.[164]
There remains the question of how to set about establishing a cotton
industry in West Africa upon a sound basis. Shall it be attempted in
the form of plantations managed by white overseers and with paid native
labour; or shall it be left very largely to native initiative, and
develop itself on the lines of a native industry—as, I believe, is the
case in India? I think that all who have some knowledge of West African
matters will unhesitatingly pronounce in favour of the latter solution.
West Africa is essentially a country of native industries, and the best
economic results have been obtained in West Africa when the motive power
all through has been the native, with the European as teacher, instructor
and guide, but _not_ as manager or director of native labour.[165] In
the construction of public works the same phenomenon is observable in
a somewhat different form. Experience has demonstrated that where the
recruiting of labour for railways or road construction has been left in
the hands of the chiefs, requisite labour was forthcoming, and sufficient
left on the farms to allow usual production, and therefore the export
trade has remained unaffected; whereas when recruiting operations have
been directed by Europeans outside the authority of the chiefs, labour
was indeed obtainable, but at the cost of disorganising the general
labour supply of the country and consequently affecting adversely the
export trade.
A knowledge of these facts suggests, therefore, that the cotton industry
can be promoted with the greatest chance of success by interesting the
rulers of the country and their councils in the movement; by giving the
chiefs the benefit of expert advice; by enlisting their sympathies and
good-will; by supplying them with cotton seed, implements, and possibly
hand-gins, gratis; and so on. Here at least the necessity of proceeding
on lines of instruction entirely is manifest. The object is to improve
an existing industry, to greatly enlarge and systematise it, _to get the
people of the land interested in it_. If the native can see a profit in
the business, he will take it up. That is morally certain. It has been
so in every branch of West African commerce. So keenly has the native
embraced new trade outlets offered to him that upon occasion he has, when
uninstructed in the art of production, compromised the future. Absolute
and entire co-operation of officialdom and commerce is essential if the
cotton movement in West Africa is to be attended with success. The
Germans may here serve us as a model to imitate. The home Government,
the local Government; the forces of industry and commerce in Germany,
and in the particular Colony where the experiments are being made, have
vied with one another in the effort to achieve an aim of common interest
to all. Centres of instruction have been established in the Colony;
model farms have been created; Negro farmers from the States have been
brought over through the instrumentality of Mr. Booker T. Washington, the
distinguished Negro scholar and manager of the Tuskegee Institute.[166]
In all these matters the official world has worked hand in glove with the
commercial world.
It is equally important that the cotton associations and merchants should
be in earnest. No mere pecking will suffice. Disappointments and delays
must be discounted in advance. There are sure to be plenty of both.
Ginning and compressing machinery must be set up either on the coast,
or, if it be decided to try Lagos, at large centres such as Ibadan and
Abbeokuta; and preferably what is known as the “American round lap,”
which ensures simultaneous ginning and compressing in 250 lb. round
bales, instead of the more cumbrous and more expensive separate ginning
and compressing machines, which produce the 500 lb. square bale. In
short, the movement must be engineered, from the beginning, on a real
scientific basis. If Togoland with its transport difficulties has been
able in the first year’s experience to export 70,000 decimal pounds of
cotton, what may not be achieved by those of our West African Colonies
where transport facilities exist; where the population is at least as
dense if not denser; and where British subjects have been in contact with
the natives for periods ranging from fifty to one hundred years?
I cannot leave this subject without referring to the indirect relation
it bears to the Negro problem in the States. At present all is vague
and uncertain. We cannot tell what may be the outcome of the movement;
but if it be a success, what vistas does it not open up for the future!
We have seen how the Germans have invited the co-operation of American
Negro cotton farmers. The few who have gone out—the German reports assure
us—have elected to remain. More, it is announced, are to follow. What
would the attitude of the American Government be in the face of a steady
flow of emigration on the part of the coloured population of the Southern
States, to help to build up in its country of origin what it has built up
in America? In what light would the Americans regard the up-springing of
a great cotton industry in West Africa? If, as events seem to indicate,
America is likely to become on an ever-increasing scale the principal
consumer of her own raw cotton, would such an occurrence be viewed with
equanimity by the American public? Or if not with actual equanimity,
with at least the feeling that the danger, presuming it to be one, might
be cheerfully faced if a deeper peril could thereby be diminished, and
in time perhaps altogether removed? Could white labour in the American
cotton plantations, with the exception of the more swampy and malarial
regions, be substituted for Negro labour, in the event of appreciable
emigration? These are questions for American statesmen and thinkers
to answer. If American intelligence can perceive in these tentative
suggestions a clue, be it ever so faint now, of future potentialities,
a clue worth following up and investigating, let America remember that
a million square miles of African territory, which was declared in 1884
internationally free commercial land, and in the consolidation of which
under its present _régime_ America is to a large degree responsible, is
in the grip to-day of a band of greedy monopolists in whose bowels reside
no scruples, no pity, no humanity; who are sowing red ruin wherever their
influence can be asserted. If America ever seriously turns her attention
to West Africa as a solution of the greatest problem of her internal
politics, let her cast her eyes upon the Congo State, misnamed Free—the
abode of cruelty and persecution, of slavery and reaction.
CHAPTER XXI
THE MAHOGANY TRADE
“The traveller who wanders through the dim recesses of the
tropical forest of Western Africa soon feels the sense of
its beauty lost in that of its mournful grandeur, and there
steals over him a profound feeling of solitude and a deep
consciousness of the solemnity, majesty, and utter loneliness
of this great, gloomy wilderness.”—Dr. AUSTIN FREEMAN.
The great forest region of Africa is one of the wonders of the world.
It is a moot point whether Africa should be described as possessing two
forest belts or only one. Roughly speaking, the forest region takes the
form of an inverted hatchet or axe, with French Congo, the Congo Free
State, and a portion of the Great Lakes districts as the blade; while
the West Coast, from Sierra Leone downwards, provides the handle. There
are gaps here and there; in the Cameroon hinterland; among the mangrove
swamps of the Niger Delta, and behind Lagos on the Niger side. The
forest is densest in the Upper Congo, where Stanley, we know, struggled
in it for many weary weeks, as though held in the grip of some hideous
nightmare from which there was no escape.
In this natural hot-house, always bathed in an atmosphere of humidity and
steam, vegetation flourishes in the wildest profusion and exuberance, and
with the widest diversity of size and species, from the mighty _bombax_
to the creeping lichen. So abundant is this luxurious growth, so thick
the canopy formed by the spreading branches and creepers overhead,
that, save here and there, where some giant has fallen and broken down
the surrounding undergrowth, leaving a gap overhead through which the
sunlight penetrates flickeringly, the forest is plunged in eternal
gloom. This gloom and the silence which accompanies it are the two
great characteristics of the African forest. Except for the occasional
chattering of monkeys, the crash of a falling tree, or the far-off
chirrup of birds, who seek the sunlight in the topmost branches, the
silence broods everlastingly. The effect of living amongst this gloom
and silence is most depressing to the European, and it is no matter for
surprise that the terrific solemnity of their environment should have
exercised a profound influence upon the naturally superstitious minds
of the native Africans who dwell therein. It is amongst the dwellers in
the forest region that we find the lowest type of African humanity[167]
and the most sombre developments of African religious conceptions. All
European travellers who have spent some time in this great forest region
have been alike impressed by its grandeur and its melancholy, and their
descriptions bear witness to the way in which their feelings have been
wrought upon by the natural phenomena with which they were surrounded.
It is only within quite recent years that European enterprise has
concerned itself with the potential riches of this vast forest region, or
rather of that portion of it which it is as yet possible to commercially
develop, viz. the belt on the West Coast—or, to refer to the illustration
given above, the handle of the axe. The results already achieved in a
short period of effort, which can hardly be called more than tentative
and unsystematic, are such as to warrant the most sanguine expectations
for the future, when facilities of transport shall have brought the main
portion of the forest region within reach of the European markets. It is
curious to observe how, in its main lines, the trade of Western Africa
has arisen in a succession of well-defined stages. The earliest trade was
in gold-dust, and, so far as we know, confined to gold-dust, unless the
gorilla (or more probably the chimpanzee) skins brought home by Hanno
be counted as trade—which would be a somewhat humorous classification.
Then ensued a long period of absolute neglect of West Africa by civilised
man. When once more the latter turned his attention to that part of the
world, gold was again the principal item of trade, accompanied by ivory,
and later on by slaves—the later a monstrous evil, whose Nemesis is
to-day making itself felt in the United States. The gold trade died out,
the ivory trade languished, and the gum, palm oil and kernel trades came
into existence, to be followed by the rubber trade, and lastly by the
timber trade—principally confined to mahogany. On the principle of _plus
ça change, plus c’est la même chose_, the gold industry is now again
reviving, although on very different lines from the old barter system.
That is, of course, a general statement. There have been, now and then,
exceptions to prove the rule, and so far as timber is concerned, a not
inconsiderable business was carried on in the Gambia and Sierra Leone
some fifty years ago.
[Illustration: FELLING A MAHOGANY-TREE]
[Illustration: SQUARING THE TREE]
Sir Alfred Moloney, however, was able to write in 1887 that, after having
made many inquiries, such timber trade as had previously existed “may
be said to have altogether ceased or to have sunk into the export done
in dye-woods and ebony.” The following tabulated statement shows how
insignificant was the timber trade in West Africa between the years 1878
and 1885:
WOOD AND TIMBER EXPORTS FROM WESTERN AFRICA, 1878 TO 1885.
Year. Articles. Countries whence imported. Quantity. Value.
Tons. £
1878 Wood and timber From the West of Africa, Nil. Nil.
unenumerated not particularly designated
1879 ” ” ” ”
1880 ” ” 1733 14,892
1881 ” ” No mention.
1882 ” ” 1458 10,750
1883 ” ” 1441 11,100
1884 ” ” 1395 9,980
1885 ” ” 1181 9,565
In 1889 the total import of African mahogany was only 68,000 feet, and
in 1890—or a little over ten years ago—it did not amount to more than
259,000 feet. To-day the mahogany trade has grown to be one of the most
important branches of commerce in West Africa. Enormous quantities of
logs are shipped home from the Gold Coast, Lagos and the Ivory Coast, and
the mahogany exports from the Niger Coast Protectorate,[168] which were
started in August, 1899, produced 23,983 superficial feet in the year
1899-1900.
The industry is carried on by two categories of shippers, viz. the
European merchant established on the coast, who either employs native
labour to cut down his own trees, or who buys timber direct from the
native; and the native merchant who ships home on commission. The chief
centres of the mahogany trade on the coast are: for the Gold Coast—Axim,
Twin Rivers, Sekondi and Chama; for the Ivory Coast—Assinie, Half
Assinie, Lahou and Grand Bassam; for Southern Nigeria—Benin and Sapelli.
Lagos timber is carried round to Forcados in branch boats, and there
shipped on the homeward-bound steamers. The South Coast mahogany trade
is chiefly confined to Botica Point, Gaboon, Eloby and Mayumba, although
a few logs have been sent home in the steamers of the Cie Belge Maritime
du Congo, from near Boma in the Congo Free State. The South Coast timber
trade appears to be dying out, owing chiefly to the pale colour of the
wood, which does not now commend itself to buyers.[169] The vast forests
of the Upper Congo cannot, with advantage or profit, be tapped until
the Congo Railway Company lowers its preposterous rates, and until the
administration of the country is in other hands than the monopolist
clique which controls it.
[Illustration: DRAGGING THE SQUARED LOG THROUGH THE BUSH]
[Illustration: SAPELLI, SOUTHERN NIGERIA’S PRINCIPAL TIMBER PORT]
It may be interesting to give the actual exports of timber from the Gold
Coast and Lagos from 1895 to 1899, showing the wonderful strides which
have taken place. The Gold Coast, it may be stated, has a total forest
area of 12,000 square miles.
EXPORTS FROM THE GOLD COAST.
Year. Value.
1895 £28,245
1896 52,234
1897 90,509
1898 110,331
1899 87,076
EXPORTS FROM LAGOS.
Year. Value.
1895 Nil.
1896 £275
1897 8,271
1898 12,944
1899 34,737
Liverpool, Havre, Hamburg, Marseilles and Bordeaux absorb nine-tenths of
the exports of mahogany from Africa, but a certain proportion finds its
way from those ports to the United States.[170] Of the ports mentioned,
Liverpool holds far and away the first place. The statistics of Liverpool
imports from 1889 to 1900 inclusive will be found in the Appendix.
In view of the evidence given of the phenomenal increase of the mahogany
trade, it seems almost incongruous to say that the existing condition
and the future prospects of the trade have, for some months past, been
causing much apprehension in West African commercial circles. The truth
is that the growth of the trade has been checked, and for the last twelve
months has even been showing signs of decay. There was a decreased
export in 1901 of over 11,000 tons, and the figures for the first six
months of the present year show a further decline, although prices have
considerably advanced and the demand for good logs exceeds the supply.
It is a fact recognised by all the interested parties that the export
of mahogany from West Africa has received a serious check. What are the
reasons? They differentiate with the localities. In the Gold Coast the
falling off which has occurred is due, in the first place, to labour
being attracted from the timber to the gold-mining industry, and to the
needs of railway construction. Many thousands of natives have thus been
drawn away from timber-felling to work on the railway; for the mines, or
as carriers for the various prospecting expeditions into the interior.
A second contributory cause has been the necessarily trade-disturbing
element of warfare, otherwise stated, the Ashanti War, in the shape of
the general unrest and disorganisation brought about by the excessive
demands for carriers, &c. In the Ivory Coast, prospecting expeditions
have also affected the output. As far as Lagos is concerned, the remarks
of the Governor in the last report of that Colony for last year afford
the requisite explanation.[171]
The freight question is undoubtedly held to militate against the
development of the timber industry, and it had been freely prophesied
that the effect would begin to make itself felt last year. How much the
decline was due on the whole to high freights, and how much to other
causes mentioned, it would be difficult to say. With the technicalities
of the subject I will not bore my readers. Suffice it to say that the
principal objection which is advanced against the steamship owners,
is the way in which the system known as the “sliding scale” is worked
out. At present logs over two tons pay increased freight, and a further
increase is made upon logs of three tons and upwards. It is urged
that, if the principle of the bigger the log the better the timber
were sound, this would be all right enough; but it so happens that the
average sale price of a one-ton log is much the same as that of a two-,
three- or four-ton log, except when the heavier log is what is termed
a good “figured”[172] log. Figured logs fetch any price, according to
the fancy of the purchaser, and in such cases the question of freight
is a bagatelle. But the vast majority of the logs do not possess these
qualifications, and the increased freight on the heavier logs tells
very heavily against the merchant, and may even go so far, when low
prices prevail on the home market, as to render any profit on the sale
impossible. Of course, the steamship owner has his reply ready; and, so
far, he considers it good enough to justify the existing rates.
When all is said and done, the fact remains that the timber trade is
languishing. It would be a thousand pities to allow this to continue,
if it can be avoided. A trade once abandoned or paralysed is not easily
restarted. It is in the interest of all the parties concerned to arrive
at a _modus vivendi_ which shall allow the native who cuts and squares
the wood, the merchant who ships it, and the steamship owner who carries
it, to make a profit. In this as in other respects one would like to see
some systematic measures of instruction adopted, under joint official
and commercial auspices, to show the natives how the best logs can be
selected for felling, which would avoid the sending home of a mass of
worthless and immature timber calculated at times to flood the market and
depreciate prices, while damaging the forests in Africa.
CHAPTER XXII
ISLAM IN WEST AFRICA
The steady and continuous spread of Islam in the western portion of the
Dark Continent is a fact which no one acquainted with the subject will
attempt to deny. It is, indeed, so well established that to specialise
particular instances where it has been observed would be a needless
undertaking. It is everywhere palpable, striking, impressive. It can no
more be disguised or ignored than the concurrent circumstance of relative
failure on the part of Christian missions. While Mohammedanism continues
to gain converts far and wide; to absorb whole tribes; to filter down the
rivers to the ocean; to pierce the forest belt, with hardly a check—save
here and there, as, for example, among the Ibos on the Niger—Christianity
makes no headway in the interior; and even in its confinement to the
coastwise region, or perhaps it would be more accurate to say, some of
the Europeanised towns on the coast, its progress is slow, so slow,
indeed, that well-informed observers are not wanting who believe that it
is losing rather than gaining ground. At any rate, it is not, I venture
to think, an exaggeration to say, Christianity is maintaining itself with
difficulty among heathen communities in West Africa, and beats in vain
against the strong tide of Mohammedanism.[173]
It cannot be without interest to Englishmen whose West African Empire
covers so large an area, and numbers between thirty and forty millions,
to devote careful attention to a subject which is fraught with such
far-reaching importance, and which it is imperially necessary for Great
Britain to take into serious consideration as constituting a factor which
has to be reckoned with and appreciated at its proper value. On that
account it may not be out of place to discuss in a general way the whole
subject of Mohammedanism in West Africa. The problem is a great one, and
although there is no pretence here to more than touch the fringe of it,
even a tentative effort is, perhaps, of interest to the daily increasing
section of the public, which begins, although still but dimly, to realise
the nature and the extent of the responsibilities Great Britain has
undertaken in West Africa.
Rejecting, as, in my opinion, we can do with safety, the legend that
attributes the existence of Mohammedanism in Walata (Biru), the seat
of the Ghanata Empire as early as the sixtieth year of the Hejira, or
about 682 A.D., there is yet good reason to believe that Islam crossed
the Sahara, and became powerful in the Western Sudan, earlier than the
eleventh century A.D., which is the period assigned to that event by the
majority of authorities. We know positively that the fifteenth prince of
the first and Za dynasty of the Songhay, Za Kasai, was converted to Islam
in the year 1000 A.D.[174] From El Bekri we glean that Mohammedanism
had taken such firm root in the Songhay Empire about sixty years after
the conversion of Za Kasai (1067 A.D.) that none but a Muslim could be
king. In the reign of Yusif Ibn Tashfin, the founder of Morocco, 1062
A.D., many Negroes, according to Leo Africanus, became followers of
the Prophet. Barth’s invaluable “Chronological Table of the History of
Bornu” shows us that Islam was introduced into Kanem (and Bornu)[175]
in the reign of Hume, the first of the Muslim rulers of that extensive
Empire (1086-89), and the circumstance that this potentate died in Masr
(Misr)—_i.e._ Egypt, infers that he was either on his way to or from
Mecca.[176] Now it seems inconceivable that Gao or Gogo, the capital
of the Songhay Empire, which was situate on the Niger about 500 miles
in the heart of the country of the Negroes, should have yielded to the
influence of Islamic preachers who came from the north, before the
introduction of that religion in the intervening region comprised between
the southern limits of the Sahara and the Western Sudan. That it should
have struck the Niger, and followed it as providing the swiftest vehicle
of penetration inland before permeating the countries that lay on either
side of the river, is natural enough, and we find indirect confirmation
that it did so in the circumstance that the other great Negro kingdom
contemporary with Songhay, that of Melle or Mali, which had succeeded
Ghanata, only embraced Islam in the person of its king, Baramidana,
in 1213, or about two centuries after the conversion of Za Kasai. It
may therefore, I think, be assumed, without departing from the limits
of inherent probability, that if the existence of mosques in Walata
were relegated to 900 A.D. instead of 682 A.D., the former date would
approximately represent the truth; and that Mohammedan proselytisers
must have been busily at work in the Senegal about that time or a little
later, pushing southwards and eastwards from thence, until they reached
the Niger, and pursuing their course onwards to the most important city
on its banks, Gao; reaching it, as already stated, in the opening years
of the eleventh century,[177] and having met with success, continuing
their triumphal progress to the third great Negro kingdom of West Africa,
Kanem.[178]
The introduction of Islam revolutionised Western Africa. His first
contact with a revealed religion powerfully affected the naturally
intense spiritual nature of the Negro. What was the precise nature of
the religious beliefs entertained by the Songhays, Mandingoes, Fulani,
Hausas and other tribes inhabiting the Upper Senegal and Upper Niger at
the time of the advent of Mohammedanism it is difficult to say. It may
have been the animism which, under its modern appellation, Fetishism,
is met with to-day in its purest form among the true Negroes of the
coastwise swamp and forest regions. Or, as is much more probable, it
may have been a form of pantheism allied with animal worship inherited
from contact, at a remote period, with Egyptian culture; as witness the
_Tarik’s_ description of the original fish-god of the Songhays, believed
by some authorities—and not without reason—to have been the manatee;[179]
the alleged regard of the Mandingoes for the hippopotamus;[180] and the
strong presumptions of an ancient bovine worship among those Fulani who
have remained faithful to their original calling of _bororoji_ (herdsmen)
as distinguished from their more ambitious countrymen of the towns, whom
destiny has fashioned into statesmen, diplomatists and warriors. Whatever
those beliefs may severally have been they were flung aside, and Islam
struck so deep that the Negro became in time not only as zealous, but
upon occasion more zealous than his Semitic teachers. Under the fostering
impulse and care of the new religion, these backward regions, says
Thomson,[181] commenced an upward progress. A new and powerful bond drew
the scattered congeries of tribes together and welded them into powerful
communities. Their moral and spiritual well-being increased by leaps and
bounds, and their political and social life took an altogether higher
level.
“Islamism is in itself stationary, and was framed thus to
remain; sterile like its God, lifeless like its first principle
in all that constitutes life—for life is love, participation
and progress, and of these the Coranic deity has none. It
justly repudiates all change, all development, to borrow
the forcible words of Lord Houghton, the written book is
there the dead man’s hand, stiff and motionless; whatever
savours of vitality is by that alone convicted of heresy and
defection.”[182]
The underlying thought in the above passage is evidently comparative.
The writer is unconsciously drawing a comparison between the two great
revealed religions of the world, Christianity and Islam, as such.
But as we are here concerned merely to treat of the performances of
Islam in West Africa, and of the effect upon the _Negro_, primarily
of Islam, indirectly of Christianity, it can without hesitancy be
asserted that what may be partly true in the description given of
Islam in its relation to mankind as a whole is wholly false as regards
its influence in West Africa. To the _Negro_ the God of Islam is not
sterile: Islam is not lifeless. It is a living force, giving to its
Negro converts, as Mr. Bosworth-Smith says, “an energy, a dignity, and
a self-respect which is all too rarely found in their pagan or their
Christian fellow-countrymen.” Individually and collectively the Negro
has progressed since Islam crossed the desert, and just as to the Negro
fetishist of the forest and the swamp religious conceptions permeate
every act, preside over every undertaking and insinuate themselves in
every incident of his daily existence, so Islam, where it has laid
permanent hold upon the Negro, claims from him an allegiance entire and
complete.
We need not seek for proof of this. It is writ large over West
Africa. Negroes, not by dozens or by scores, but by tens of hundreds,
traverse thousands of miles on foot from the innermost parts of the
Mohammedanised Continent; from Senegal, from the Niger Bend, from Bornu,
from Hausa, from our Coast Colonies of Sierra Leone and Lagos, to perform
the Haj, the sacred journey to Mecca, which every true believer should
accomplish at least once in his life. A clergyman belonging to the
Church Missionary Society, writing from Tripoli,[183] recently spoke
of “a ceaseless stream of Hausa pilgrims continually passing through
Tripoli on the way to Mecca after a wearisome tramp across the desert,”
a significant admission from such a source. This “ceaseless stream” is
not confined to Hausa. It flows from all parts of Western Africa. It has
flowed thus for many centuries, and the volume, far from diminishing,
increases. That is not the sign of sterility. Burton, during his stay in
Mecca, was witness of the extraordinary influence wielded by Islam on the
Negro mind. The case, as he remarks, was not an exceptional one.
“Late in the evening,” he says, “I saw a negro in the
state called Malbus—religious frenzy. To all appearance a
Takruri,[184] he was a fine and powerful man, as the numbers
required to hold him testified. He threw his arms wildly about
him, uttering shrill cries, which sounded like _le le le le_,
and, when held, he swayed his body and waved his head from side
to side like a chained and furious elephant, straining out the
deepest groans. The Africans appear unusually subject to this
nervous state, which, seen by the ignorant and the imaginative,
would at once suggest ‘demoniacal possession.’ Either their
organisation is more impressionable or, more probably, the
hardships, privations, and fatigues endured whilst wearily
traversing inhospitable wilds and perilous seas have exalted
their imaginations to a pitch bordering upon frenzy. Often they
are seen prostrate on the pavement, or clinging to the curtain,
or rubbing their foreheads upon the stones, weeping bitterly,
and pouring forth the wildest ejaculations.”
Dr. Blyden, speaking of the native Moslems of Sierra Leone, has said,
“Wherever they go, they take the Koran with them. In a wreck or a fire,
if nothing else is saved, that book is generally rescued. They prize and
honour it with extreme reverence and devotion.... I have known them to
pay as high as five pounds sterling for a Manuscript Koran and think it
cheap.” One might fill a volume in giving concrete instances, as well as
general statements founded upon the personal observations of travellers
in all parts of Western Africa, to prove the inapplicability as concerns
West Africa of Palgrave’s passage quoted above, a passage which I have
specially chosen because it represents, unfortunately, what may be called
“home opinion” on the subject.
It can, no doubt, be said with truth, that the majority of West African
Mohammedans cannot read Arabic, and that a large proportion of them
only know the ordinances of the Koran by hearsay; but this, far from
being an argument against the influence of Islam in West Africa, is but
an added proof of the grip which Islamic thought has attained over the
African mind, and of its having supplied the Negro—not through specific
rules, regulations and ordinances, but in its main conception—with
something which he required both in a spiritual and material sense. It
is, moreover, advisable to accept with caution the general statements
attributing wholesale ignorance of letters to Muslims in West Africa.
Blyden gives a long list of works which he observed in a Mallam’s house
in the Sierra Leone hinterland. The _Tarik_ tells us that, not long
after the introduction of Islam in West Africa, many Negroes rivalled
their Semitic or Berber teachers in knowledge and erudition. Barth met
in the wildest parts of Adamawa a Fulani from far-off Massina carrying
a considerable number of Arabic books as _trade_. Many other instances
could be given.
Islam in West Africa is, indeed, a living force and a most powerful
agency “everywhere knitting the conquerors and the conquered into an
harmonious whole,”[185] and Englishmen must regard it as such. It
confronts them more particularly in its political aspect in Northern
Nigeria; and in Sierra Leone, the Gambia, the Gold Coast, Lagos, and to
a much lesser degree, in Southern Nigeria, in its social aspect. People
in England appear strangely unacquainted with these facts. West African
Mohammedanism is presented to them in distorted shape by those who
have interest in so doing, and to whom the public ear is more readily
accessible. But the local authorities in the West African Colonies
realise the state of affairs; and what is more, are rapidly coming to
the conclusion that the Mohammedan section of the community is not only
the most orderly and the most progressive, but necessitates, both as a
matter of duty and of policy, recognition on the part of the Government.
Within the last few years Mohammedan schools have been established with
official sanction and support in all our Colonies; a mosque built by the
late Shitta Bey has been opened at Lagos[186] by the (then) Governor in
person, and in Sierra Leone a Director of Mohammedan Education has been
especially appointed at a fixed salary per annum.
As with Great Britain, so with France, but to a very much greater
degree. France’s African Empire is almost wholly an Islamic one, and
confining ourselves to that part of it which is properly West African,
the overwhelming majority of the inhabitants are Muslims. With the
exception of a small section of Bobos, Diakankes and Bambarras, a larger
but declining section of the Malinkes and a few wandering Fulani in
the more remote districts of Barani, Fuladugu, Bobo-Dialassu, &c., the
whole of the Western Sudan is more or less Muslimised. In the north
of her colony of Guinea, France has the large Muslim Fulani State of
Futa-Jallon; in Senegal, Mohammedanism has spread right down to the
ocean; in the Chad region, in Baghirmi and a considerable distance up
the Shari, Islam has flourished for at least four centuries, and through
Fulani cattle-rearers and Hausa traders, the tenets of the Prophet are
being propagated as far south as the Shari, Sangha and Ubanghi. The
French have established numerous schools at which the sons of Mohammedan
chiefs receive instruction on Western lines. Among such schools may be
mentioned those of Kayes and Medina. Special instructors appointed by
the French Government teach Arabic side by side with French, and every
effort is made by France to secure Muslim co-operation on lines of
Western thought in the great work which she has taken in hand. The French
African Committee go so far as to print a special bulletin in Arabic,
which, together with the Arabic newspaper _al Mobacher_, published in
Algeria, is distributed gratuitously to a large number of influential
Mohammedans throughout the Western Sudan, especially in such centres as
Jenne, Timbuctoo, Nioro and Sokolo. Needless to say these publications
are largely composed of laudatory articles calculated to inspire their
readers with the justice, generosity, and liberty of French political
conceptions. The French seem to be adopting in this, as in many other
respects in West Africa, a very enlightened attitude. At the Kayes
school, for instance, they have appointed a special teacher from Algeria
to superintend instruction in the Arabic tongue.[187] Moreover, in
order to make clear to the Muslim population that their sons can attend
the Government schools without fear of having to listen to teaching
conceived in a spirit of hostility or criticism towards Islam, the
French authorities not only permit but encourage the presence during
class time of the Muslim schoolmasters themselves, thus removing the
natural suspicion of Muslim parents, and at the same time making allies
of the “marabouts.” This line of conduct, it may be added, is especially
embodied in the instructions given to all District Commissioners.
How comes it that Islam has succeeded with the West African Negro when
Christianity has fared so badly? Islam has marched from triumph to
triumph among the Negroes, but of the greatest effort ever put forward
by the Christian Church in West Africa, that by the Portuguese in the
Congo in the sixteenth century, there remains little or no trace, and the
results of more widespread but less consistent (because rent by internal
differences) efforts of to-day cannot be termed otherwise than profoundly
discouraging, when one considers the lives expended in a fruitless task;
pitifully sterile, when one is aware of the large sums that have been,
and continue to be, spent in the attempt. It would seem as though the
failure of the Christian Church in North Africa, and the failure of Roman
Catholicism in South West Africa, in the sixteenth century, were to be
repeated in these later days by the multifarious sects and denominations
the monotony of whose painful struggles to gain a foothold on the western
shores of the unfathomable continent is only varied by the jealousies and
recriminations which they indulge in towards one another.
The Protestant churchman is wont to ascribe the failure of Christian
propaganda in South-Western Africa in the sixteenth century to Roman
Catholicism, which to him is the embodiment of an evil little if at all
removed from the evil of Islamic doctrine.[188] I have heard English
and French Roman Catholics attribute it to the inherent incapacity, or
weakness, or corruptibility—according to the particular views of the
individual—of the would-be converters, the Portuguese. Persons devoid of
special religious prejudices are sometimes inclined to argue that the
mere fact of the slave trade being in existence contemporaneously was in
itself sufficient to account for it. Upon examination none of these views
appear very conclusive. Protestantism has not fared better in West Africa
than Roman Catholicism. Indeed, it may be doubted whether it has fared,
on the whole, quite as well. No argument worthy of serious attention has
been adduced to prove the exceptional unfitness of Portuguese prelates to
successfully accomplish the task they had begun, nor does the decline
of the political influence of Portugal in West Africa provide a fitting
explanation, because the flimsy nature of the first apparent successes
of the Roman Catholic Church had become evident before that decline took
place. As for the alleged slave-trade deterrent, it was, contradictory as
the statement may appear, probably no deterrent at all, but rather the
reverse; for the policy of the Portuguese consisted in promoting friendly
relations with the more powerful potentates of the littoral, and in
supplying them with guns and gunpowder to make war on the inland tribes.
The latter, and not the coastwise natives, were, in the main, the chief
sufferers by the slave trade; and the coast people, being guaranteed from
molestation, would have no occasion to invoke the miseries inflicted upon
them by the Portuguese traffickers in human flesh, when approached by the
Portuguese inculcators of Christianity. In fact, if the political acts
of professing Christian nations in West Africa are to be considered as a
factor in the measure of success, or failure of Christian propagandism
in West Africa—a debatable proposition upon which I propose to refer
later on—it may without hesitation be affirmed that recent developments
of European policy have done more to prejudice the natives against the
doctrines of Christianity, as propounded by European teachers, than the
slave trade with all its savagery and horrors.
[Illustration: A SUSU MALLAM]
We must go deeper than this, and in doing so try and clear our minds
of preconceived opinions, no easy matter when certain errors have
been so persistently dinned into our ears that they have come to be
regarded as cardinal articles of faith; and those who in this respect
occasionally venture to disturb the serenity of our convictions are
looked upon as outside the pale of respectable society. One of such
preconceived opinions is embodied in the quotation from Palgrave’s
“Arabia” already commented upon. Another bears on the nature of Islamic
proselytism in West Africa. It is an ingrained belief with most people
that Mohammedanism in West Africa has ever been propagated by brute
force; is ever and always associated with “slave-raiding.” The mere
epithet of “slave-raiders” applied in Reuter’s telegrams to a tribe
with whom trouble has occurred, is sufficient to justify in the eyes
of the public any expeditions of a punitive kind which the authorities
in their wisdom think fit to organise, against those who have incurred
the displeasure of a District Commissioner or Military Commandant. Far
be it from me to assert that occasions do not arise when the adoption
of punitive undertakings is not only an unavoidable necessity, but a
positive duty owed by the Suzerain Power to its protected subjects. But
I would venture respectfully to suggest that the term “slave-raiding” is
much abused, not a little distorted, and sometimes most unfairly applied.
It is used almost exclusively in connection with Mohammedan tribes. When
a difference comes about with pagans, we are told that it is caused by a
predilection to human sacrifices. A reference to the frequent collisions
which have taken place between Great Britain and the natives of Western
Africa during the last six years will show that, either as a primary or
an accessory cause of the difficulty, human sacrifices are invariably
given in the case of a pagan community and slave-raiding in the case of a
Mohammedan community.
There could be no greater error than the prevalent idea that in West
Africa, Islam has attained its remarkable successes _manu militari_. Most
of Islam’s triumphs in West Africa have been won by the peaceful sect
of the Quadriyah, founded by Sidi-Abd-el-Kader-el-Jieari in 1077 A.D.,
first introduced into West Africa in the fifteenth century; and the work
accomplished by this sect has been more enduring and more widespread
than that of the other great order in West Africa, the Tijaniyah, which
believes primarily in the sword as a means of conversion.
“In the beginning[189] of the present century[190] the great
revival which was so profoundly influencing the Mohammedan
world stirred up the Quadriyah of the Sahara and Western
Sudan to renewed life and energy, and before long learned
theologians or small colonies of persons affiliated to the
order were to be found, scattered throughout the Sudan,
on the mountain chain that runs along the coast of Guinea,
and even to the west of it, in the Free State of Liberia.
These initiates formed centres of Islamic influence in the
midst of the pagan population, among whom they received a
welcome as public scribes, legists, writers of amulets, and
schoolmasters; gradually they would acquire influence over
their new surroundings, and isolated cases of conversion would
soon grow into a little band of converts, the most promising
of whom would often be sent to complete their studies at the
chief centre of the order; here they might remain for several
years, until they had perfected their theological studies, and
would then return to their native place, fully equipped for the
work of spreading the faith among their fellow-countrymen. In
this way a leaven has been introduced into the midst of fetish
worshippers and idolaters which has gradually spread the faith
of Islam surely and steadily, though by almost imperceptible
degrees. Up to the middle of the present century[191] in the
Sudan, schools were founded and conducted by teachers trained
under the auspices of the Quadriyah, and their organisation
provided for a regular and continued system of propaganda among
the heathen tribes. The missionary work of this order has been
entirely of a peaceful character, and has relied wholly upon
personal example and precept, on the influence of a teacher
over his pupils, and the spread of education.”
The Quadriyah order, moreover, is not animated by hostility towards
Christians, in which it differs materially from that of the Tijaniyah.
The French find it advisable to co-operate politically with the former
sect. “It is,” writes Captain Morrison in the interesting report already
alluded to, “our business to see that the Negroes, Moors, Tuaregs and
other inhabitants of the Western Sudan should become more affiliated to
the Quadriyah (Kadria). It is, thanks to the spirit with which the Imam
of Lanfiera inspires his adepts, that friendship and protection have been
granted to all our explorers in that region.” M. le Commandant Binger
thus describes the work of Quadriyah Muslims in the important city and
country of Kong, in the hinterland of the Ivory Coast, which he was the
first to discover and bring to the notice of Europe:
“A hundred years ago, the influence of the Muslim community of
Kong did not extend beyond a few miles of the city. Surrounded
on all sides by pagan tribes who existed by rapine and
brigandage, the people of Kong could not carry on trade and
dispose of their cotton goods without great loss, consequent
upon the exorbitant taxes imposed by the pagan kinglets,
non-payment of which involved the pillage of caravans. What did
the Muslims do? They established Mohammedan families from Kong
in all the villages situated between Kong and Bobo-Dialassu
first, and between Kong and Jenne afterwards. It took them
fifty years to settle one or two families in each village.
Each of these immigrants organised a school, asked some of
the inhabitants to send their children there, then little by
little, through their relations with Kong and other commercial
centres, they were able to render service to the pagan king of
the country, to gain his confidence, and gradually to take part
in his affairs. If a difficulty arises it is always a Muslim
who is appealed to. Even if he be quite alone in the country,
the king will empower him to negotiate, because he is usually
able to read and write and has the reputation of being a good
and holy man. If the Muslim ambassador fails in his mission, he
proposes to the pagan king that the mediation of the people of
Kong shall be invoked. Thus the country becomes placed under
the protection of the Mohammedan States of Kong. Gradually
Islam makes progress. More Muslim families settle among the
pagans, who do not fail to become converts. The latter quickly
recognise that the one means of finding aid and protection
wherever their travels may lead them lies in the adoption of
Islam.[192] Moreover, have not the pagans a significant example
before them? Do not the Muslims live in comparative ease and
comfort? The pagan, while acknowledging that it is commerce and
industry that render Mohammedans prosperous, attributes much
of that prosperity to the Supreme Being, and the Muslim takes
care to point the moral, ‘God wills it thus.’ It is clearly
apparent from the above that the Islamic propaganda of Kong is
carried on by persuasion. Force is but rarely employed, and
only against pagan peoples composed of thieves and brigands,
and when the Kong Mussulmans are driven to make use of it.”[193]
The practices of the Kong people in this respect are not at all peculiar
to themselves. We find the same procedure mentioned by Thomson, Barth,
and numerous other explorers; and the influence of Islam among the Hausas
could never have been maintained if to the early conquests of Othman
Fodio had not succeeded the peaceful efforts of the Muslim teacher,
schoolmaster and priest. Dr. Blyden once described to the writer the
incidents relating to the conversion of one of the largest pagan towns in
the Sierra Leone hinterland, the knowledge of which he gleaned from the
inhabitants themselves in the course of his travels in the Protectorate.
On a certain day the inhabitants of the town observed a man, black like
themselves, but clad in a white garment, advancing down the main street.
Suddenly the stranger prostrated himself and prayed to Allah. The natives
stoned him and he departed. In a little while he returned, and prostrated
himself as before. This time he was not stoned, but the people gathered
about him with mockery and reviling. The men spat upon him and the women
hurled insults and abuse. His prayer ended, the stranger went away in
silence, grave and austere, seemingly oblivious to his unsympathetic
surroundings. For a space he did not renew his visit, and in the interval
the people began to regret their rudeness. The demeanour of the stranger
under trying circumstances had gained their respect. A third time he
came, and with him two boys also clothed in white garments. Together they
knelt and offered prayer. The natives watched, and forbore to jeer. At
the conclusion of the prayer a woman came timidly forward and pushed her
young son towards the holy man, then as rapidly retreated. The Muslim
rose, took the boy by the hand and, followed by his acolytes, left the
village in silence as before. When he came again he was accompanied by
three boys, two of them those who had been with him before, and the third
the woman’s son, clad like the rest. All four fell upon their knees,
the holy man reciting the prayer in a voice that spoke of triumph and
success. He never left the town again, for the people crowded round
him beseeching him to teach their children. In a short time the entire
population of that town, which for three centuries had beaten back the
assaults of would-be Muslim converters by the sword, had voluntarily
embraced Islam!
It is in incidents such as these, which are by no means rare in West
Africa, that the moral force of Islam lies, and which is largely
accountable for its astonishing successes. The fanatical zeal of an
Ahmadu, a Samory and an El-Haji-Omar are but drops in the ocean compared
with the systematic moral suasion exercised by Islamic teachers, who,
carrying no staff or scrip, relying solely upon the inward strength
derived from contact with a higher creed, brave the perils and
discomforts incidental to their calling with a sublime indifference only
met with in Biblical narrative. There is a passage in Arnold’s “The
Preaching of Islam” which accurately interprets the misconceptions which
exist on the subject of Islamic propaganda in West Africa:
“Unfortunately,” says that author, “for a true estimate of the
missionary work of Islam in Western Africa, the fame of the
_jihads_, or religious wars, has thrown into the shade the
successes of the peaceful propagandist, though the labours of
the latter have been more effectual to the spread of Islam
than the creation of petty short-lived dynasties. The records
of campaigns, especially when they have interfered with the
commercial projects or schemes of conquest of the white man,
have naturally attracted the attention of Europeans more
than the unobtrusive labours of the Mohammedan preacher and
schoolmaster.... These _jihads_, rightly looked upon, are but
incidents in the modern Islamic revival, and are by no means
characteristic of the forces and activities that have been
really operative in the promulgation of Islam in West Africa;
indeed, unless followed up by distinctly missionary efforts,
they would have proved almost wholly ineffectual in the
creation of a true Muslim community.”
CHAPTER XXIII
ISLAM IN WEST AFRICA
Being now perhaps in a somewhat more open frame of mind with regard to
the work of Islam in West Africa, we may attempt to investigate the
methods of Islam and the methods of Christianity in their relationship to
the Negro. In this manner we may hope to come to still closer quarters
with the subject, and by so doing arrive at a tolerably clear impression
of its various phases. Why does Africa, which was, as has been truly
said, “the nursing mother of Christianity,” remain impervious to the
teachings of the highest religion? Why does Christianity, which has
laboured for so many centuries in Western Africa, make no appreciable
advance in that country? The failure may, I think, be ascribed to four
main causes: first, the refusal to admit that the circumstances which
regulate certain natural laws vary with climatic considerations and
racial idiosyncrasies; secondly, the tendency which Christianity, as
taught in West Africa, has to denationalise; thirdly, the incompatibility
between the ideals of Christ and modern conceptions of Christianity;
fourthly, the political action of Christian Powers.
For obvious reasons the question of polygamy is a very difficult one
to publicly discuss, but the subject of Christianity and Mohammedanism
in Western Africa cannot adequately be treated without referring to
it. It is no use shutting our eyes to the fact that the refusal of the
Christian Church to admit polygamists into its fold is one of the great
obstacles with which the Church in West Africa has to contend. That is
not seriously disputed, and yet, so far as can be observed, the chief
dignitaries of the Church with whom all decisions affecting missionary
enterprise in West Africa must ultimately lie, give no sign that they
realise the paramount importance of the problem. Now and again individual
utterances are made, which tend to show that some Churchmen, at least,
are possessed of a spirit sufficiently broad to approach the subject in
more practical fashion. A well-known Canon of the Church once remarked
that, “owing to polygamy, Mohammedan countries are free from professional
outcasts, a greater reproach to Christianity than polygamy to Islam.”
Although the first part of that statement may not be accepted _ad
literatim_, there are, unfortunately, sufficient data to show that the
morals of Mohammedan communities in West Africa are higher than those of
the Europeanised West Coast towns, where alone Christianity has gained a
sort of foothold, and where a monogamous Christianity has been preached
off and on for centuries past. And it is, at any rate, true that in West
Africa the Mohammedan is, as a rule, distinctly averse to relationship
with public women; and also, as a rule, jealously guards the honour of
his wives and daughters.
Let us consider for a moment how this refusal on the part of the Church
to receive polygamists appeals to the Negro in relation to Christianity.
If there is one social feature of the Negro which all observers are
agreed in recognising, it is the sincerity and depth of the link between
mother and son.[194] With what sort of feelings, then, must the Negro
look upon a religion which, according to its expounders, brands his
parents with immorality? In very truth, whether we approach this great
subject from a standpoint of common sense and severe practicability,
or whether we claim to study it on moral grounds alone, only one
conclusion can be arrived at. To offer Christianity to the Negro at
the price of repudiating the members of his household is unreasonable,
preposterous, unjust, and even cruel. It is unreasonable, insomuch as
it ignores the most fundamental laws of human affection which exist in
more or less developed form in every community and under every clime.
It is preposterous, because it displays an extraordinary ignorance
of the customs of the Negro and the strength of the family tie, and
all that appertains to it among the Negroes. It is unjust, because it
would deprive the rejected women (and children) of all they possess,
cover them with shame and obloquy, thus deliberately inciting them to
lead immoral lives. It is cruel, because, with an entire inconsequence
and heedlessness of after effects, it would break up a social system
consecrated by immemorial usage. There is a noble passage in Faidherbe’s
great work which I cannot refrain from quoting in this connection:
“Certain people,” said that distinguished Frenchman, “would
seem to desire that the natives should be induced to repudiate
their wives and to retain but one. This method appears to me
to be thoroughly immoral. What! Our object is to strengthen
family ties, and we would begin by disorganising the family! We
should commit a great injustice, and we should be displaying
a singular callousness towards the women and children, if we
professed to grant to the native the title and privileges of a
citizen on the condition that he kept one wife and expelled the
others. We should place venerable fathers of families in the
position of sending away, with their children, wives with whom
they had lived for fifteen, twenty, or thirty years. And how
would they distinguish between their wives?... Disorganisation
would be complete.”[195]
There is another aspect of the question which cannot fail to arrest the
attention of all enlightened and truly Christian men. Is polygamy a
necessary institution on physical grounds for the Negro _in Africa_? The
evidence in a corroborative sense is not to be lightly dismissed. Without
stopping to discuss the generally admitted theory that the sexual side of
man’s nature becomes more pronounced as the tropical zone is approached,
it is incontestable that a well-grounded belief exists in West African
educated native circles that the effects of monogamy upon the Negro _are
racially destructive_. Dr. Blyden’s testimony in this respect may not,
perhaps, command universal acknowledgment, but the following passage
from his writings is well worthy of note:
“Owing,” he says, “to the exhausting climatic conditions, the
life and perpetuity of the population depend upon polygamy.
The difference is marked between children born under monogamic
restrictions and those whose parents are polygamists. In the
one there is the evidence of physical deterioration and mental
weakness; in the other are manifest physical vigour and mental
activity and alertness. In the one there is the sad evidence
of arrested growth, suppressed physical development, and
intellectual sluggishness; in the other there is astonishing
muscular strength and fully developed chest—a reproduction of
their fathers’—not weaker, but wiser than their fathers’, when
not diverted from aboriginal simplicity by alien influence.”
The exhausting climatic conditions of which Doctor Blyden speaks is
accountable for a custom, almost universal throughout West Africa, among
both Mohammedans and pagans; which, although it may have some drawbacks
attaching to it, must nevertheless be assumed to entail preponderating
advantages for the racial welfare of the people, or it would hardly have
been so widely adopted. I refer, of course, to the extensive period of
lactation—three years as a rule—during which time husband and wife have
no connection; connection, indeed, generally ceasing when conception has
taken place. The custom is attributive to the belief that too frequent
child-bearing is injurious to the health of the mother and the offspring,
in view of the climate.[196] This is a point which also deserves the
most attentive consideration. The instinct of primitive peoples in such
matters is generally found to be based upon knowledge born of experience.
The only portion of the Dark Continent where orthodox Christianity has
made any appreciable inroad is Uganda. Now what does Sir Harry Johnston
tell us in his last report? He says there is a serious decrease in the
birth-rate of the Bantu Waganda. He quotes Monseigneur Strachir’s opinion
that one of the causes of this state of affairs is the introduction of
monogamy, consequent upon the spread of the Christian faith.
“In many parts of West Africa,” continues Sir Harry Johnston,
“where Christianity prevails, but where there is very little
result other than pious utterances from the mouth, ostensible
monogamy is corrected by the possession of recognised or
unrecognised concubines, and by a general promiscuousness in
sexual matters. But in Uganda, Christianity seems to have taken
such a real hold upon the people that, though by no means free
from immorality—as no nation or community is free from the same
tendency—they really seem to be striving at genuine monogamy
and the exclusive possession of one wife for a partner. As the
Baganda women are certainly very poor breeders, this means that
the majority of couples only have one child. In fact, the birth
of a second child on the part of the wife is such an unusual
occurrence that the wife, in consequence thereof, is given a
new and honorific title.”
A Liberian Bishop—one of the kindliest of men—to whom I showed the
above passage, replied sententiously that the ways of the Almighty were
unfathomable, but that the disappearance of the few could not be held to
weigh in the balance as compared with the salvation of the many; which
seemed to me to bear a curious analogy to that passage in “Azurara”
in which the old Portuguese historian, apostrophising Prince Henry
the Navigator on the occasion of the first appearance at his court of
West African slaves, torn with every accompaniment of barbarity from
their homes by those gallant knights Antam Gonçalvez and Nuno Tristram,
exclaims:
“O holy Prince, peradventure thy pleasure and delight might
have some semblance of covetousness at receiving the knowledge
of such a sum of riches, even as great as those thou didst
expend to arrive at that result?... But thy joy was solely
from that one holy purpose of thine to seek salvation for the
lost souls of the heathen. And in the light of this it seemed
to thee, when thou sawest those captives brought into thy
presence, that the expense and trouble thou hadst undergone
was nothing: such was thy pleasure at beholding them. And yet
the greater benefit was theirs, for though their bodies were
now brought into some subjection, that was a small matter in
comparison with their souls, which would now possess true
freedom for evermore.”
I hope it will not be thought that these references are made with any
idea of depreciating the efforts, and in some respects surprisingly
successful efforts, of Christian propaganda among the Bantu races of the
Uganda Protectorate. The point under discussion is not the evangelising
success of the Church in Uganda, but the physical effects of a monogamous
Christianity upon the races of Africa.
[Illustration: FULANI MALLAM]
I have been at great pains to obtain all the evidence available bearing
directly or indirectly on this subject, and in the aggregate it bears out
what precedes. The highest type of the Christian educated Negro urges
that an entire latitude should be left to the aboriginal element in the
matter, and although professing monogamists themselves, they strictly
maintain—whether rightly or wrongly is not for the layman to decide—that
in so doing the Church would not be acting contrary to the principles of
divine revelation.[197]
I have given as the second contributory cause of the non-success of
Christian missions in West Africa the tendency to denationalisation.
It is unhappily true that the Christianised Negro becomes to a large
extent denationalised, and the reason of it lies in the methods employed
to convert him. Islam, on the other hand, not only encourages the
spirit of nationality in the African, but intensifies it. The Muslim
Negro is elevated among his pagan neighbours; he gains their respect
and increases his own. Islam takes the Negro by the hand and gives him
equality with all men. From the day the pagan adopts Islam, no Semite
Muslim can claim racial superiority over him. Islam to the Negro is the
stepping-stone to a higher conception of existence, inspiring in his
breast confidence in his own destiny, imbuing his spirit with a robust
faith in himself and in his race. Christianity does not do this for the
Negro. Its effect, indeed, is quite contrary. Instead of encouraging, it
discourages. Instead of inculcating a greater self-reliance, it seems
to lessen that which exists. The Christian Negro for the most part is
a sort of hybrid. He is neither one thing nor another. His adoption of
European clothes causes him to be looked upon partly with suspicion,
partly with ridicule, by his pagan fellow-countrymen; although they make
use of his services as clerk or secretary when occasion requires it.
Mohammedans treat him with undisguised contempt. More bitter perhaps
than anything else is the scorn which Europeans themselves bestow upon
him. Question any white official, military man, trader or traveller, as
to his impressions of the West African native. He will tell you that the
pagan native of the interior is more often than not a fine fellow, one
of nature’s gentlemen, hospitable, kindly, simple, courteous; that the
Mohammedan native is a splendid man, with a carriage full of pride and
self-reliance, arrogant may be, haughty, but singularly dignified, with
a conscious superiority and quiet confidence stamped all over him. But
the Christian Negro is seldom spoken of without opprobrium. His vanity,
his conceit, his “veneer of civilisation,” the vices he has acquired and
so forth, are the inevitable theme. His unfortunate habit of adopting
the latest vagaries of European fashions, both in his own person and in
the person of his women folk, is the butt of constant sarcasm, as are
the accounts of the solemnisation of the Christian form of marriage in
a native West Coast town. Even the missionaries are compelled, although
with natural unwillingness, to admit an unpalatable fact. “There are a
great many natives on the coast and in Lower Nigeria,” writes Canon
Robinson, “who call themselves Christian; there are distressingly
few converts.... My advice to travellers on the coast in search of
trustworthy servants would be to prefer the heathen or Mohammedan to the
professing Christian, because a bad religion sincerely accepted, or even
no religion at all, is to be preferred to a religious profession which
is only a sham.” A humiliating confession, humiliating to the Christian
Church, humiliating to European civilisation. What between one thing
and another, the Christianised Negro is a _déclassé_, a _culotté sans
culottes_.[198] Of course there are exceptions, but they are relatively
scarce, and consist in the main of natives who have acquired wealth by
commerce (wealth being a safeguard to open obloquy all the world over, no
matter what the colour of the possessor’s skin), and who either through
the enjoyment of special educational advantages, or because they are men
of unusually high character and intelligence naturally, have succeeded
in grasping the true Christian ideal and have gained moral and spiritual
ennoblement thereby. It is my privilege to number such a man among my
friends. But I greatly doubt whether he would feel at ease in travelling
or sojourning alone in the interior, even among the tribe to which he
belongs, in his own country of origin. There seems to be a barrier
between the Christianised Negro and his non-Christian countrymen; a
barrier which excludes sympathy, and which European policy tends to still
further accentuate.
To what are these things due? To no one particular circumstance, but to
a whole set of circumstances, which together produce the effect. To the
general, omnipresent suggestion—possibly quite unintentioned in many
cases—of the Negro’s inherent racial inferiority, inculcated by European
missionaries. To the never absent, one might say inevitable insistence,
whether outspoken or only understood, upon a great intellectual, social,
moral gulf which yawns between the Negro and his Caucasian instructor; a
gulf that can never be bridged by Christianity, as taught in West Africa
by Europeans.
The third and fourth contributory causes, viz. incompatibility between
the ideals of Christ and the modern conceptions of Christianity, and
the political action of Christian Powers, may be treated together, for
they are closely allied one to the other; as, indeed, they also are to
the third cause, upon which I have briefly touched. There is a striking
passage in the last literary contribution on West African affairs,
penned by Miss Kingsley on that fatal voyage to the Cape, which puts in
more pregnant language than I could hope to do the underlying thought
expressed above:
“I know,” wrote Miss Kingsley, “that there is a general opinion
among the leading men of both races that Christianity will
give the one possible solution to the whole problem. I fail to
be able to believe this. I fail to believe Christianity will
bring peace between the two races, for the simple reason that,
though it may be possible to convert Africans _en masse_ into
practical Christians, it is quite impossible to convert the
Europeans _en masse_ to it. You have only got to look at the
history of any European nation—the Dutch, the Spanish, the
Italian, the German—every one calling themselves Christian, but
none the more for that tolerant and peaceable. Each one of them
is ready to take out a patent for a road to heaven, and make
that road out of men’s blood and bones and the ashes of burnt
homesteads. Of course, by doing this they are not following the
true teachings of Jesus Christ, but that has not, and will not,
become a factor in politics.”
The bewildering contradictions between the ideals laid down by Christ,
as taught by the expounders of his word, and the practical effect of
that teaching as exemplified in the conduct of Europeans and European
Governments, confronts the Negro at every turn. The more intelligent he
is, the more advanced in the social scale, the more puzzling does it
become. Is it a question of charity? The Muslim propagandist speaks of
Christ with deep respect amounting to reverence. He is _Kalima_—the Word;
_Masih_—the Messiah; _Qual-ul-Haqq_—the Word of Truth; _Ruh_—the Spirit
(of God). He is “One illustrious in this world and in the next”: “One who
has near access to God.” The Christian missionary speaks of Mohammed “as
an impostor;” “an arch impostor;” “a man full of evil and wickedness.”
Islam is a “bad religion”: “its ways are the ways of darkness”: “it is
Satan’s work,” and so on. Is it a question of self-abnegation? The Bible
and the Koran utter the same precepts in almost identical terms. But what
a difference in the spiritual practice of their respective expounders
in West Africa! The Muslim preacher follows out the letter of his book.
He goes on his way alone and unattended, carrying neither purse nor
scrip. He lives the life of the Negro, enters into his pursuits, shares
his hardships and his pleasures, assimilates himself in every possible
way with those whom he hopes to convert. The European missionary is
compelled, by the exigencies of the climate very greatly, to attend
primarily to his own comforts. He travels with a long file of carriers
bearing his baggage; preserved foods, linen, camp impedimenta and what
not. Some of the most earnest missionaries keenly realise the drawbacks
which such procedure must entail in the prosecution of their work, both
physically and morally. They are deeply sensible of the adverse influence
which it cannot fail to exercise over their labours. We have seen an
English prelate, high up in the hierarchy of his Church, suggest a
decrease in his salary, in order that the balance might be devoted to the
appointment of another helper in the great cause.[199] On the other hand,
we find in the works and letters of prominent missionaries engaged in the
West African field, egotistical essays of the following description:
“Care must be taken that the waterproof cloak is _stitched_. Sponges,
bath-towels, &c., will suggest themselves. Do not forget the table-linen;
a neatly arranged table helps to tempt the appetite, which is often
fastidious. Antibilious compounds are worth in my judgment _two guineas_
a box.” The above passage is derived from a book recently published,
written by a missionary with nine years’ experience in West Africa. The
articles mentioned by the writer are recommended by him as indispensable
to the welfare of a teacher of the Gospel in West Africa. The following
is a typical passage culled from the epistolary effusions published from
time to time in the organ of the Church Missionary Society from the pen
of a most energetic Bishop, who has been endeavouring with singular
ill-success, and not without some danger of arousing disturbances, to
evangelise the Hausas. “We are all well.... Our appetites are enormous.
We have plenty of food. We receive presents of food from the people every
day—rice, onions, corn, maize, fowls, bananas, &c. B—— shoots a good many
partridges and guinea-fowl, and we have a good reserve of European and
English stores.” That these little peculiarities do not in the slightest
degree detract from the sincerity of the writers may be accepted without
reserve. All we are here concerned with, is to consider the general
effect which these conceptions of the methods of propagating Christianity
in West Africa are likely to have upon the African. Are men who profess
so tender a regard for their well-being calculated to make much headway
in an evangelical sense? It may reasonably be doubted.
Is it a question of vice? The Mohammedan preacher does not leave a
stone unturned to combat drunkenness in every form, and to a very
large extent he succeeds. The sobriety of the great mass of Muslimised
Negroes no longer requires to be demonstrated. Laxity in this respect
is the exception which proves the rule. The European missionary also
denounces drunkenness, and with a fervour at times which is not always
discriminating. But he is terribly handicapped (1) by the European
trader, about one-fifth of whose total trade consists in the importation
of freshly distilled liquor, often but not invariably containing various
impurities, and in quality not exceeding that which is sold in low
public-houses in this country, and which freely mixed with water may
not be very injurious, but drunk neat, as for the most part it is, in
the _coastal_ regions of West Africa, is—we have overwhelming testimony
to that effect—harmful;[200] (2) by the European Governments who,
although they do now and again raise the duty on spirits in deference to
public opinion, tacitly encourage a traffic without which their whole
administrative machinery would become temporarily paralysed, seeing
that from 45 per cent. to 75 per cent. of the revenue of their Colonies
is derived from this traffic. These circumstances may, or may not, be
preventable. They exist, and cannot be ignored. As for another kind of
vice; the life lived by many white men in West Africa is not, perhaps,
calculated to give the Negro a high idea of the morality of Christian
Europe. His occasional visits to Europeanised coast towns—presuming him
to be living some distance in the interior—do not probably imbue him
with the notion that his trousered countrymen are the gainers in moral
ethics, through contact with European civilisation; nor, unhappily, can
it be said that the tales and personal experiences related by those of
his educated brothers who visit our great cities are of a kind to lessen
the impression he may already have formed as to the results of twenty
centuries of Christianity in Europe.[201]
Is it a question of gauging the true inwardness of the doctrine of peace
and love? It is to be feared that the political aims of European Powers
in West Africa are too often associated with Maxims and Martinis to
admit of much doubt on that score. The Negro is a shrewd man, and he
distinguishes professions from actions. The readiness with which the
white interlopers in his country appeal to the sword as the shortest cut
to the solution of a misunderstanding is instructive. The hastiness with
which his habits and customs are trampled upon by his would-be elevators;
the cheerful alacrity he is expected to show in swallowing innovations
thrust upon him at what, to his conservative prejudices, appear to him a
moment’s notice; and, finally, the increasing desire on the part of his
European friends to appropriate his most precious heritage, his ancestral
lands, and the fruits thereof, for their own use—all these things,
whether in fashionable parlance they be the “inevitable” accompaniments
of opening up West Africa by Western Europe or not, constitute those
contradictions of which I have already spoken, and whatever else they
may do, militate against the spread of Christianity in the land of the
Negroes.
Is there a remedy, and if so, on what lines is it to be sought for?
There is only one _native_ Christian State in Africa—Abyssinia—and its
Christianity is declared by eminent divines to be tainted with all
sorts of heresies and objections. But it has endowed Abyssinia with
sufficient vitality to enable her to repel Mohammedan invasion for a
long term of centuries, and the strong religious zeal of Abyssinia’s
warriors was not a negligible factor in beating back the unjustifiable
aggression made upon the independence of that country by Italy. To-day
the Emperor of this African Christian State is, with one exception,
probably the most powerful native ruler in the world. No doubt, it does
not enter the heads of European statesmen to encourage the growth of a
similar State in West Africa; which, indeed, is an obvious impossibility
for many reasons. Yet Abyssinia provides a moral for the Christian
Church. The Christianity of Abyssinia is an _African_ Christianity,
originally taught by an _African_, perpetuated by _Africans_. Orthodox
or unorthodox, it has shown itself suitable to the necessities and the
requirements of Africans; and if Christianity in West Africa, is ever
destined to make appreciable progress, it will be when it is provided
with its only feasible agent, a West African Church: a Church designed
to respond to the needs of West Africa, which are not the needs of
Europe; a Church whose servants shall be neither Europeans nor repatriate
“Afro-Liberians,” but West African Negroes, imbued with the instincts and
patriotism of race; a Church founded upon an enlightened acquaintance
with nature’s immovable laws; upon principles of true science, which is
true religion; upon a wise recognition that what is good and proper and
right for one great branch of the human family may be bad, improper, and
wrong for another.
PART IV
CHAPTER XXIV
ANGLO-FRENCH RELATIONS IN WEST AFRICA
The subject of the relationship between England and France in West Africa
is one to which every year that passes adds importance. The French
have during the last few years left us far behind in Western Africa,
so far as territorial expansion is concerned. They have now a great
Empire there. They have acquired it by dint of persistent, far-sighted,
courageous effort; qualities which it is regrettable to state have been
conspicuously lacking on the part of the British official world. If
a tithe of the energy which has distinguished Liverpool, Manchester,
Glasgow, and Bristol merchants in Western Africa had been displayed by
successive British Governments, the possessions of Great Britain in West
Africa to-day would be infinitely more extensive than they are.
In addition to getting the better of us, in a territorial sense,
France—whose possessions touch our own at almost every point—is steadily
becoming a serious commercial competitor. It is with that commercial
competition that we shall have to reckon in the future to an increasing
degree. It is of two kinds. There is legitimate competition and unfair
competition. In either case it behoves us to carefully study its nature
and consequences; to draw the necessary lessons therefrom; to candidly
acknowledge in a spirit of tolerant common sense that in many respects
the cause of its pressing hardly upon us is due to superior management
on the part of the French; to appeal to the spirit of equity and fair
play in our neighbours, when, as is the case in some parts of their West
African possessions at present, British merchants, who have powerfully
contributed in creating the trade of those very possessions, are getting
neither fair play nor just treatment; and generally to brace ourselves
together, realising that in West Africa, as everywhere else, the old
position of undisputed commercial supremacy which Great Britain was
able to maintain at one time with very little trouble, can no longer be
retained unless we shake off our facile opportunism and tackle the new
conditions in a scientific manner.
Of early French enterprise in Western Africa very little seems to be
known by the average Englishman; and yet the French were among the very
first pioneers of Western Africa—probably the very first—before the
Portuguese, at any rate, by at least 100 years. After the remarkable
studies recently published in the French African Committee’s journal by
Commandant Binger, the distinguished chief of the African department of
the French Colonial Office, there is not, I think, any alternative but
to accept as conclusive the French claim of being the first Europeans to
visit the West African coast. Spanish and Genoese navigators; the former
hailing from Catalonia, the Lancashire of Spain, may possibly have been
contemporaneous with the French. But, apart from French testimony, it is
affirmed by eminent Spanish authorities themselves, such as Navarette
and Viera, that the French preceded their own countrymen. The Canaries
were discovered by a Genoese of French descent, and with a French name,
Maloisel to wit, about 1275 A.D. They were also conquered by a Frenchman
named De Béthancourt in the first years of the fifteenth century. In
the beginning of the fourteenth the West African coast as far south as
the Senegal certainly, and Sierra Leone probably, was regularly visited
by French ships. So much has now been established. Whether French ships
then pushed south to the Gold Coast is not quite so clear. Personally I
incline to the belief that this has also been satisfactorily made out,
and the confirmatory testimony of Villaut-de-Bellefonds no longer stands
alone.
The paucity of historical and documentary evidence has hitherto been
the principal objection to the French claim of priority. It has, of
course, been made the most of by Portuguese historians. But, apart from
the circumstance that Commandant Binger has now been able to partly
fill up the gap, and apart from the eminently reasonable explanation
of Labat that the old records of the port of Dieppe, from whence many
of the French ships bound to the West Coast started, were destroyed by
the bombardment of that port in 1694, there is very good reason, to my
mind, why the Portuguese on the one hand should possess such splendid
and unique accounts of their early exploits in West Africa from the
middle of the fifteenth century onwards; and why, on the other hand, the
French, who arrived on the scene at least a century before them, should
be so poorly represented in their own national archives. The reason is
this. The enterprise of Portugal in West Africa—which has so incomparably
enriched the domain of geographical knowledge—was, from the first, an
official undertaking. It was conceived by Prince Henry the Navigator,
one of the most remarkable figures in history, and all the resources
of the science and literature of the age were invoked by him to give
to the new epoch of discovery a national and historical permanency,
which should be the means of reflecting glory for ever on Portuguese
annals. Very different was the enterprise of the French. It was in no
sense official, but private. It was undertaken not by renowned knights
and important personages in kingly service, but by hardy, illiterate,
independent mariners and merchants of Normandy. The object was not, as in
the case of the Portuguese, fame, geographical discovery, and religious
zeal, but trade. The men who fitted out the French ships and sent them
on their perilous course were Dieppe, Rouen, and Honfleur merchants; and
the French vessels returned, not with captives forcibly torn from their
homes with every accompaniment of cruelty in order to convert them to
a faith of peace, charity, and good-will, but with ivory, spices, and
gold dust. That was the earliest form of trade in West Africa by the
people of Western Europe. The slave trade came afterwards. To this day a
local industry in ivory carving exists at Dieppe, and every one who has
visited that quaint old seaport has noticed the numerous ivory ornaments
displayed in the shop windows. If, therefore, the British merchants can
claim to be the latter-day pioneers of commercial enterprise in West
Africa; if during the century that has just closed their commercial
aptitude and initiative gained for them the foremost commercial position
on the West African littoral, it was French merchants who originally
led the way. We have too often led the way ourselves in most parts of
the world to begrudge the French this honour, so far as Western Africa
is concerned. Rather should it be a bond of respect, the twin sister of
sympathy between us and our neighbours.
The first recorded instance upon which Englishmen and Frenchmen met off
the West African coast resulted, curiously enough, in an alliance. It
happened in this way. One William Towerson, in the course of a voyage to
Guinea in 1555, being pursued by some Portuguese brigantines, opportunely
came across a fleet of French ships, with whom he joined company for
safety. The alliance does not seem to have been a very satisfactory one,
as it turned out; still, it was an alliance, of sorts. This first meeting
took place some thirty-five years subsequent to the earliest known
appearance of an Englishman in West Africa, in the person of one Andrew
Battel, of Leigh—whether an ancestor of the three old maids of that ilk,
history sayeth not—who put to sea in a Portuguese slaver, and after
many extraordinary adventures amongst the natives of Angola, succeeded
in getting back to his native country. The beginning of the sixteenth
century marked the awakening of Englishmen to the potentialities of the
West African trade. It had been preceded by a notable slackening in the
energies of Normandy merchants. The Hundred Years’ War with England had
crippled enterprise of any kind in France. The House of Valois was in a
parlous state. The great war which began in 1337 and continued, with
occasional breaks of short duration, until the marvellous successes of
the Maid of Orleans compelled the English to give way, was marked by
the crushing defeats the French sustained at Crecy and Poitiers at the
hands of Edward III., and at Agincourt at the hands of Henry V.; and,
to make use of some quoted words, “The State was reduced to bankruptcy,
the nobility excited to rebellion, and the mass of the people sunk in
barbarism.”
No sooner, however, had the victories of Joan of Arc infused new vitality
into the French, than we find renewed evidence of the enterprise of
Dieppe and Rouen merchants in West Africa. The revival of that enterprise
coincides with the entry upon the scene of English merchants: Windham,
Hawkins of evil memory, Rutter, Baker, and others, and the records bear
witness to the contemporary presence of French trading vessels on the
West Coast from Senegal to the Gold Coast. Recent discoveries of old
manuscripts, dating back to 1574, at Honfleur prove that from that year
to 1583—a space of nine years—thirty-two French vessels left that port
alone for West Africa. For some time English and French got on well
enough on the West Coast. The power of Portugal was fast decaying, and
adventurers of all nationalities, notably the Dutch, were hurrying to the
spot. Then came more wars between English and French, with their natural
effect upon commercial transactions in West Africa. In 1696 the French
destroyed the British settlement at the mouth of the Gambia. For the
next hundred years or so relations between the Europeans established or
trading on the West Coast appear as a tangle of animosities. Every one
seemed to be fighting his neighbour, and pirates of all nationalities
attacked every vessel they came across, including those owned or manned
by men of their own race, even Gambia Castle, garrisoned by a British
force, being on one occasion captured and sacked by a notorious British
pirate named Davies, presumably a Welshman! Notwithstanding all this
dire confusion, the English were gradually getting the upper hand all
down the coast. In 1794 Sierra Leone was bombarded by a French squadron
without the authority apparently of the Revolutionary Government then in
power. Twenty years later, the power of Napoleon having collapsed, all
that was left to France by the Treaty of Vienna was her settlement on the
coast of Senegal.
England remained in a preponderating position politically and
commercially on the West African coast. Such, too, was her position in
the main until the revival of a French Colonial policy, under the impulse
of those far-seeing statesmen Gambetta and Jules Ferry in 1883. At any
period between 1815 and 1883 England had the opportunity of creating an
extensive Empire in West Africa and annexing practically the whole coast.
And here the curtain rings down on the old _régime_, and a new chapter in
the history of Anglo-French relationship in West Africa begins.
To whom should be properly attributed the initiation of the scramble for
Africa? It has been a cause of considerable inconvenience to the Cabinets
of Europe, and of still greater inconvenience, we may feel tolerably
certain, to the natives of Africa. Each Power that participated in it
throws the onus on its neighbour. So far as West Africa is concerned,
whatever claim or credit may be taken, the French must, I think, be
held guilty or meritorious, according as individual opinion may differ.
The scramble in West Africa arose from what, for want of a better
description, may be termed the discovery by the French of the West
African hinterlands. When Gambetta and Jules Ferry awoke the slumbering
colonial instincts of their countrymen, inland West Africa was to all
intents and purposes a blank. Englishmen and Frenchmen sat on the coast,
the former doing a large trade and the latter little or none. In two
places only were organised attempts at interior penetration being made.
On the Lower Niger, Englishmen were pushing their trade inland. On the
Senegal, the era of political conquest begun by Faidherbe was being
slowly developed, despite many difficulties and set-backs. The political
energies of Great Britain were paralysed by the resolution arrived at in
1865 to abandon all Government action in West Africa, with the possible
exception of Sierra Leone. France was still feeling the effects of the
disasters of 1870.
With the propaganda of Jules Ferry and Gambetta in favour of a policy
of Colonial expansion, a change came o’er the spirit of the dream as
regards West Africa. Backed by a strong body of opinion; supported by
men of note, such as M. Waldeck Rousseau, as he has himself recently
reminded us, French activity in Western Africa became very pronounced,
and the work once begun was not abandoned on account of the temporary
reverses suffered by French arms in Tonquin, which drove Ferry from power
and broke his heart. French missions, generally of a peaceful character,
started eastwards and southwards from the Senegal, and northwards from
the coast, to explore the unknown interior. They reported it to be a
fairly salubrious, fertile, cereal-producing and cattle-rearing country,
unobstructed by dense forests such as are met with inland from the West
Coast proper to a depth varying from sixty to two hundred miles. This
country was inhabited by intelligent races relatively advanced in the
scale of civilisation, possessing flourishing industries and commercial
aptitude. The French found regularly constituted States, more or less
Muslimised, and in some of which social law and order had reached a high
stage of development; large towns of 10,000 to 15,000 inhabitants with
regular market-days, where iron smelting was highly advanced, where the
natives dressed in handsome clothes of their own manufacture, and used
leather sandals, sword-belts, and scabbards, despatch-bags, and saddles
fabricated by themselves. It was a revelation. The chief drawback about
this vast inland region, which seemed to offer such brilliant prospects
under able administrative supervision, was its liability to be swept by
fire and sword at any moment by some over-zealous adherent of a certain
militant sect of Mohammedans, which enjoyed great influence in the
Western Sudan. These French agents were generally well received, and by
their means vast stretches of hitherto unknown country were opened up and
brought to the knowledge of the world.
Out of these discoveries was born the desire—the very natural and
legitimate desire—on the part of the French to build up a mighty empire
in West Africa, a black Indies, which should rival the Indies of the
East in extent, in wealth, and in the prestige which its acquisition
would confer. Exploring and semi-political missions were followed by
expeditions of a definite political character, and district after
district, State after State, tribe after tribe, came under French
influence; by peaceful means in the majority of cases. All this time the
English were doing nothing, in an official sense. Liverpool men were
calling upon the Government to wake up to what was going on, but their
efforts were entirely unsuccessful. Wider and wider grew the sweep of the
French net, closer and closer to our own Colonies, which it threatened to
throttle in its meshes. Sierra Leone became encircled on three sides by
French territory; the magnificent country of Futa-Jallon, the Switzerland
of Western Africa as it has been called, which had been visited at
various times by agents of the Government of Sierra Leone (notably Dr.
Blyden), of which it formed the natural hinterland, was acquired by
France without firing a shot. The Gold Coast, and Lagos, and what is
now known as Northern Nigeria—whose safety the Convention of 1890 was
supposed to guarantee—were in imminent danger of sharing a similar fate.
I have often seen it stated, even by authorities of no mean order,
that the French were permitted or allowed to carry out the great task
of securing the hinterlands of Western Africa. In point of fact, the
statement is very misleading and has had a somewhat mischievous effect.
England was not in a position to allow or disallow. The French conceived
a plan and carried it out in the face of tremendous obstacles; they were
prepared to undergo sacrifices which we were not prepared to accept, and
such being the case, they were answerable to none but themselves. Their
success and our failure was the due measure of their enterprise and our
apathy.
When the future of our Colonies appeared thoroughly compromised by the
cutting off of the interior markets, the British Government suddenly
realised that Liverpool and Manchester merchants had been clearer-sighted
than British officialdom, and at the last moment efforts were made to
secure for the British Colonies such of the hinterlands which remained
unabsorbed. Then arose a very delicate position, which taxed the
diplomatic resources of both Powers to the uttermost. British and French
officers with excitable native troops under their command, remained
facing one another in the far interior a few hundred yards distance for
weeks at a time, awaiting instructions from the irrespective Governments.
To the good sense, tact, and mutual esteem of these officers is due that
peace was preserved between England and France. We owe a deep debt of
gratitude to these men, who, suffering from the debilitating effects of
the West African climate and the hardships attendant upon West African
travel—neither of which are conducive to sweetness of temper, managed to
keep their heads. Mainly thanks to them the quarrel was adjusted without
bloodshed, and the Anglo-French Convention of 1898 was signed. It left
our Colonies of the Gold Coast and Lagos greatly circumscribed, but
assured us in “Nigeria” a magnificent territory some 504,000 square miles
in extent.
The era of territorial rivalry between Great Britain and France in
Western Africa has, it may be legitimately assumed, quite passed away.
We continue to be rivals in commercial matters, but that is a peaceful
rivalry—or should be—which ought not to exclude friendship. Nevertheless,
as trade questions are often converted into fertile causes of dispute, it
is essential that Englishmen and Frenchmen, in order to work harmoniously
together in the future, should thoroughly understand one another’s
points of view in this connection. We, as a nation, are free traders.
The French, as a nation, are protectionists. It would be absurd and
undignified for us to complain of the different economic standpoint
taken up by our neighbours. Moreover, there are various degrees of
protectionism in France. There is the extreme school of M. Méline,
which, if its doctrines were strictly applied to the French West African
Colonies, would ruin them in five years. There is the school which
upholds partial protectionism in France, but favours freedom of trade in
the French Colonies. The latter is happily gaining in strength. We should
endeavour as far as in us lies to work with the representatives of this
school. One of the clauses of the 1898 Convention, which caused a great
outcry in France when it became known, stipulated that no differential
treatment was to be meted out to British trade throughout a considerable
part of the French West African possessions for a term of thirty years.
The following extract, bearing on this subject, from an address read by
M. Bohn, the head of the largest firm of French West African merchants,
before the Marseilles Geographical Society, in September 1898, three
months after the Convention was signed, is interesting:
“A certain colonial school,” said M. Bohn, “starting from the
premise that the only object of colonies is to favour the
outlet of goods manufactured in the mother country, demands the
application of prohibitive tariffs upon foreign goods imported
into our colonies. This system, which contributed so powerfully
to lose Spain her finest colonies, flourishes in Gaboon,
which is the least prosperous of our colonies, and which only
subsists at all by constant grants in aid from the metropolis.
These examples are hardly encouraging. On the other hand, we
are able to see that those of our colonies which are developing
themselves in the most rapid and satisfactory manner are those
where no differential tariffs exist.... From that point of view
it is certain the Franco-English Convention of June 1898, by
abolishing for a period of thirty years all differential duties
in the Ivory Coast and Dahomey, has assured for that period the
commercial prosperity of these colonies.”
That notable statement and others like it (the truth of which has been
amply borne out since) show that experienced Frenchmen engaged in the
West African trade realise, as we do, that a policy of free trade is one
which in West Africa spells commercial success by the nation which adopts
it. The existence of such views in France is a very encouraging sign for
those who firmly believe that trade is the greatest progressive agency
which can be brought to bear upon the relations between Western Europe
and Western Africa.
Recent events are proving that a natural community of interests exists
between British and French merchants in Western Africa; that they will
have to fight a common foe, the Concessionnaire, and that every action
calculated to bring them into closer relationship is a step in the right
direction.
CHAPTER XXV
TEN YEARS OF FRENCH ACTION IN WEST AFRICA
The history of France’s action in West Africa during the last ten
years has been so remarkable that it deserves to be recorded in some
detail, and where possible her policy may be usefully compared with
our own. On January 23, 1892, the Paris _Figaro_ published a literary
supplement entitled “Our African Domain,” in which was set forth by
various competent authorities—amongst whom was Captain Binger;[202]
Emile Masqueray, the well-known student of Algerian problems; Georges
Rolland, one of the foremost advocates of the Trans-Saharan Railway; and
“Harry Alis,” the redoubtable Colonial propagandist, Lord Cromer’s _bête
noire_, whose tragic end will be in the recollection of many—the past
achievements, actual position and future aspirations of France in Western
and Central Africa. The supplement was divided into five parts, entitled
respectively “Algeria”; “Penetration towards the Chad”; “Senegal and
Dependencies”; “Our Position on the Gulf of Guinea”; “Congo and Chad.”
At the time this supplement appeared, the revival of Colonial ambition
in France, which owed its inception largely to the foresight and courage
of Jules Ferry, had taken firm root among the _élite_ of French public
opinion. But although the seed where it fell gave forth lusty fruit, the
sowers were relatively few, and the area under cultivation was still but
small in 1892. The Chamber of Deputies was slow to grant fresh credits.
Politicians as a whole viewed the eloquence of Eugène Etienne and other
exponents of the Ferry school with ill-disguised nervousness, if not with
positive apprehension, fearing that the country was being turned from its
true business of guarding against possible aggression from Germany, and
was playing into Bismarck’s hands by rushing into Colonial adventures
which it was known that Bismarck, for his own reasons, was desirous of
encouraging. No one party or rather group cared to identify itself too
closely with the expansionists, remembering the whirlwind of popular
passion which assailed and overwhelmed _le Tonkinois_. On the other hand,
it was not wise to entirely dissociate one’s self from a movement which
was steadily gaining a hold over the masses. So Parliament vacillated,
and, swayed by contrary winds, voted funds one minute and sought to
withdraw them the next.
The _Figaro’s_ supplement was widely criticised. The schemes it
elaborated were not merely ambitious, they were gigantic. “Our policy,”
it argued, “is to make one homogeneous entity of Algeria, Senegal, and
Congo _viâ_ the Tuareg-Sahara and the Central and Western Sudan.” The
timid Deputy shuddered at the prospect. What must have been, even to the
master-minds who initiated the policy, not much more than a fond hope
strengthened by an unshaken faith in the destiny of the country; what,
in the eyes of those who opposed it, appeared as a monstrous figment of
the imagination, is to-day in its main lines a reality! How has it been
accomplished?
“Our intentions are pure and noble, our cause is just, the future
cannot fail us,” wrote Faidherbe in 1859, and, on the whole, despite
errors, despite the effects of temporary reaction coming after acute
disappointment, despite some individual instances of cruelty and
oppression, events have justified Faidherbe’s confident declaration.
The work of France in Africa during the last ten years and more has, in
the main, been a work of progress tending to benefit the populations
with whom she has come in contact. Notable exceptions there have been,
of course, especially during the years 1897 and 1898, when the scramble
for West Africa was at its height, and under the spell of an insensate
rivalry deeds were committed by all the parties in the struggle which
cannot be too strongly condemned. To France’s debit account must be
placed the ruthless proceedings of Bretonnet in Borgu; the needless
bloodshed of which Mossi, Kipprisi, and Gurunsi were the scenes; the
inevitable barbarity which characterised Marchand’s hunt for carriers
in the Upper Ubanghi and Bahr-el-Ghazal. These incidents in themselves
are odious and reprehensible; but it is only fair to recognise that they
were the outcome of international jealousies the responsibility for which
was collective rather than single, shared in by other Powers as well
as by France herself. In what may be regarded as France’s own sphere
of influence, acts have also been perpetrated from time to time which
call for censure. The punishment meted out to certain towns hostile to
the French in the Western Sudan have been altogether disproportionate
to the offence. In the case of the French officers Voulet and Chanoine,
an incalculable amount of suffering was inflicted upon the unfortunate
people on the western banks of the Niger. But from these isolated
transgressions against the principles of humanity, culpable as they have
been, the records of no European Power in Africa are free; and they
cannot, in the circumstances of France, be held to negative or even
weaken the advantages she has undoubtedly conferred upon the population
of the Western and Central Sudan, nor yet tarnish the great reputation
France has achieved in the emancipation of millions from centuries of
tyranny and invasion. If she has had her Voulets and Chanoines, France
can show in the persons of her De Brazzas, her Bingers, her Monteils,
her Crozats, her Foureaus, Noirots, Gentils, Hoursts, and Lenfants,
performances which the subjects of other Powers may have equalled but
have not surpassed; always excepting Barth, whose moral grandeur towers
high above that of all his competitors on West African soil.
From the time when the Sieur de Brüe—one of the clearest-headed Frenchmen
who ever served his country in Africa—paid ceremonious visits to the
King of Kayor and the “grand Seratik” of the Fulas at the close of the
seventeenth and at the beginning of the eighteenth century; from the
time when raiding bands of Trarza Moors, extending their depredations to
the very confines of St. Louis (1840-60) compelled Faidherbe to take the
offensive against them, to the present day, it has been the lot of France
to find herself confronted in West Africa with races differentiating in
every respect from the true Negro of the coast regions—the people whom
England had, up to 1900, been chiefly concerned with. Eight years before,
a certain Select Committee of the House of Commons, frightened at the
responsibilities England was assuming in West Africa, pusillanimously
recommended the abandonment of all our settlements except Sierra Leone,
thus enunciating a policy the evil effects of which continued until
1895 and greatly limited our footing in West and Central Africa; France
had just emerged successfully from a death grapple with one of the most
powerful individuals that ever sprung from African loins, el Haj-Omar,
the great Tukulor Mallam and warrior. Looking backward at that long
vista of years, when France was slowly but irresistibly thrusting her
influence into West Africa, _viâ_ the Senegal and Upper Niger, by pouring
out her treasure and the blood of her sons like water; while England
remained supine on the coast heedless of the representations of her
merchant-pioneers, it was not surprising that, awakening almost too late
from our lethargy, we should have found the French, having triumphed over
their obstacles in the north, forging southwards and cutting off our
rich hinterlands in the interior. Writing to the Marquis of Dufferin in
1892, Lord Salisbury contrasted the policy of Great Britain and France in
Western Africa. “France,” wrote Lord Salisbury, “from her basis on the
Senegal Coast, has pursued steadily the aim of establishing herself on
the Upper Niger and its affluents.... Great Britain, on the other hand,
has adopted the policy of advance by commercial enterprise.” There was,
indeed, on the part of Liverpool, Manchester, and Bristol merchants,
plenty of “commercial enterprise,” but it would have been difficult for
Lord Salisbury to have quoted a single instance where that “commercial
enterprise” had constituted “a policy of advance.”
It is due to the type of native inhabiting the chief radius of France’s
operations in Western Africa, that her task has been rendered so
dangerous and so difficult, and its fulfilment so remarkable. Criticise
as we may, and often enough unjustly, because ignorantly, the colonising
capacities of our Gallic neighbours, and the fluctuations of their
colonial policy, it is beyond question that no nation on earth could
have achieved what she has achieved in Western Africa, without the
possession of a doggedness and determination for which we do not—to
our own injury, be it said—even now, give her the credit which she
deserves. For centuries upon centuries the enormous tract which lies
between the edge of the Sahara Desert and the fringe of the tropical
forest belt—consisting for the most part of grassy uplands varied by
wide plains of amazing fertility, by reason of the yearly overflow of
the waters of the Niger—had been the cockpit of Africa. Empire after
empire rose and fell; invasion and counter-invasion swept devastatingly
over the country. The splendours of Jenne and Timbuctoo vanished with
the sway of the Songhay, beneath the bullets of Morocco’s musketeers.
Fulani domination arose and gave way before Tukulor cruelties. Semi-negro
kingdoms came into being, declared their independence of this or that
conqueror, only to be subdued, while their victors had, in turn, to bite
the dust before some stronger foe. The mingling of races in that vast
region has no parallel in Africa. Ages ago the pastoral Fula—veritable
Asiatic—had settled therein with his flocks and herds, destined in
time by the sheer force of superior intellect to become the master
where he had been either the guest or the despised tenant. Later came
infiltrations of the Moorish element proper; pastorals also these,
emigrating from the plateaux of Adrar to the well-watered valley of the
Niger. Tuaregs, the redskins of the Sahara, descendants, as some affect
to believe, of those tall, fair-haired, long-limbed warriors of Northern
Europe who, about 1500 B.C., advanced slowly through Gaul and Spain,
and crossing the Mediterranean in ships, landed on the North African
Coast, ever pushing southwards, overcoming the terrors of the desert and
reaching the green pastures beyond, but repairing the greater part of the
year to the desolate Saharan solitudes of which they remain the virtual
masters, though Foureau and his _tirailleurs_ have for the first time
in history passed through without paying the toll. Arabs too, but again
later, and generally speaking farther south and east in Kanem, Wadai and
Baghirmi, where Lamy met his death and Gentil was fighting two years and
more; Arabs from the north with caravans of merchandise, and other Arabs
from the east; Shuwas, of whom no man knows the history or the origin.
They intermarried, these tawny, straight-haired nomadic strangers, with
the aboriginal blacks, or raped their women, as the case might be; and
from these unions, legitimate or otherwise, through long centuries,
there sprang into existence fierce cross-races and wild, reared in war,
nurtured in an atmosphere of turmoil and brigandage; negro Fula, negro
Moor, negro Arab, exaggerating the savage instincts of the parent stock,
whom they turned and rent when strong enough. One such hybrid product
became in time the scourge of the Western Sudan—the Tukulor, offspring
of Negro (Joloff) and Fula, unsparing, ruthless, dreaded alike by Fula
and Negro, and whose atrocities are written in letters of blood from Toro
(Senegal) to the frontiers of Hausa.
In this medley of races there came in the tenth century of our era
the first whisperings of a revealed religion. The whispering quickly
changed to the deep hum of many voices proclaiming aloud the word of the
Prophet. Islam spread with inconceivable rapidity. The Fulani became
speedy converts, but the arts they employed to win over their pagan
neighbours were usually peaceful. Not so with the Tukulors and the other
cross-races. They saw in it naught but a fresh incentive to warlike
deeds, and soon professed Mohammedans were not merely massacring the
infidels, but waging battle against their more peaceable co-religionists.
As though this were not enough, another fruitful cause of bloodshed
and disturbance was fated to arise, and still further plunge in woe
this distracted country. The Portuguese adventurers on the coast, in
the course of their professed desire to save the soul of the Negro,
made a discovery, to wit, that the muscular development of the Negro
eminently fitted him for manual labour. From that discovery dates the
most atrocious traffic the world has ever witnessed. In their greed
for slaves, the Christians of Western Europe and of America—without
distinction of nationality, though perhaps the Portuguese and English
were the worst offenders—set tribe against tribe; and the better to
stimulate the industry, imported wholesale guns and gunpowder, objects
which they ascertained the Negroes greatly coveted. The blacks waged war
right merrily upon one another, and their so-called prisoners of war
filled the slavers’ hulks. Presently the tawny races beyond the forest
belt joined in the game, desiring above all things the acquisition of
guns and the wherewithal to use them, which meant power and increased
facilities for plunder. Slave-raiding then assumed almost incredible
proportions. Internecine warfare received a new and terrible impetus. No
excuse, whether valid or imaginary, was henceforth needed to attack one’s
neighbour; and where in former days contentment might have been secured
by a rich booty of cattle and sheep, the requirements of the case now
necessitated the capture of the human animal himself. In such a country,
desolated by centuries of strife; among such a people, upon whose vices
Europe had grafted her own; under such circumstances, has lain the
destiny of France in Western Africa.
A favourite argument used by those who favour a militarist policy in
Northern Nigeria consists in pointing to the action of the French in
the Western Sudan. It is held by some to be inconsistent to express
approval of the military trend of French policy in regions adjacent to
Northern Nigeria, and to disapprove of it in Northern Nigeria itself.
I do not think that the charge of inconsistency will bear examination.
In the first place, we should be careful not to generalise. In West
Africa proper—that is, in the coastwise regions, the home of the true
Negroes—the military policy has, on the whole, been rarely resorted to
by the French. In the Western Sudan, although, no doubt, a good deal
of bloodshed might have been avoided at different times, I fail to see
myself, bearing in mind the object of French policy, how that object
could have been obtained without military conquest. As far as the purely
moral aspect of the matter is concerned, the right of any European Power
to interfere in the internal affairs of West Africa may be queried; but
if a given region can, in West Africa, be pointed to where the results of
such interference are of a beneficent nature, that region is the Western
Sudan. France is restoring to the enormous expanse of territory between
the Niger and the tropical forest belt the prosperity which it possessed
in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries under the Songhay, when Jenne
was the granary and the store-house of the Niger countries. She is laying
the basis of a prosperity far greater than in those days, because she
is able to bring peace where the Songhays could not. Having conquered
the cross-races, she wisely refrains from either interfering with their
customs, such as domestic slavery, upon which the social fabric of West
Africa depends, or from allowing, save in strictly circumscribed limits,
Christian propaganda among them, being well aware that such propaganda
in Mohammedan communities but newly subjugated is the certain precursor
of trouble, bloodshed, and fanaticism. She has hunted down and destroyed
the four tyrants who successively barred her way to the interior, and
who had perpetrated untold miseries upon hundreds of thousands of human
beings—El-Haji-Omar, Amadu, Samory and Rabah. Had she been able to
acquire the services of these men, it would perhaps have been better, but
the body of evidence is against the possibility of her power to have done
so. But there is a limit to approval of French military action, and if,
now that France’s political influence is internationally secure in the
regions east and north of the Chad, she chooses to embark open-eyed in a
struggle with the Senussi, she will be making a grave mistake. Unless
deliberately incited by unprovoked aggression, her game there is to
sheath the sword and give diplomacy the innings, and those Frenchmen who
see the danger of precipitate, immature action in Wadai and Kanem, and
are strenuously agitating against it, are wise in their generation.[203]
But, taken all in all, the circumstances in which England finds herself
in Northern Nigeria, and the circumstances in which France found herself
in relation to the Western Sudan before the conquest, are widely
different. The aims pursued by France in the Western Sudan, and by the
English in Nigeria, were not in their inception the same. The regions
coveted by France were for the most part widely removed—at immense
distances indeed—from her basis on the coast and her basis on the Senegal
River. To make her claims to those regions _internationally_ valid, it
was requisite that France should wield some tangible influence over them,
and in many cases that was impossible without conquest.
But the British in Northern Nigeria were very differently placed.
Northern Nigeria was the prolongation, so to speak, of the British base
in “the Rivers.” It lay immediately at the back of them. The possession
of the Niger’s mouth facilitated the extension of British influence up
the River and its affluent the Binue. Moreover, British merchants and
explorers had ascended both the Niger and the Binue many years before;
they had paved the way for what was to follow; and for fifteen years
before the advent of direct Imperial control in Northern Nigeria, its
native potentates had been united in close ties of political relationship
with a British Chartered Company. The Government stepped into the shoes
of the Chartered Company, not to play the _rôle_ of _conquisitador_ and
initiator, but to reap crops sown for it; to consolidate work already
half accomplished. It should, in parenthesis, be stated that France
manages the Western Sudan, a territory very much larger than Northern
Nigeria, and where a state of continuous internecine warfare had existed
for centuries, with an army not more than 3000 strong. Again, if warfare
has attended the establishment of French influence in the Shari region,
it has been due to special circumstances. Thus Gentil acquired a
Protectorate over Baghirmi without firing a shot. It was only when the
country which France had placed under her protection was invaded and laid
waste by Rabah that military action became a duty.
No comparison is really possible between the respective parts of Great
Britain and France. Both are distinct, and must be judged according to
their antecedents and special features.
In Northern Nigeria[204] we have to do with native rulers with whom we
have been in treaty relationship for fifteen years, and in commercial
relationship for longer still. They are our wards, we are in a fiduciary
capacity towards them; they are our _protégés_. We undertook by treaty to
subsidise them; we pledged ourselves by treaty “not to interfere with the
customs” of their people. It should be our object, following the precepts
of Sir Andrew Clarke, to make those rulers “far bigger” men than they
are, not to break them. They come of a proud race, a capable race, of
superior mental calibre, possessed of statesmanship and skill. They have
played a great part in the history of Western Africa. Barth, who knew
them well, has said of them that “they are the most intelligent people in
Africa.” To reduce them to impotence; to scatter their power; to break
the organisation they have created into small pieces would be politically
foolish, practically unwise, morally unjust, Imperially disastrous.
To strengthen their rule where weak; to perfect it where oppressive;
to assist them, work with them, and through them along their natural
lines; to interfere as little as possible with the customs and habits
of themselves and their people; to respect their religious beliefs; to
work gradually, peacefully, tactfully, for the attainment of the only
conceivable objects which have taken us to their country—commercial
development, advancement, prosperity—those should be the political
principles guiding us in Northern Nigeria.
The accomplishment of the colossal plan sketched out by the _Figaro_
in 1892, viz. the unification (if the word be permissible) of the
French possessions in Africa by expeditions from north, west, and
south, designed to meet on the shores of Lake Chad, may now be briefly
given. It is a stirring tale. The first attempt—if we exclude that of
Flatters from the north, of which the purpose was limited—was made from
the south, by the blue-eyed, fair-haired enthusiast, Paul Crampbel. He
fell assassinated by Rabah’s emissaries at El Kuti on April 15, 1891.
Dybowski and Maistre, sent out by the French African Committee in
Crampbel’s footsteps, had to retire without doing much more than useful
exploring work. Then came Gentil’s turn, a modest naval lieutenant who,
profiting by Rabah’s complications in Bornu, succeeded after incredible
difficulties in reaching the mouth of the Shari (after signing a treaty
of Protectorate with Baghirmi) and floating a small steamer upon the
waters of the mysterious lake. But the success was short-lived. Rabah
recrossed the Shari, forced the French to retire, and once again swept
Baghirmi with fire and sword. France hurried fresh reinforcements to the
spot, and these under Bretonnet were attacked by Rabah and decimated. A
further and more vigorous effort was required.
And here the scene shifts to the north. In October 1898 that intrepid
explorer, Foureau, left the oasis of Sadrata, near Wargla, in Algeria,
at the head of a force of picked men, 310 strong, consisting of troopers
from the Senegalese and Saharan _tirailleurs_, than whom there are
probably no more splendid fighters in the world, unless it be our own
Sikhs. Foureau was accompanied by three civilian friends. Commandant
Lamy led the military portion of the expedition, which comprised four
other officers besides himself. The object of the expedition was to
cross the Algerian Sahara and reach the Chad, while Gentil and Bretonnet
gained a firm foothold on its shores by working upwards from the Congo
and Ubanghi. Foureau and his companions plunged into the unknown desert,
and for ten months entirely disappeared from view. Frequent rumours of a
wholesale massacre reached Europe, and remembering the fate of Douls, De
Palot, Dournaux-Dupérré, and Joubert, Flatters and Bonnier, at the hands
of the fierce nomads who roam the desolate wastes through which Foureau
had to pass, France held her breath. If Foureau fell, it would not only
be a frightful disaster, fraught with peril to French policy throughout
her vast Mohammedan zone in Africa; it might also mean a revulsion of
popular feeling, a hanging up of cherished schemes for a generation or
more. But Foureau did not fall or fail. He reached the Asben oases in
safety, and demonstrated to timid minds that the Tuaregs, when confronted
by a well-armed and disciplined force, skilfully led and sufficiently
numerous to inspire respect, prefer, in the main, to hold themselves at a
distance.[205]
Again the scene changes. The plan was half-performed. The third advance
came from the west by the way of the Niger Bend. It was at first attended
by the direst results. The gallant Cazemajou met a cruel and treacherous
death at Zinder. Voulet and Chanoine, who succeeded him, showed what evil
unlimited authority and the disordering effects of the African climate
can work upon ill-regulated minds. Denounced by one of their subordinates
for barbarous conduct towards the natives, they, having already forgotten
the ordinary dictates of humanity, forgot alike honour and patriotism,
foully murdered the superior officer who had been instructed to replace
them, tore off their uniforms, declared themselves renegades, and
perpetrated the wildest excesses. But their shrift was short, and they
soon met their fate from the rifles of the native soldiers they had
temporarily led astray.
The French Government, however, did not relinquish its determination. The
fragments of the Voulet-Chanoine mission were got together, and under
the joint leadership of Captain Joalland and Lieutenant Meynier reached
the Chad, subsequently joining Gentil’s forces in the Lower Shari. By
this time Foureau had also gained the Chad. The three missions, which
after so many vicissitudes thus met together in their common goal, were
immediately called upon to face a new and most formidable danger. Against
the town of Kusri or Kusseri, where the French had established their
headquarters, Rabah was marching at the head of 5000 men, of whom 2000
were armed with guns of various patterns. He had also three fieldpieces,
captured from Bretonnet. The French disposed of a total strength of
774 officers and men—the latter natives without exception—with four
fieldpieces. They were assisted by 1500 Baghirmi auxiliaries, who do not
appear to have been of much use, contenting themselves with looting after
the battle was over. Rabah pitched his war camp three miles from Kusri,
and awaited the onslaught of the French. It proved to be irresistible.
Rabah himself perished. His losses amounted to 1000 killed and wounded,
and his camp, with the whole of its contents, fell into the hands of
the French. The French losses were severe. They included the brave
Lamy, Captain Cointet, a white non-commissioned officer and seventeen
men killed. Their wounded amounted to sixty, among them Captain Lamothe
and Lieutenants Meynier and Galland. But the victory was complete,
and Rabah, the noise of whose conquests had filled Central Africa for
close upon a quarter of a century; whose destructive strides had left
a bloody track from the Bahr-el-Ghazal to the Chad; Rabah, the last of
the great _conquisitadores_, had gone the way of El-Haji-Omar, and of
Samory. The plan elaborated by the _Figaro_ eight years previously was an
accomplished fact.
Since Rabah’s overthrow the French have been engaged in systematically
consolidating their hold upon the Central Sudan and the lower Shari. M.
Terrier, the able Secrétaire-Général of the French African Committee,
explains in the Committee’s Bulletin for April 1901 the procedure which
is being adopted. One cannot but be impressed with the grasp, the
sagacity, and the statesmanship displayed. The Shari region has been
divided into two districts, the most northerly of which abuts on Lake
Chad, and includes Baghirmi and the Shari mouths. It is administered
on military lines. The southern district, comprising the upper reaches
of the river and its affluents, is administered on civil lines. The
population of the southern district is composed of Negroes, whose
religion is fetishism, or what it pleases us to call fetishism. The
northern district is inhabited by various branches of the Negroid
Baghirmis; by the Kotokos; by the Shuwa Arabs, and by a few pastoral
Fulani. The pagans of the southern district have for centuries been
subjected to the raids of the Arabised-Negroes of Bornu and Baghirmi. It
was from among them that the principal supplies of slaves which used to
find their way across the desert route to Tripoli before the Firman of
1865 were drawn. France, by ridding them of their external foes, claims
the right to make them share in her administrative expenses. She is all
the more justified in doing so, as for many years to come, and until
the Shari is connected with the Ubanghi by a railway, there will be no
trade upon which to levy duties in order to obtain revenue. One-half of
the population is expected to furnish carriers, and the other half pays
an annual tax of four pounds of rubber per hut, of which two pounds is
returned to the chiefs as commission. We are assured—on the authority
of M. Terrier—that the chiefs are bringing in the tax voluntarily from
long distances. In the northern district, which was directly under
Rabah’s influence, the French found an existing organisation which they
have in the main retained, but the tax levied by the Emir of Baghirmi
upon his subjects being considered too heavy, the French have reduced
it by two-thirds, thus relieving the population from an undue burden
of taxation. The Emir and his chiefs—through whom French influence is
exercised—benefit by this reduced tax; that is to say, they keep it for
themselves. Contributions of slaves to the Emir and chiefs in the form of
tribute by the sub-chiefs are, of course, suppressed. The revenue of the
Emir being thus limited, but nevertheless assured to him, together with
the continuation of his prestige, the Emir himself, who owes his throne
to the French, and has, moreover, been relieved by them of the necessity
of paying an annual tribute to Wadai, is expected to furnish annually
to the Administration 240 pounds of millet, 500 cloths, and 100 oxen,
amounting roughly to £1680.
Here, then, as in the Western Sudan, the words of Faidherbe ring sound;
and M. Etienne, speaking at a Conference held the other day at the Paris
Colonial School, was only saying what has hitherto been true when he
asserted that:
“France can in all sincerity maintain that she has delivered the peoples
of inland Africa from an intolerable yoke. She has liberated millions of
human beings from sanguinary tyrants who had reduced them to slavery. She
has accomplished a work of emancipation, of liberty, and of generosity.”
It would be sad indeed if, led astray by evil counsels, France should be
induced in another portion of her West African domain, viz. French Congo,
to tarnish the great reputation she has undoubtedly built up.
It may be doubted whether the problems with which France has had to
contend in West Africa have ever been rightly understood among us, for
Englishmen are usually generous-minded enough to appreciate good work
carried out by others, even though the others are sometimes rivals.
Certain is it that of the nature of French exploits in West and Central
Africa the average Englishman is hopelessly ignorant, and even English
writers of repute persist in shutting their eyes to the great, the almost
revolutionary changes which experience, dearly bought, has wrought in
French Colonial conceptions. We have failed as a nation in doing justice
to the actions of the French in Africa. We have underrated their capacity
and refused to admit the existence at their council boards of a central
plan carefully matured which the frequent shuffling of Ministerial
portfolios merely retarded but did not alter. At the present moment we
apparently will not realise that France is applying to the economic
development of her vast territories the same strenuousness of purpose
with which she steadily pursued her work of conquest and absorption.
CHAPTER XXVI
THE COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL CONDITION OF THE FRENCH POSSESSIONS
The logic of facts is gradually bringing home to Englishmen that the
French have within recent years revolutionised the commercial position of
their West African possessions; of those possessions, that is, which are
at present commercially exploitable. But a singular amount of ignorance
continues to prevail on the subject, and in non-specialist circles the
French possessions are still in a sorry condition both commercially
and financially. So far is that deep-rooted idea from the truth, that
not only are the French doing exceedingly well commercially in West
Africa; but they are doing comparatively better than we are. Moreover,
their possessions are actually costing less to manage, and economy
in administration is not secured at the expense of requisite public
works; quite the contrary. The days when Englishmen could represent the
ideals of French Colonial management in West Africa in the light of a
custom-house official and a soldier; an expenditure overlapping revenue;
constant grants from the mother country; an embryonic trade and a growing
budgetary deficit, have passed and gone. In some respects the French
are turning the tables upon us. Even so distinguished an authority as
Sir Harry Johnston falls into the popular error when he says that “with
the exception of Tunis, there is not a single French possession in
Africa which is self-supporting or other than a drain upon the French
exchequer.” It is a complete fallacy, and it can be proved so up to
the hilt. Here and there, it is true, the old, bad, paralytic red-tape
conception remains, but on the whole the French possessions north of the
Bights are progressing with an astonishing rapidity; able to construct
important public works out of their own surplus revenues, and to enter
into railway contracts on guaranteed loans of their own raising. Miss
Kingsley, in her “West African Studies,” suggested that, granting the
possibility of France becoming “commercially intelligent,” she might
“pocket the West African trade down to Lagos from Senegal,” and there can
be no doubt that if British policy in West Africa continues to be carried
out on the present lines, and if French policy in West Africa can escape
the contamination of the concessionnaire _régime_ applied with such
deplorable results in French Congo, France can and will do an enormous
amount of commercial damage to our possessions in West Africa, and on a
fair field, in legitimate competition. Senegal, French Guinea, the Ivory
Coast and Dahomey are all self-supporting, and the growth of trade in
these possessions is in all conscience eloquent enough, as the following
figures show:
SENEGAL GUINEA IVORY COAST DAHOMEY
1889 £1,520,000 £320,000 £160,000 £360,000
1899 2,920,000 1,000,000 520,000 1,000,000
1900 3,189,400 973,000[206] 686,300 1,101,084
None of our Colonies can show such a rate of progress as their young
(Senegal excepted) Gallic competitors. The increase is really phenomenal.
In the French Colonies mentioned the expenditure is well within the
revenue. In French Guinea conspicuously so. Would that we could say the
same of our possessions! In all these Colonies the French are spending
less than we are in the work of administration. In some of them they
are nevertheless spending more in public works, and before long their
expenditure in that respect will in the aggregate far exceed ours. It
will suffice to give one or two instances in support of these general
statements.
The position of Dahomey is particularly interesting, because it adjoins
Lagos, because Lagos is one of the transit ports for Dahomey, because
both Colonies are building a railway in the same direction, and because
both Colonies aim at capturing the bulk of the interior trade. Compared
with Lagos, Dahomey is, of course, only an infant in years, but an infant
of sturdy growth. Its trade has jumped from nineteen million francs in
1893 to twenty-seven million francs in 1900. The growth in its export
trade is very noticeable. In 1893 it amounted to £347,258 (8,681,463
francs), and in 1900 had grown to £502,350. In 1893 the export trade
of Lagos was £836,295; in 1900 it was £885,111. True, Lagos saw better
days in 1896 and 1899 (£975,203 and £915,934 respectively),[207] but the
ratio of increase has not been equal to that of Dahomey. In 1894, on an
export trade of £821,682, the expenditure of Lagos amounted to £124,819;
in 1900, on an export trade of £885,111 the expenditure was £187,124,
including £37,214 for public works and £18,169 on account of public debt.
In 1900, on an export trade of £502,350 Dahomey spent £119,664, of which
£29,000 in public works, and in 1901 contributed £60,000 from its own
local revenue for the railway.[208] In 1900 Dahomey spent £8000[209]
in military and police; Lagos spent £39,095.[210] For some unexplained
reason Dahomey does not export timber, but her exports of palm-oil and
palm-kernels are increasing yearly. Dahomey is now actually exporting
very nearly as much palm-oil as Lagos.[211] In palm-kernels Dahomey has
not yet reached the level of Lagos, but is forging ahead, having exported
24,211,614 kilos, or roughly 24,000 tons, in 1901, against 21,986,043
kilos in 1900, and 21,850,982 kilos in 1899. Lagos shipped in 1900-1901
over 47,000 tons of kernels. Some years ago the French, annoyed at being
dependent upon Lagos as the only port of transit for the trade of their
Colony (Lagos is connected with Porto Novo, the capital of Dahomey, by a
lagoon, and the facilities of the Lagos route were, and still are, for
certain classes of goods very much greater owing to the bar service),
constructed at Kotonu one of the few wharves which exist on the West
African coast-line. This wharf, aided by the duty imposed on the Dahomey
transit trade _viâ_ Lagos by the Lagos authorities, has succeeded in its
object, and the bulk of Dahomey’s trade now passes through Kotonu instead
of _viâ_ Lagos. In this way has Lagos, for temporary revenue purposes,
played into the hands of her competitors. The Colony is also building a
railway[212] which is likely to prove a most important undertaking. The
fiscal policy adopted by France in Dahomey since the 1898 agreement,
abolishing the differential tariff for thirty years, has been well
calculated to bring about the conspicuous advancement observable, and
unless the railway concessionnaire, under his agreement with the local
government,[213] is allowed to interfere in the territories ceded to
him with the freedom of trade, and with native rights of land tenure,
the wisdom of Dahomey’s fiscal policy will continue to bear fruit. Most
people will be astonished to learn that Dahomey taxes her trade, in the
main, at a lower rate than Lagos, and it is unquestionable that the
circumstance acts in the former’s favour and to the latter’s detriment.
There is so much misconception about on subjects of this kind, which
nevertheless have so direct a bearing upon the prosperity and commercial
position of our West African possessions and of their rivals, that it has
been thought advisable to give in the Appendix as complete a comparative
table as possible of the duties in both Colonies.[214] To that list the
reader may be referred. On all articles but cottons Dahomey charges lower
duty than Lagos. If Dahomey can manage her affairs, and get a surplus
revenue to boot by charging 2_d._ a pound on tobacco and gunpowder, and
11_s._ 4_d._ and 4_s._ 10_d._ respectively on rock salt and sea salt,
why in the world cannot Lagos do the same, instead of charging 8_d._
and 4_d._ a pound on tobacco, 6_d._ a pound on gunpowder, and 20_s._ on
both classes of salt? The answer is, because the Crown Colony system is
infinitely more costly than the French system of administration.
France’s oldest Colony in West Africa, Senegal, despite the periodic
ravages of yellow fever, against which it is to be hoped science will now
be in a better position to struggle with success, is in a very healthy
condition commercially and financially, although rather too dependent
upon a single industry, viz. ground-nut production.[215] Its export
trade has increased from £517,934 in 1891 to £1,000,000 in 1900; but its
expenditure, instead of increasing in similar or greater proportion, as
is generally the case with British Possessions; has remained practically
stationary, at about £150,000; while surplus revenues have enabled her
to agree to pay a yearly subsidy of £36,000 for a period of twenty-two
years to the Western Sudan (Kayes-Niger) railway, from the completion of
which she is sure to largely benefit. In the construction of public works
Senegal is easily ahead of any European possession of West Africa. A
railway 250 kilometres long connects St. Louis, the capital, with Dakar,
the principal seaport, and the best on the coast. St. Louis, Dakar and
Rufisque have all been provided with fresh water. The Faidherbe bridge is
a great engineering triumph, and the wharves at Rufisque and Dakar are
well organised. Surveys for another railway through the Salum district,
with prolongation to Kayes, are being undertaken, and there is a project
on foot for improving navigation on the Senegal River. Senegal seems
destined to have a brilliant future.
The Ivory Coast has come very much to the fore of late as a possible
goldfield, to rival if not to surpass the Gold Coast. _Le Transvaal
français_ is the title already given to it by enthusiasts. Prospecting
work is being undertaken, and hundreds of permits have been granted. A
good deal of secrecy is being observed in connection with the matter,
and a wise check appears to have been kept upon the flotation of bogus
companies. There seems to be good ground for believing that auriferous
deposits exist in considerable quantities, and recent explorations have
revealed the existence of many old native workings, and even of a mine
actually being exploited by the natives, that of Kokombo in the Baoule
district. Experts think that the Ivory Coast will prove particularly
rich in dredging propositions. The Baoule, Indenie, Attie and Jaman
countries are reported to be the four districts in the Colony which
will repay the gold-seekers. Commandant Binger, who has travelled all
over the country, is a great believer in its gold-bearing capacity, and
in Dr. Freeman’s opinion, South-West Jaman is the gold country _par
excellence_ of the entire region; richer than Ashanti and other portions
of the British Protectorate.[216] At the Paris Exhibition of 1900 many
samples of auriferous quartz from the Ivory Coast were exhibited, from
Kuadikofi, Nangu-Kru, Alepe and Adokoi, and also some specimens of native
gold workmanship from Baoule and Jaman which point to a high degree of
artistic talent on the part of the workmen. Gold dust has been exported
from the Ivory Coast for many years, of an average annual value between
1890 and 1897 of £25,000. At present the trade of the Ivory Coast, which
is steadily increasing, is chiefly remarkable for its timber export. The
ports of Grand Bassam, Lahou and Assinie are among the most important
timber-shipping centres on the coast. In 1892 the Ivory Coast exported
mahogany to the value of £23,000; in 1900, to the value of £44,000.
Nearly all the mahogany comes to Liverpool, which imported in 1899 from
the Ivory Coast 4714 logs measuring 2,727,349 cubic feet, and in 1900,
5748 logs measuring 3,697,416 cubic feet. In the old days the Ivory
Coast, the “Elfenbein Küste” of the Germans, was celebrated for the
article its name implies.
Writing in 1730, Barbot says that “the inland country affords yearly
a vast quantity of fine large elephants’ teeth, being the best ivory
in the world, most of which is constantly bought up along this coast
by the English, Dutch, and French, and sometimes by the Danes and
Portuguese.” In quaint language, he goes on to tell us how important the
ivory trade of the Ivory Coast was in those days, and how the natives
profited thereby. “This great concourse of European ships,” he writes,
“coming hither every year, and sometimes three or four lying together
at anchor in the road, has encouraged the blacks to set so dear a rate
on their teeth (_sic_), and particularly on the larger sort, some of
them weighing two hundred pounds French, that there is not much to be
got by them, considering the vast charges that commonly attend such a
remote trade.” Barbot describes his own trading operations on the Ivory
Coast, and speaks of having “six large canoes about the ship full of fine
elephants’ teeth, each canoe manned by five or six hands at least—and
all lusty, resolute men.” Quoting some Hollanders, the same author
writes that “it is scarce to be conceived what a multitude of elephants
there is about this country.” It is quite clear that in those days ivory
was practically the only product exchanged by the natives against the
iron bars and rings, beads, kettles, cotton, brandy, and other articles
brought by European traders in their sailing vessels. Now the ivory
trade has practically disappeared, owing, no doubt, to the extermination
of the elephants in the coastal regions. What small quantity does come
down for shipment appears to be brought by caravans from the Western
Sudan. This disappearance of a trade which was flourishing enough at one
time to become the synonym of an extensive portion of the West African
coast-line, is one of those curious facts of which West Africa affords us
so many examples. It seems to me that we have one of the most striking
proofs of the highly developed commercial instinct of the West African
native, in the circumstance that no sooner has one branch of trade fallen
off than he replaces it by another. No doubt the initiative is not his
own, but the motive power is, and the very adaptability which he displays
in meeting the new demands of commerce affords the clearest indication of
the progressiveness of his race. Thus in the Ivory Coast; the ivory trade
has gone, and has been replaced by the oil, kernel, and rubber trade;
and, of quite recent years, by the mahogany trade.
So far, the Ivory Coast is the most backward of the French West African
possessions in the shape of public works, although there is a wharf at
Grand Bassam; but a very big scheme is in contemplation including the
construction of a harbour and railway, the piercing of the sandbank at
little Bassam opposite to the well-known “bottomless pit” so dreaded by
mariners, and the dredging of the Bingerville lagoon. The future of the
Ivory Coast would appear to be in good hands, so far as a very efficient
staff of administrators is a guarantee; M. Clozel and M. Maurice
Delafosse in particular having distinguished themselves of late in
studying the aboriginal tribes, and in laying the basis of an intelligent
native policy which, if pursued, will make of that possession a second
French Guinea. Just now, however, the military element appears to have
the upper hand, and there has been a regrettable collision between the
French authorities and the powerful Baoules, which has undone the work
of years of pacific endeavour, and which might, in the opinion of those
Frenchmen who know the country best, have been avoided. Archæological
discoveries of profound interest have been made in the Baoule country,
pointing to former intercourse with a more advanced people, whom M.
Delafosse thinks must have been the Egyptians.[217]
[Illustration: MAP SHOWING THE LOCALITY AND NATURE OF HARBOUR IMPROVEMENT
SCHEME IN THE IVORY COAST]
French Guinea can serve as a model of what a common-sense, commercial,
sympathetic administration is able to achieve in West Africa; and the
late Dr. Ballay, its founder and for more than a decade its governor,
will rank as the best type of Colonial Administrator, a worthy emulator
of his countryman, le Sieur de Brüe, and of our own Sir John Glover. The
strides which French Guinea has made since its birth in 1889 are really
phenomenal. In 1890, Konakry, the capital, was non-existent. To-day it
numbers 10,000 inhabitants, of whom some 300 are Europeans. The trade
of French Guinea, which in 1890 only amounted to £300,000, reached in
1899 and 1900 about £1,000,000. It is one of the most cheaply and yet
most effectively administered possessions on the coast. Its revenue
is buoyant, owing largely to the successful collection of a poll-tax,
and although a railway to Kurussa, on the Niger, is in course of
construction, the expenditure is well beneath the revenue. A magnificent
carriage-road 137 kilometres in length has been built from Konakry to
the foot of the Futa-Jallon plateau. Its import duties are, with the
exception of one or two articles, lower than in that of its moribund
neighbour, Sierra Leone. On the other hand, there is an export duty of 7
per cent. on rubber and gum copal. Its condition as compared with that of
Sierra Leone can best be set forth in tabular form:
FRENCH GUINEA IN 1900 SIERRA LEONE IN 1900
Total trade £962,209 Total trade £921,017
Export trade 391,191 Export trade 362,741
Expenditure 116,699 Expenditure 156,421
EXPENDITURE ANALYSED EXPENDITURE ANALYSED
Public works and railway £57,478 Public works and railway £36,084
Other expenditure 59,221 Other expenditure 120,337
It remains to be said that last year (1901) the export trade[218] of
Sierra Leone fell from £362,741 in 1900 to £304,010, reckoning specie,
and from £317,980 to £265,433, excluding specie, the latter figure
being the lowest for twenty-one years. At the same time the expenditure
increased from £156,421 to £173,457, only £91,976 less than the
purchasing power of the Colony.
CHAPTER XXVII
FRENCH AND BRITISH MANAGEMENT IN WEST AFRICA
Apart from the belief, which has been dealt with in the previous chapter,
that France cannot manage her West African possessions successfully,
another idea appears to be widely entertained. It is said that French
methods of rule in West Africa are excessively harsh. I cannot find
any evidence to support this view. The records of all the Powers who
have possessions in West Africa are tarnished by acts of oppression and
injustice to the native, but I have seen no proof that in this respect
France compares unfavourably with either England, Germany, or Portugal.
On the whole, France’s record is perhaps cleaner than that of most
other Powers. North of the Bights, the portion of West Africa which has
engaged our attention hitherto, I should say the balance of evidence is
decidedly to France’s credit. That is the opinion of Sir Charles Dilke;
it was the opinion of the late Miss Kingsley, and one or two other
competent authorities. Speaking in September of last year at a meeting
of the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce, an African of the Africans, and a
distinguished scholar, Dr. Blyden, who has had exceptional facilities for
judging, and who, withal, holds an official position under the Sierra
Leone Government, made a striking reference to the subject.
“France,” said Dr. Blyden, “has a peculiar work to do for Africa—a
work much needed and suited to the genius of the Celtic race.... The
contribution of the French to the civilisation of Africa evidently
springs not only from what they have in common with all mankind, but
from what is special to themselves. France is France. England is
England. France can do for Africa what England cannot do, and England
can do for Africa what France cannot do. This all thinking Africans
recognise, and all gladly co-operate with each nation according to the
measure in which their systems agree with native ideas and customs
and traditions. And there seems to be more of conformity in the
French methods than in the more rigid and unimaginative system of the
Anglo-Saxon. Whatever there is among the natives of original, racy, or
romantic interest is not perishing under French administration.”
That is a true saying, and it goes far towards explaining the political
success of the French in West Africa.
It is surely a circumstance which should impress us that the French have
been able to successfully apply direct taxation in their possessions
without bloodshed or disturbance, while in Sierra Leone we have failed so
disastrously. As direct taxation in West Africa is a problem fraught with
great danger, one needing the utmost care and discrimination, it seems
worth while to give more than passing notice to what has already been
done by the French and ourselves in the matter. A poll-tax was applied in
French Guinea in 1897. In 1900 it yielded £90,000, and I am informed on
good authority that the returns for 1901 will reach £140,000, and will
still further increase, as the taxable radius has not yet been reached.
It has been peacefully collected. Was this the result of overwhelming
military strength? Not at all, for although French Guinea is now about
three times the size of Sierra Leone, the military, or rather the police,
force of the French Protectorate is just a little over half what it
is in Sierra Leone. The “show of force” theory has, therefore, been
conspicuous by its absence. It has been replaced by a plentiful supply of
imagination, plus the appreciation of certain scientific facts. What, in
the first place, are the scientific facts? The tax in French Guinea is
a poll-tax, the tax in Sierra Leone is a property-tax. In the one case
there was no interference with native land tenure; in the other there
was indirect interference with native land tenure. Mr. Chamberlain[219]
himself was “disposed to think that the natives saw in the tax an attempt
to interfere with their property.” Yet Mr. Chamberlain has maintained
the tax. Farther on Mr. Chamberlain says, “that the aversion of the
natives to the payment of the tax is not insuperable may be inferred
from the fact that a similar tax is levied without difficulty from
similar races by the French in the neighbouring territory.” There Mr.
Chamberlain showed that he was not properly informed. The tax was not
a “similar” tax, and the “races” in French territory are not “similar”
but dissimilar. What ethnic similarity is there, for instance, between
the Fulani, the ruling race in a large portion of French Guinea, and the
Mendi, Timini, Konnos and Sulimas of Sierra Leone? Such confusion is
extraordinary. The peoples of French Guinea are either Mohammedan, or
for the most part inured to direct taxation for many centuries past by
Mohammedan conquest.[220] The peoples of Sierra Leone were independent
races, who have beaten back every attempt at Mohammedan conquest, and
among whom a regularly recurring impost is unknown, and contrary to
all native ideas. An almost identical argument has been made use of in
regard to the Gambia. We collect a hut-tax in the Gambia; why not in
Sierra Leone? For the same reason that what may be sound in one place is
not sound in another. You cannot lump West Africa together and evolve
identical legislation for the whole! The passion for assimilation is
fatal to good government in West Africa. The peoples of the Gambia are,
again, either Mohammedan or have undergone conquest by Mohammedans. The
case of the Gambia, moreover, is in another sense quite different from
Sierra Leone. Sierra Leone is covered with dense forests. Gambia is a
small strip of territory on either bank of a river. The villages along
its shores can be raked by gun-boats. Every part is easily accessible,
and on the other side of the border the French are in occupation. What
chance is there of resisting Government demands, even though the tax were
bitterly opposed, which is not the case for the reasons already given;
although the Gambia natives are probably no more in love with it than
we are with our income-tax? Direct taxation is ever unpopular; among
primitive peoples particularly so. Finally, the natives of French Guinea
are much richer than those of Sierra Leone. So much for the scientific
facts. Is it not about time that the Colonial Office took over the
services of a trained ethnologist, or created independent native councils
in West Africa in touch with the Administration?
[Illustration: SUSU CHIEF AND STAFF]
Dahomey and Ashanti also offer a parallel in another way. In Dahomey
the poll-tax was applied for the first time since the Conquest (1892)
in 1899. It yielded £8200 in 1899 and £22,290 in 1900. There has been
no trouble, and as in French Guinea, the tax has not prevented a
steady increase in the export trade, notwithstanding the thousands of
able-bodied men employed on the railway. In both Dahomey and Ashanti
the people taxed are Negroes, and were formerly subject to an unusual
state-form in West Africa, viz. a despotism. They have been conquered,
and conquest implies a tacit right to levy an impost. But conquest
involves great hardships on the conquered in West Africa. Villages and
granaries are destroyed, crops burnt, acres of land laid waste; many of
those who would be sowing and reaping and gathering produce have been
killed, and general distress ensues. That is the time for the conqueror
with his higher culture, and the lofty ideals of the religion he
professes, to take the conquered by the hand and try to renovate what he
has shattered, but on better lines; to act, since he chooses to call the
Negro a child, as a parent, who, after administering castigation, makes
friends once more with the offender. Put differently, every assistance
should be given, and due latitude allowed to a tribe which has been so
unfortunate as to incur the wrath of the superior people, whose reforming
zeal is nothing if not drastic. The French gave the Dahomeyans seven
years’ breathing space before they taxed them.[221]
[Illustration: ASHANTI FIELD FORCE AT CAPE COAST _EN ROUTE_ FOR KUMASI]
What has been our action in Ashanti? No sooner has a desolating war been
ended, a war attended by certain incidents which do not reflect credit
upon us as a nation; a war which was caused by a series of official
blunders of the grossest kind, than we clap on direct taxation, and
in such a form that a premium is put upon future troubles. In fact,
shortly after this taxation was announced to the beaten chiefs, yet
another rising was only averted by the prompt despatch of more troops
to Kumasi.[222] Could anything less imaginative—to put it mildly—be
devised than this application of a war indemnity nearly thirty years old,
previous non-payment of which was made the excuse for the arrest and
deportation of Prempreh and the annexation of the country; and when the
revival of the claim by the authorities in 1900 is admitted to have been
one of the contributory causes of the last rising? As Sir William Geary
pointed out in 1900:
“To take a metaphor from private property, one cannot foreclose
a mortgage, receive the rents and profits of the land, and then
beyond that ask for interest on the debt when one has helped
oneself to payment. We annexed Ashanti in 1896, and not only
have we obtained formal sovereignty, but the matter has turned
out a good bargain for us. We are carrying away the natural
gold of the country for the benefit of European shareholders.
Now we want to tax the natives.”
Is policy of this kind calculated to bring prosperity to British West
Africa? In 1864 the _Times_ expressed itself as follows with regard to
the ruler of Ashanti:
“Instead of harbouring culprits against his crown, instead of
disregarding the treaties between himself and us, instead of
trying to sap the foundations of his throne, we should strive
to cultivate acquaintance with him by the tranquil arts of
trade. At the back of his vast dominions, receding to the foot
of the Kong mountains, reside natives who owe and yield him
obedience. What benefits might be showered on the Protectorate
if we would set our heads together to foster and consolidate an
intercourse based on amity and on the extension of legitimate
traffic!”
Wise words, excellent precepts. Why does not the _Times_ preach them now
for application in other parts of West Africa, where the Crown Colony
system has not yet quite succeeded in undoing the work of generations
of peaceful, commercial efforts? If there be still life left in this
miserable residue of the once powerful Ashanti nation, no doubt but
that more trouble arising out of the tax will ensue. It does not seem
as though the contingency were looked upon as altogether remote even
in official eyes, and there are some significant passages in the last
Blue Book on the subject. Happily at present we have an excellent
resident at Kumasi in the person of Captain Donald Stewart, a man of
broad sympathies, and it may be that his personal influence will prevail
against the slumbering discontent which the policy of his chiefs renders
inevitable in the country, whether it be given open expression to or
not.[223]
[Illustration: RETURN OF ASHANTI FIELD FORCE]
There is a passage in the evidence of one of the European witnesses
before Sir David Chalmers, in the course of the inquiry into the hut-tax
war, which explains better than anything else perhaps the difference
between the procedure of the French in Guinea and that of the British
authorities in Sierra Leone. “They are not so particular there. The
great man Alimami Dowla is supposed to collect the tax, and he brings
the money to the Governor and says, ‘This is what I have been able to
collect,’ and the Government say, ‘Thank you.’” That is precisely what
the French have done all through. They have gone to the chiefs as “big
friend”; explained to them that they required money for the railway,
roads, and so on; pointed out the advantages; asked them to contribute;
presented them with an extremely handsome commission of one-third of the
moneys collected (in other words, subsidised them) in their respective
districts, and “winked the other eye,” so to speak, when the moneys
presented have not equalled the amount due. At the same time the prestige
of the chiefs has been everywhere upheld; the native courts preserved;
vexatious European legal formulas kept out of the country; European
merchants encouraged to come in, and regularly consulted in the work of
administration; the numbers of officials restricted; economy practised
in every branch of the service, and military methods tabooed. Result,
a magnificent success politically, commercially, financially. Compare
this with what has taken place in Sierra Leone. We are taking away the
power of the chiefs instead of strengthening it.[224] The hut-tax was
originally enforced in a hasty, not to say brutal manner. Instant payment
was demanded. Chiefs were dragged from their villages, treated as felons,
handcuffed and marched off to gaol under the eyes of their unresisting
people. The Frontier Police, an ill-disciplined force[225] recruited from
the dregs of the Protectorate, committed all sorts of abuses, and, to use
the words of the Royal Commissioner, “oppressive severity” was exercised,
and this most delicate business was approached in a general spirit of
“imperious and uncompromising force.” A rising very naturally ensued
which convulsed the whole Protectorate. Sir David Chalmers’ subsequent
report, which condemned the hut-tax and recommended its withdrawal, was
not acted upon; the hut-tax has been maintained, and an expensive civil,
military and magisterial _régime_ set up, unsuited to the country and
beyond its power to maintain. Result, the expenditure has risen to about
60 per cent. of the producing power of the Colony, which is steadily
decreasing; and the up-keep of the machinery to collect the tax costs
more than the tax produces. The Colonial Office, which exhausted itself
in ingenious explanations to disconnect the rising with the hut-tax,
has recently issued an optimistic statement—on top of many others of a
similar kind—containing the report of the new Governor’s tour in the
hinterland.[226] It seems that everything is for the best in the best
of all possible worlds. The natives are delighted with everything, the
hut-tax included. The fall in the exports (the true test of prosperity
of a West African colony), which have been on the downward grade since
the hut-tax was introduced, and were lower last year than they have been
for twenty years (the year of the rebellion excepted), is accounted for
by “want of activity on the part of native producers,” and to the action
of the French. With regard to the latter, the French have for many years
levied a tax upon native caravans crossing the frontier, and the rapid
development and the judicious management of French Guinea have killed the
transit trade which used to pass _viâ_ Freetown, and is now concentrated
at Konakry. Yet, in view of French competition, the authorities deem it
politic to keep up the tax and all the incidental expenses it involves.
The caravan traffic with the far interior was doomed when the French
secured the back country; and the revival of the complaint about taxing
caravans strikes one as a little insincere for several reasons, and
among them because, although it is natural that the natives of our
Protectorate adjoining the French possession should be sorry to lose
the profits they derived from the passage of caravans through their
districts, and complain accordingly, no evidence has been adduced to
show that the natives from the remoter hinterlands beyond the frontier,
which, be it remembered, belong to France, are desirous of travelling
all the way to Freetown to dispose of their products, when there are
French factories quite as near where as good prices can be obtained for
produce. It is curious, too, to contrast these explanations with other
official assurances given out both in 1899 and 1900, that the country
would soon recover from the hut-tax war and the export trade regain its
normal dimensions. French competition is no new thing. To conclude, the
export trade of Sierra Leone twenty years ago is given at £366,000 for an
expenditure of £72,000: last year the expenditure was £173,457 including
the railway expenses, and £154,210 minus the railway expenses. The
expenditure has, therefore, excluding the railway expenses, increased by
over 100 per cent. in the face of a decline in the producing power of the
country. That is the road to financial ruin, and those concerned know it
well enough; but until the British public makes up its mind to seriously
tackle these West African questions, the few who say so will, no doubt,
continue to be looked upon as pessimists, “sentimental theorists,” or
fools, until the inevitable day of reckoning comes.
PART V
CHAPTER XXVIII
THE CONCESSIONS _RÉGIME_ IN FRENCH CONGO
“What is important in colonial matters is that the Governments,
in their difficult and uncertain, but systematic, march, should
have increasingly before them the ideal which they proposed to
themselves, and which they never lose sight of in the darkest
nights, the star which shines in the heavens, and of which the
beams are justice and humanity.”—M. DÉCRAIS, Colonial Minister
in the Waldeck-Rousseau Cabinet.
“We even think that on account of the difficulty, of the
impossibility, in which the natives find themselves of making
known their feelings and expressing their grievances, the
interests of those natives should be the object of special
kindness and solicitude....
“Can we allow these natives to be subjected to the unbridled
exploitation, to the economical servitude with which they are
threatened? The exclusive right which the Concessionnaires
will arrogate to themselves of buying from the natives
living upon their concessions at such prices as they, the
Concessionnaires, choose to impose, the natural products of
the soil, or the harvest which their labour has produced, is
but a disguised form of slavery.... In conclusion, we can
but say that this Concession _régime_ is antagonistic to the
well-being, to the material and moral progress of our natives,
and to the responsibilities we have assumed in submitting them
to our domination.”—“Memorial” of the “French West African
Company”[227] to M. Décrais.
By one of those extraordinary contradictions of which French history
affords so many curious examples, liberty-loving France, with her
splendid record in West Africa, having proved her capacity to
successfully manage possessions in West Africa; numbering among her
officials and merchants connected with West Africa men of the highest
moral calibre, imbued with humanitarian instincts and earnest advocates
of a sound native policy; has within the last few years sanctioned the
institution of a _régime_ of territorial monopolies in the French Congo
which has already led to deplorable occurrences, and cannot fail to cause
still greater evils if permitted to continue. To explain all the phases
of this grave departure from French traditions in West Africa would
require a great deal more space than is here available. One can only give
its origin, indicate its main lines and the events which have hitherto
taken place in connection with it, and briefly discuss how it affects
the general relationship of Western Europe with Western Africa and the
interests of British subjects in the maritime zone of the French Congo.
Some three years and a half ago the huge profits earned by certain
rubber companies, so-called, in the Congo State; the enormous premiums
at which their shares stood on the Antwerp Stock Exchange; the wild
speculations which anything to do with Congo rubber gave rise to in
Belgium; the colossal increase in the yearly output of rubber from the
Congo State, which from a value of 260,000 francs in 1888 had risen to
15,850,000 francs in 1898,[228] provoked in France—or, at any rate,
among some influential Frenchmen, notably in Government circles—a desire
that similar results should accrue in the French Congo. “Here,” ran the
argument, “we have an immense territory as rich in forest products,
notably rubber, as the Congo State, which is doing very little, which
for years has been a drag upon the metropolis; while the Belgians—these
new-comers in Africa, these tyros at tropical colonisation—are making
fortunes every day. Why cannot we imitate them?” The feeling was
thoroughly natural. Those who entertained it, however, forgot four
things—three of which may at this stage be referred to—or, if they did
not forget them, they at all events brushed them aside in the enthusiasm
of the moment. They forgot the causes which had led to the comparative
stagnation of French Congo on the one hand and the causes which were
moulding a state of prosperity in the remaining French Colonies on the
other. They forgot the political ambitions of the astutest diplomatist in
Europe—the Sovereign of the Congo State. They forgot _how_ the inflated
premiums, colossal profits, and the exaggerated production had been and
were being brought about. If the latter point did present itself to the
minds of a minority, it was assumed that, under a French administration,
abuses such as those known to exist in the Congo State were impossible,
and that results in every sense equal to those obtained in the Congo
State could be secured in French Congo without them. Swayed by these
considerations, the French Government and French Colonial public, with
the exception of a handful of far-seeing and experienced men, sought to
carry out the new programme without delay.
King Leopold foresaw at once the danger and the opportunity; the danger
if a sudden influx of French capital into French Congo should lead to the
construction of a railway from the French coast-line to Brazzaville on
the Upper Congo, to threaten the monopoly of traffic with the interior
enjoyed by the Matadi-Stanley Pool railway; the necessity of averting it
by placing the financial control of the French concessions in Belgian
hands, whereby the construction of such a line could be delayed _ad
infinitum_; and the double advantage of (1) fostering the movement in
France, on account of the increased railway freight the development of
the movement would bring for the existing Belgian line, to say nothing
of the increased customs duties on goods and material for the French
Upper Congo (whose only practical route was, of course, _viâ_ Congo
State territory), which would accrue to the Congo State for the same
reason; and (2) of securing for the small but influential Belgian group
of which he is the supremely able leader a preponderating position in
the possessions adjoining his own.[229] Gathering his financiers and
co-partners in that vast Trust—which is called the Independent State
of the Congo—King Leopold flung himself into the breach, and with such
good effect that French Congo was in an incredibly short space of time
partitioned on paper into some forty odd concessions of all shapes and
dimensions, with nominal French heads, but with Belgians on the board of
administration, a majority of Belgian shareholders behind, with Belgian
capital either openly or in disguised form the controlling factor, with
strings pulled in Belgium, ideas borrowed from Belgium, Belgian methods
of tropical African development and Belgian methods of rigging the home
markets writ large all over them.[230] With what consummate skill the
Sovereign of the Congo State weaved his nets, flung them forth and
landed his fish, only those who have had a glimpse of what has gone
on behind the scenes can describe. It would make a curious story, and
not an altogether savoury one, and perhaps some day it will be fully
told.[231] The clever manipulating tactics of the king were only equalled
by the infatuation, the heedlessness, the utter want of reflection which
characterised the action of the French Government of the day and the
noisiest section of the French Colonial party. A policy involving the
most far-reaching consequences was suddenly adopted with, as a French
writer of distinction has said, “une insouciance, une désinvolture
presque criminelles.” Seemingly hypnotised, France plunged headlong
into an abyss whence she is vainly seeking to emerge, and in which she
has already soiled her hands, and as De Brazza rather nobly puts it,
“compromised her dignity.”
Meanwhile the French Congo Concessions are in being, and what has
been the outcome up to the present after more than two years of the
experiment? The promoters have done excellently well. Floating their
concessions at absurd premiums on the Antwerp market, and coming on
the crest of the rubber wave, they were able—not in all cases perhaps,
but generally—to dispose of their holdings at substantial profits. The
shareholders who imitated their example showed prescience, for, with the
exception of two companies, there has not been one single transaction
this year in the shares of forty-three of these companies which are still
quoted in the Antwerp financial and Congo organs! Their paper, in fact,
is unsaleable. Several of the companies have fizzled out. Those who
have not been allowed to prey on the legitimate barter trade existing
in the Maritime Zone are in more or less of a moribund condition, and
after squandering their shareholders’ money have accomplished absolutely
nothing. But what of the effect upon the country? Free trade in the
Maritime Zone has disappeared, and with it the revenue it supplied to the
Administration. The export trade has actually decreased. The finances are
so gravely compromised that a loan of 10,000,000 francs is spoken of,
and at one period last year there was not even available in the local
treasury sufficient cash to pay the salaries of officials. All public
works and improvements of any kind are, of course, suspended. The local
Courts are kept busy with endless litigation between Concessionnaire
Companies who accuse one another of poaching upon their respective
preserves, the boundaries of none of which have, by the way, ever been
delimited. There have been two native risings attended with considerable
loss of life and destruction of property, and chaos reigns supreme. The
Paris Colonial organs are filled with suggestions, exhortations, threats,
revilings, but with the solitary exception of one Deputy[232]—M. le
Comte d’Agoult—and a handful of courageous journalists, such as M. Jean
Hess, the African explorer, and M. Serge Basset, of _La Revue_, no one
of note in French Colonial circles has boldly tackled the subject, gone
to the root of it, or preached the only possible solution. The fact that
the affair has raised an international problem—or rather two—of great
delicacy, may have something to do with the unwillingness to come to
close quarters displayed by the leading organs of the French Press. But
it is lamentable, in every sense of the word, that France with all her
generous instincts should be able on this occasion to record but very few
protesting voices against the fatal reversal of the wise and just native
policy she has hitherto pursued in the main, and with such conspicuous
success, in her other West African possessions.
For it is in the relation it bears towards the natives that the
concession _régime_ in French Congo offers the strongest ground for
criticism. The saying that “evil communications corrupt good manners”
was never more applicable than in this case. Once started on the road
mapped out three years ago, subsequent events became inevitable. It
would have needed a man of iron—and the warmest friends of the ex-French
Colonial Minister, who was not the initiator, but the successor to a
heritage of trouble, would not credit him with such proclivities—to have
stemmed the tide and refused, even at the risk of resigning, to allow
his country to be dragged along the path of reaction towards which the
concession _régime_ infallibly tended. Step by step the French Government
has found itself impelled to gravitate nearer to the Belgian conception.
The Concessionnaires found English and German merchants trading
peacefully with the natives on what they claimed, according to their
contracts with the French Government, to be their own property. Disputes
arose, seizures of produce took place, and it became increasingly urgent
to define the “rights” of the concessionnaires. M. Décrais hung back
a long time, but goaded by nearly all the Colonial and some of the
daily newspapers, with constant pressure brought to bear upon him from
influential quarters, he was fain at last to take the leap. He took it,
and through the Governor of French Congo issued a decree (March 20,
1901) as to which one can only say that, if a few years ago it had been
predicted that a French Minister could have framed such a document, the
prophecy would have earned the contemptuous unbelief of all Frenchmen, or
foreigners acquainted with the part played by France in Western Africa.
The decree declared that one idea dominated[233] the entire
concession policy, viz. that the products of the soil belonged to the
concessionnaires, who alone had a right to dispose of them, the natives
not being entitled to sell them to any one but the concessionnaires. To
tone down the arbitrary nature of this promulgation, mention was made
of native reserves, where the natives would be free to do what they
liked. But this apparent modification of the absolutism of the decree
is entirely illusory for three reasons: (1) the area of the reserves
was not delimited, and in view of the enormous difficulty and expense
delimitation would involve, could not hope to be for many years to
come; (2) a decision of the local courts had ordained that, pending
delimitation of the reserves, the reserves were legally non-existent, and
that the whole country was therefore exploitable by the concessionnaires;
(3) an antecedent ministerial decree had announced that, when the
reserves were delimited, the areas reserved should not include any land
producing saleable products.[234] Whatever may have been the difficulties
with which the French Colonial Minister was beset, the issue of the
above decree cannot in equity be defended. It virtually handed over the
population of French Congo to the mercy of European speculators, of
Belgians grown fat on the misery and the degradation of the natives in
the Congo State. It left the door open to the grossest abuses, the most
cynical outrages against humanity. It let loose the tongues and pens
of all the apostles of force and coercion for Africa. It reduced the
natives to the level of servants and serfs of the greedy clique which had
fastened its talons in the country, and it strengthened the position of
the Congo State in Europe.
Secure in the official recognition of their “rights,” the concessionnaire
companies’ next move was precisely what might have been expected in view
of the class of men controlling them. Legitimate commerce having no place
in their calculations, they at once started a “campaign” for the purpose
of forcing the French Government to coerce the natives into bringing
rubber and other forest produce to their factories, on such terms as
they, the concessionnaires, chose to pay for the labour expended by the
natives in collecting it. While their subsidised organs daily devoted
reams to prove that compulsion was essential in dealing with primitive
peoples, their agents in Africa hastened, as far as possible, to put
these principles into practice. Arms of precision were smuggled into
the country, and soon the concessionnaires were attempting on a smaller
scale to copy the exploits of their countrymen on the other side of the
Congo River. _Facilis descensus Averni._ The agitation was partly met by
the application of a hut-tax paid in kind, the produce to be handed in
by the natives to the Government authorities, who would dispose of it
to the concessionnaires at a nominal price; thus giving an appearance
of legality to the transaction, and disguising coercion in the garb of
administrative requirements. The Government having accomplished nothing
whatever in the way of bettering the country, improving communication,
or constructing public works from which the natives might be expected to
derive some benefit, the hut-tax was naturally resented; its application
in French Congo being, moreover, scientifically unsound, and only
feasible of accomplishment by a long course of preparation. Grafted upon
the action of the concessionnaires, the measure was followed by outbreaks
in various directions, especially among the warlike Fans of the Ogowe and
the Upper Sangha people.
This new step on the part of the French Government stirred up for a time
the opponents of the concessionnaire _régime_ in France. De Brazza sent
a memorable protest to the _Temps_. Its concluding passage is well worth
quoting:
“France has assumed a duty towards the native tribes (of French
Congo) who for twenty-seven years have lent their assistance
in the work of expansion. These people have received from us
the seal of their future liberties.... We must not sacrifice
them to the vain hope of immediate results by thoughtless
measures of coercion opposed to the generous ideas which our
flag personifies. We should be committing a great mistake to
discount that result, by enforcing at the present time taxes
upon the products of the soil, or by compelling the natives to
work in the form of forced labour or military service. It would
constitute a great blow to our dignity if such labour and such
taxes were converted into a sort of draft-to-order in favour of
the concessionnaires.... It is to recall these considerations
to men’s minds, and to avoid the moral bankruptcy to which
economic and financial disasters may lead us, that I have
emerged from the reserve I had imposed upon myself.”[235]
Just then, too, one of the very few genuine French concerns among the
concessionnaire companies, managed by a Frenchman distinguished for his
explorations in the country, M. Fondère, wrote publicly to the Colonial
Minister, abandoning his concession:
“Experience has convinced us,” he wrote, “that, notwithstanding
any modifications of detail which your department might
suggest, either in the administrative organisation of the Congo
Colony or in the agreement between the Government and the
Concessionnaires, the exclusive monopoly of the concessions is
a vain epithet. The right to sell his products to whomsoever
he may please cannot be denied to the native, because he has
always possessed it. Moreover, all stipulations to the contrary
notwithstanding, it would be quite illusory to think of taking
this right away from the native. That could only be done by
force of arms.”
Shortly afterwards, M. Albert Cousin, also a well-known man in French
Colonial circles, who had previously been a warm defender of the
concessions _régime_, published a pamphlet to the effect that he had
changed his mind, and was now convinced the experiment was a mistaken
one.[236]
These repeated blows staggered for a moment the defenders of the
Belgian conception in France. The newspaper which had the most largely
contributed to influence French Colonial opinion even went so far as to
admit that it could not but be “very much impressed by the new ideas
which are coming to light.” The ideas are not new. They are as old as the
hills. They date back from the time when man, evolving from the brute,
became a law-maker, and decided that certain fixed principles of morality
should form the basis of social order.
That temporary hesitation offered a great opportunity for French
statesmanship, but no one came forward to enforce the lesson. And so the
powerful influences which had been at work from the first set themselves
to destroy the “impression” created. They partially succeeded, but they
could not destroy it altogether, and I rather fancy it is becoming more
pronounced and will eventually carry the day. One factor, at any rate, is
likely to assist its growth not a little—the extravagant demands of the
concessionnaires and the violent attacks on the French Government on the
part of the Belgian organs devoted to the interests of their compatriots
in French Congo. The institution of the hut-tax was merely a sop. It
staved off the clamour for a time, but in the nature of things could not
last for long. To feed the army of concessionnaires with the proceeds
of a hut-tax an army of native levies is required. That is what the
concessionnaires claim must be organised, and once more the same strings
are being pulled, the same arguments put forward, the same machinery set
in motion. The French Government must do what the Congo State has done.
It must raise 15,000 or 20,000 men, arm them with weapons of precision
and turn them loose upon the population in order to enforce a tribute
on the yield of which the concessionnaires shall not only live but run
their shares up to high premiums, present respectable dividends to their
Belgian holders, and generally make money at the expense of the natives
of the French Congo, using the French Government as a sort of decoy-duck
the while. I doubt if it will work. I fancy King Leopold and his friends
are going rather too far. But one thing at least is certain. Either the
concessionnaires, who know nothing of trade and are not concerned with
mere matter-of-fact commercial considerations, who have never looked
upon commerce as an element in their “business,” will themselves be
compelled to throw up the sponge; or they will compel in one shape or
another the French Government to give them physical means to establish
slavery in the French Congo, as it has been established in the Congo
State. To suppose the latter is almost an impossibility, notwithstanding
all that has happened, and it is perhaps not displaying too great an
optimism to hope that the concession _régime_ in French Congo may perish
from its own internal corruption. Meanwhile it remains to be seen how
that _régime_ has affected and continues to affect British interests,
and the part it plays in the international situation created by the
proceedings of the Congo State.
CHAPTER XXIX
INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS AND MONOPOLY
“As to the ground on which we contend for the rights we have in
the interior of Africa, they have really been our own guiding
principles throughout. _It is not territory, it is freedom
of trade_, and on that ground we are strong and shall do our
very utmost.”—Extract from a speech by LORD SALISBURY to a
deputation of Chambers of Commerce, 1898.
Speaking at Manchester in 1884, Sir H. M. Stanley prophesied,
as a result of the creation of the Congo State, an export
of British cotton goods to the Congo State of £26,000,000
annually. According to the same speaker, one firm on the Congo
River alone imported, in 1879, British goods to the value
of £185,000. After seventeen years’ existence, the _total_
imports of British goods to the Congo State is far below that
figure—viz. £133,200 in 1901!
The importance of British trade interests in French West
Africa may be estimated from the fact that in 1900 the French
possessions absorbed British goods to the value of £709,900,
and sent £534,727 of produce to British ports.
In the _cahier de charges_ or agreements between the French Government
and the Concessionnaire Companies the latter were held to respect the
“acquired rights of third parties,” and the “general rights created by
the Berlin Act.” Who were the “third parties”? What were their “acquired
rights?” What were the “general rights created by the Berlin Act”?
When in the early part of the nineteenth century the European nations
put a stop to the export slave trade, Great Britain, having led the way
in securing this reform, entered into treaties with most of the chiefs
and head-men along the West Coast, giving some of them subsidies and, by
means of consular and naval visitations, encouraging them to give their
attention to the gathering of their forest products for sale to Europeans
in exchange for the merchandise of Europe. In this way the trade in
palm-oil was stimulated in the Niger Delta and Windward Coast; whilst in
Gaboon it took the shape of barwood, ebony and ivory, and in the River
Congo palm-oil and ivory. At that time there was no European Government
established on the African coast between the Gold Coast and Ambriz. The
Europeans who settled along the coast traded from their vessels. After
the introduction of steam, the European traders (chiefly British) traded
in hulks in the Niger Delta, and built houses and stores at various
points along the whole coast-line down to Ambriz. Small sailing vessels
plied between these trading places and the terminus of the ocean steamers
(then Fernando Po, or Cameroons), and sailing vessels from Europe sailed
regularly to and fro, bringing their goods and taking home their cargoes
of vegetable and animal products. Soon after the establishment of steam
the French Government made a treaty with the chiefs of the Gaboon River,
by which ground was ceded for a coaling station for the French men-of-war
then plying on the African coast to put down the foreign slave trade.
Shortly afterwards, an American citizen established in Fernan Vaz
discovered a vine, of which the sap, when exposed to the atmosphere, was
found to yield india rubber, and in course of time this new industry was
fairly started and gradually spread over the adjoining territory. It was
a slow process, but in a few years the gathering of rubber became general
in that part of the coast, and in Gaboon the French naval officers saw
that there was a trade to be taxed, and forthwith a Custom House was
built and duties placed on imports.
When British merchants first established themselves in Gaboon the
political authority of the French Government was confined to the Gaboon
River estuary, and the up-river trade was carried on at our merchants’
personal risk. In order to induce the natives to collect rubber, European
traders had perforce to let the natives have goods on credit, as those
natives near the coast had to go far into the interior to buy from other
natives; who, in their turn, had to be given credit wherewith to buy from
natives still farther inland, and induce them to seek the vines and make
the rubber. In this way the credit system, as it exists to-day, was
created.
In the pursuit of this rubber trade, fostered by British merchants,
the natives of Gaboon, crossing their country to the South, struck the
Ogowe River, which gave them easy access to a wide field from which to
collect produce. In course of time the European traders followed the
natives across country, and meeting the river,[237] lost no time in
tracing its course to the sea and at once establishing sea communication
between Gaboon and the Ogowe. Their example was imitated by the French
Government, and in due course possession was taken by France of the Ogowe
and Fernan Vaz; but when at Berlin the Governments of Europe settled
who were to become the owners of the Congo and the adjoining maritime
territories, France had, in point of fact, no political influence south
of Fernan Vaz. This expansion of Gaboon was initiated by British and
German enterprise, French white traders coming in after the pioneer
work was accomplished. When 2° 30´ of South latitude was fixed as the
northern boundary of the free-trade zone, it was expected that that line
would include within it the trade of Sette Camma, the trade of which
was British and German entirely. The Chambers of Commerce of Liverpool
and Manchester set forth these facts at the time: before the treaty was
made, and when urging the principle of free trade within the zone fixed
by treaty, no idea was in the mind either of the traders, the Chambers
of Commerce, or the representatives of the various Governments concerned
in the making of the Berlin Treaty, other than that the freedom of
trade therein referred to applied to the only known trade in existence,
viz. the collection and sale by the natives of the vegetable and other
products of their country in exchange for European merchandise. Any
legislation, therefore, of which the effect is to alienate the rights of
the natives to collect the produce of their country, and to dispose of
those products freely to whomsoever they wish, is a direct violation of
the principles of equitable treatment towards the natives which animated
the Conference and the rights of the signatory Powers of that Conference.
It is then perfectly clear (1) that the “third parties” mentioned in
the _cahier de charges_ were the European merchants who had created the
existing trade of the French Congo, the taxes upon which supplied the
local administration with funds for purposes of revenue; (2) that the
“acquired rights” of those merchants consisted in the right to continue
their trade, the freedom of which was guaranteed under the Berlin Act;
(3) that the “general rights created by the Berlin Act” were, on the one
part, the rights of the natives (“whose moral and material well-being”
the contracting Powers to the Berlin Act bound themselves to “care for”)
to their land and the produce thereof; and, on the other part, the
rights of each of the signatory Powers to ensure that the principles of
the Berlin Act were not violated by any one of the parties to that Act.
The way in which the rights of the natives are “cared for” under the
concessions _régime_ was dealt with in the last chapter. It remains to be
said to what usage the “acquired rights” of the merchants trading in the
country have been subjected.
Two of the most important firms trading in the French Congo at the time
of the issue of the Decree of Concessions (March 1899) were British.[238]
They were among the very first to open up the country to trade, their
representatives had always been law-abiding citizens under the French
flag; they had ever worked harmoniously with the French officers, who
from time to time had sought their assistance in developing this or
that district, had asked them to send their native traders into such and
such a region, and generally encouraged them in every way to promote
and extend the area of their trading operations. In the course of over
a quarter of a century’s trade in the country the British firms had
contributed large sums to the local revenue, and had cheerfully paid
the enormous differential customs tariffs levied upon British goods,
the taxes, the licences, the duties of all sorts affecting the various
branches of their businesses prescribed by the law of the land. Their
standing was, of course, well known to the French Government, and in a
secret letter of instructions[239] communicated to the concessionnaires
by the French Colonial Minister, the former were required to pledge
themselves “to leave entire latitude for two years to the existing
foreign firms for all the commercial undertakings which they may perform
in the territory conceded” to them; and further, that they should
propose to the said foreign firms at the end of the two years, and in
the event of difficulties arising with the latter, to buy up their
establishments. The pledge was duly given. But it was not carried out.
The French Government, finding itself incapable of compelling obedience,
allowed the matter to slide, and was brought by successive stages in
the development of affairs to the issue of the Decree of March 26, 1901
(mentioned in the previous chapter), which declared, as has already been
stated, that the products of the soil—that is to say, the only medium
of trade in the country—belonged exclusively to the concessionnaires,
and that the natives were not free to dispose of them to any one but
the concessionnaires. The “acquired rights of third parties,” and the
rights of the natives, had gone by the board; the rights of England as a
signatory Power of the Berlin Act had been infringed; and the Act itself
had been violated in one of its most essential articles, viz. Article V.,
which says that “no Power which exercises, or shall exercise, sovereign
rights in the above-mentioned regions shall be allowed to grant therein
a monopoly or favour of any kind in matters of trade.”
To describe the series of outrages[240] perpetrated by the agents of the
Belgian groups, masquerading as French patriots, upon our merchants which
took place during the two years that the Concessionnaire Companies had
bound themselves to allow “entire latitude” to the firms trading in the
country; the protests of our merchants, who were never informed by the
French authorities that their _locus standi_ had become modified; who
continued on the one hand to pay customs dues on their imports, licences
for the factories and native traders, while forcibly prevented, under the
eyes of the same authorities and with their tacit assent, from disposing
of their goods to natives against produce; the expostulations of Sir
Edmund Monson, our Ambassador in Paris; the promises of M. Décrais which
were never fulfilled; the actions at law brought by our merchants at
great expense in the Congo to test the legality of the concessionnaires’
proceedings; the deputation of nine Chambers of Commerce to Lord
Lansdowne; the upholding of the concessionnaires’ claim by the local
courts, whose judgments as _Le Temps_ (which has pleaded, together with
one or two other French papers,[241] for justice to our merchants) has
pointed out, was based not upon law, but upon the Decree of March 1901,
which the judges could not go beyond; the persecution of our merchants
by the concessionnaires for purchasing produce from their concessions on
the strength of the said judgment; the infliction of heavy fines upon
our merchants; the entire stoppage of their trade; the seizure of their
produce at African ports and even at a French port;[242] the evacuation
of our merchants which is now proceeding; the renewed representations
of British Chambers to the Foreign Office; above all, the unaccountable
lethargy of the British Government,[243] and, with one or two honourable
exceptions,[244] the indifference of the British Press—to adequately
describe these things would require a couple of chapters at least.
The position to-day is this, that from the greater part of the Ogowe
Basin, which alone is unaffected by the Berlin and Brussels Acts, being
outside the Conventional Basin of the Congo, our merchants have been
expelled, without a penny compensation. In the Conventional Basin of
the Congo, where—as in the Ogowe—our merchants have been established
for upwards of twenty years; where their rights to trade freely with
the natives are solemnly guaranteed by International Treaties, British
subjects are being expelled, not only without compensation but with
ignominy and insult, after suffering heavy losses; the trade which they
brought into being ruined, the trading stations they have built deserted,
themselves arbitrarily removed from regions where they have laboured for
so long.[245]
It is a shameful, a discreditable episode. But if it be true that
out of evil good may come, there is still some hope that out of the
treatment—treatment which to those who know all the details is beyond
the reach of Parliamentary language to characterise—meted out to British
merchants in the French Congo may come the liberation of the peoples of
the Congo State from the Belgian yoke, and an international understanding
binding upon the Powers whereby a rational, common-sense, and just
native policy may be mutually agreed upon, and the vast region of the
Congo Basin thrown open to the legitimate commerce of all nations. The
movement against monopoly based upon force in West Africa; against the
evil which King Leopold has sown; against the follies as well as the
horrors which that evil has engendered, is growing apace. The expulsion
of British subjects from French Congo may yet serve as the lever whereby
the edifice of fraud and greed and cruelty reared by Africa’s self-styled
“regenerator” may be overthrown. And the reason is this.
The British Government has for years been pressed to inquire into
the doings of the Congo States upon humanitarian grounds. The German
Government, the Governments of the United States and of France have
been similarly approached. None of them have taken definite steps in
the direction desired. The chief reasons in the case of England, France
and Germany are probably three. First, international rivalries in the
partition of Africa and the political ambitions which those rivalries
have begotten. By a combination of circumstances of which King Leopold
took full advantage, the Sovereign of the Congo State has been able
to intrigue first with France against England (1892-94), with England
against France (1894), with France against England (1897-99). When
the expedition of Major Marchand—who would never have reached Fashoda
but for the reinforcements in men, ammunition and stores despatched to
him over the Congo Railway, through Congo State territory—was seen to
be a political failure, King Leopold turned fawning upon England, and
attempted to gain our consent to his appropriation of the Bahr-el-Ghazal.
With his usual astuteness he endeavoured to strengthen his diplomacy
at the Court of St. James by securing, meanwhile, a _fait accompli_ in
Africa. In this he failed, mainly through journalistic enterprise in
exposing his carefully laid plans (that also, by the way, would make an
interesting little story). After the Fashoda episode King Leopold was
again pro-British for a short time, until he became once more France’s
good friend, and plunged the French Congo into chaos. In the interval
of acting honest broker to England and France alternately, he has tried
to play Germany off against England in sundry matters, such as the
Trans-African railway scheme. So much for international rivalries on the
Western Central African field, in which the Sovereign of the Congo State
has held most of the trumps. To these must, of course, be added other
rivalries on a wider field amongst the Powers in question, which tended
still farther to paralyse all useful, disinterested and combined action
for humanitarian ends in the Congo. The second reason is dynastic. King
Leopold is connected with the Royal Families of England and Germany.
Only those who are in Court secrets know the exact extent to which
the Sovereign of the Congo State has profited by that, to him, happy
circumstance. It has, undeniably, been considerable. The third reason is
the self-imposed halo of sanctity with which the public press has been
gulled for years by the happy knack of attributing abuses of a more than
usually flagrant character to individual wrongdoing of agents—a plea used
again and again with never-failing results. To these reasons—there are
others, no doubt, and two of them are briefly touched upon in the next
chapter—are mainly due the failure of the Powers to fulfil their duties
under the Berlin Act _upon humanitarian grounds_.
But now an altogether different aspect of the Congo problem has sprung
up. So far the Stokes affair[246] has alone provided what might be termed
a _material_ cause of complaint against the Congo State. The effect
of this outrage was modified by renewed international rivalries which
occurred shortly afterwards, and even the subsequent appointment of Major
Lothaire as Managing Director in Africa for one of the “Companies” in
which the Congo State holds 50 per cent. of the shares, and of which King
Leopold appoints the agents, failed to exercise the influence which,
but for the international rivalries aforesaid, it would otherwise have
wielded. But the horizon has cleared of late. The scramble for Africa is
over. The Powers are beginning to think seriously of the immense problems
which beset them in Tropical Western Africa. And it is precisely at this
turning-point, as it were, in European policy in Western Africa that the
material side of the question has risen. England and Germany have both
in their respective ways been sharply confronted with the Nemesis of
their past indifference to the repeated violation of the Berlin Act by
the Congo State. Germany has seen her ivory trade in German East Africa
disappear, her protected natives driven out of Congo State territory,
forbidden to purchase ivory or produce of any kind from the natives on
the Congo side of the German Congo State frontier, because by the laws
of the Congo State every product of the forest, whether vegetable or
animal—when either is of intrinsic value—belongs not to the native owner
of that forest, whose ownership the State does not recognise, but to the
State itself. England has seen her merchants expelled from the French
Congo by an extension of the system of territorial monopolies involving
absolute rights over the products of the soil, inaugurated by the Congo
State in 1892. The Belgian conception has thrived upon the Powers’ _non
possumus_. The African cancer has attacked both banks of the Congo, and
wherever spreads the fell disease, liberty, legitimate commerce, free
trade, alike for white man and black, disappear.
The Belgian conception of development in Tropical Western Africa is
observed a little late in the day to have another side to it. It is not
now merely an institution for earning dividends and reducing the African
population. It stands forth as a menace to all legitimate European
interests in West Africa. What England and Germany could not agree to
do when humanitarian considerations alone were in question, they can no
longer ignore with safety to their interests in Africa. The tentacles of
the Belgian octopus are flung wider and wider, French Congo, Fernando Po,
the Muni Territory, Dahomey, the Ivory Coast and South West Abyssinia
are all alike either threatened, or victims to the insidious embrace
which breeds death and devastation to the natives of Africa.[247] The
treatment of our merchants in French Congo has given a fresh impetus, and
an added motive, to the demand of public opinion that the Congo State
shall be called to the bar of international inquiry; for if the expulsion
of British subjects from a region solemnly declared internationally free
commercial land, necessitates specific action on the part of the British
Government in the form of a request for arbitration, which is the line I
have reason to believe our Government has taken, there remains the larger
question behind—the question of the violation of the Berlin Act by the
Congo State, originator of the new African slavery. The Upas-tree has
thrown up a new sucker, and although the fresh growth may be removed,
no permanent good will ensue unless the tree itself be rooted up and
destroyed. The whole scheme, the _raison d’être_, the entire future of
European action in Tropical Western Africa is involved in this question.
If the Governments are still slow in realising it, the people are not.
The well-informed press of England and of Germany is unanimous in
calling upon the British and German Governments to act in combination
for the suppression of the monopolistic _régime_ in West Africa, and
its fountain-head the Congo State. The German Colonial Society, with
its 32,000 members, has held two great meetings for this purpose, and
has passed resolutions of the most emphatic kind, and at the same
time is using its considerable influence to ensure that in the two
Cameroons concessions engineered at the same time as the French Congo
concessions and by the same means, trade shall be unrestricted and the
native free to dispose of his products, to whomsoever he will.[248]
In that respect, Germany is trying her best to undo an initial error,
committed under false advice, and the full consequences of which are
now understood. In England, we are witnessing a happy alliance of
genuine philanthropy, of scientific knowledge, and of commerce united
in a common aim, testifying to the fact that there never has been a
question of African politics where morality and practicability are so
closely entwined,[249] and if the British Press as a whole still lags
behind, it is only fair to remember that England has but just emerged
from a great war which has absorbed for three years the energies of
the country. Indeed, when all the circumstances are considered, we
should perhaps be thankful for the amount of attention which the Press
has given to the subject, while maintaining the view that, in the
specific matter of the treatment of our merchants in French Congo, it
has displayed singular lack of foresight. In the United States signs
are not wanting that the special responsibility incurred by America,
which first recognised the International _status_ of the International
African Association—subsequently the Congo State—is beginning, now
that the policy of the State is better known, to weigh with thoughtful
Americans, who for many reasons ought not to disinterest themselves
from West African affairs; and President Roosevelt has been appealed
to, to co-operate with other of the signatory Powers of the Berlin Act
to bring about a new Conference. It is to be hoped that the appeal will
be heard. America’s position is such that she can act in this matter
without a suspicion of selfish motive, and the importance of her moral
support at this juncture cannot be over-estimated. In France, it may
safely be asserted that the _élite_ of the French official element in
West Africa is entirely opposed to the monopolistic conception,[250]
that the most powerful French merchant firms are profoundly and
anxiously antagonistic, and that with few exceptions the best-informed
French writers on West African affairs and French local explorers (Mr.
Chevalier, for instance) are dead against it. How, then, can we account
for what has occurred? Very easily, I think. A grave mistake has been
committed. It is recognised, not always publicly, on nearly all sides
in France. But the French Government hesitates to admit it, and the
incident of the British merchants intensifies the difficulty. Every
French Government dreads the parrot-cry of being too friendly to the
English, and no one knows better than Lord Lansdowne how that permanent
feature in French politics hampers French statesmen. The influence behind
the concessionnaires is still strong. They have still the majority of
the French Colonial Press on their side—for reasons which need not be
too closely inquired into; and King Leopold’s personal influence in
Government circles (which he takes every opportunity of strengthening,
witness, for instance, the despatch of a special envoy of welcome to
President Loubet on his return from Russia), is still conspicuous,
as every diplomatist in Europe knows. The truth is that the French
Government is marking time. The next few months will be crucial ones in
the history of the concession experiment. The concessionnaires will make
a supreme effort to justify their existence, and to force the Government
to raise a large standing army in the Congo to coerce the natives into
collecting rubber. If they fail, the Government may begin to gently
remind them that they have fulfilled none of the terms of the _cahiers de
charge_, and if England and Germany can succeed in coming to a definite
understanding between themselves and the United States, France may be
only too glad to fall back upon a joint Conference as the best way out
of the _impasse_ into which her so-called friends, the Belgians, have
plunged her.
It is possible that this forecast errs on the side of optimism, and, in
any case, it is but too obvious that the monopolists are very strong
and have great wealth and influence at their back. Meanwhile all those
to whom the continuation and growth of the Belgian conception in Africa
appears as a virulent disease spreading wherever it can obtain a
foothold, and to be fought without pause or rest, can best be fulfilling
what they conceive to be their duty, by throwing more and more light upon
the proceedings of the Congo State.
CHAPTER XXX
THE HISTORY OF THE CONGO STATE
“At the present time the body called the International
Association—however startling it may appear to you—is
invulnerable and unassailable. All the armies in the world
could not reach it. It is impalpable, intangible as air. I call
it Benevolence, Charity, Philanthropy—the Spirit of Peace,
good-will to all men—Progress. It is here amongst you to-night
... It eludes your armies, it mocks your best efforts; at a
whisper it has disappeared and you cannot recall it.... The
founders of the International Association have been called
dreamers.... Men understand, or think they do, why a George
Peabody should invest hundreds of thousands in model lodgings,
or a Josiah Mason in an Institute.... They can understand also
why an entire nation spent £20,000,000 to free the slaves in
the West Indies.... Though they understand the satisfaction
of a sentiment when applied to England, they are slow to
understand that it may be a sentiment that induced King Leopold
II. to father the International Association. He is a dreamer
like his _confrères_ in the work, because the sentiment is
applied to the neglected millions of the Dark Continent. They
cannot appreciate rightly, _because there are no dividends
attaching to it_, this restless, ardent, vivifying, and
expansive sentiment which seeks to extend civilising influences
among the dark races, and to brighten up with the glow of
civilisation the dark places of sad-browed Africa.”—Sir H. M.
STANLEY at the London Chamber of Commerce, September 19, 1884.
“Tous les pouvoirs émanent du Souverain qui les exerce par
lui-même ou par ses délégués. Il consulte s’il le juge bon le
Conseil Supérieur siégeant à Bruxelles. Il prend en personne
les mesures les plus importantes.... Le Souverain manifeste sa
volonté sous la forme de décrets contresignés par le Secrétaire
d’Etat....”—M. A. J. WAUTERS, “L’Etat Indépendant du Congo,”
chap. xxxii., “Pouvoir législatif,” p. 433.
Legends die hard. The legend which attributes to King Leopold of Belgium
and the Congo State a philanthropic motive in African affairs is still
alive among us, although not quite to the extent that it used to be. It
would have died long ago but for two causes, the misstatements indulged
in by two or three well-known Englishmen and the apparent failure of the
British Press, as a whole, to comprehend the _fons et origo mali_ which
is raising up such terrible future complications for Europe in Central
Africa. Upon occasion one is tempted to think—and the supposition
is strengthened by such articles as that which the _Times_ recently
devoted to the Congo annexation debate in the Belgian Chamber—that the
curious omission to come to close quarters with the subject proceeds
not so much from inability to see things as they really are, as from an
unwillingness to criticise the Sovereign of the Congo State himself.
Personalities are held to be bad form, especially where Royalty is
concerned. If that be, indeed, the real explanation of the whitewashing
of the Congo State which finds favour in many quarters, there is nothing
to prevent the process from going on indefinitely. I maintain that it
is utterly impossible to arrive at the truth, if the king’s personal
responsibility in the maladministration of the Congo State is to be
perpetually shelved. Why should it be? The administrative _régime_ of the
State, as M. Cattier has truly said, is an “absolute despotism.” No one
who is acquainted with that _régime_ believes for a moment that a Van
Eetvelde, a Droogmans, a Liebrechts or a Cuvelier exist for any purpose
than that of carrying out the king’s instructions and superintending
the routine work which those instructions entail. King Leopold is sole
master, and must bear the responsibility for the _sequelæ_ of measures
which he himself has initiated and, through his agents, caused to be
applied. The king has openly and repeatedly claimed for himself this
position before the world. He has posed, and continues to pose, as the
regenerator of the African. He has put it on record, in a letter to
his agents, that “his only programme is the work of moral and material
regeneration.” He has written of the “results achieved” by the Congo
State as being due “to the concentration of all my efforts in one field
of action.” He has, throughout, loudly insisted upon the purity and
unselfishness of his intentions. Adverse comment has been dismissed by
him with a loftiness of tone, a simulated consciousness of high purpose,
a dignified picturesqueness of expression from which it is impossible
to withhold a meed of admiration, as in the case of a play repugnant to
one’s sentiments but yet so excellently rendered that objection to the
theme cannot blind one to the art of the performers. “My aim throughout
life has been to find the truth and make the truth known to others. I
have often been misunderstood and misrepresented, but we must not be
discouraged; let us ever go forward in the path of duty, striving to let
the light shine forth.” It cannot be a subject of complaint on the part
of his Majesty or his Majesty’s friends if, under these circumstances, we
take the Sovereign of the Congo State at his word; if we recognise that
in the management of the affairs of the Congo State he has adopted to the
uttermost the proud assertion of Louis XIV.: “_L’Etat: c’est moi_”; if,
making due note that his declared policy has been the regeneration of the
African Negro—a policy in the execution of which he shuns not publicity
but only desires light and truth—we judge his acts and the consequences
of those acts from the standpoint he himself has laid down.
It is essential for our purpose to give an historical retrospect of the
events which preceded the General Act of Berlin in 1885.
On September 12, 1876, King Leopold held a conference in Brussels to
consider the best means which could be devised in order to open up
Central Africa to European civilisation. The “barbarism” of Africa
had already begun to perturb his Majesty, who was careful to place on
record the absolute disinterestedness of his intentions. Addressing the
assembled scientists and explorers,[251] King Leopold spoke thus: “Is it
necessary for me to say that in inviting you to Brussels I have not been
guided by egotism? No, gentlemen, if Belgium is small, Belgium is happy
and content with her lot, ... but I should be pleased to think that this
civilising movement had been inaugurated from Brussels.” The outcome of
this conference was an “International Association for the exploration and
civilisation of Central Africa.” Its professed objects were exploration,
together with the establishment of sundry centres where explorers of all
nationalities might refit. Committees for the collection of funds were
to be established in all the countries represented,[252] and an Executive
Committee appointed in Brussels to manage the funds. King Leopold, who
from the commencement was pursuing his own ends—as he clearly showed
later—saw to it that the Belgian Committee should be in the forefront of
the subscribers, and to such good purpose that ere long the Association
came to be looked upon as a Belgian Organisation.
The association first of all directed its efforts towards the East
Coast of Africa; but when Stanley arrived home in January 1878, after
having discovered the course of the Congo, the necessity of a change of
policy became obvious. The king speedily secured Stanley’s services,
a “Committee of Studies” for the Upper Congo was formed, and Colonel
Strauch was despatched to the Congo as a representative of both the
association and the committee of studies. Meanwhile King Leopold’s
ambitions were slowly maturing, and the theory of an African State in
which he would be the representative head was already shaping itself
in his Majesty’s mind. In a letter which he wrote to Stanley, Colonel
Strauch suggested the formation “of an independent confederacy of free
negroes, the king, to whom the conception and the creation of such a
confederacy would be due, to be president thereof.” “Our enterprise,”
continued Colonel Strauch, “does not tend to the creation of a Belgian
Colony, but to the establishment of a powerful _negro kingdom_.” This
idea appears to have been sedulously fostered by Colonel Strauch among
the European traders established in the Lower Congo, with results which
afterwards became apparent. Whether it was put forward as a blind or
not it is difficult to say. Anyhow, Stanley knocked it on the head.
About this time France and Portugal began to evince uneasiness at the
somewhat exclusive complexion which the association and the committee
were beginning to assume, and there ensued a long intrigue in which
the principal actors were Stanley and De Brazza. De Brazza forestalled
Stanley on the right bank of the Congo, and Stanley checkmated De
Brazza on the left bank above Stanley Pool. Portugal, whose explorers
discovered the Congo’s mouth in 1484,[253] whose treaties with the
natives undoubtedly possessed greater validity than those concluded by
the association’s agents, and who still retained commercial interests
in the region, now became thoroughly alarmed, and endeavoured, with the
assistance of Great Britain, to make good her claims. On February 26,
1884, a Convention was signed between Great Britain and Portugal, the
practical effect of which would have been to put a stop to the expansion
of the Association in the interior. The Convention was attacked at home
and abroad; abroad, from various motives, including the fear that Great
Britain’s political influence on the Congo would become paramount; at
home, because, by the terms of the Convention, the right of Portugal to
impose a moderate import tariff was recognised, and it was feared that
this recognition might lead later on to the application of differential
tariffs to which Portugal was wedded, and because the British Chambers
of Commerce and the British Press were deluded as to the real nature of
the International Association, which represented itself as devoted to
free-trade principles. The Convention was opposed by European merchants
in the Congo for the same reasons, backed by the belief that the aims
of the Association tended towards the maintenance and strengthening of
native rule, which the community of mercantile West African interests
well knows to be the best guarantee of the development of legitimate
trade.
The Convention was by mutual consent abandoned. Its abandonment was
preceded by a remarkable event, viz. the recognition by the United
States of the Association[254] as a friendly State. The king, aided by
Stanley, who was still at that time, I believe, an American subject, had
played his cards cleverly with General Henry S. Sandford (subsequently
one of the two American representatives at the Berlin Conference), and
the declaration sent by the former to the United States Government, in
which he stated that “the International Association of the Congo hereby
declares that by treaties with the legitimate sovereigns in the basins of
the Congo and of the Niadi-Kwilu, and in adjacent territories upon the
Atlantic, there has been ceded to it territory for the use and benefit of
Free States established and being established,” appears to have exercised
a considerable influence. The “Free States” appealed to American
sentiment.[255] Needless to say, the one thing that has not been created
in any shape or form in the Congo is freedom either for native States,
or native institutions, or European trade,[256] and how General Sandford
could have been deceived to the extent of penning the above despatch,
in view of the emphatic manner in which Stanley had rejected Colonel
Strauch’s suggestion in 1878 (which presumably General Sandford had in
his mind, although six years had passed since it was made), it is hard to
understand. The American recognition of the new status of the association
was followed by Bismarck’s suggestion of a conference of the Powers, in
order to set at rest the rivalries which had arisen in the Congo Basin.
The conference first met in November 1884, and subsequently in February
1885. Largely influenced by the decision of the United States, the Powers
authorised their representatives to follow the lead of the American
Government, and on August 1, 1885, King Leopold had the inexpressible
satisfaction of notifying the Powers that the association would be
henceforth known as the Congo Free State, and himself as the Sovereign
of that State. In this manner was the evolution of King Leopold from a
pure philanthropist to the ruler of a million square miles of territory
in Central Africa accomplished. The king, argue his admirers, had come
to see that patriotism was a duty greater even than philanthropy. The
practical had outweighed the ideal. Very well; but as we study the next
stage in this royal metamorphosis, let those who follow us remember
the memorable words spoken in 1876 before the assembled scientists and
explorers in Brussels: “Is it necessary for me to say that, in inviting
you to Brussels, I have not been guided by egotism? No, gentlemen; if
Belgium is small, Belgium is happy and content with her lot.”
The Berlin Conference laid it down that no import dues should be
established in the mouth of the Congo for twenty years. But in 1890 King
Leopold, alleging the heavy expenses to which he had been put by the
campaign against the Arabs in the Upper Congo, applied for permission to
levy import duties. It was the first disillusionment; and the British
Chambers of Commerce began to wonder whether their opposition to the
Anglo-Portuguese Convention had not been mistaken. The king’s request was
granted (the Powers merely reserving to themselves the right to revert to
the original arrangement in fifteen years), but not without the bitter
opposition of the Dutch, who had very important commercial interests
in the Congo, backed by the British Chambers of Commerce and all the
traders in the Congo, irrespective of nationality. A representative
gathering was held in London on November 4, 1900, presided over by Sir
Albert Rollit, to protest against the imposition of import duties and to
denounce the hypocrisy which attributed to philanthropic motives the
desire on the part of the Congo State so to impose them. The speakers at
the meeting drew attention to the strange anomaly revealed by the sight
of a monarch who, having spent certain sums with alleged (and loudly
advertised) philanthropic motives, now came forward to claim repayment
of those sums, just like an ordinary business man, but a business man
who, having acquired a vast estate under false pretences, demanded from
the victims the wherewithal to pay for its management! They quoted with
telling effect Stanley’s speech at Manchester on October 21, 1884, given
on behalf of the association and against the Anglo-Portuguese Convention,
in which he declared that “the £500,000 which it (the association) has
given away to the Congo, it gave freely; the thousands of pounds which
it may give annually it gives without any hope of return, further _than
a sentimental satisfaction_.” They were able to show that—even then—King
Leopold, notwithstanding his formal assurances to the commercial world
that the Congo State would never directly or indirectly itself trade
within its dominions, was buying, or rather stealing, ivory from the
natives in the Upper Congo and retaining the proceeds of the sale on the
European market. They proved that, profiting by the silence of the Berlin
Treaty on the subject of export duties, the Congo State had already
imposed taxes amounting to 17½ per cent. on ivory, 13 per cent. on rubber
and 5 per cent. on palm-kernels, palm-oil, and ground-nuts, the total
taxation amounting to no less than 33 per cent. of the value of the whole
of the trade. Finally, they had no difficulty in demonstrating that, with
all his professed wish to stamp out the slave-raiding carried on by the
half-caste Arabs in the Upper Congo,[257] his Majesty was himself tacitly
encouraging the slave trade by receiving tribute from conquered chiefs in
the shape of slaves, who were promptly enrolled as soldiers in the State
army.[258] The sincerity of King Leopold’s solicitude for the natives of
Africa was in other respects appearing in its true colours, _vide_ the
letter of Colonel Williams, a British officer in King Leopold’s employ,
who, in disgust at the outrages which were taking place on the Congo,
denounced them to the king. This letter, from which I give the following
extracts, was read at the conference by Mr. Philipps, representing the
Manchester Chamber of Commerce. It ran thus:
“Your Majesty’s Government has been and is now guilty of
waging unjust and cruel wars against natives, with the hope of
securing slaves and women to minister to the behests of the
officers of your Government. In such slave-hunting raids one
village is armed by the State against the other, and the force
thus secured is incorporated with the regular troops. I have no
adequate terms with which to depict to your Majesty the brutal
acts of your soldiers upon such raids as these. The soldiers
who open the combat are usually the bloodthirsty cannibalistic
Bangalas, who give no quarter to the aged grandmother or the
nursing child at the breast of its mother. There are instances
in which they have brought the heads of their victims to their
white officers on the expeditionary steamers and afterwards
eaten the bodies of the slain children.”[259]
The history of King Leopold’s action in Central Africa between 1876 and
1890 may therefore be summed up as follows. First stage: Inauguration
of a “movement” for the “exploration and civilisation of Africa” from
motives (so stated) of pure philanthropy, devoid of any shade of personal
egotism or ambition on the part of Belgium. The expenditure of a certain
sum of money for this (alleged) intent. The acquisition of a certificate
of high moral purpose. Second stage: The “movement” takes the form of a
State, possibly an “independent confederacy of free negroes,” with the
king as president. This idea is abandoned, and for it is substituted the
theory of an “Independent State” administered directly by the king and
his representatives. The theory takes root, and by the Act of Berlin is
converted into a _fait accompli_. According to this Act, the king becomes
sovereign of the “Congo Independent State,” and undertakes that the State
shall grant no monopoly or privilege in matters of trade, shall watch
over the welfare of the natives and shall not impose any import duties.
Formal assurances are also given to the commercial world that the State
will not trade on its own account, directly or indirectly. Third stage:
The State promptly starts trading for ivory in the Upper Congo, and
wages war against the natives by means of a cannibal army, raised from
slaves captured in war and paid by the vanquished as tribute. Its agents
begin to be accused of shocking treatment of natives. Fourth stage: The
king asks for permission to impose import duties, pleading the expenses
which he is incurring in putting down slave-raiding, and the Brussels
Conference grants the request.
It may, I think, be fairly argued that the “sentimental satisfaction”
which in 1884, according to Sir H. M. Stanley, was all that the king
required as a reward for his out-of-pocket expenses, had assumed
a singularly practical shape in 1890. From a philanthropist to an
ivory-trader is a long step.
No sooner had the Sovereign of the Congo State obtained the acquiescence
of the Powers in the imposition of import duties, which, it is almost
unnecessary to say, enormously strengthened the international position
of the State, than the plans which his Majesty had conceived for the
development of what was rapidly becoming tantamount to a Belgian
possession, manifested themselves. What were those plans and what were
their _leit motif_? So far as the plans are concerned, I will come to
them later. But their _leit motif_ may be briefly stated now. To those
who have studied the personality of King Leopold, acceptance of the
philanthropic claim put forward by that monarch is simply impossible at
any stage of his African undertaking. In any case, the philanthropic
claim weakened with every year that passed after 1876. The revelations at
the London meeting of November 4, 1890, definitely exploded it. Whoever
attributed philanthropy to the Sovereign of the Congo State after that
meeting was foolishly credulous, although he might still be honest.
Whoever, being acquainted with the edicts of 1891 and 1892, from the time
those edicts were thoroughly known in Europe, that is to say, towards
the middle of 1892, has endorsed the philanthropic claim must have been
guilty of gross deceit. I would go even farther than this, and say that
such persons have been guilty of conniving and inducing the public to
connive at a crime which has been steadily growing ever since, in the
extent and heinousness of its criminality; a crime for which Europe will
yet pay dearly.
King Leopold found himself in 1885 possessed of an enormous territory, in
the acquirement of which he had expended a certain sum as an investment.
Not being a philanthropist; but, on the contrary, a very shrewd man of
business, his next thought was how to get his capital back—with interest.
By throwing open the Congo to legitimate commerce; by encouraging and
facilitating the trade of all nations as he solemnly undertook to do;
by pursuing a common-sense policy towards the natives, the Sovereign of
the Congo State might have recovered the original capital he had sunk on
the Congo, and even have realised a fair percentage upon it. At the same
time he would have laid the foundations of a peaceful and commercially
prosperous colony _for Belgium_, a colony with vast resources, a
magnificent river system and unlimited future possibilities. That would
have been true patriotism, and the ends attained might have justified
the not very honourable means employed. King Leopold preferred to adopt
another course, which has led him from illegality to violence, and from
violence to barbarism. The king’s intention all through was to recoup
himself for his expenditure at the earliest possible moment. So much for
the _leit motif_.
The measures adopted by his Majesty to bring about this desired result
were as follows: Five months after the termination of the Berlin
Conference, King Leopold issued a decree (July 1885), whereby the State
asserted rights of proprietorship over all vacant lands throughout the
Congo territory. It was intended that the term “vacant lands” should
apply in the broadest sense to lands not actually occupied by the natives
at the time the decree was issued. By successive decrees, promulgated
in 1886, 1887 and 1888, the king reduced the rights of the natives in
their land to the narrowest limits, with the result that the whole of
the odd 1,000,000 square miles assigned to the Congo State, except such
infinitesimal proportions thereof as were covered by native villages
or native farms, became _terres domaniales_. On October 17, 1889, the
king also issued a decree ordering merchants to limit their commercial
operations in rubber to bartering with the natives. This decree was
interesting merely as a forewarning of what came later, because at that
time the rubber trade was very small. In July 1890, the same year as
the Brussels Conference, the Congo State went a step farther. A decree
issued in that month confirmed all that was advanced in November of the
same year by the speakers at the London Conference, held to protest
against the imposition of import dues by the State. By its terms King
Leopold asserted that the State was entitled to trade on its own
account in ivory—the first open violation of his pledges. Moreover, the
decree imposed sundry extra taxes upon all ivory bought by merchants
from the natives; which, since the State had become itself a trading
concern, constituted an equally direct violation of the Berlin Act, by
establishing differential treatment in matters of trade. Such were the
plans King Leopold made, preparatory to obtaining from the Powers the
power to impose import duties.[260] Everything was ready for the great
_coup_, which should also inaugurate the fifth stage of his Majesty’s
African policy.
The Brussels Conference met. The Powers with inconceivable fatuity
allowed themselves to be completely hoodwinked, and within a year the
greatest injury perpetrated upon the unfortunate natives of Africa
since the Portuguese in the fifteenth century conceived the idea
of expatriating them for labour purposes had been committed, and
committed, too, by a monarch who had not ceased for fifteen years to
pose as their self-appointed regenerator! On September 21, 1891, King
Leopold drafted in secret a decree which he caused to be forwarded to
the Commissioners of the State in the Ubanghi-Welle and Aruwimi-Welle
districts, and to the chiefs of the military expeditions operating in the
Upper Ubanghi district. This decree never having been published in the
official Bulletin of the State, its exact terms can only be a matter of
conjecture; but we know that it instructed the officials to whom it was
addressed “to take urgent and necessary measures to preserve the fruits
of the Domain to the State, especially ivory and rubber.” By “fruits of
the Domain,” King Leopold meant the products of the soil throughout the
“vacant lands” which he had attributed to himself, as already explained,
by the decree of 1885. The king’s instructions were immediately followed,
and three circulars, dated respectively Bangala, December 15, 1891,
Basankusu, May 8, 1892, and Yakoma, February 14, 1892, were issued by
the officials in question. Circular No. 1 forbade the natives to hunt
elephants unless they brought the tusks to the State’s officers. Circular
No. 2 forbade the natives to collect rubber unless they brought it to
the State’s officers. Circular No. 3 forbade the natives to collect
either ivory or rubber unless they brought the articles to the State’s
officers, and added that “merchants purchasing such articles from the
natives, whose right to collect them the State only recognised provided
that they were brought to it, would be looked upon as receivers of stolen
goods and denounced to the judicial authorities.”
Thus did the Sovereign of the Congo State avail himself of the additional
prestige conferred upon him by the Brussels Conference. He did not
obtain his own way entirely, because the years which had elapsed since
the Berlin Conference had witnessed the creation of a powerful group
of Belgian trading companies, presided over by one Colonel Thys, who
afterwards brought the construction of the railway which unites the Lower
to the Upper Congo to a successful termination, and who is now probably
the largest land-owner in Africa. These companies were doing a large
trade in rubber and ivory with the natives. They were well organised,
and the man at their head was both capable and fearless. The companies
invoked the Act of Berlin, protested against its gross infringement by
the State, dwelt largely upon the sacredness of free trade and native
rights, pleaded for Belgium and the world at large; and, finding these
considerations insufficient, violently attacked the king himself with
the avowed intention of forcing him to abdicate his “sovereignty” on the
Congo. It is useless to detail the process of an agitation which, if it
did nothing else, showed up in lurid colours how much the patriotism of
the King of the Belgians was subordinated to the egotism of the Sovereign
of the Congo State. The upshot of it was that the king squared the
colonel, and the commercial companies of the Rue Bréderode group, as they
are familiarly designated, were induced to keep silence by the grant of a
trading monopoly over a very large area where they would be free to carry
on their business unmolested. His resolute adversary being thus disposed
of, the king forthwith issued a decree, dated October 1892, by which he
defined the limits of his _terres domaniales_, and crowned the policy
he had ever steadily pursued by creating for himself in Central Africa
a vast preserve, a _Domaine Privé_, from which he might draw unlimited
resources with a view to his own personal enrichment. The extent of this
preserve cannot cover less than 800,000 square miles.[261] The summit of
King Leopold’s ambition had been attained.
CHAPTER XXXI
THE _DOMAINE PRIVÉ_
“Our only programme, I am anxious to repeat, is the work of
moral and material regeneration.”—Extract from a published
letter of his Majesty King LEOPOLD II., King of the Belgians,
Sovereign of the Congo Free State.
It is to be regretted that writers who, from time to time, call attention
to the terrible maladministration prevailing in the Congo State do not,
as a rule, strive to bring its _causa causans_ clearly before the public.
The main issue becomes too often imbedded in a mass of surplus detail,
and the bewildered individual searching for light gropes about in despair
with an eternal query on his lips—“Why?” Why these atrocities which have
been attested by dozens of honourable men[262]—atrocities which the Congo
State Administration has long ceased to deny, and now merely attempts to
minimise; atrocities of which every mail from the Congo brings additional
proof?[263] Why this callous ferocity which appears at first sight to
have in it naught but incoherence and downright stupidity, which seems
so monstrous as to be almost incredible, and yet is vouched for, not
only by travellers and missionaries who have witnessed its effects, not
only by those who are in a position to guarantee the authenticity of
information received from persons unwilling to allow their names to
appear through fear of jeopardising their means of livelihood, but by
the actual perpetrators, who, not without reason—although this excuse
cannot shield them from execration—throw the responsibility upon the
system whose servants they have been? Where is the underlying motive of
it all? The answer to the query is, the _Domaine Privé_. When you have
learnt what the _Domaine Privé_ is, what it means, what it involves,
what it necessitates, what it renders inevitable, the story is told and
everything is explained.
In the first place, let these main facts be borne well in mind. The vast
territories of the _Domaine Privé_ have for eleven years been absolutely
closed to legitimate private enterprise. Trade, which in Central Africa
means the exchange of European merchandise for raw products, does not
exist therein. The native living within these territories has been
deprived by Royal Decree of his rights as a land-owner. Property held
for centuries by well-defined native laws, vested in particular families
and tribes, has been appropriated without consulting the interested
parties, let alone compensating them. With the deprivation of his land
the native has been dispossessed of the fruits thereof; the rubber
growing so luxuriously in his forests he may (by decree) only gather
for the State—we will see presently how the “may” becomes “must”; the
ivory stacked about his villages is no longer his, but another’s; the
elephants which roam about his country and damage his plantations he can
incur the physical peril of destroying, but may not reap the reward to
which he is thereby entitled, for the tusks of the slain beast do not,
according to Royal Decree, belong to him. Since he cannot dispose of his
produce, which is his wealth and also his currency; since he has lost his
rights in his own land; since he cannot even hunt the wild beast which
provides him with the wherewithal to make horns for war and the chase,
armlets and anklets for his wives, ornaments for his habitation, he is
no longer a free agent, but has become _de facto_ a serf. In theory,
then, the decrees of September 1891 and October 1892 made of the native
throughout the _Domaine Privé_ a serf. In theory a serf he remained
for a little while. But as the grip of Africa’s regenerator tightened
upon the _Domaine Privé_, as the drilled and officered army, armed with
repeating-rifles, gradually grew and grew until it was larger than the
native forces kept up by any of the great Powers of Europe on African
soil,[264] as the radius of the rubber taxes was extended, as portions
of the country began to be farmed out to so-called “companies,” whose
agents were also officials of the king; the native of the _Domaine Privé_
became a serf not in theory only but in fact, ground down, exploited,
forced to collect rubber at the bayonet’s point, compelled to pay onerous
tribute to men whose salaries depend upon the produce returns from their
respective stations—the punishment for disobedience, slothfulness,
or inability to comply with demands ever growing in extortion, being
anything from mutilation to death, accompanied by the destruction of
villages and crops.
The _Domaine Privé_ is “worked” in two ways. The country is vaguely
divided into districts, and the business of the _Commissaires_ of
districts, and their agents and sub-agents, is to collect _impôts de
nature_, the taxes in kind, which the king levies. There is no limit to
this taxation. The _Commissaires_ are told to “devote all their energies
to the harvesting of rubber,” but at the same time to proceed “_as
far as possible_ by persuasion rather than force.” The purport of the
instructions maybe briefly summed up thus: “Obtain all the rubber and
ivory you can; your future advancement depends upon your energy.”[265]
Of course, this _régime_ in a country like Africa, where the native is
not obliged to “work” in order to live, would be so much beating of the
air, if force were not used to give it practical effect. King Leopold
understood that well enough, and, to use the expression of a French
Colonial writer of repute—M. Pierre Mille—“the basis of the king’s
economic policy has been the formation of an army sufficiently strong to
force the natives to pay the rubber and ivory tax.” A large army, chiefly
recruited from the Bangalas and Batetlas—both cannibal tribes—was raised,
and when not engaged in rebelling against its officers, it has proved
only too well its value.
Side by side with the enforcement of the _impôts de nature_, King Leopold
bethought him of another scheme whereby to increase his revenue, and, at
the same time, to throw dust in the eyes of European public opinion, by
professing to sanction private enterprise in the _Domaine Privé_. His
Majesty took to farming out portions of his domain to certain financiers
with whom it suited him to keep on good terms. “Companies” were formed,
in which the State retained a half interest. These companies are supposed
to obtain the rubber and ivory they ship home in such large quantities
by barter; but as more often than not the king’s officials and the
companies’ agents are the same persons, and as the companies have the
assistance of the _Force Publique_ (or permission to raise their own
forces) to facilitate their commercial operations,[266] we may judge of
the amount of legitimate barter trade which is carried on. There are six
of these companies[267] in existence. The first group of five consists
of the _Société Anversoise du Commerce au Congo, the Abir, the Compagnie
du Lomami, the Comptoir Commercial Congolais, and the Société Générale
Africaine_. The State holds half the shares of the _Abir_ and half the
shares of the _Société Anversoise_. It has no shares in the _Comptoir
Congolais_, but receives 50 per cent. of the profits. Its arrangement
with the _Compagnie du Lomami_ is, I believe, on the same lines as
that with the _Comptoir Commercial Congolais_; and with the _Société
Générale Africaine_ on the same lines as the _Abir_ and _Anversoise_.
The _Société_, or rather _Comité Spécial du Katanga_, is also a _Domaine
Privé_ company, but under a somewhat different form. One-third of the
profits of the latter institution go to the Thys group of companies and
two-thirds to the State. The principal officials of the _Comité Spécial
du Katanga_—the sixth _Domaine Privé_ company—are Messrs. Droogmans
(president and Secrétaire-Général), Arnold, De Keyser, and Lombard. All
these men are highly-placed officials of the State. Droogmans is the
Minister of Finance, Arnold is director of the Domaine, director of
Agriculture, and of “Central book-keeping”; De Keyser is a director of
the Finance Department, and Lombard is a director of the Department of
the Interior.
The _Société Anversoise du Commerce au Congo_ being a typical
representative, we may examine its condition. It was formed in August
1892 under Belgian law, but reconstructed in January 1898 under Congo
law—quite a unique jurisprudence, of which it may be said _summum jus
summa injuria_—with a capital of 1,700,000 francs divided into 3400
shares of 500 francs each. King Leopold has conferred upon this company
some 12,000 square miles situated in the Mongalla district. Within
that large area, of course, no one has the right to enter; in that
particular, the Mongalla district resembles every other portion of the
Congo _Free_ State above Leopoldville, in the sense of being a monopoly
within a monopoly. The administrative seat of the _Anversoise_ is 104
Rempart des Béguines, Antwerp; its principal headquarters in Africa are
at Mobeka. Its president is M. A. de Browne de Tiège, nominated under
the constitution of the company by the king himself. M. de Browne de
Tiège is the king’s principal financial adviser in Congo affairs, and
has several times lent moneys to the State. He has a seat in the House.
The administrators are Baron Goffinet,[268] Ed. Bunge, and C. de Browne
de Tiège; the “Commissaire” is Count Emile le Grelle. The original
shareholders are: the Congo State, 1700 shares; A. de Browne de Tiège,
1100 shares; Bunge & Co., 100 shares; E. P. Grisar, 130 shares; Deyman
& Druart, 100 shares—which accounts for 3130 out of the 3400. No one
with even a superficial knowledge of Belgian society need be told of the
relations between the king and Baron Goffinet, Count le Grelle and E. P.
Grisar. The net profits for the four years 1897-1900 have been: 1897,
120,697 francs; 1898, 3,968,832 francs; 1899, 3,083,976; 1900, 84,333, or
say a profit in four years of 7,275,838 francs. The “State’s” holdings
being 50 per cent., its share in the profits would be proportionate. At
this point it may be well to remark that the inspired utterances which
from time to time appear in the British Press, dated from Brussels, to
the effect that the Sovereign of the Congo State does not hold a single
share in these companies, constitute, of course, a polite fiction. In all
matters affecting the _Domaine Privé_ the State is the King. The _Domaine
Privé_, let it be reaffirmed once again, is the king’s property and his
alone. The shares of the _Société Anversoise_ have stood as high as
13,730 francs (March 1900), which for a 500-franc share is sufficiently
alluring. At that figure, which can be easily verified by the sceptical,
his Majesty’s 1700 shares were worth over 23,000,000 francs, or say
£933,000. During the last two years, outbreaks in the Mongalla district
have been so numerous that the profits of the company have fallen
somewhat.
The performances of this particular offshoot of King Leopold’s _Domaine
Privé_ have been worthy of the regenerating nature of the Congo State
rule. In 1900, one or two of its agents confessed to killing, by order,
150 natives, cutting off 60 hands, crucifying women and children, and
impaling the sexual remains of slaughtered males on the stockade of the
villages whose inhabitants were slow in gathering rubber! “_Les scandales
de la Mongalla_” led to stormy debates in the Belgian Chamber on July 16
and 17 of last year. It may not be out of place to recall their nature.
“July 17.—M. VANDERVELDE: We are not anti-colonial in
principle.... But we are adversaries of a capitalist colonial
policy which entails exploitation, theft, and assassination....
You dare not, in the name of Christian morality, defend the
exploitation of the _Domaine Privé_.... Rubber and ivory
represent 93 per cent. of the exports.... The _Domaine Privé_
produces much more than the budgetary returns. How are these
extraordinary results obtained?... The Congo State has
introduced forced labour, tribute, paid in kind, and a twelve
years’ military service.... We protest against this disguised
form of slavery. (Applause.) The greatest names in England
and Germany have condemned this system. The premiums given
to Congolese agents have been repudiated by the honest ones
amongst them. (M. DE BROWNE DE TIÈGE interrupts.) M. de Browne
de Tiège, who is interested in Congo affairs, must be admirably
posted in the Mongalla lawsuit, which revealed acts of cruelty
in his very own district.
“M. DE BROWNE DE TIÈGE: It is false.
“M. MAROILLE: No doubt; like the stories of the severed hands.
“M. LORAND: It is so true that, as a result of what I have
stated here, the particular officer whom I challenged to deny
the facts has written giving me information, in which he admits
that these ‘war trophies’ were brought in. That is Congo
civilisation! On all sides war, massacres, crimes continue
there. How can you possibly defend these things?
“M. FURNEMONT: On the coat-of-arms of the city of Antwerp
figure cut hands. M. de Browne, who inhabits Antwerp, no doubt
considers the emblem very appropriate....
“M. DE SMET DE NAEYER (Belgian Premier): The exploitation of
the _Domaine Privé_ is conformable with jurisprudence....
People criticise tribute paid in kind (_prestations de
nature_). Do they not exist to a certain extent in Belgium? Why
suspect the Congo State of cruelty?
“M. LORAND: We are entitled to do so. Remember the 1300 severed
hands.
“M. DE SMET DE NAEYER: Faults have certainly been committed,
but the State is applying itself to their disappearance. The
disinterestedness of the creators of the Congo State will find
its reward in the gratitude of the country....
“July 18.—M. LORAND: Your colonial policy is analogous to
the crimes mentioned in Article 125 of the Penal Code; it is
a policy of devastation, pillage, and assassination. [The
speaker (I quote from the Parliamentary report of the Belgian
papers of that date) then read some correspondence published
in the Antwerp newspaper _La Métropole_, in which a series of
executions, murders, and expeditions against the Bundjas are
mentioned.] ‘Are we,’ he continues, ‘to have another edition of
the severed hands incident?’
“M. DE BROWNE DE TIÈGE: That is not the question.
“M. LORAND: Indeed. But it happens precisely to be the
question. (M. DE BROWNE DE TIÈGE interrupts.)
“M. VANDERVELDE: Your interest, M. de Browne, is so direct
a one in this matter that you might refrain from any
participation in this debate.”
The cutting-off of hands item is a constantly recurring charge. I have
in my possession at the present moment a photograph from the Upper Congo
of three natives, a woman and two boys; the woman and one of the boys
have their right hands severed at the wrist, the other boy has both
hands severed. The correspondent who sent it me—and whom I know to be an
honourable man—saw the victims himself, and was satisfied that soldiers
of the State were the culprits. I fully believe him, but the photograph,
of course, does not prove it.[269]
[Illustration: THE VICTIM OF A RUBBER RAID
A LIVING ILLUSTRATION OF THE “MAIN COUPÉES” DEBATES IN THE BELGIAN
CHAMBER. THE BOY HERE PHOTOGRAPHED IS NOW CARED FOR BY A BRITISH
MISSIONARY IN THE UPPER CONGO]
In November last, an American ex-agent of the _Société Anversoise_, Mr.
Canisuis, who served for some time under the amiable ex-Major Lothaire,
who, as already stated, was appointed Director in Africa of this company
_after_ the murder of Stokes, in a Press interview said: “Last year I
was on a rubber expedition with Major Lothaire, and during the six weeks
it lasted 900 natives were killed and scores of villages were burnt.”
According to this gentleman, the natives receive the equivalent of one
penny per pound of rubber, paid in merchandise valued at 100 per cent.
above cost price. We knew that before. As things go in the Congo State,
that particular rate of pay is even generous. But you cannot get rubber
in Africa at even the munificent sum of one penny per pound, and sell
it in Europe from 3s. to 4s. per pound, without those gently persuasive
methods which find favour in quarters where the “regenerating” instinct
is properly developed!
I trust I shall not be unduly troubling my readers if I pass another
of King Leopold’s _Domaine Privé_ companies under review. It is not my
fault that the whitewash has been laid on so thickly, and the process
of scraping is bound to take some little time—and, from the author’s
point of view, no little trouble. What company could be better singled
out than the _Abir_, the most powerfully equipped of all—the “Queen” of
Congo companies as it has been called? Originally the Anglo-Belgian India
Rubber Company, founded in August 1892, and in which Colonel North was at
one time largely interested, it was, like the _Anversoise_, reconstructed
under “Congo law” in 1898 with a capital of 1,000,000 francs, divided
into 2000 shares without designation of value, “giving right of 1/2000
of the _avoir social_.” King Leopold has conferred upon this company
the monopoly of exploitation in the Lopori and Maringa districts of the
_Domaine Privé_. The administrative seat of the _Abir_ is 48 Rempart
Klipdorp, Antwerp; its headquarters in Africa are at Bassankusu. The
President is M. A. van den Nest; administrators, A. Mols and Count H.
van de Burgh; _Commissaires_, Jules Stappers and F. Reiss; Director, Ch.
de Wael; Director in Africa, Ch. Sterckmans. I am under the impression
that the British interests in the company ceased when it ceased to be
a company in the ordinary acceptation of the term, viz. in 1898, as
aforesaid. At any rate, I can find none but Belgian shareholders in the
documents I have been able to obtain. First and foremost comes the Congo
State with its 50 per cent., viz. 1000 shares, the inevitable M. A. de
Browne de Tiège being _mandataire_ for the State; then M. A. de Browne
de Tiège has 60 shares in his own name, and M. C. de Browne de Tiège 50,
while our old friend the _Société Anversoise_ has 150 shares represented
by M. de Browne de Tiège, President, and M. Bunge, Administrator; Bunge
& Co. (whom we have seen hold 100 shares in the _Anversoise_) have 50
shares; other shareholders are Alexis Mols, Charles de Wael, F. Reiss,
&c.[270] I have used the word _clique_ to describe the handful of persons
who are running the Congo State (and as much more of Africa as they can
lay hands on) with the king as Managing Director. It is an appropriate
term, as the particulars given for these two “Companies” show. I may add
that M. A. van den Nest, President of the _Abir_, is the original holder
of 120 shares in the _Comptoir Commercial Congolais_, of which company M.
Alexis Mols is President, while Messrs. Charles de Wael and F. Reiss are
also holders, the one to the extent of 100, the other to the extent of 60
shares.[271] Baron Goffinet’s name crops up again in the _Lomami_,[272]
and so it goes on.[273] These men are the king’s bodyguard. I know
nothing of them personally. They may in private life be the most
blameless of men, but the extraordinary thing is that Europe should be
content to allow 1,000,000 square miles of African territory to be run
by this _clique_ with its royal head, entirely for their own ends, and
to fill their own pockets! Why, in the name of common sense and common
decency, should hundreds, if not thousands, of natives of Africa be slain
annually on account of this _clique_? It would be grotesque, were it not
so horrible; so monstrous as to seem more like a nightmare than a reality.
But to return to the _Abir_. Its net profits in 1897 were 1,247,455
francs; in 1898, 2,482,697 francs; in 1899, 2,692,063 francs. The figures
for 1900 I am unable to give, I regret to say. In 1901 the net working
profits (_bénéfices nets d’exploitation_) were 2,455,182 francs, and
the “profit and loss account” was closed with 2,614,370 to the good.
A dividend[274] of 900 francs was declared on each share, and “the
State” being the possessor of 1000 shares, it follows that its august
Sovereign raked in the nice little sum of 900,000 francs, or say £36,000,
for one year’s working of this eminently satisfactory “subsidiary” of
the _Domaine Privé_. In four years the _Abir’s_ net profits amounted,
therefore, to 8,877,397 francs, nearly nine times as much as its total
capital! In June 1899 the shares stood at 17,900 francs per share, and
the total value on the Antwerp Stock Exchange of this concern, whose
capital is one million, was 35,800,000 francs! But since that date the
shares have been up to over 25,000 francs per share! In June of this
year they had fallen to a little over 11,000 francs per share. For a
considerable time past they have been quoted _in tenths_; that is to
say, one-tenth shares are bought and sold, and give rise to a great
deal of speculation on the Bourse. Imagine the fortune which a holder
of 1000 _full_ shares has had the opportunity of making during the last
few years! Those 1000 shares, at 25,000 francs per share, were worth a
million sterling! What it is to be a royal rubber merchant in the Congo!
It will have been noticed that the shares of the _Abir_ have dropped.
The fact is that there have been “indiscretions,” and several Belgian
newspapers published in October of last year some unpleasant details with
regard to the circumstances under which these enormous stocks of rubber
find their way to Europe. Amongst other revelations published—all of
which purported to come from “a most honourable and esteemed agent” of
the _Abir_—were the following: (1) In September 1897, the whole of the
Upper Bolombo country was devastated (“_mis à feu et à sang_”) by the
Dikila factory to compel the natives, with whom contact had not before
been established, to make rubber. (2) “On Aug. 24, 1900, I met at Boyela
two young women, one of whom was _enceinte_, with their right hands cut
off. They told me they belonged to the village of Bossombo, and that the
soldiers of the white man of Boyela had cut off their hands, because
their master did not produce enough rubber!” These statements appear to
have had the effect of depreciating the market value of the shares. But,
really, the “bulls” might have been prepared for them. Possibly, they had
not read the evidence given a year before by M. de Lamothe, ex-Governor
of French Congo, before the Commission of Colonial Concessions held in
Paris. M. de Lamothe, who had just returned from five months’ sojourn in
the Upper Congo, remarked in the course of his deposition that:
“The Belgians have recently had insurrections in their
territory. It is but right to add, however, that they sometimes
make use of proceedings towards the natives that Frenchmen
would never use.... The _Abir_, for instance, possesses a
considerable territory and has even police rights (_sic_)
over the natives. From that point of view the rights which
its charter confers upon it are exaggerated. _Its agents have
applied this so well that they have succeeded in inducing
30,000 natives to leave their territory and take refuge on the
French bank of the Congo._”
Is it necessary to plunge yet deeper into this garbage of human
villany and greed? The entire system is based upon terrorism. No man
in his senses can really believe otherwise. A volume might be filled
with misdeeds which since the days of Cortès and Pizarro have never
been equalled, much less surpassed. The habitual _modus operandi_ in
the Mongalla territory was tersely put by one of the agents of the
_Anversoise_:
“When natives bring rubber to a factory they are received by
the agent surrounded by soldiers. The baskets are weighed.
If they do not contain the 5 kilos. required the native
receives 100 blows with a _chicotte_.[275] Those whose
baskets attain the correct weight receive a piece of cloth,
or some other object. If a certain village contains, say, 100
male inhabitants (a census is always taken of the village
before operations begin) and only fifty come to the factory
with rubber, they are retained as hostages, and a force is
despatched to shoot (_sic_) the fifty recalcitrant natives and
burn their village.”
There are some districts which do not produce rubber: such a district,
for instance, as the Bangala country proper, where hardly any rubber
grows. Let it not be imagined that the people of that district are the
gainers thereby. They are not subject, it is true, to either the rubber
tribute or the rubber-collecting operations of the _Domaine Privé_
companies. But their lot is little better for all that. The Bangala
country is one of the great recruiting centres of the State for its
army.[276] The Bangalas are cannibals, and good fighters. It is also
a victualling centre for the State posts. A great deal of information
has been reaching me from this district of late. It may be usefully
epitomised. First, as to the recruiting. The method adopted is this: A
general order is sent from Boma to the Commissaires of Districts to the
effect that so many recruits must be sent down. Each Commissaire then
sets to work to obtain recruits. There is no system in the demands. Towns
are dropped on according to the whim of the Commissaire. A particular
village is summoned to supply a certain number of young men. The summons
is rarely communicated by a white officer: almost invariably by native
soldiers. The summons once made, it has to be obeyed, or the usual
punishment is meted out. Nevertheless there has, upon occasion, been
active opposition to this forced recruiting. There is always passive
opposition. Both men and women object and complain very bitterly, but
they have to submit. Mothers, wives, and relatives have been seen crying
and protesting against their children, husbands, and relatives being sent
away as recruits, for very few ever return; which is not astonishing,
seeing that they serve twelve years. Secondly, as to the victualling-tax.
Every month, and sometimes every fortnight, goats, fowls, palm-oil, eggs,
and cassava bread have to be supplied to the State troops. The burden is
increasingly heavy, because since it was first assessed the population
has very much decreased. When accused of extortion the State replies
that it pays for its produce. It does pay, at about one-twentieth of
the market value. The natives have not infrequently to purchase produce
themselves, in order to meet the demands of the State, which they are
compelled to dispose of to the State soldiers at a much lower price than
they have paid themselves:
“Every two or three miles a sentry, with a subordinate or two,
and two or three servants from the locality, are stationed. It
is part of the sentry’s duty to see that the tax is taken up
regularly, and if he does not do so he is severely reprimanded
by his chief. Now a keen-witted soldier will see to it that
he is not reprimanded, and an unprincipled soldier will do
anything to the people to wring the tax out of them, rather
than run the risk of being a marked man in the Commissaire’s
book.”
The oppression and misery which ensue can be imagined. The result of this
double pressure for men and foodstuffs has been, naturally, to bring
about a great decrease in the population. A correspondent who knows the
Bangala country well, tells me that between 1890 and 1895 there was no
perceptible decrease in the population. The taxes were first levied in
the latter year, and in five years (1895-1900) there has been a reduction
of one-half of the population. This appalling ratio of reduction is
partly to be accounted for by the fact that sleeping sickness is endemic
in the country, and that the withdrawal of the strongest and most virile
elements of the population to serve in the army is naturally followed
by a decline in the birth-rate. Those that are left have “the heart
wrung out of them” by the food-tax. The people along the river are
fast dying out, and the State “is forcing the backwood folks to start
towns on the river the better to exploit them.” In one relatively small
area my correspondent says, “Since 1890, one town half a mile long has
disappeared; another, a quarter of a mile long, has also gone; and up a
creek where there were 1500 people, there are scarcely 400 now.”
So long as Europe tolerates the _Domaine Privé_, so long will these
things be—just as long as the regenerator of Africa and his friends can
make money out of their philanthropic undertaking and can count upon
dishonest, interested, or infatuated friends in Europe to throw dust in
the eyes of the public.
There is one other feature of this unsavoury business which must be gone
into before we can close the chapter on the _native_ aspect of Congo
State rule. The Congo State invariably attempts to wriggle out of the
responsibility for these horrors, by attributing their perpetration
to the “excesses” of individual agents; and M. Jules Houdret, the
Consul-General of the Congo State for England, had the effrontery the
other day to point to the punishment of some of the _Anversoise’s_
people as affording a justification for the State’s claim to be what
it professes, viz. solicitous of the welfare of the natives! It is
a barefaced attempt to bamboozle public opinion, as impudent as the
proposal made by the representatives of the Congo State at the Mansion
House meeting last May to “inquire” into specific acts of cruelty
brought forward. We know what these “punishments” mean. Occasionally,
with a grand flourish of trumpets, the State announces that an agent
has been punished. The announcement generally follows each fresh crop
of revelations. One or two sub-agents are, for the time being, made
scapegoats, and everything goes on as before. How could it be otherwise
when the SYSTEM ITSELF is what it has been shown to be? The time has
gone by when the public can be deceived by these sophistries, by these
perpetual and frivolous excuses and denials.
The edicts of the Congo State administration, coupled with certain
material facts as to which there can be no dispute, show the main
factors, if one may say so, of the system of African tropical
development, which it has instituted, to be these:
(1) Alienation of native ownership in land.
(2) Monopoly over the products of the soil.
(3) Natives forbidden to collect those products for any one but the
State, or the subsidiary trusts (_Domaine Privé_ companies, if that
appellation be preferred) created by the State, and in whose profits the
State shares, generally to the extent of 50 per cent.
(4) Natives compelled to bring in rubber and ivory, and also recruits for
the native army (and for labour in the cocoa and coffee plantations), to
the State as tribute, and to supply the subsidiary trusts with rubber and
ivory.
(5) The existence of a regular army of fifteen thousand[277] men armed
with Albini rifles, and an unnamed number of irregulars to enforce the
rubber and ivory tribute and to “facilitate the operations” of the
subsidiary trusts.
(6) White officials in receipt of instructions to devote all their
energies to the exploitation of rubber and ivory; in plain words, to
get as much rubber and ivory out of their respective districts as they
possibly can.
(7) The financial existence of the State dependent upon the rubber and
ivory tribute, and upon the profits it derives from its share in the
subsidiary trusts.
When on the one side you have the factors already enumerated, and on
the other a primitive and—in the face of coercion backed by rifles
of precision—helpless population, common sense asserts that gross
oppression, violence, and every form of tyranny and outrage must be the
infallible outcome of such a system; and it is that _system_ which the
Powers are morally bound to put a stop to, seeing that it is they who are
morally responsible for its existence.
CHAPTER XXXII
THE “TRADE” OF THE CONGO STATE
It is a little surprising to find that M. Cattier, the Belgian
Imperialist, whose masterly indictment of King Leopold’s administration
does him infinite honour, should attempt to defend, not the outcome of
the system of the _Domaine Privé_ in the shape of compulsory military
service for twelve years, forced labour in Government plantations, &c.,
all of which he condemns, but the legality of the system itself. He
states his case as follows. Article V. of the Berlin Act, which forbade
monopoly and privilege in the Congo Basin in matters of trade, was meant
to apply internationally, and the Congo State was thereby bound not to
grant commercial advantages to the subjects of any one nation which it
denied to the subjects of another nation. M. Cattier says:
“The Government of the Congo State could not, therefore, adopt
any legislative measure, nor establish any _régime_ conceding
international monopolies or privileges.... All facilities
granted to its subjects in trade matters should be legally
extended to the subjects of other nations.... But this does
not prevent the Congo State from establishing the commercial
_régime_ which it thinks advisable, and no objection can be
raised against its legislative action, when the measures
adopted apply, under the same conditions and in the same
manner, to the subjects of other nationalities, including the
Congo nationality.”
It follows, therefore, according to M. Cattier, that in attributing to
himself all vacant lands in the Congo Basin, from which action arose the
_Domaine Privé_, and in farming out portions of the _Domaine Privé_ to
his financial friends, upon whom he has conferred an absolute monopoly of
exploitation in the regions affected, the Sovereign of the Congo State
has not violated the Act of Berlin; although M. Cattier admits that by
so doing he has committed “a violation of the rights of the natives.”
This curious theory of M. Cattier’s has been dismissed by Dr. Anton
(_Professeur agrégé à l’Université d’Iéna_) as a legal quibble, in which
opinion I entirely concur. M. Cattier’s views are mutually destructive.
Admitting, for the sake of argument merely, that the interpretation he
gives to Art. V. of the Berlin Act is, from the strictly legal aspect
of the matter, accurate; once M. Cattier attempts to put his case in
language that laymen, unversed in legal subtleties, can understand, it
breaks down hopelessly. For what does M. Cattier tell us in the passage
above? “No objection can be raised against its (the State’s) legislative
action when the measures adopted apply under the same conditions and
in the same manner to the subjects of all nationalities, including the
Congo nationality.” But the measures adopted do not apply equally to
all nationalities! Three-fourths of the Congo State is the State’s—that
is, the king’s—private property, and is closed to the trade of all
nationalities, except the Belgian and “Congo nationality;” not in theory
but in fact. Can an Englishman, or a German, or a Chinaman if you like,
import European merchandise in the territory, for example, acquired by
the _Société Anversoise_, and barter that merchandise against the raw
products of the soil, on a basis of a legitimate commercial transaction?
Of course they may not. Was not an Austrian arrested—on Lake Moëro, and
on, it appears, a British steamer—only a few months ago for trading with
the natives in the Katanga region, although he actually had a permit to
trade from the Katanga Company, given to him prior to the arrangement
arrived at by the Congo State and the Katanga Company to work those
territories on joint account? And arrested, too, in such a way that
his removal from this world was a matter of moral certainty—handed
over to the merciful treatment of King Leopold’s cannibal soldiery,
to be transported 2000 miles away; he a white man and unarmed![278]
What pitiful sophistries are these which attempt the squaring of the
Congo circle! The Congo State, which undertook not to trade directly or
indirectly in its dominions, has become not only the largest “exploiter”
within it, but in the major portion thereof the exclusive “exploiter.”
The king has translated Article V. of the Berlin Act, which reads that
“no Power which exercises or shall exercise sovereign rights in the
above-mentioned regions, shall be allowed to grant therein a monopoly or
favour of any kind in matters of trade,” by conferring upon himself an
absolute monopoly, which has made of him the biggest ivory and rubber
merchant in the world. In this capacity he can export his produce under
special conditions, free of dues, which come out of one of his Majesty’s
pockets to go in at the other. All this is diametrically opposed to the
provisions of the Berlin Act.
My object is principally to prove that King Leopold’s intervention in
the Dark Continent has from first to last been due to selfish motives,
and has resulted in the most appalling consequences; whether we confine
ourselves to the past and present merely, or whether we look into the
future. I must crave forgiveness for having dwelt so largely upon matters
of trade. It was, however, necessary, because the king’s native policy is
the inevitable sequel of his commercial policy. I must, indeed, revert
again to this aspect of the question in order to refute once and for
all the untruths so sedulously fostered, that the Congo State is in a
nourishing condition and that independent trade is flourishing within
it; and in refuting it to show—which is more important—that, were it not
for the ivory and rubber which the natives of King Leopold’s preserve
are forced to produce at the cost of constant warfare, massacres, and
atrocities innumerable, the export returns, and consequently the whole
trade of the Congo State, would be practically _nil_, or so small as to
be unworthy of attention. This can best be done by giving facts and
figures which all the ingenious theorising in the world cannot overcome.
The following table shows the relative proportion of the rubber and ivory
exports from the Congo to the total exports:
TABLE I
Total of Total of
Year. Rubber. Ivory. both Exports. all Exports.
Francs. Francs. Francs. Francs.
1898 15,850,987 4,319,260 20,170,247 22,163,481
1899 28,100,917 5,834,620 33,935,537 36,067,959
1900 39,874,005 5,253,300 45,627,305 47,377,401
1901 43,965,950 3,964,600 47,930,550 50,488,394
If the rubber and ivory exports are deducted from the total exports, it
will be seen that—apart from these two products—the exports only amounted
in 1898 to 1,993,234 francs, in 1889 to 2,132,422 francs, in 1900 to
1,750,096 francs, and in 1901 to 2,557,844 francs, about 97 per cent. of
which was represented in each year by kernels and palm-oil shipped almost
exclusively from the Lower Congo[279] to Rotterdam, by the Dutch House
_Die Nieuwe Afrikaansche Handels Vennootschap_.
The next table provides statistics of the rubber and ivory shipped home
by the Congo State, as shipper, being the proceeds of the taxes—_impôts
de nature_—levied upon the natives of the _Domaine Privé_. As will be
observed, the Congo State is at pains to conceal the real proceeds. Ever
since 1893, when the actual returns exceeded the estimates by one-half,
the State has never published the former. The correct figures may,
however, approximately be arrived at by comparing the estimates with the
rubber and ivory disposed of by the State, as vendor, on the Antwerp
market. The enormous difference during these last few years between the
estimates _and the produce actually sold by the State_, possesses a
significance which will not be lost upon my readers. Into whose pocket
does the surplus go? But need we ask the question?
TABLE II
VALUE OF PRODUCE (IVORY AND RUBBER) DERIVED FROM THE
“DOMAINE PRIVÉ” IN THE SHAPE OF TAXES (IMPÔTS DE NATURE).
Produce (ivory and
rubber) from the
Year. Published returns. Actual returns. _Domaine Privé_, sold
on the Antwerp market
by the State’s brokers.
Francs. Francs. Francs.
1893 237,057 347,396 Unobtainable.
1894 300,000 } _Ibid._
1895 1,250,000 } 5,500,000
1896 1,200,000 } Withheld 6,000,000
1897 3,500,000 } from public 8,500,000
1898 6,700,000 } knowledge. 9,000,000
1899 10,000,000 } 19,130,000
1900 10,500,000 } 14,991,300[280]
It will thus be seen that, out of a total rubber and ivory export from
the Congo State in 1898 amounting to 20,170,247 francs (see Table I.),
the _Domaine Privé_ taxes produced 9,000,000 francs, or close upon
one-half; and that out of a total rubber and ivory export in 1899,
amounting to 33,935,537 francs, the _Domaine Privé_ taxes produced
19,130,000 francs, or not far short of two-thirds. The illustration is
in itself sufficient to destroy the theory of commercial prosperity so
assiduously propagated by King Leopold and his friends, in order to
deceive public opinion. Such “prosperity” entails the death of many human
beings. What could, indeed, be more eloquent of the true condition of
affairs! The total exports from the Congo State in 1899 are found (see
Table I.) to amount to 36,067,959 francs, of which 33,935,537 francs are
represented by rubber and ivory, in which the Congo State’s share as
tax-gatherer is no less than 19,130,000 francs. The Congo State asserts
that it does not trade. It merely imposes taxes which every “civilised”
Power (Heaven save the mark!) has the right to do; yet it incorporates
in its so-called trade figures the yield of its taxes! What becomes,
then, of this flourishing trade we hear so much about? On the evidence
produced, it sinks for 1889 to 16,937,959 francs (36,067,959 minus
19,130,000) instead of 36,067,959 francs, which the world is invited
to believe. In reality it does not amount to anything like 16,937,959
francs, for the simple reason that there is no “trade” at all in the
Congo State north of Leopoldville; and that, if we extract from the
remaining figures the exports from the Lower Congo, where genuine trade,
sadly hampered by taxation, alone exists, the balance is represented by
the shipments of the _Domaine Privé_ subsidiary monopolies in which the
Congo State benefits to the extent of 50 per cent.; and by the shipments
of the Thys Trust, which is a monopoly within a monopoly, although
conducted, it is but right to add, on different lines. Such is the
“trade” of the Congo State, the most gigantic fraud which ever came into
being to work misery upon mankind.
It would be unjust not to recognise that all this sordid history
has aroused loathing and distress in the hearts of many honourable
Belgians—not confined to the Party which opposes Colonial policy for
Belgium—mainly, as I believe, on the ground that King Leopold, in the
course of his illegalities and intrigues, will end by compromising
the neutrality of his country. It would be as equally unjust not to
express admiration for the indomitable energy displayed by Colonel
Thys in constructing the railway to Leopoldville, as to include in the
condemnation of King Leopold’s POLICY in Africa all the Belgians who
have been employed at one time or another in the State service. Sir
Harry Johnston has recently lent the weight of his name in favour of the
Congo State, in respect to the “very small portion” of the State which
he has visited. Sir Harry Johnston might have added that the rubber laws
are not in full operation in the “very small portion” of the country
he visited, and that the Belgian officers with whom he came in contact
have not been employed in that degrading business, their duties in that
particular region being confined to strengthening the obscure political
aims which King Leopold is pursuing in the Nile Valley. For a description
of the state of affairs prevailing south of the “very small portion”
of the Congo State alluded to, Mr. Grogan’s volume, and Mr. Robert
Codrington’s recently published “Travel and Trade Routes in Northern
Rhodesia and adjacent Parts of East Central Africa,”[281] together with
the revelations attending the treatment meted out to the late Mr. Rabinek
by the officials of the State, may be consulted with advantage. It would
be an insult to Sir Harry Johnston—who has himself condemned the system
of territorial concessions—to suggest that he desires in any way to
bolster up the Congo State; but it is certainly a thousand pities that
he has committed himself, even partially, to statements which, however
accurate in themselves, cannot fail to exercise an unfortunate influence,
without making himself acquainted with the general system under which
the Congo State is run. When the nature of that system is understood, it
becomes an outrage upon common sense and common decency to write one word
in extenuation of the system, or of the man who has originated it.
M. Cattier, to whose work I have several times alluded, represents the
type of Belgian who, convinced of the necessity of a colonial programme
for Belgium, has sufficient perspicacity to realise, and sufficient
courage to assert, that the policy of King Leopold in the Congo State
carries within it the germs of death. How true this is, the reader must
judge for himself; but it is at least significant that among a section
of French Colonial writers who think they see in the recent abandonment
of M. Beernaert’s Annexation Bill, at the king’s dictation, the final
postponement by Belgium and the consequent assertion—at some future
date—of France’s right of pre-emption, are beginning to ask themselves
whether the king’s ultimate aim is not to continue for some years longer
his “ruinous exploitation” of the Congo State; and then, when uprisings
have reached such a scale that the king’s cannibal army, however large it
may by that time have become, is powerless to cope with them; and when
whole tracts of the richest and most easily accessible rubber districts
have been irretrievably impaired, to offer the squeezed lemon, for a
consideration, to his Gallic neighbours. If the pernicious _régime_
which King Leopold has inaugurated in Africa were confined to the Congo
State, it would still be sufficient, one might have thought, to stir the
conscience of Europe, if not for the sake of her own dignity outraged in
the violation of solemn obligations, if not for the sake of humanity,
then for the sake of the future relations of black man and white man in
Central Africa. But, as we have seen, the _régime_ is spreading, and with
every year that passes it threatens more acutely all legitimate European
enterprise in Africa.[282]
This accursed _Domaine Privé_, and all the evils it has brought with it,
cannot last for ever. Like all such “negations of God” it will perish.
But what will remain behind for Europe, when the Congo State has passed
away, to deal with? A vast region, peopled by fierce Bantu races, with an
undying hatred of the white implanted in their breasts; a great army of
cannibal levies, drilled in the science of forest warfare, perfected in
the usage of modern weapons of destruction[283]—savages whose one lesson
learned from contact with European “civilisation” has been improvement
in the art of killing their neighbours; disciplined in the science of
slaughter; eager to seize upon the first opportunity which presents
itself of turning their weapons against their temporary masters; rendered
more desperate, more dangerous, more debased than before the advent of
King Leopold’s rubber collectors, who, by way of regeneration, have
grafted upon the native’s failings, born of ignorance, the worst vices
of the Africanised civilisation of modern Europe—cupidity, hypocrisy,
cruelty, and lust.
In their own most obvious interests, for the sake of humanity and right,
in the name of enlightened statesmanship and political common sense,
the Powers cannot allow the disease introduced into West and Central
Africa by King Leopold of Belgium to be farther extended. Nor do their
responsibilities end there. The source of the disease must be dealt with.
The canker must be rooted out and cast upon the dunghill. The Congo State
must be called to account for its crimes against civilisation; for its
outrages upon humanity; for the unparalleled and irreparable mischief it
has committed.
And what a warning lies here for the Western nations! The Congo State is
the living embodiment of the evil counsels, so lavishly, so thoughtlessly
given in connection with native policy in West Africa. In the Congo
State we see what these counsels lead to when put into practice. All
this talk about the puerility of preserving land tenure, the futility of
maintaining native institutions, the efficacy of punitive expeditions,
the necessity of teaching the native “the dignity of labour,” the cry for
territorial concessions, the advocacy of monopoly, and all legislative
acts framed in accordance with these views, or with some of them, tend to
produce in greater or less degree a state of affairs in Western Africa
similar to that which prevails on the Congo. In the case of the Powers,
the motives may be of the very best, the intentions honest and sincere;
but if once the thin end of the wedge be driven home; if once legislation
be passed or acts sanctioned which are founded upon a repudiation of
the inherent right of the native to his land and the fruits thereof; if
once it be officially admitted that it is legitimate to force the native
to give under compulsion that which is purchasable on fair terms, we
are committed to a policy of reaction of which no man can prophesy the
consequences or the end. To those conceptions Tropical Africa opposes her
vastness, her climate, and the prolific nature of her peoples. They can
be tried; apparent success may attend them for a time; lasting success
they will never secure. Tropical Africa _cannot permanently be held
down by force_, and in attempting to do so by placing modern engines
of destruction in the hands of Africans, Europe will be but digging the
grave of her ambitions on African soil.
But Europe can achieve a great work in Tropical Africa for good,
and benefit her own peoples in doing so. To divorce the two is
impossible. Evil wrought in Tropical Africa will have its aftermath
in Europe. The European has need of the Negro, and the Negro of the
European. In occupying the country of the Negro, Europe has assumed
a great responsibility. It is well, perhaps, European statesmen
should occasionally be reminded, that for Europe to forget the moral
responsibility in pursuing the material ends is to invite a certain
Nemesis. These pages cannot be more fittingly closed than by recalling
the words of a wise and good woman, who understood the nature and
immensity of the problem:
“Not only do the negroes not die off in the face of white civilisation
in Africa, but they have increased in America, whereto they were taken
by the slave trade. This fact urges on us the belief that these negroes
are a great world race—a race not passing off the stage of affairs, but
one that has an immense amount of history before it. The moulding of
that history is in the hands of the European, whose superior activity
and superior power in arts and crafts give the mastery; but all that
this mastery gives is the power to make the future of the negro and
the European prosperous, or to make it one of disaster to both alike.
Whatever we do in Africa to-day, a thousand years hence there will be
Africans to thrive or suffer for it.”[284]
E. D. M.
APPENDIX
SIERRA LEONE
EXPENDITURE, LOANS, EXPORT TRADE, RAILWAY
Expenditure Export Trade
1897-1902. 1897-1902.[285]
1897 £112,000 £361,747
1898 121,000 267,156
1899 145,000 307,929
1900 156,000 317,980
1901 173,457[286] 265,433
1902 177,882[287]
RAILWAY
Railway Expenditure
1899-1902.
(Included in total
expenditure.)
1899 £10,493
1900 23,320
1901 19,642
1902 23,606[288]
LOANS FOR RAILWAY
Amounts advanced to end 1900 £307,539
Loan authorised 631,000
First section, 32 miles, formally opened May 1st, 1899.
Second section, 23¼ miles, “taken over by the open line,” end 1900.
Third section, 80½ miles, in course of construction.
According to the statement forwarded by the Local Traders’ Association of
Freetown to Sir A. King-Harman in 1901, the third section of the railway
(to Bo) will entail an annual charge on the Colony of £11,000, plus a
further sum of £6000 for “increased cost of administering and operating.”
FOR MILITARY PURPOSES
Annual charge of £6000 for eight years from 1899 on account of the sums
advanced by the Imperial Treasury for the Hut-tax war.
THE PROTECTORATE
Expenditure 1898-1902. Revenue 1898-1901.
Civil. Military. Total.
1898 £10,455 £20,634 £31,089 £7,754
1899 14,124 25,672 39,796 21,943
1900 17,000 23,499[289] 40,499 33,468
1901 25,767[290] 23,707[291] 49,474 38,347
1902[292] 24,807 24,911 49,718
GOLD COAST
EXPENDITURE, LOANS, EXPORT TRADE, RAILWAY
Expenditure Liabilities incurred Export trade
1897-1900 1897-1902. 1897-1900.
(Inclusive.)[293] (Incomplete.) (Inclusive.)[294]
1897 £406,370 1897 £ nil.
1898 377,976 1898 265,000 1897 £857,793
1899 309,656 1899 100,000 1898 992,998
1900 272,303 1900 928,300 1899 1,111,738
1902 1,035,000 1900 885,446
Total £1,366,305 Total £2,328,300 Total £3,847,975
Expenditure, £1,366,305; Liabilities incurred (incomplete), £2,328,300
Export trade, £3,847,975.
The Gold Coast Report for 1901 has not yet been published. According
to the statement made this year before the Legislative Council of the
Colony by Sir Matthew Nathan, the Imperial Government advanced £400,000
on account of the last Ashanti expedition, but whether this sum includes
the £202,300 advanced for the same purpose in 1900 is not clear. Assuming
that it does, the liabilities incurred by the Colony from 1897 to 1902
inclusive will amount: (1) Loans by Imperial Government, £1,491,000; (2)
Gold Coast Government Loan, £1,035,000; Total, £2,328,300.
The Ashanti Blue Book (1901) estimated the total cost of administrating
Ashanti at about £60,000 per annum. According to Sir Matthew Nathan’s
statement referred to above, the expenditure in 1902 may be set down at
£107,148. Assuming these figures to be correct, the total expenditure in
Ashanti from 1897 to 1902 (reckoning an expenditure of £60,000 in 1901)
works out at the very large figure of £319,385, entirely exclusive of
grants-in-aid (assuming the £202,300 in 1900 to be incorporated in the
£400,000 advance), amounting to £695,000. Up to and including 1900, the
revenue of Ashanti was £3406. In the Ashanti Blue Book already mentioned,
the annual revenue for Ashanti is estimated at £14,600, less 10 per cent.
to the Chiefs (_i.e._ less £1460). Assuming this amount to have been
collected in 1901 and 1902, the total revenue for Ashanti from 1897 to
1902 inclusive amounted to £29,686, against an expenditure of £319,385,
and grants-in-aid to the amount of £695,000.
These figures should be borne in mind when examining the following
tables, which do not go farther than 1900, that is to say, as far as the
last issued Colonial Office Report.
EXPENDITURE, GRANTS-IN-AID, AND REVENUE OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES AND
ASHANTI
1897-1900 inclusive
TOTALS
Expenditure. Grants-in-Aid. Revenue.
Northern Territories £213,338 £195,000 £7,736
Ashanti 175,450[295] 202,300 3,406
DETAILED
NORTHERN TERRITORIES
Expenditure. Grants-in-Aid. Revenue.
1897-98 £121,022 1898 £45,000 1897 Nil.
1899 54,875 1899 100,000 1898 ”
1900 37,441[296] 1900 50,000 1899 ”
1900[297] £7,736
ASHANTI
Expenditure. Expenditure. Revenue. Grants-in-Aid.
Ordinary. Extraordinary.
1897 £13,723 1897 £151,614[298] 1897 Nil.
1898 4,304 1898 603 1898 ”
1899 2,608 1899 20 1899 ”
1900 2,578 1900 Not given. 1900 £3,406 1900 £202,300
RAILWAY
Position December 31st, 1901: Completed, say, 45 miles;[299] sum
expended, £389,869.[300]
Loans from the Imperial Treasury: 1898, £220,000 (Railway
Ordinance);[301] 1900, £676,000 (“certain public works, railway
construction,” etc.)[302]
Future: Officially expected to reach Obuassi end 1902.
Gold Coast Loan: 1902, £1,035,000, “to defray cost of constructing a
railway 169¼ miles from Sekondi to Kumasi.”
LAGOS
EXPENDITURE, LOANS, EXPORT TRADE, RAILWAY
EXPENDITURE, 1891-1902-03 LIABILITIES INCURRED
1891 £66,388 “The amount of the debt of the
1892 86,513 Colony on 31st March 1901 was
1893 101,251 £972,902. This debt has been
1894 124,829 incurred solely for the building
1895 144,483 of the railway from Lagos to
1896 168,444 Ibadan, the tramway from Lagos
1897 182,668 to Iddo, the Abbeokuta branch of
1898 203,802 the railway, and the bridges from
1899 223,289 Lagos Island to the mainland.
1900-1901 187,124 “The Legislature has sanctioned
1901-1902 231,597[303] the borrowing of £1,053,700 for
1902-1903 240,718 these purposes.”[304]
It is recognised that the above
amount will not be sufficient to
defray the entire cost.
EXPORT TRADE
(These figures include the export of specie.)
1891 —
1892 —
1893 £836,295
1894 821,682
1895 985,595
1896 975,263
1897 810,975
1898 882,329
1899 915,934
1900-1901 831,257[305]
Owing to the intelligent way in which the Report for 1900-1901 is
prepared, it is possible to separate the specie from the total exports
for the years 1896-1900, 1901, as given in that Report. The total
exports, less specie, for the above-mentioned period were as follows:
EXPORT, LESS SPECIE
1896 £906,393
1897 740,179
1898 821,112
1899 834,358
1900-1901 705,237
There are special reasons to account for the heavy fall in 1900-1901.
Nevertheless, a glance at the expenditure and export columns cannot fail
to accentuate the fact that the growth in expenditure is incommensurate
with the increase in the purchasing power of the Colony. The financial
future of Lagos now depends entirely on the railway. When the entire sum
authorised has been expended, which will be this year, I believe, and
other expenses are added thereto, it is estimated that the railway will
have cost about £9000 to £10,000 per mile. In this connection the Dahomey
figures should be consulted.
The notes in the expenditure column include, of course, moneys expended
on public works. The growth in expenditure and the relation it bears to
the producing capacity of the country would, perhaps, appear even more
clearly if the expenditure totals were given, minus the expenditure on
public works. It has not been possible to satisfactorily separate them in
every case; but, as a simple illustration, 1893 and 1900 may be compared.
Ordinary expenditure. Export trade.
1893 £75,207 £836,295
1900 131,742 831,257
It will thus be seen that whereas, within the period given—eight
years—ordinary expenditure has nearly doubled, the producing power of
the country is found, at the close of the eighth year, to be stationary.
It may be argued, and justly, that the area of the Protectorate has been
extended since 1893. But the point is, _the way these dependencies are
managed_. Is not the management carried out upon altogether too elaborate
and expensive a scale? Does this increase in ordinary expenditure
correspond with an increase in the production, that is to say, in the
prosperity of the colony and the people of the colony? If it does not,
no special knowledge of political economy is required to predict that,
if the system be not modified in the future, the steadily increasing
expenditure will, before very long, act as a positive deterrent upon the
producing power of the country. In fact, there is sufficient evidence
to justify the fear that in some instances this stage has already been
reached.
COMPARATIVE TABLES OF IMPORT DUTIES IN VOGUE IN LAGOS AND DAHOMEY
DAHOMEY. LAGOS. In favour of
Tobacco (manufactured) 2⅙d. per lb. 8d. per lb. Dahomey.
” (unmanufactured) 2⅙d. ” 4d. ” ”
Gunpowder 2⅙d. ” 6d. ” ”
Trade guns 1s. 7⅕d. each 2s. 6d. each ”
Kerosene 0⅜d. per gallon 2d. per gallon ”
Salt rock 11s. 4½d. per ton 20s. per ton ”
” sea 4s. 10½d. ” 20s. ” ”
Lead ⅑d. per lb. 1d. per lb. ”
Coal Free of duty Pays duty 10% ”
Fresh fruit and seeds ” Pay ” ”
Tools of all kinds
(_i.e._ mechanical,
agricultural, etc.) ” [306]Pay ” ”
Furniture ” [307]Pays ” ”
SILKS, VELVETS, COTTONS AND PRINTS
In Dahomey these articles pay duty on their weight; in Lagos the tax is
an _ad valorem_ one. How these different duties work out in practice can
only be ascertained by giving specific instances. The following examples
are taken from actual shipments:
DAHOMEY. LAGOS.
50 c. per 10 per cent.
kilo. _ad valorem._ In favour of
£ s. d. £ s. d.
Silk shipment of £50 value—
38 kilos weight 0 15 3 5 0 0 Dahomey.
Velvet shipment of £90 value
—384½ kilos 7 13 9 7 0 0 Lagos.
Cottons shipment of £52 value
—659 kilos 13 3 7 5 4 0 ”
Prints shipment of £100 value
—979 kilos 19 12 0 10 0 0 ”
SPIRITS
DAHOMEY. LAGOS. In favour of
Brandy, rum, &c., 18/20
under proof, equals 46°
Tralles, at 1f. 20c. per
hectolitre per degree
plus 5c. for bottles 2s. 1d. per gallon 3s. per gallon Dahomey.
Gin 0° to 20° Tralles 1s. 9½d. ” ” ”
Gin 20° to 50° ” 2s. 8⅖d. ” ” ”
Gin 57° proof (Sykes) 3s. 1d. ” ” Lagos.
Alcohol:
68 over-proof—96° Tralles 4s. 2¼d. 5s. 0¼d. Dahomey.
60 ” —91° ” 4s. 4s. 9⅗d. ”
THE DAHOMEY RAILWAY
LENGTH—ESTIMATED COST—FINANCE—PRESENT POSITION—GENERAL REMARKS
KOTONU-TCHARU (TCHAOUROU)
Length, 605 kilometres, or 377 miles, in two sections. First section,
Kotonu-Acheribe (Atcheribe). Second section, Acheribe-Tcharu.
Length of first section, 186 kilometres, or say 115 miles. Estimated cost
of first section, 63,000 francs per kilometre. Estimated total cost of
first section, 11,718,000 francs.
In English figures[308]—Total estimated cost of first section, 115 miles
long, £468,740, or say £4076 per mile.
It is intended to subsequently carry on this line from Tcharu to Karimama
on the Niger.
RESULTS AS FAR AS AT PRESENT KNOWN
Actual work commenced May 1, 1900. In March 1902, 82 kilometres, or
say 51 miles, of embankment, earthworks and “ouvrages d’art” complete,
were handed over to the Concessionnaire, who is called upon to provide
and lay down sleepers and rails, provide rolling-stock, &c. Fifty more
kilometres, or say 32 miles, similarly complete, were ready at the date
mentioned to be handed over to the Concessionnaire. The Colony, which
has itself undertaken the work, has thus prepared in less than two years
132 kilometres, or say 82 miles of line. The chief difficulties met with
have been in crossing the swamps between Kotonu and Godomey, the marshy
streams of Whydah and the Pahu lagoon, where the earthworks are 26 feet
high. To fill up a depression of 16 feet in the centre of the lagoon
40,000 cubic metres of sand and earth were required. A distance of 12
kilometres between Wagbo (Ouagbo) and Taffo required 75,000 cubic metres
of embankment. In the crossing of the Lama 2500 workmen were continuously
employed for five months in placing 80,000 cubic metres of gravel. All
the labour was found in the Colony. The number of natives continuously
employed has varied from 3500 to 5000, _entirely recruited through the
Chiefs_. There has been no trouble with the workmen, and no police force
has been employed on the works. The export trade of the Colony has not
suffered during the process, notwithstanding the withdrawal of so large
a quantity of labour from the farms; but, indeed, has increased,[309] a
tribute to the wisdom of leaving the _recruiting entirely in the hands of
the Chiefs_.
FINANCE
The Colony undertakes the cutting embankment, earthworks, &c., everything
but the laying of the rails, sleepers, the providing of the same,
rolling-stock, stations and so forth.
It has undertaken to advance for five years _out of its own local
resources_ a sum of one million francs, say £40,000 annually. For 1901
the Colony undertook to provide £60,000, instead of £40,000.
GENERAL REMARKS
The French accurately claim that their railway will carry them much
farther inland for a given distance covered than the Lagos railway with
the big curve eastward which it takes from Abbeokuta; whereas they
are pushing their line almost due north, and at their present rate of
progress, in comparison with the time taken over the British line, their
iron horse will have penetrated very much farther into the interior than
Ilorin, long before the British line creeps up to that place. Upon this
premise they base a number of conclusions, the first and foremost of
which is that the French line will thus be able to capture the inland
traffic which finds its way into the Lagos hinterland from the Niger,
along the Nikki road (the French have a “post” at Nikki, which is a great
centre for the caravan traffic), and to drain the western portion of
Sokoto, to the detriment naturally of Lagos and Northern Nigeria. Well,
in Northern Nigeria we do not seem to care much about trade, the military
and political policy being more showy, albeit a nice little bill will
have to be met presently, for the showy policy cannot be indulged in in
West Africa without having to pay the piper some day. But in the case of
Lagos it is a different affair, and the French argument is worth looking
into. There can be no doubt that if the Concessionnaire of the Dahomey
line lays his rails and provides his rolling-stock at the same ratio of
speed as the Colony has performed its share of the work, the contention
that the French rail-head will in a couple of years be carried deeper
into the interior is correct. That the Concessionnaire will do so is,
of course, an assumption. He has been engaged in quarrelling with his
contractors for a considerable time, but now it appears he is seriously
setting to work; at least, that is the information I get from Lagos. It
is equally true that the French line, when it has reached its terminus
at the 377th mile, will plunge into a network of trade roads, branching
eastwards to Lagos and westwards to Togo, and will have an excellent
chance of diverting the flow of the internal commerce from both those
Colonies. To that extent Lagos will probably be a loser, because the
African is very conservative and will cling to his old trade routes
rather than abandon them for new ones, and naturally the French railway
will benefit him. But the French, perhaps, forget that the Lagos line,
as far as Ibadan, at any rate—as far, that is to say, as it goes at
present—does not rely upon inland traffic for its existence. It will
be fed locally by the increased production which will accrue along its
line of march by the conversion of thousands of carriers of produce,
into cultivators and reapers of produce. Between Ibadan and Ilorin, it
cannot hope to do much anyhow. Beyond Ilorin again, increased local
production will feed it, Nupe being a rich and well-populated country. If
the British line remains stationary at Ibadan for many years, however,
the danger from its French competitor, supposing the latter to follow a
progressive construction, would certainly become more acute. Here, again,
the question of finance comes in, and the French Colony is decidedly
better off. What greater contrast could, indeed, be imagined?—Lagos
in debt to the tune of over a million, burdened for all time with an
annual drain of £50,000, while Dahomey is not in debt to the extent of
one penny, and cheerfully advances £60,000 in one year to the works of
construction out of its surplus funds! As for the _cost_ of construction,
if the French estimates hold good, or anywhere near it, the French line
will be built at about half the cost of its British competitor.
* * * * *
Since the above remarks were written news has been received that 65
kilometres of the railway were opened to traffic in September, and that
rail-head is expected to reach Abomey in January next.
FRENCH GUINEA RAILWAY
LENGTH. ESTIMATED COST. FINANCE. PRESENT POSITION
KONAKRY-KURUSSA _viâ_ TIMBO
Length, 550 kilometres, or 342 miles.
Highest estimated cost of line, 80,000 francs per kilometre.
Highest estimated total cost, 44,000,000 francs.
First section, Konakry-Kandia, 150 kilometres, or say 92 miles.
In English figures: Total estimated cost of line, 342 miles long,
£1,700,000; or say, roughly, about £5140 per mile.
RESULTS UP TO DATE, ACCORDING TO THE REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF
FRENCH WEST AFRICA IN JUNE LAST
The earthworks have reached Kandia at the 149th kilometre (say 92nd
mile).
With the exception of two places, between the 27th and 44th kilometre,
and between the 90th and 107th kilometre, the earthworks and embankment,
&c. are finished and in good condition. One steel bridge thirty-three
yards long is already fixed up, and two others are in process of being
so. The 34 kilometres which remain are being proceeded with rapidly.
Seventeen hundred workmen are continuously engaged thereon. Rails and
sleepers are being regularly landed at Konakry. The first locomotive
has arrived. By October the rolling-stock complete for the first 150
kilometres, say 92 miles, will have arrived in the Colony.
FINANCE
For the first section the Colony borrowed from the “Caisse des
Retraites,” on its own guarantee, eight million francs (£320,000), at 4
10% in August 1899; and four million francs (£160,000) at 4% from the
“Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations” in March 1901. The first loan is
to be paid back in forty annual payments, and the second in twenty-five
annual payments, the two annuities together amounting to 430,000 francs,
or say £17,200.
These loans will be further supplemented by drafts upon the Colony’s
local funds.
WEST AFRICAN MAHOGANY TRADE
IMPORTS OF WEST AFRICAN MAHOGANY INTO EUROPEAN PORTS IN THE YEARS
1898-1901
1898 40,167 tons
1899 48,902 ”
1900 55,959 ”
1901 44,582 ”
DESTINATION OF IMPORTS IN 1901
Liverpool 29,312 tons
London 6,998 ”
Glasgow 278 ”
Germany 4,735 ”
France 3,259 ”
IMPORTS, IN SUPERFICIAL FEET, OF WEST AFRICAN MAHOGANY INTO LIVERPOOL FOR
THE PAST 13 YEARS
Sup. ft. 1889 68,000
” 1890 259,000
” 1891 1,600,000
” 1892 3,000,000
” 1893 4,984,000
” 1894 4,700,000
” 1895 3,400,000
” 1896 5,098,000
” 1897 8,134,000
” 1898 10,519,000
” 1899 13,508,000
” 1900 14,034,000
” 1901 11,652,000
IMPORT, CONSUMPTION AND STOCK OF WEST AFRICAN MAHOGANY INTO LIVERPOOL
1898-1901
1898. 1899. 1900. 1901.
IMPORT 10,519,000 ft. 13,508,000 ft. 14,034,000 ft. 11,652,000 ft.
CONSUMPTION 10,571,000 ” 13,496,000 ” 13,764,000 ” 11,978,000 ”
STOCK 633,000 ” 645,000 ” 915,000 ” 589,000 ”
IMPORTS OF WEST AFRICAN MAHOGANY INTO LIVERPOOL FOR THE FIRST SIX MONTHS
OF 1901 AND 1902 RESPECTIVELY
LOGS
January. February. March.
1901. 1902. 1901. 1902. 1901. 1902.
Lagos 1558 799 767 184 386 120
Benin 202 599 62 376 69 —
Sapeli 65 49 44 44 58 —
Other West African Ports 2373 626 505 1130 264 198
April. May. June.
1901. 1902. 1901. 1902. 1901. 1902.
Lagos 311 42 210 43 72 114
Benin 121 181 56 66 77 —
Sapeli 87 89 36 42 77 —
Other West African Ports 604 617 206 502 320 114
THE GOLD COAST MINING INDUSTRY
Having but casually referred to the Gold Coast mining industry, it has
been suggested to me that a few remarks might be contributed to the
subject in an Appendix. I am somewhat reluctant to write anything on the
point, because I know absolutely nothing about mining; and the opinions
I have formed, such as they are, are the outcome (1) of conversations
with a number of men who are more or less experts, and have formed their
views of the prospects of the Gold Coast mining industry from personal
investigation on the spot; (2) the perusal of a quantity of reports by
Companies which are operating and prospecting ... and by Companies which
are doing nothing at all but squander their shareholders’ money; (3)
historical research and study of the past performances of the Gold Coast
as a gold producer. Beyond that I have no knowledge whatever; nothing but
opinions, which perhaps the reader will kindly bear in mind when perusing
the following notes.
There is not the slightest doubt that gold exists in considerable
quantities in West Africa. The earliest records we have of any trade at
all being done on the West Coast of Africa is a trade in gold dust. The
external trade of West Africa dates back to the period when the Negroes
beheld the Carthaginian galleys bearing down upon their shores. The
internal gold trade of West Africa is probably even more remote—but there
we enter the domain of conjecture.
There is not the slightest doubt that the Portuguese, Dutch, English,
French, and so on, obtained enormous quantities of gold from the Gold
Coast.
For many years the gold _trade_ in the Gold Coast has practically been a
thing of the past. The gold _trade_, as a trade, is long since dead.
At the beginning of last century the great gold store—which had been
accumulating for ages—of the Coast peoples of the Gold Coast became
exhausted. At that period the Ashantis, farther inland, still retained
large quantities of gold ostentatiously displayed. James, Bowdich,
Dupuis, Hutton, and Hutcheson bear witness to that. With the gradual
undermining of the Ashanti Kingdom this store also disappeared.
Coming to more recent times, we find that the geological formation known
as “banket” was discovered in 1878 in the Takwa district by a French
traveller called Bonnat. That seems to have been the basis of the future
modern mining industry in the Gold Coast, replacing the extinct trade.
Many years of disappointment and failure followed Bonnat’s discovery,
due in a very large measure to the absence of transport facilities and
to mortality. However, some of the mines which had come into existence
subsequent to the discovery refused to be discouraged, and went on
working, more or less half-heartedly, notably in the Wassau and Takwa
districts.
In January 1900 the scene changed, as though by a magician’s wand.
The man who waved it was a Mr. Stanley Clay, an engineer reputed of
considerable ability, in the employ of the Consolidated Goldfields of
South Africa, which Corporation had been approached by the men who owned
the Wassau and Takwa mines. This gentleman reported in effect that the
banket formation of the district he had been despatched to examine was
so like the banket formation of the Rand as to be hardly distinguishable
from the latter. Although some years previous to that report the Ashanti
Goldfields Corporation, Limited—the parent, so to speak, of the Ashanti
mines—had come into existence, I believe I am correct in stating that the
remarkable “boom” in Gold Coast mining undertakings practically dates
from the favourable report above alluded to.
Be that as it may, the last two years have witnessed the extraordinary
movement with which every one is familiar. According to “Wallach’s West
African Manual” for June 1901, 321 companies had at that time been
created, with a total nominal share capital of £25,567,170. “The issued
share capital will amount to approximately £15,750,000, if all is fully
paid up.”[310]
This is truly colossal. But all is not gold that glitters. The boom,
prematurely, and to a large extent, dishonestly engineered, collapsed.
Deep distrust has taken the place of sanguine anticipations, and public
confidence, greatly shaken, is apt to rush to the opposite extreme. The
Gold Coast mining industry has many enemies and many unwise friends. The
“boom” was, of course, thoroughly unjustified. The public lost their
heads completely. Company after company was formed, a large proportion
of which hardly knew where their territory lay, let alone whether it
contained any gold. But the public did not care twopence so long as it
was a Gold Coast venture, and a great many rascals have done excellently
well out of the British investor. Finally, this constant flotation of
companies got to be in the nature of a scandal; and the Governor of the
Gold Coast, in a courageous speech, which has remained famous, before the
local Chamber of Commerce, and for which Sir Matthew Nathan deserves the
greatest possible credit, denounced the abuses which the movement was
giving rise to. Mr. Chamberlain promptly endorsed the Governor’s views,
and caused a public statement to be made which fell like a bombshell on
the market-riggers. Flotation of new companies after that was an almost
impossible task, and the market received a staggering blow from which it
has not yet recovered. There is pretty certain to be renewed activity at
some not very distant day. Let us hope that the next time it will rest on
something more tangible than fairy tales.
That gold exists in the Gold Coast is demonstrated beyond a shadow of
doubt. That it can be worked at a profit has yet to be satisfactorily
proved, even in the case of the properties which are, or will be, in
close proximity to the railway now in course of construction. For the
purposes of illustration the Gold Coast may be divided into three
portions. First, where gold exists in such quantities—other conditions
being favourable—that it is reasonable to believe the mines, if
economically and wisely administered, will become dividend-producing.
Secondly, where gold exists, but not in sufficient quantities—the
conditions of mining in West Africa being what they are—to enable the
mines ever to become dividend-paying. Thirdly; where no gold exists at
all.
Now when it is borne in mind that options have been acquired by
individuals pretty well all over the country, and companies have been
formed to work those options, it will be easily understood that shares of
a considerable number of existing companies are not worth the paper upon
which they are inscribed. In my opinion, if Mr. Wallach’s “321” companies
were divided by six, the residue would be an optimistic prophecy as to
the number of Gold Coast mining companies existing ten years hence.
This number would be amply sufficient to allow of the Gold Coast to
become, what I believe it will become, a gold-producing region of very
considerable value. Personally, I am as equally convinced that some of
the mines will become good dividend-payers, as I am that the majority are
rubbish. The two main difficulties which the mining industry in the Gold
Coast have to face are climate and transport.
The first is a very real difficulty, and the public would do well to
treat with the utmost scepticism reports emanating from directors of
Gold Coast companies, especially those whose properties are situate near
the coast; who pooh-pooh the danger of the climate. If Major Ross’s
indefatigable efforts are backed up by the authorities and the mining
companies, we shall see a better state of things before many years are
past. But that the climate will always be an adverse element to contend
against is positively certain. Those who say the contrary are not dealing
honestly with the public.
Many people imagine that transport difficulties will vanish when this
crawling single line to Kumasi has been completed. Let those who are
inclined to that belief study one of the excellent maps of the Gold Coast
mines now available, and see how many of the properties, out of the total
of companies floated, approximate sufficiently to the line to feel its
usefulness. Before transport difficulties can be said to be overcome, the
Gold Coast must be a network of railways. That may come, but the time is
not yet by a long, a very long way.
The alleged labour difficulty I have dealt with elsewhere. It is largely
fictitious, as the most reputable companies and the most experienced
Europeans will bear witness. The boot, the stick; abuse; inadequate pay;
dishonest dealing—so long as these incentives to labour exist on the
Gold Coast, and they exist to-day, so long will certain people endeavour
to make the British public believe that labour is improcurable in West
Africa save by measures of coercion, or by Asiatic emigration, or by
draining the other West African colonies of their able-bodied men. Decent
wages; just treatment; tactful dealing; a high type of representative—the
mining companies which supply these have not, and will not have,
occasion to complain. The Administration might play a useful part in
imitating the French policy of obtaining labour for the Guinea Railway,
viz. through the Chiefs, and through them alone, and refuse to allow
authorised or unauthorised recruiting agents.
From the point of view of the investing public, those who contemplate
putting any money into the Gold Coast mines should carefully weigh
the difficulties mentioned against the counterbalancing reasons for
optimism in the facts (1) that some undoubted experts, and some men of
undoubted integrity and ability who have a reputation to lose, have
staked that reputation upon the existence of “paying” gold in the Gold
Coast; (2) that a powerful corporation has undertaken a heavy liability
in guaranteeing a certain sum for a number of years to the Gold Coast
Railway; (3) that a very large sum of money has been sunk in the
country for the purpose of mining enterprise; (4) that the past history
of the Gold Coast is all in its favour. Finally, the investor should
discriminate carefully between the companies and “groups” which are
justifying, or honestly seeking to justify, their existence and those
that are not.
APPROXIMATE AREA AND POPULATION OF THE BRITISH WEST AFRICAN POSSESSIONS
GAMBIA. Population, 14,260.
SIERRA LEONE. Colony, 4000 square miles; population, 136,000.
Protectorate, 30,000 square miles; population,
750,000.
GOLD COAST. Gold Coast Proper, 40,000 square miles; population,
1,500,000.
Ashanti proper. Neither area nor population known.
Northern territories, 38,000 square miles[311];
population, 317,964 (C.O. Report, July 1902).
LAGOS. Colony, 3460 square miles } Population,[312]
Protectorate, 25,450 square miles } 1,500,000.
NIGERIA. 500,000 square miles; population, 25 to 30
millions.[313]
THE RABINEK CASE
(See Chapter xxxii.)
On October 27th, Sir Charles Dilke, having asked the Under-Secretary
for Foreign Affairs if he could say whether, in the Rabinek case, the
prisoner was taken by the Congolese authorities from a British ship
in British waters, and, if so, what course his Majesty’s Government
proposed to adopt, Lord Cranborne, in a printed answer, said: “It is at
present uncertain whether Mr. Rabinek was actually on board a British
vessel when arrested, or whether the ship was at the time in British
waters. Inquiries are, however, being made, and on receipt of definite
information his Majesty’s Government will be in a position to consider
what action should be taken in the matter.”
Since the above question by Sir Charles Dilke, the doubt as to the
actual place of Mr. Rabinek’s arrest has been removed. The Congo State
authorities can no longer evade the point. Here is a copy of the
_Procès-verbal d’arrestation_, showing conclusively that Mr. Rabinek was
arrested _on board a British vessel_.
PROCÈS-VERBAL D’ARRESTATION.
Le soussigné, Saroléa, Louis, Sous-Lieutenant de la Force
Publique, commandant la colonne mobile du Tanganyka, stationnée
à Mpueto, officier de police judiciaire, a procédé le 15 Mai
1901, à 3 heures de l’après-midi, à l’arrestation du sieur
Rabinek en exécution du mandat d’arrêt délivré le 17 Décembre,
1900, à charge du dit Rabinek par le tribunal territorial
d’Albertville. _Le prénommé se trouvait à bord du steamer
anglais “Scotia,” ancré dans le port de Mpueto._ Le Sieur
Rabinek a été remis à M. Chargois ff du représentant du Comité
Spécial du Katanga à Mpueto.
Fait à Mpueto, le 15 Mai 1901.
(L.S.) Lieutenant Commandant la
Colonne mobile du Tanganyka.
(Sig.) SAROLÉA.
The British Government has now a copy of the above.
FOOTNOTES
[1] _Journal of the African Society_, October 1901.
[2] Among the principal exceptions may be mentioned gum arabic from
Senegal, pepper, spices, &c., from the Guinea Coast.
[3] The totals here given do not, of course, include foreign and Colonial
merchandise shipped to British West Africa from British ports.
[4] The total volume of trade—British and foreign and coastwise—in each
of the West African Colonies in the five years 1896-1900, including
specie, has been as follows:
Gambia £1,797,916
Sierra Leone 4,646,503
Gold Coast 10,393,850
Lagos 8,853,461
Niger Coast Protectorate (and for 1900, “Nigeria”) 8,183,288
-----------
Gross total £42,728,479
The trade of the former territories of the Niger Company, from 1896 to
1899 inclusive, is not reckoned in this total, no public figures being
available.
[5] The totals given are, of course, exclusive of foreign and Colonial
merchandise shipped to these foreign possessions from British ports.
[6] Due to exceptional imports of coal and telegraph apparatus.
[7] German imports, like British imports, are largely for re-exportation
to other European and American ports.
[8] The chief town in Borgu on which the Lugard and Decœur expeditions
were directing their efforts.
[9] _Journal of the African Society_, January 1902.
[10] This document is published _in extenso_ in the annual report of the
Liverpool Chamber of Commerce for 1901.
[11] The Foreign Office lost us the Cameroons, the French Congo littoral,
Futa-Jallon, and heaven knows what besides. In doing so it showed itself
the indifferent servant of an indifferent public.
[12] See, more particularly, Appendices and the chapter on the Finances
of Nigeria.
[13] “By the end of April 1900,” says the report for Southern Nigeria for
1900, “twenty proclamations were passed.” I should be afraid to say how
many have been passed since.
[14] The activity of the Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine has been
phenomenal, and the useful work performed by it is internationally
recognised. To the splendid enterprise of Sir Alfred Jones, its initiator
and President, is due the astonishingly strong financial position which
the School has attained—entirely the outcome of private benevolence.
[15] In the remarkable speech he made at the Lagos Literary Institute—the
most able and statesmanlike oration ever delivered by a British official
in West Africa—Sir William MacGregor said in reference to the extension
of the Lagos Railway: “It would require probably not much greater
expenditure than would a number of military campaigns, it would save many
valuable lives to open up the country in that way, and it would leave a
permanent valuable asset. In this the locomotive would be preferable to
the Maxim.”
[16] That admirable German Institution, the _Kolonial Wirtschaftliches
Komitee_ (Agricultural Committee) might also be imitated with advantage
by our Government. Attached to the German Colonial Society, the
Agricultural Committee devotes its exclusive attention to a study of the
economic resources of the German possessions, giving special notice to
cocoa, rubber, gutta-percha, cotton, &c. Experts have been despatched
by the Committee to the South Seas to study gutta-percha, to the States
for cotton, to Central and South America for cocoa, &c. The Committee
is really composed of a trained body of agricultural and botanical
specialists working in the joint interests of the Government and the
merchants.
[17] M. Empain has lately been granted by King Leopold a huge concession
in the Aruwimi region of the Congo State in connection with the promotion
of a railway to the Great Lakes.
[18] The London Chamber being mainly—although not exclusively—concerned
with Gold Coast trade and mining developments.
[19] It was entirely owing to the assistance of the African Association’s
agents that the people of the Niger Delta were induced to accept British
protection and consular jurisdiction. By the merchants’ good offices,
Consuls Johnston and Hewett were enabled to ascend the rivers to places
where they would not have dared to enter unaccompanied by representatives
of the merchants.
[20] Chairman of the African Section.
[21] Report of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce, 1900.
[22] Messrs. Shelford’s estimate is £7000 per mile. But this cannot be
reconciled with the amount expended. It leaves out of account the cost of
bridges between Lagos Island and the mainland, which are part and parcel
of the railway scheme. In March of this year the Colony had already
expended its loan of £1,053,700, which works out at £8430 per mile. But
although the railway has reached its present terminus it is not yet
properly finished. Speaking in March, Sir W. MacGregor foreshadowed a
further expenditure of £60,000, and added, “the probability is, however,
that this will not be sufficient.” On the same occasion the Governor,
reviewing the state of the Colony, said that one of the two “principal
causes of anxiety” was “the difficulty experienced in getting the railway
into working order.”
[23] French Guinea borrowed £480,000 at the rate of 4.10 per cent. and 4
per cent. respectively.
[24] 14_s._ 8_d._ per head of the whole population of the territory.
[25] Another incident of the kind is referred to by Sir W. MacGregor in
one of his speeches before the Legislative Council. Plans were sent home
for a steam-hopper or tramway to remove refuse. The plans were rejected
by the “consulting engineers.” The Governor sarcastically remarked: “It
is doubtful that any remedy that would cost less than £100,000 will ever
be approved by the engineers.”
[26] The same belief was entertained, curiously enough, by the
inhabitants of the Niger Basin itself even in Clapperton’s day, as
witness Sultan Bello’s map, drawn for Clapperton at the latter’s request,
referred to farther on.
[27] Lyon subsequently gained Timbuctoo from Murzuk, being the second
European to visit the mysterious city. It has always remained an open
question whether Horneman did not actually cross the Desert and reach
the Chad. Denham, indeed, believed that he did so, but no trace of the
unfortunate German has ever been discovered from the time he left Murzuk,
nearly a quarter of a century before Denham arrived there himself.
[28] Caffre—_i.e._ unbeliever.
[29] For instance, the Bahr-el-Ghazal, Bahr-el-Asrek, Bahr-el-Abiad, &c.,
all rivers.
[30] Some authors consider the Hausas to be a branch of the Mandingo
race. According to this theory, the Mandingoes are the parent stock,
and the Hausas, Songhays, Bambarras, &c., are all offshoots of the
same great family. Although there would appear to be a certain basis
of probability—especially as regards the Bambarras—in the plea of a
common Mandingo origin, our historical and ethnological knowledge of the
different races of West Africa, which is still in the embryonic stage,
precludes anything in the nature of a positive assertion.
[31] Subsequent to the final overthrow of the Berbers, under Kuseila, by
the Arabs in 688 A.D.
[32] “Historical Account of the Kingdom of Tek-roor.” By Sultan Mohammed
Bello of Hoosa. Denham & Clapperton. Vol. ii., Appendix xiii.
[33] “Hausaland.” By the Rev. Charles Robinson. P. 179.
[34] The _Hausa bokoy_, or seven States, as distinct from the _Banza
bokoy_ or Bastard States, representing the seven other provinces where
the Hausa language had partly spread.
[35] “A Mission to Central Africa.” By James Richardson. 1850-51.
[36] “L’Annamite mère des langues.” Le Colonel Frey. 1892.
[37] Lieutenant-Colonel Monteil’s estimate, 1891.
[38] For hours you may wander about noting industrial scenes like these,
showing to what a length their advance in civilisation has increased
the wants of the people, and produced a necessary division of labour
into weavers, dyers, blacksmiths, brass-workers, saddle-makers, tailors,
builders, horse-boys, agricultural labourers, domestic servants,
shoe-makers, shopkeepers, traders, and others.—Joseph Thompson, in _Good
Words_, 1886.
[39] Leo Africanus tells us that Gober “had a good trade and considerable
industry, especially in leather-work” (beginning of sixteenth century).
[40] Since the above was written, Mr. Consul Jago’s report (No. 578)
on the “Trade and economic state of the vilayet of Tripoli during the
past forty years” has been published by the Foreign Office. It is a most
interesting document. The Consul gives a table of the value of Tripoli’s
trade with the Central Sudan States (Sokoto, Bornu, Wadai) for the period
1862-1901 as follows: 1862-71, £318,000; 1872-81, £1,846,300; 1882-91,
£1,283,000; 1892-1901, £1,141,700; annual average, £114,725.
[41] Consul Jago appears to favour this view. I venture to suggest that
the paragraphs (pp. 7 and 8) in which he refers to the point are open to
criticism. Take, for instance, the cost of transport. Notwithstanding
that, at first sight, the assertion may appear strange, I believe that,
if any one cares to take the trouble to work out the cost of transport of
a ton of European merchandise from London to Kuka (1) _viâ_ Tripoli and
by caravan across the desert, (2) _viâ_ Burutu, the Niger and overland,
the former route will be found the cheaper of the two. Things do not
always appear to be what they are in Africa. If France can come to a
working understanding with the Senussis, the caravan trade will revive.
[42] According to Lieutenant-Colonel Pilcher, who commanded the West
African Frontier Force in 1898, the Hausa is more quarrelsome than the
Yoruba or Nupe, gets into trouble more often, and is not so quick at
picking up drill or musketry (Colonial Office Report, No. 260, West
African Frontier Force, June 1899). Other officers eulogise the Hausas,
and among military men they are, I think, believed to be superior
fighters to either the West Indian or Mendi Negro, while about equalling
the Yoruba. The Negro seems to fight more fiercely and recklessly when he
has Islam to fall back upon.
[43] “Géographie Universelle,” livre xii. p. 587. 1887.
[44] “The Colonisation of Africa,” p. 282. 1899.
[45] “Narrative of a Mission to Central Africa.”
[46] “The Language of Bornu.”
[47] “Magana Hausa.” By J. F. Schön, D.D., F.R.G.S.
[48] “Hausaland; or, Fifteen Hundred Miles through the Central Sudan.”
1897.
[49] “Specimens of Hausa Literature.” “A Hausa Grammar.” “A Hausa-English
Dictionary.” “The Gospel of St. John in Hausa.”
[50] Full details are supplied in Canon Robinson’s book.
[51] Apart from the question whether the Hausas can claim to have
“attempted the production of a literature” any more than the Fulani or
Kanuri, there remains the fact—which goes to confute Canon Robinson’s
somewhat sweeping generalisation—that the language of the Tuareg—the
Tamashek—has been reduced to literature in _Tamashek characters_, and
that both sexes among the Tuareg are regularly instructed therein.
[52] “Kanuri Proverbs and Kanuri-English Vocabulary.” By the Rev. S.
N. Koelle. On page 9 of the introduction to his book, Koelle speaks
of the system of orthography followed by him as that of Professor
Lepsius, of Berlin, in the pamphlet entitled “Standard Alphabet for
Reducing _Unwritten Languages_ and Foreign Graphic Systems to a Uniform
Orthography in European Letters.”
[53] Baikie gives nine Hausa dialects, viz.: “Katshena, the purest and
best; (2) Kano; (3) Gober; (4) Daure; (5) Zamfara; (6) Zuzu; (7) Biranta
Goboz; (8) Kabi; (9) Shira, or Shura.”—“Narrative of an Exploring Voyage
up the Rivers Kwora and Binue.” By William Balfour Baikie. 1856.
[54] It is found in French Guinea, north of Sierra Leone, but is not
there the staple product, rubber taking its place.
[55] Southern Nigeria, or rather the Niger Delta, is commonly known as
“the rivers.”
[56] The figures for 1900 include the whole of Nigeria—that is, the
former Niger Company’s territories in the Lower Niger, and the Niger
Coast Protectorate, now incorporated into Southern Nigeria.
[57] _Idem._
[58] Germany has a protective tax on kernel or other foreign crushed
oil, which enables her to keep the home market to herself, and she
has made a profitable use of the cake for feeding cattle, whilst our
farmers—largely, I understand, through the operation of the tenant-right
conditions of tenure, or perhaps through mere prejudice—refuse to use it
to any extent.
[59] In Senegal and the Gambia the ground-nut industry, which is also
essentially a native industry, takes its place, the number of palm-trees
in those possessions being very scanty—not worth mentioning, in fact.
[60] It is also used for lubricating mixtures for the axles of railway
carriages.
[61] Giving out trust is not invariably confined to the European. Native
chiefs have been known to give trust to Europeans up to 1000 cases of
palm-oil, in days, too, when palm-oil was worth £15 per puncheon. This
would represent a credit of £15,000.
[62] In point of fact, palm-oil from the Congo district is the richest in
stearine.
[63] The first West African kernels were imported in 1860 by Mr. A.
Mackenzie Smith and the late Mr. Charles Lane, of Liverpool. The Old
Calabar district led the way in Southern Nigeria. The trade was begun
there in a small way in 1864. Benin was the next place in Southern
Nigeria to follow suit, and by 1867 the trade was fairly large. By 1880
the trade had spread to the other rivers, New Calabar, Bonny, Brass, and
Opobo.
[64] The average crushing of the African Oil Mills is, I believe, about
600 tons weekly.
[65] The exception is the machine erected at the Brass River in 1877 (by
the Count de Cardi, I believe) and used to this day by the firm which has
the principal trade of this district. It can produce, I believe, forty or
fifty bags of clean kernels per day of ten hours. It would require 600 or
700 pairs of hands to give this result in the same time.
[66] I am given to understand that efforts to use hand-crushing machines
are being made by a merchant firm in French Guinea.
[67] An interesting account of this most valuable experiment is given by
M. Pierre Mille in the _Journal of the African Society_ for October 1901.
[68] Various types of hand-ploughs are now being experimented with
in Senegal for the purpose of quickening production.—See _Journal
d’Agriculture Tropicale_, September 1901.
[69] Many people, on the other hand, will consider the somewhat elaborate
judicial machinery set up in Northern Nigeria as distinctly premature.
The administration of English law in West African Protectorates (see
p. 16, Northern Nigeria Report), even when modified by native law
and custom, is a feature of the Crown Colony system which has little
to recommend it. Dr. Ballay’s plan in French Guinea was infinitely
preferable. In all matters affecting the relations of natives with
natives Ballay insisted that native law should be the basis. He declined
to introduce all the technicalities of European law among a people whose
own laws are founded upon just principles, and, given security in their
application, work effectively and well.
[70] August 1, 1891. It was first called Consular Jurisdiction.
[71] Sir Ralph Moor has since declared that Southern Nigeria is in
“a very sound financial position.” The test of sound finance must be
different in West Africa from any other part of the world.
[72] Colonial Office Report, No. 315.
[73] In that year Southern Nigeria spent £30,196 on military expenses
and £8236 only on the “Aborigines” department. Under “Political
and Administrative” expenses, £20,327 was absorbed; under “Marine
Department,” £32,531; £24,654 only was spared for public works, but
“Prisons” necessitated £7200, against £1171 under “Botanical” and £1147
under “Sanitary”!
[74] In 1890 the value of exports from the Delta was estimated at over
£1,300,000.
[75] The Nupe campaign was undertaken after great provocation, and is
understood to have been carried out with the approval, tacit or avowed,
of the Emir of Sokoto, who had reason to complain of the Emir of Nupe’s
conduct.
[76] Similarly Nupe refused to have anything to do with Herr von
Puttkamer in 1889 without consulting the Company, although the German (or
his interpreter) passed himself off as the “Queen of England’s messenger.”
[77] Northern Nigeria.
[78] “The Foundation of British East Africa.”
[79] Colonial Report, No. 346, page 11, par. 2.
[80] Lord John Russell’s Instructions to Captain Henry Dundas Trotter,
Commander William Allen, Commander Bird Allen, and William Cook, Esquire,
Commissioners for making and concluding agreements with the Chief Rulers
of the Western Coast of Africa for the suppression of the traffic in
slaves and the establishment of a lawful commerce, 1840.
[81] The absence of any wish to “act otherwise” on the part of the native
is invariably assumed in Europe, and but too often by Europeans in
Africa. In this connection the following passage from Clapperton (when
travelling in Nigeria) is worth noting: “It was with feelings of the
highest satisfaction that I listened to some of the most respectable of
the merchants, when they declared that; were any other system of trading
adopted, they would gladly embrace it in preference to dealing in slaves.”
[82] Archibald Constable & Co. 1898.
[83] Not to be confounded with the King of Benin who massacred
Consul-General Phillips.
[84] Referring to domestic slavery in the Northern Territories of the
Gold Coast, the late Lieut.-Colonel Northcott, C.B., whose death was a
sad blow to the Empire and to West Africa particularly, in his report
on those territories (Report on the Northern Territories of the Gold
Coast—published by the Intelligence Division of the War Office in 1899),
says: “The every-day life of slaves differs in no respect from that
of the free men. Ground is allotted to them, on which they are free
to work for their own benefit, the rule generally being that they may
take two days out of every five for work on their own account. With the
accumulated results of this labour they are at liberty to purchase their
freedom. The price demanded is not excessive, and ranges from £2 to £5,
according to locality; but so lightly does the yoke of slavery bear
that only a comparatively small proportion seek their emancipation by
this means. Slaves may marry, and are encouraged to do so, the children
becoming the property of the master. The apparent hardship of liability
to sale is in reality not oppressive. The march to the new owner’s place
of abode is free from any suggestion of cruelty or force; the slave
partakes of his master’s food and shares his lodging, and he is certain
of kind treatment on arriving at his destination.”
[85] This is pidgeon-English, the Hausa for ivory tusk (_i.e._ piece of
ivory) being _hakorin_, or _hauwin giwa_.
[86] Named in honour of Park, who is supposed to be the first European to
have noticed it.
[87] And Lagos again since the opening of the railway.
[88] Up to the present, however, shipments of this prepared latex have
met with scant success.
[89] In the “Report of the Sierra Leone Company” (London: James Phillips,
printer, 1794) the following passage occurs, which most probably refers
to the _Pendatesma butyracæ_. “Butter and tallow tree. This is common in
low lands about Freetown; it abounds with a juice resembling gambodge
in taint and durability, which exudes after the least laceration, and
becomes more coagulated, viscous, and of a darker colour. The wood of
this tree is firm, and seems adapted to various economical purposes. The
fruit is nearly oval, about twice the size of a man’s fist; the rind is
thick, pulpy, and of a pleasant acid; in the inside are found from five
to nine seeds of the size of the walnut, containing an oleaginous matter,
extracted by the natives and used with their rice and other food.” A
gentleman of my acquaintance who knows this tree, tells me he has seen it
growing in Sierra Leone, so that there seems no reason why experiments
similar to those undertaken in French Guinea should not be made in our
colony, which adjoins that French possession.
[90] Known as “piassava” in the trade. Large quantities are imported from
Liberia. It is used in brush-making.
[91] Benni seeds crushed yield a fine edible oil.
[92] On the right bank of the Binue: in the Mitchi or (Munshi) country.
[93] Stone potash used to be a monopoly of the Igarras, who sold it to
the down-river tribes, but the Niger Company has taken the monopoly from
the Igarras of late years and disposes of it at Lagos, realising, it is
said, considerable profit—from 2 to 300 per cent.
[94] He will sometimes cut the vine down and chop it into pieces of about
one foot in length the more readily to extract the sap.
[95] Or even 20 per cent.
[96] There are many other ways of preparing rubber: this is one of them.
[97] “A Short Account of the Invasion of Hausa by the Phulas.” By
Bashima, a Hausa-Fulani, in the “Magana Hausa” (J. F. Schön. 1815).
[98] About 1840.
[99] And by no one so well as Joseph Thompson, “Mungo Park and the Niger.”
[100] “Othman established the severest punishment upon whoever committed
the slightest violation of the law.”—“Travels of Sheik Mohammed of Tunis”
(Bayle St. John. London: 1854).
[101] One of the numerous designations of the Fulani.
[102] “Journal of a Second Expedition into the Interior of Africa,” &c.
1829.
[103] Under the old Hausa _régime_ the inhabitants of the Northern
Hausa States paid direct taxes to the Kings. According to the curious
and interesting records of Assid-el-Haji-Abd-Salam Shabiny, a Tunisian
merchant, the Sultan of Hausa imposed a tax of 2 per cent. on all
products of the land. The people also paid a land tax, and certain duties
were exacted on all goods sold in the market-place (“Relation d’un voyage
à Timbuctoo vers l’année 1787”).
[104] A missionary has recently admitted that “To the Hausa what is in
the Koran is of God, and what is not in the Koran is not worth knowing.”
[105] To-day, _Guinée française_.
[106] This is explained by the unwillingness of the Fulani to allow
unions between their women-folk and their Negro neighbours.
[107] Recently translated into French by M. O. Houdas (Paris: Ernest
Leroux. 1900).
[108] Leo Africanus.
[109] At one time Melle ruled over Songhay and Timbuctoo. In 1329 the
Mellians were driven from Timbuctoo by the pagan Mosis (the most powerful
pagan kingdom which ever arose in West Africa). The people of Melle
reconquered the place, but were finally expelled by the Tuareg in 1433.
Melle was subsequently overcome by the Songhay and fell to pieces.
[110] Published by the Hakluyt Society.
[111] We are indebted to M. Dubois for the first complete copy.
[112] The reigning family says the _Tarik_ were white and their subjects
Wakoris (Mandingoes). This strengthens the Fulani argument, the
complexion of the pure-blood Fulani inclining to white by comparison with
their neighbours. In his “Notice Géographique sur la Région du Sahel”
(which includes Bakunu, the former Baghena), Commandant Lartigue says of
the Fulani still inhabiting that district, “Quelques-uns sont presque
blancs; leur cheveux sont à peine crépus, et ils ont les traits fins et
réguliers des Européens de bonne race.”
[113] The language of the Fulani.
[114] The Empire which, as we have observed, was raised upon the ruins of
Ghanata by the Mandingoes, the subject race at the time of the latter’s
foundation.
[115] D’Eichtal’s assertion (“Les Foulahs.” Paris: 1842), that the
Fulani “to this day” call the whole of Senegambia “Melli,” I do not find
confirmed, but it is worth mentioning, nevertheless.
[116] The first map in which Melle figures is a Spanish one (1375 A.D.).
In the map of Mathias de Villadestes, the Venetian (1413 A.D.), the word
“Toucuzor” is written by the side of that of the King of Melli, “Mussa.”
For “Toucuzor” read “Toukulor” (Tukulor), the cross race of Fulani-Joloff
and Fulani-Mandingo.—“Considérations sur la Priorité des Découvertes
Maritimes sur la Côte Occidentale d’Afrique.”—Binger.
[117] Barth’s chronological table of the Songhay.
[118] Marmol—born in Granada, 1580—translated by Nicholas Perot
d’Ablancourt.
[119] The _Tarik’s_ statement that Salta Tayenda fled into “Futa” affords
substantial indication of the presence of Fulani in that country at a
previous date, which we know, of course, from other sources.
[120] This tradition obviously refers to Fulani pressure—the root of the
word (Pul, or Ful) signifying red, or reddish.
[121] A correspondent of a Paris paper, _La Dépêche Coloniale_, writing
from Kunde, on the Sangha River, on December 10, 1901, says: “Our
clothes, which are ragged from bush travelling, do not convey a great
idea of our influence, especially when compared to the Fulbes (Fulani)
in their embroidered cloths and leather riding-boots. They are all on
horseback and we are on foot. _There are thousands of them_, and all are
armed.”
[122] Their presence in Omdurman—that is to say, in the heart of the
Eastern Sudan in the Nile valley—has already been noted by Father
Ohrwalder. On page 300 of “Ten Years’ Captivity in the Mahdi’s Camp”
(Major Wingate, R.A. London: 1895), we read, “Several of the Fellata, who
came from distant parts of Bornu, Wadai, &c., were stopped at Omdurman on
their way to Mecca”; and again, on page 305, “The inhabitants of Omdurman
are a conglomeration of every race and nationality in the Sudan—Fellata,
Takruris, natives of Bornu, &c.”
[123] Dr. Barth’s estimate as to the date of the foundation of Ghanata
is certainly not exaggerated, in view of the _Tarik’s_ statement that
twenty-two kings had reigned before the Hejira.
[124] Ernest Flammarion, Paris. English edition: W. Heinemann.
[125] Toledo was wrested from the Moors in 1085; Saragossa in 1118;
Valencia, 1238; Seville, 1248; the Beni-Nasr held Granada until 1492.
[126] De Barros, Barth, _Tarik_.
[127] Makrizi, de Barros, Barth.
[128] _L’Anthropologie_ (Tome x., No. 6), of which Dr. Verneau is one of
the editors.
[129] In plain language, a prominence of the jaws—one of the
characteristics of the Negro type.
[130] Dr. Randle MacIver and Anthony Wilkin, in “Libyan Notes.” Macmillan
& Co. 1901.
[131] Concubinage with negresses being the natural explanation.
[132] Other authorities, basing their arguments, _inter alia_, upon
the assumption that the wild people “covered with hair” encountered
by the Carthaginian colonists were none other than the gorillas which
Du Chaillu, more than two thousand years afterwards, brought to the
knowledge of an incredulous world, and upon the unlikelihood of any
of those animals being in Hanno’s day so far north, maintain that the
expedition reached the Gaboon estuary, or even the mouth of the Congo.
The point is never likely to be cleared up. The two sides are stated with
great clearness by the late Miss Kingsley in “West African Studies.”
(Macmillan & Co.)
[133] Lest it be supposed that I am appropriating other people’s ideas
without acknowledgment, I hasten to add that Major Rennel, in his notes
on Park’s travels (“Travels in the Interior of Africa.” London: 1799)
hazards the same suggestion, and Barth and Frey follow suit. But I think
that, in the light of our further knowledge of the peoples and history of
Western Africa, the identification of the “Leucæthiopes” with the Fulani
becomes a good deal more than a suggestion.
[134] The cattle possessed by the Fulani—who are the herdsmen of West
Africa—are the hump-backed Asiatic kind (_Bos indicus_). That was a great
point with Faidherbe in favour of the Eastern theory. The Abyssinians’
cattle, it may be observed, belong to the same breed.
[135] “Then Joseph came and told Pharaoh, and said: ‘My father and my
brethren, and their flocks, and their herds, and all that they have, are
come out of the land of Canaan, and, behold, they are in the land of
Goshen.’”
[136] Cattle-rearer.
[137] “An Account of the Native Africans in the Neighbourhood of Sierra
Leone.” By Thomas Winterbottom, D.D., Physician to the Colony of Sierra
Leone. 1803.
[138] The Joloffs (Senegal) declare that the Fulani converse habitually
with their cattle.
[139] Moore, writing of the Gambia Fulani in the eighteenth century,
says, they manage cattle so well that the Mandingoes give them their own
to look after.
[140] Native cavalry soldier.
[141] Related in the French African Committee’s journal.
[142] De Guiraudon was, apparently, unaware of this passage, which has an
important bearing upon his statements.
[143] Not pear-shaped, as with the negress.
[144] Barth, Baikie, Gray, Monteil, Mollien, De Giraudon, Callié, &c.,
vie with one another in their enthusiasm over the beauty of the Fulani
woman of pure blood, which is all the more pronounced in view of their
ethnic surroundings. Barth speaks of young Fulani girls whose forms
“recall the finest Grecian sculptury.” “The women are very beautiful, and
possess strange powers of fascination in their large deep eyes,” says
Monteil. “The women in particular,” remarks Gray, “might vie in point of
figure with the finest forms in Europe, and their walk is particularly
majestic.” “The Fulani women, many of whose countenances are resplendent
with a veritable beauty” (Reclus).
[145] “West Africa.”
[146] _Ibid._
[147] Witness, for example, the admirable work on land tenure on the
Ivory Coast just published by Administrator Clozel; also that gentleman’s
article in the _Journal of the African Society_ for July.
[148] I have not yet heard of any departure from the rule.
[149] “Modern ideas and legislation,” says Dr. Alfred Zimmerman, “forbid
violent proceedings. The natives should be taught to work by cultivating
the sentiment in them that it is their interest to do so. _Experience
proves that protection of property is the surest means to attain that
end._”
[150] Paul Kollmann’s “The Victoria Nyanza” may be consulted in this
connection with advantage. The illustrations of domestic ornaments, of
flasks, bark-boxes, drums, &c., constructed by the natives of Usukama and
Ukerewe show real beauty of design.
[151] Sir Marshall Clarke’s recent report is instructive. Speaking of the
natives of Rhodesia, he says: “They work in the mines either from direct
pressure brought to bear upon them by the administration, a pressure only
short of force, or the necessity of earning enough to pay their taxes....
This,” continues Sir Marshall Clarke, “does not tend to make industry
attractive”; and, he adds, “At present there is undoubtedly discontent
among the natives.”
[152] “The evidence available seems to indicate that the labour
difficulty on the Gold Coast may probably be overcome without the
importation of labourers from other countries, and that success or
failure in the matter is largely dependent on the person in charge of the
undertaking. It is very desirable that the persons in charge should be
gentlemen and men of education, as it is found that such are more likely
to be able to deal satisfactorily with the natives, who generally require
to be handled with much tact and judgment.”—Par. 9, “Labour Ordinance”:
issued by Colonial Office.
[153] “According to native ideas there is no land without owners. What is
now a forest or unused land will, as years go on, come under cultivation
by the subjects of the Stool, or members of the village community, or
other members of the family” (“Fanti Customary Law,” J. M. Sarbah). What
holds good in the Gold Coast is equally applicable to the rivers and to
Lagos, indeed throughout West Africa, wherever Negro culture is met with.
[154] In order, of course, to do away with the idea that there is any
wish or desire on the part of the Government to alienate the land from
the rightful owners thereof.
[155] The amended Lagos Bill exempts from its operation native
customary rights and defers to the authority of the Native Councils
of the hinterland. Its working depends largely, therefore, upon the
interpretation placed by the Colony’s Governor for the time being on the
nature of the relationship between those Councils and the Administration.
Sir W. MacGregor has passed a Bill (the Native Councils Bill) which, he
thinks, will strengthen the position of the Councils. But it is safe to
say that, in all matters affecting land legislation in West Africa, the
procedure for safeguarding native rights, and in their main lines those
rights themselves, should be laid down as clearly as possible in the Act
itself.
[156] For an intelligent native view on the subject the reader is
referred to the speeches of Dr. O. Johnson, Member of the Legislative
Council of Lagos, in moving the rejection of the Amended Forest Ordinance
(May 1902). Dr. Johnson’s status in the Colony may be estimated from
the fact that the extraordinarily able historical address on the native
history of Lagos, delivered by him at the Lagos Institute last year, was
published as a Government paper in the Colony.
[157] Who, for some time past, has individually done much to stimulate
cotton-growing for export in West Africa.
[158] In the manifesto issued by the Association in October there figures
a list of Vice-presidents, headed by Sir Alfred Jones, K.C.M.G., and
including no less than twenty-two members of Parliament, among whom one
notices such well-known names as Winston S. Churchill, R. Yerburgh,
Alfred Emmott, Sir William Mather, Lord Stanley, the Hon. Arthur Stanley,
the Hon. W. R. W. Peel, C. A. Cripps, K.C. J. H. Whitley, Sir J. Leigh,
&c.
[159] Moloney.
[160] Secretary of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce.
[161] The cotton-producing capacities of Northern Nigeria have already
been commented upon.
[162] The _Deutsche Togo-gesellschaft_.
[163] And as with cotton, so with rice—the Songhays were great
rice-growers, and _Gao_, or Gago, their ancient capital, is said to mean
rice in the Songhay language.
[164] Sir Alfred Jones has voluntarily offered to carry cotton from West
Africa freight free for two years, and I understand that Mr. Woermann, of
the line of that name, has agreed to ship a considerable quantity of Togo
cotton free of charge.
[165] And where the enterprise has been carried out on the household
labour plan, which has been compared to the peasant proprietary system.
[166] Chemical manure has been supplied free by manufacturers of the
article. An exhibit of cloths manufactured with Togo cotton has been held
at Dusseldorf, &c.
[167] Sir H. Johnston’s and Mr. Grogan’s discoveries have recently
emphasised this fact.
[168] Now Southern Nigeria.
[169] And, say the merchants engaged in the trade, to high freights.
[170] The American demand is, I understand, increasing.
[171] C. O. Report, No. 348.
[172] For a technical explanation read the following: “The extremely high
prices obtained here for figured logs have naturally excited shippers,
especially native traders, and all are desirous to learn what constitutes
figure.... This is a subject difficult to elucidate, but we may say that
‘roe’ may be described as the curved direction the grain of the wood
takes by one ring overlapping the other; to be of any value, beyond
ordinary plain wood, it must be of a very pronounced and bold character.
This gives the required variation of light and shade.”
[173] The conversion of several hundred natives to Islam at Jebu-Ode, one
of the large Yoruba centres in close proximity to Lagos, and where the
Church has laboured for years, is a recent incident which points in the
direction stated.
[174] _Tarik._
[175] Kanem at the time ruled over what was known later as Bornu.
[176] Makrizi attributes the introduction of Islam into Kanem to Hadi el
Othman, who was probably of Fulani origin, although Makrizi does not say
so.
[177] Timbuctoo was not founded until about seventy years after the
conversion of Za Kasai.
[178] The theory which gives an Eastern origin to Mohammedan proselytism
in Kanem seems unworthy of consideration.
[179] The manatee is the _ayu_ of the Fulani, and its signification—viz.
that of a mythical creature living in the water and dragging any one in
who sees it—seems to argue the existence of an ancient superstition.
In various parts of the Niger and Binue this strange animal is still
regarded with a certain awe, which, however, does not prevent it from
being slaughtered, both for its flesh and skin. The Soninke legend of the
water serpent, which each year claimed the handsomest girl of the village
as a victim, would seem to bear a distinct relation to this, the former
_ayu_ worship of the Songhays.
[180] Binger suggests that the word Mande, or Mandingo, is derived from
the same root as manatus, and signifies the people of a country where the
manatus is worshipped.
[181] “Mungo Park.” Joseph Thomson. The “World’s Greatest Explorers”
series.
[182] Palgrave’s “Arabia,” vol. i. p. 372.
[183] “Niger and Yoruba Notes,” January 1900.
[184] A native of the Western Sudan.
[185] Blyden.
[186] It has been pointed out to me that the Muslim teachers in this
mosque do not teach reading, but only the Slate-pattern. That simply
shows that Islam in West Africa is capable of being much improved, and
should be moulded, if possible, on Western lines of thought; but it does
not affect the main argument in the least.
[187] Captain Morrison’s report, issued by the Government of the French
Sudan.
[188] For instance, read the following passages in “Pilkington of
Uganda” (C. F. Harford Battersby). “This is the lost truth, the loss of
which gave Satan the opportunity of introducing both Mohammedanism and
Popery.... They (the Waganda) have learnt to contend with the three forms
of darkness which they will meet in Africa: Heathenism, Mohammedanism,
and Popery.” And again: “Does it not seem as if the French Mission is
just God’s appointed instrument to complete the confusion of Rome in
Uganda?”
[189] Le Chatelier.
[190] The nineteenth century.
[191] The nineteenth century.
[192] It is a remarkable fact, frequently borne witness to, that an
unarmed Muslim Negro can travel without molestation through vast
stretches of country in Africa, a privilege denied to his Christianised
compatriot.
[193] “Esclavage, Islamisme, et Christianisme.”
[194] Affecting in many parts the laws and customs of the people in
respect to native land tenure.
[195] “Le Sénégal: la France dans l’Afrique Occidentale.”
[196] Negro medical men—I mean qualified medical men—of whom there are
a few in West Africa, emphatically corroborate this: and they bring a
great many arguments, founded upon actual experience, in support of the
contention.
[197] An ecclesiastic well known in the African field, and for whose
really wonderful labours I entertain the highest respect and admiration,
informed me only the other day that, within his personal cognisance,
over 150 couples had been married in Liberia by a certain minister,
in a certain district, within a period of five years; and that the
total number of births up to date was five, and the survivals two. My
reverend friend found in that striking fact (for the truth of which he
vouched, and he is a truthful man) a justification of his view that a
large proportion of Liberians, that is to say, the descendants of the
blacks from the States, led indolent and unhealthy lives. To my mind, it
conveys an eloquent demonstration, that _on West African soil_ monogamy
for the Negro spells race extinction. Naturally my friend would not
admit the conclusion, although in his heart of hearts I believe he is
rather troubled on the subject. But he recognised—and admitted—in course
of conversation that polygamy was a question which the Church, in her
work among tropical peoples, had now to resolutely face and earnestly
discuss. There is, I fear, no doubt that the monogamist—or professing
monogamist—Liberians are, like the Waganda, dying out.
[198] Politically, the same attitude is adopted by the British
authorities; and in the case of the Sierra Leone Hut-tax war, and
the Forest Ordinances in Lagos, it has been sought to divorce the
educated—and mainly, professing Christian—element of the coast from
community of thought, sympathy, and common racial feelings with the
non-educated, and mainly pagan or Mohammedan, element of the interior.
[199] “As soon as half a dozen missionaries leave Liverpool,” writes the
same authority, Archbishop Dobson, “no end of a stir is made about the
devoted party, and so forth. I do not mean to be sarcastic about the
missionaries, but it does make one a trifle ashamed at times to meet a
stalwart trader hereabouts on an occasion, who has been coming here off
and on for twenty years, and his chief business is palm-oil, and his best
view a mangrove swamp.”
[200] It is even admitted to be harmful by Sir Alfred Jones, whose
steamers carry a large proportion of this liquor to West Africa, and
by a large proportion of the merchants who deal in it. The merchants
are sometimes violently attacked on account of this trade. Personally,
I detest the West African liquor traffic. I look upon it in the same
light as the opium traffic in the Far East—a blot upon the escutcheon
of Christian Europe. But those who denounce the merchants might just
as well, and more logically, denounce the Governments. _Per se_ the
liquor traffic is not a lucrative trade to the merchant, but to the
local administrations on the coast it is the backbone of revenue. I was
never able to share the late Miss Kingsley’s views on this subject,
while fully agreeing with her as to the inanity of making the merchants
the scapegoats of an evil the responsibility for which is, in a sense,
universal. Despite anything that may be said to the contrary, I shall
believe that a powerful factor in determining Miss Kingsley’s views was
the knowledge that, but for the existence of the liquor traffic as a
supplier of revenue, direct taxation would be substituted throughout
British West Africa owing to the extravagance of the Crown Colony system;
and I know that Miss Kingsley strongly objected to the introduction of
European spirits into the interior regions by means of the railways. The
liquor question would require a special chapter to adequately discuss.
[201] He will, no doubt, be edified to learn that the Cape Government has
found it necessary to pass a law imposing a severe term of imprisonment
upon white _women_ convicted of sexual intercourse with the natives—a
circumstance not precisely calculated to increase his respect for our
Christian civilisation.
[202] Captain—now Commandant—Binger has for some little time past been
in charge of the African Department of the French Colonial Office. His
travels, books, and pamphlets are familiar to every student of Western
Africa.
[203] It would seem now that they have temporarily prevailed with the
Government.
[204] In the Sokoto Empire (Hausa States) more particularly.
[205] They did it so well that, after the failure of their attack upon
the French camp, they denuded the country of supplies and reduced the
expedition to terrible straits for a time.
[206] The fall predicted, and officially foreseen, in 1901 has come
about, owing to the rubber crisis. The measures taken during the last
fifteen months to stimulate fresh industries in the country, and the
advance of the railway, will, no doubt, make themselves felt in the next
two or three years.
[207] For the Lagos exports and expenditure, see Appendix.
[208] C.O. Report. 1900.
[209] “Rapport d’ensemble.” Dahomey, 1900.
[210] For 1902, on a total estimated expenditure of £121,560, Dahomey
provides £32,000 for the railway and £11,911 for public works ordinary
or, say, a total of £43,911 for railway and public works.
[211] The following statistics of the export trade of Dahomey, compiled
from figures recently obtained, are interesting:
QUANTITIES IN KILOS.
(1015 kilos to the ton.)
Palm-kernels. Palm-oil.
1898 18,091,312 6,059,539
1899 21,850,982 9,650,081
1900 21,986,043 8,920,359
1901 24,211,614 11,290,658
First quarter 1902 6,972,297 3,488,766
_Ibid._ 1901 4,768,050 1,993,520
[212] See Appendix.
[213] It is worthy of note that the French Government authorises the
Administration of the several West African colonies to make their own
agreements for railway construction.
[214] So far as the heavier duties charged on spirits in Lagos are
concerned, the fact is distinctly to the credit of Lagos.
[215] There is a very curious circumstance connected with the ground-nut
trade. All the ground-nuts go to the Continent—both from Senegal and
Gambia—the oil extracted, therefrom, or the bulk of it, is used in making
margarine, which is subsequently consumed, to a very large extent,
by the English people! Why have we not our own crushing-mills? Is it
because we are short of milk? It cannot but strike one as peculiar and
unfortunate that we should send our West African ground-nuts to France,
and afterwards buy from the French the oil the nuts yield for our own
consumption! Ground-nuts will grow anywhere in West Africa, and the
labour involved in cultivating them is very small.
[216] Belgian syndicates have been trying, and are still trying, to
get hold of the French Ivory Coast goldfields. Hitherto they have been
defeated by the vigilance of the French merchants; but there is no
knowing what may happen in view of the extraordinary influence which King
Leopold appears to wield over the French official world.
[217] “Sur des traces probables de civilisation Egyptienne et d’hommes de
race blanche à la Côte d’Ivoire.” Masson & Cie., Paris. A pamphlet which
ought to be read by all students of West Africa.
[218] Specie is usually included in the trade figures—a very misleading
practice.
[219] Sir David Chalmers’ report, p. 169.
[220] Like the Susus, for example, who are very numerous in French
Guinea, but of whom a few only have settled in the British Protectorate
adjoining.
[221] Let it not be imagined that the contrast here made between French
political action in Dahomey and British political action in Ashanti
implies approval of direct taxation _per se_. It is ever a dangerous
experiment in West Africa, especially with pagans, even if conquest has
supervened. If the system under which the taxes are collected is not
carefully watched, grave abuses are almost certain to follow. Quite
recently rumours of oppression in the taxation of the natives in Upper
Dahomey have appeared in the French Press. What truth there may be in
them I do not know. But it is true, I believe, that the excellent staff
whom Governor Ballot gathered round him has left the Colony since Ballot
left it, and has been replaced by less experienced and less competent
material.
[222] Last Ashanti Blue Book, 1902.
[223] See Note in Appendix.
[224] See the evidence of Lieutenant-Colonel Gore, Colonial Secretary for
Sierra Leone. Sir David Chalmers’ report.
[225] Between July 1894 and February 1898 no fewer than sixty-two
convictions—admittedly representing a small proportion of offences
actually committed—were recorded against them for flogging, plundering,
and generally maltreating the natives.
[226] One of the pet arguments of the authorities consists in invoking
the benefits which have accrued to the people of the Protectorate since
the passing of the Protectorate Ordinance in the matter of putting down
the slave trade. For these benefits the natives, says officialdom, ought
to be delighted to pay a tax. Possibly they would have paid it in time,
more or less willingly, had they been approached in a different spirit.
But, so far as the slave trade is concerned, the argument is singularly
weakened by the circumstance that Sir F. Cardew publicly declared in
1895 that the slave traffic had “practically disappeared within the
Protectorate.”
[227] The French West African Company, _Cie française de l’Afrique
Occidentale_, is the largest French firm of African merchants in West
Africa. Founded in 1887 with a capital of 7,000,000 francs; total
turn-over in 1899, 22,000,000 francs; factories in Senegal, French and
Portuguese Guinea, Gambia, Sierra Leone, Lagos, and Ivory Coast.
[228] In 1900, 39,874,005 francs; in 1901, 43,965,950 francs.
[229] The same game was tried with the Germans in Cameroons. To quote
from an article in the _National Zeitung_, which, as I have reason to
know, may be accepted as authorised: “If in the Congo State itself the
Berlin Act could be disregarded in this way, and the natives obliged to
bring in the produce against their will, why could it not also be done
in other places? And as the Congo State was itself making the best use
of its monopoly, and only gave concessions to others at high prices, the
monopolists tried, and not without result, to obtain the same state of
affairs both in France and in Germany. In Germany, the German Colonial
Society at once protested against this state of affairs. In spite of
this, however, several of the Belgian capitalists were able to obtain the
help of influential German persons, who obtained from the Government the
concession of South Cameroon. This company had obtained the assistance
of Colonel Thys for its operations on the Brussels Stock Exchange, and
immediately after the flotation of the company the shares were driven up
to two or three times their value. Further concessions in the free-trade
zone were not conceded, and, with the exception of the North-West
Cameroon concession, in consequence of the energetic opposition in
colonial circles, no further concessions were, or will be, made in the
German territories. The German Government has entirely abandoned this
policy of concessions.”
[230] It is, of course, no easy matter to get at the precise
constitution of these companies, but the following example of one of
the “groups” is typical of the majority of them. _Comptoir Colonial
français._ Parent company: head offices, Paris; has founded at least six
Concessionnaire Companies, of a total capital of 9,650,000 francs; Board
of Administration numbers six directors, of whom three are Belgians;
two-thirds of the shares held in Belgium; two of the Belgian directors
are directors of the four _Domaine Privé_ Companies in the Congo State,
whose profits are shared by the State (read the King); the third also
belongs to the Congo clique; among the Belgian shareholders are other
directors of these same _Domaine Privé_ Companies, all men enjoying
the confidence of, and closely connected with, the Sovereign of the
Congo State. One of the six Concessionnaire Companies of this “group”
has specially distinguished itself in the persecution to which British
merchants have been subjected—discussed in the next chapter.
[231] Some light has been thrown upon its African chapters by Mr. R. E.
Dennett, an Englishman in French Congo, and a recognised authority on the
Fjort peoples, in “West Africa.”
[232] I should say now, ex-Deputy.
[233] “Une idée domine l’ensemble du système, tous les produits du
territoire, concédé quels qu’ils soient, sont la propriété de la Société
Concessionnaire. Seuls les agents de cette Société ont le droit de les
recueillir ou de les acheter des indigènes qui les ont récoltés; ces
derniers ne pouvant disposer librement que des produits des reserves qui
leur ont été spécialement attribuées et sur lesquelles je reviendrai, et
devant en thèse générale, lorsqu’ils s’emparent d’un produit quelconque
du sol en dehors de ces reserves, les remettre aux concessionnaires dont
l’intérêt bien entendu, est de remunérer ensuite leur travail.”
[234] “Les indigènes ont droit aux superficies qui leur sont nécessaires
pour les cultures vivrières correspondantes aux besoins de leur
alimentation. On peut leur attribuer une certaine étendue de forêt
nécessaire à leurs besoins de chauffage et de construction, mais ils
n’ont pas droit a réclamer des forêts domaniales _dans le but de
faire commerce de leurs produits naturels_ et de constituer ainsi une
concurrence ruineuse pour le concessionnaire” (Art. 18).
[235] The French Government has recently voted De Brazza an annual
pension of 10,000 francs.
[236] “Concessions Congolaises.” By Albert Cousin, Membre du Conseil
Supérieur des Colonies. Paris: Augustin Chalamel.
[237] An English trader, Mr. Walker, was the first to do so. He is
admitted by French writers to have discovered the Ogowe.
[238] Messrs. John Holt & Co. and Messrs. Hatton & Cookson, both of
Liverpool, and both connected with the West African Trade for upwards of
half a century. Mr. John Holt is probably the most enterprising pioneer
of Britain’s trade in West Africa, possessing trading stations in most of
the British and Foreign West African Colonies. He is the vice-chairman
of the African Trade Section of the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce, and
very few men living have so wide a grasp of West African questions or so
profound a knowledge of West African problems.
[239] Whose existence was unknown in England until towards the end of
last year.
[240] Seizure of British goods on public roads; breaking open of British
factories; flogging of British native agents, &c.
[241] Notably that most excellent monthly, _Le Bulletin du Comité
de l’Afrique française_, through the instrumentality of the two
distinguished thinkers and writers who dictate its policy, Count Robert
de Caix and M. Auguste Terrier.
[242] Forty tons of ebony, bought in the usual way by a British firm on
the Congo and shipped to Havre in a French ship, were seized at that
port (1902) on a mandate of a Concessionnaire Company. This produce has,
however, now been restored.
[243] The Foreign Office was warned as far back as the beginning of 1898
by the Manchester Chamber of Commerce of the danger of the possible
inauguration of a system of territorial monopolies. Lord Salisbury said
it would receive “our most earnest attention,” and admitted inferentially
that in fiscal questions England had, as a free-trade country, “inferior”
means of influencing other countries; “with the occasional exception,”
added his lordship, “of territorial concessions, we have no means
whatever of persuasion.” Nevertheless, in the purely fiscal question
which formed the principal object of the Deputation of Chambers of
Commerce to Lord Salisbury on this occasion, that of the differential
tariff in the French possessions, Lord Salisbury was able to get his
own way, simply by persuasion, by “influencing France’s ideas.” Yet in
this matter of the French Congo Concessions, in which the purely fiscal
question does not enter at all, and where we have an international treaty
to work on, Lord Lansdowne has been unable to prevent the expulsion of
British merchants from an internationally free-trade zone!
[244] The _Morning Post_, the _Manchester Guardian_, the _Liverpool Daily
Post_, and _West Africa_.
[245] The German merchants, despairing of obtaining even the most
elementary justice, have evacuated the territory. Our merchants have
chosen the nobler part of making a stand for their rights, guaranteed
under international law.
[246] To which must now be added the somewhat similar Rabinek affair—an
Austrian subject arrested and “removed” by the Congo State in the Katanga
district under circumstances analogous, in some measure, to the case of
Mr. Stokes.
[247] The other day the then French Parliamentary representative of
Senegal, in a speech to his constituents at St. Louis, warned them that
the greatest danger threatening their hinterland, the French Sudan, was
King Leopold of Belgium and his monopolist gang.
[248] At the great “Colonial Congress” held in Berlin on October 11,
Consul Vohsen moved a resolution, unanimously carried, calling upon the
Powers to institute proceedings for the revision of the Berlin Act.
Consul Vohsen said: “From the very first the Congo State, and recently
France in the French Colony of French Congo, have acted against the
principles laid down in the Congo Act.” ... Referring to the Congo
State, he continued: “All so-called countries ‘not occupied by natives’
situated in the Free Trade zone were, as far back as July 1885, declared
the property of the State, and in the year 1892 heavy taxes were imposed
upon the rubber trade, which was entirely prohibited in parts of the
Free Trade zone. The consequence was that the freedom of trade and
commerce guaranteed by the Congo Act was practically abolished. The first
condition of freedom of trade for the nations is freedom to the natives,
in such a way as to leave them free to dispose of the natural products
of the soil and of the chase; which state of affairs existed before the
passing of the Act in all French, English, and German colonies in West
Africa, and exists to-day, with the exception of the territories of the
Congo State and the French Congo, the very colonies where, strange to
say, free trade is insisted upon by Articles I. and V. of the Act.”
[249] Among the supporters of the Mansion House meeting of May 15
(held under the auspices of the Aborigines Protection Society) were
Mr. John Morley, Sir J. Kennaway, Earl Spencer, the Marquis of Ripon,
Lord Avebury, Mr. Lecky, M.P., Sir Edward Clarke, K.C., Sir W. Brampton
Gurdon, M.P., K.C.M.G., Sir Charles Dilke, M.P., Sir Mark J. Stewart,
M.P., Mr. James Bryce, M.P., Mr. W. S. Robson, M.P., and other
politicians of both parties. Five Chambers of Commerce, the African
Society, and the German Colonial Society were represented, and Dr. Alfred
Zimmermann, _attaché_ to the German Embassy in London, also attended.
[250] Commandant Binger’s views are well known. M. Cousturier (Governor
of French Guinea), in his report on French Guinea for 1901, does not
conceal his adverse opinion of Belgian methods of collecting rubber in
the Congo State.
The author could produce documentary evidence showing that similar
opinions are held by other well-known French officials in West Africa.
[251] Belgium, Great Britain, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy and
Russia sent delegates to the conference.
[252] This was done with the exception of England.
[253] Diego Cam.
[254] The original title had by this time been changed to that of
“International Congo Association.”
[255] The point is brought out very clearly by Mr. Dennet, our only
authority on the Fjort Kingdom of Congo, and the author of several books
concerning the Fjort, in a series of interesting letters published
last year in “West Africa.” Mr. Dennet, who has lived twenty-two years
consecutively in the Lower Congo, positively declares that the treaties
made by the Association, and referred to by General Sandford, had no
validity whatever in native law.
[256] In his report on the Congo State for 1898, Consul Pickersgill
concludes a long enumeration of the taxes levied upon independent trade
by the following humorous passage:
“I may sum up this portion of my remarks by quoting the jocose
observations of the English and American missionaries, who declared to
me that there is nothing free in the Independent State, except fevers;
while a Belgian Father with whom I had some conversation on the subject,
remarked: ‘The Government taxes even the civilisation we bring.’”
[257] Who held the monopoly of the ivory trade in the Upper Congo, which
the Congo State, by exterminating them with the aid of its cannibal
soldiery (see Hinde’s “Fall of the Congo Arabs”), became possessed of.
[258] See Mr. Herbert Ward’s “Five Years with the Congo Cannibals,” p.
297.
[259] The whole paragraph might have been written a few weeks, instead
of eleven years, ago. The state of affairs pictured by Colonel Williams
has worsened instead of bettered. The evil is more widespread and the
means of perpetuating it more extensive and more powerful. Read in this
connection the latest revelations by Mr. Canisius and Captain Burrows.
[260] The importance of the 10 per cent. import duty was purposely
exaggerated. The amount derived therefrom was trifling. The merchants
objected to it on principle. As Sir Albert Rollit justly remarked,
“The reason for our opposition is only that they (the import duties)
would infringe the great principle of freedom of commerce, which was
the very basis of the programme of the Berlin Conference.” It is quite
clear, however, that the majority of the merchants also opposed the
import duties from a vague distrust of the king’s ultimate intentions, a
distrust which events proved to be only too well founded.
[261] The map published by the African Society in the May (1902) issue of
its Journal may be consulted with advantage in this respect.
[262] Among whom might be mentioned Augouard, Hinde, Glave, Morrison,
Hawkins, Sheppard, Andrew, Sjöblom, Alfred Parminter, De Mandat-Grancy,
Rankin, Murphy, Lloyd, Grogan, and many others, without counting Belgian
authorities—more numerous than all foreigners put together.
[263] At the present moment heavy fighting is going on in the Welle
district, due, as I have reason to know, to the usual rubber taxes. The
facts as to this particular rising may, happily, have been made public
before the publication of the present volume.
[264] The regular army—_Force Publique_—of the Congo State is admitted
officially (Bulletin, July 1900) to be 15,000, but we know that in
addition to this regular force—15,000 cannibals armed with Albinis,
sections of whom are continually revolting—the State habitually arms,
whenever it deems necessary, thousands of irregulars, cannibals for
choice (see the letter written in October 1899 to the king by the acting
head of the American Presbyterian Mission in the Kassai district). There
is also a large reserve corps, but the extent of it is not known.
[265] It may be usefully noted here that the _impôts de nature_ are
applied by the Congo State in the so-called Free Trade Zone as well as
in the _Domaine Privé_, and until the Kassai district was incorporated
in the _Domaine Privé_ many and bitter were the complaints by companies
operating in the former zone of the unfair competition to which they were
subjected by the levying of this tribute. Instances have been given by
some of these irate traders where the State’s officials have threatened
the natives with condign punishment if they did not hand over all their
rubber to the said officials. An arrangement has recently been concluded
between the State and the Kassai companies—the Kassai district was
the only portion of the Upper Congo where independent trade had been
allowed—whereby the Kassai companies have amalgamated into a syndicate
_in which the State holds one half the interest_. To all intents and
purposes, therefore, the Kassai has now been incorporated in the _Domaine
Privé_, WHICH HENCEFORTH EMBRACES THE WHOLE OF THE CONGO STATE NORTH OF
STANLEY POOL.
[266] Both these facts have been repeatedly asserted. They were proved
beyond manner of doubt last year by the disclosures attendant upon the
Mongolla scandals, in which agents of the _Société Anversoise_ were
involved.
[267] Seven, if we include the Kassai Trust recently formed.
[268] Baron A. Goffinet is “Conseiller de Légation, Secrétaire des
Commandements de leurs MM. le Roi et la Reine, Major de l’Etat, Major de
la Garde Civique, Aide-de-camp, Ministre Résident.” Baron C. Goffinet is
“Conseiller de Légation, Intendant de la Liste Civile du Roi, Ministre
Résident, Major de la Garde Civique.”
[269] I have quite recently received from another correspondent in the
Congo the photograph here reproduced.
[270] “Abir (Société à responsabilité limitée) Statuts.” Anvers:
Imprimerie Ratinckx Frères, Grand Place, 40-42.
[271] “Comptoir Commercial Congolais (Société à responsabilité limitée)
Statuts.” Anvers: Imprimerie Ratinckx.
[272] “Compagnie du Lomami (Société Anonyme) Statuts.” Bruxelles: P.
Weissenbruch, Imprimerie du Roi, 45 rue du Poincon.
[273] In chapter xxviii. I referred to the constitution of the _Comptoir
Colonial français_, which has managed to secure for its subsidiaries such
a respectable slice of French Congo. Well, Alexis Mols is one of the
Administrators, and so is A. Osterrieth, a shareholder in the _Abir_, and
so is A. Lambrechts, also a shareholder in the _Abir_, &c. &c.
[274] I am afraid Sir H. M. Stanley was somewhat premature when, in 1884,
he told the London Chamber of Commerce that people “could not appreciate
rightly” King Leopold’s philanthropy, because there were “no dividends
attaching to it.”
[275] Whip made out of hippo hide—the Congo _sjambok_.
[276] Or was until quite recently.
[277] In Congo circles in Belgium it is suggested that to guard against
“attacks which might become too threatening” (by “attacks” is meant
exposures in the public Press, and on public platforms in England and
Germany) the Congo State should largely increase its standing army.
[278] The author, who may claim to have brought the Rabinek affair to
light, is able to state that the British Government is causing specific
inquiries to be made through its representatives in Central Africa in
connection with the matter. See Appendix.
[279] The trade of the Lower Congo has sensibly diminished since the
Congo State came into existence. On August 10 of last year the merchants
established in the Lower Congo (of whom there remain a few) petitioned
the king to reduce taxation. After pointing out the heavy import and
export duty on goods and produce (20_s._ per ton on palm-oil, for
instance) and showing how small the existing export trade already was,
owing to the taxes and emigration of native labour, due to “the means
employed in raising native levies,” the petitioners went on to say:
“We do not disguise from ourselves that business in the Lower Congo is
practically _nil_.... Each of us,” continues the petition, “consistently
hopes for an increase in trade; but these hopes appear to us more and
more unreliable, and the Government of the Congo State, instead of coming
to aid us, imposes increased and too onerous taxes.”
[280] The figures for 1900 are based upon the known sale on the Antwerp
market by the State brokers in 1900 of 1828 tons of rubber and 153,445
kilos. of ivory, worked out at an average of 6 francs per kilo. for
rubber (1115 kilos, to the ton) and 18 francs per kilo, for ivory. I
believe a proportion of the produce imported was held in stock on account
of the poor state of the rubber market.
[281] “There is no trade, properly so called,” says Mr. Codrington, “on
the Congo coast of Tanganyika, but all rubber and ivory is regarded as
the property of the State, and has to be surrendered by the natives in
fixed quantities annually. The natives are, however, continually in
rebellion, and the country is unsafe, except in the immediate vicinity
of the military garrisons, and within the sphere of influence of the
missionaries.”
[282] As was anticipated, the acquirement from Spain for purposes of
exploitation of a portion of the Muni territory (which was recently
handed over to Spain by France) by the Belgian “clique” has been followed
by the usual results. A correspondent, whose name commands universal
respect, and who is in a position to speak _de visu_ on the subject,
wrote to an English friend recently that “atrocities” were going merrily
on; natives being shot down, and villages burnt in the course of “ivory
collecting” by the Belgian concessionnaires; “outrages on the villagers
are indiscriminate,” the writer adds. The same “clique” is threatening
Fernando Po.
[283] Apart from the large quantities of rifles, cap-guns, and
ammunition imported into the Congo State for the arming and equipment
of the soldiers, regular and irregular, it is morally certain, although
not easy to prove, that the agents of the State and the agents of
the _Domaine Privé_ Companies encourage some of the biggest and
most powerful chiefs of the Upper Congo to obtain ivory for them by
presents of repeating-rifles and ammunition. In this connection a M.
Léon. C. Berthier, writing from the French Upper Congo to the Paris
organ _La Dépêche Coloniale_ (issue July 16, 1902), says: “The M’Bomu
(a branch of the Upper Ubanghi, which forms the frontier between the
French and Congolese possessions, and which pursues its course to the
Bahr-el-Ghazal), here very wide, forms the southern base of the square;
this is the route where the ivory passes _sous notre barbe_ to be sold
to the Belgians on the other bank, _who pay for it in Albini rifles_,
notwithstanding all the Acts of Berlin and Brussels, which forbid even
the sale of percussion-cap guns!” The writer goes on to assert that he
has documents to prove his statements.
[284] Mary Kingsley, in the “Story of West Africa.”
[285] Excluding specie. The figures are taken from the Parliamentary
Report, June 1902.
[286] _Sierra Leone Royal Gazette_, April 18th, 1902.
[287] Estimated. Appropriation Ordinance, 1902.
[288] “Railways and Telegraphs,” Appropriation Ordinance, 1902.
[289] Colonial Office Report, No. 324. On page 8 of the same Report the
figures a given as £29,126 18s. 7d. I cannot explain the difference.
[290] _Sierra Leone Royal Gazette_, April 18th, 1902.
[291] _Idem._
[292] Estimated.
[293] The figures for 1900 do not include the expenses of the Ashanti
expedition.
[294] Including exports of specie.
[295] Ordinary for 1897, 1898, 1899 and 1900; extraordinary for 1897,
1898 and 1899.
[296] Sir Matthew Nathan’s report on the Northern Territories (No.
357—issued July 1902) says: “The expenditure in 1901 has not yet been
completely estimated.” Farther on he estimates the expenditure for 1902
at £52,381 11s. 7d. The expenditure is, therefore, largely increasing.
The above amount includes £23,038 11s. 7d. or military purposes.
[297] According to Lieutenant-Colonel Morris (C.O. Report, No. 35) the
revenue in 1901 was £7415 4s. 3d. It was estimated at £8000; and the
estimate for 1902 is also £8000.
[298] Including £97,769 paid back to the Imperial Government for cost of
expenditure on Ashanti expedition.
[299] Official statement, dated March 1902:—1st section, 39¼ miles long,
open to traffic; and section, of 9¾ miles, “approaching completion.”
[300] Colonial Office Report, No. 344:—Sum borrowed to end 1900,
apparently £798,000 (£220,000, 1898; £578,000, 1899).
[301] _Idem._
[302] Railway development, £578,000; harbour works at Accra, £98,000.
[303] Estimated.
[304] Colonial Office Report, No. 348.
[305] _Idem._
[306] If for re-sale.
[307] _Idem._
[308] One mile—1609 metres.
[309] In 1901 there was an increase of 4600 tons of palm oil and kernels
exported compared with the previous year.
[310] Wallach.
[311] Late Lieutenant-Colonel Northcote’s estimate. It does not include
the portion of the Anglo-German neutral territory, which is eventually to
be incorporated within the British sphere, according to the Anglo-German
Convention of November 1899.
[312] The principal towns of the Protectorate are Ibadan (population
180,000), Abbeokuta (population 150,000), Oyo (population 50,000).
[313] If we assume the population of Northern Nigeria to be 30 millions,
this gives us a rough total, exclusive of Ashanti, of 33,218,324
inhabitants to 645,000 square miles of territory; or not far short of the
population of France, in a territory as large as France and Germany, with
a good half of Austria-Hungary thrown in.
INDEX
Abbeokuta, 199
Abderrahman ben Abdallah ben Imran ben Amir Es-Sa’di, 130
_Abir_, _see_ Congo State
Aborigines Protection Society, 185
Abutshi, 119
Abyssinia, _see_ Christianity
Adamawa, 57, 61, 95, 128, 180
African Association, 28, 38
African Oil Mills Co., 79
Agoult, Comte d’, 290
Agricultural Committee, _see_ German
Ahmed-Baba, 55, 130
Air, 53, 54
Akassa, 56, 75
Allen, Commander, 94, 103
Alvensleben, Count, 176
Amageddi, 111
Anglo-French Convention, _see_ Treaties
-German Convention, _see_ Treaties
-Portuguese Convention, _see_ Treaties
Angola, 193, 241
Ansorge, Dr., 181
Anton, Dr., 344
_Anversoise_, _see_ Congo State
Apis, 146
Ashanti, 14, 19, 68, 104, 135, 205, 280, 281
Assay, 76
Assinie, 204, 271
Atani, 75
Axim, 204
Baghena, 131, 132
Baghirmi, 57, 258, 259, 262
Bakundi, Lake, 111
Bakunu, 130
Ballay, Dr., 87, 114, 274
Ballot, Governor, 280
Bambarras, 53, 129, 180, 215
Bamboo-palm, 116, 117
Bambuk, 133
Bangalas, 330, 339
Banyo, 111
Baobab, 116
Barbot, 271
Barros, de, 133
Barth, Dr., 40, 44, 52, 54, 55, 59, 60, 62, 70, 71, 72, 118, 126,
131, 133, 136, 209, 214, 221
Basset, Serge, 290
Bathurst, 162
Earl, 39
Battel, Andrew, 241
Bayol, Dr., 139
Belgian policy in West Africa, 176, 307, 311, _see also_ Congo State
Belgians in French Congo, 288, 307
on Muni River, 307, 350
Belgium, King Leopold of, _see_ Congo State
Bello, Emir, 36, 46, 49, 50, 51, 53, 59, 150
Benin, 68, 105, 204
Berlin, Act of, _see_ Treaties
Béthancourt, De, 239
Bilma, 42, 58, 67
Binger, Commandant, 133, 211, 220, 239, 240, 249, 271, 309
Binue, 109, 111, 113, 118, 119, 148, 211, 257
Biru, _see_ Walata
Bismarck, 250, 317
Blyden, Dr., 130, 139, 149, 213, 214, 222, 226, 227, 245, 276
Bohn, M., 173, 247, _see also_ French West African Co.
Bondu, 133, 180
Bonny, 79
Borgu, 9, 49, 251
Bornu, 40, 41, 43, 45, 50, 57, 58, 63, 85, 87, 113, 209, 259
Brass, 79, 80
Brazza, De, 251, 289, 293, 315-316
Bretonnet, Lieut., 259, 260
British Cotton Growing Association, 188, 189, 190
Brown, Dr. Robert, 131
Brüe, Sieur de, 134, 251, 274
Brussels, Act of, _see_ Treaties
Burutu, 64, 75, 76, 86
Bussa, 49, 50
Butter-tree, 114, 115
Ca-de-Mosto, 133
Caix, Count Robert de, 302
Cambyses, 76
Cameroon, 14, 177, 201, 287, 308
Caravan traffic, 41, 62-65
Cardew, Sir F., 283
Cardi, Count de, 80
Cattier, M., 313, 343, 344, 350
Chad, Lake, 38, 41, 42, 43, 48, 58, 63, 67, 70, 118, 136, 256, 259,
260, 262
Chalmers, Sir David, 281, 282
Chama, 204
Chamberlain, Right Hon. Joseph, 12, 25, 59, 169, 278, _see also_
Colonial Office
Christianity, in Abyssinia, 237
in Uganda, 227, 228, 229
in West Africa, 208-37, 256
Clapperton, 35-51, 53, 103, 126, 147, 150
Clarke, Sir Andrew, 83, 258
Clarke, Sir Marshall, 182
Clozel, M., 171, 173, 273
Codrington, Mr. Robert, 349
Colonial Office, 165, 169, 183, 184, 281, 283, _see also_ Chamberlain
_Comptoir Colonial français_, 288, 336
Conakry, 20, 114, 274
Concessions _régime_, _see_ French Congo
Congo State, history of, 312-326
“trade of,” 286, 343-53
taxation in, 327-29, 330, 339, 340, 347, 348
native policy of, 287, 292, 319, 328-29, 337, 345, 352
land policy, 323, 324
commercial policy of, 319, 323, 325, 330, 344, 345
traffic in arms, 351
_Force publique_, 329, 330
_Domaine Privé_, 327-42, 343, 347, 351
privileged Companies in, 330-38
Stokes’ affair, 306
Rabinek affair, 306, 344-49, _see also_ Appendix
and Belgian Parliament, 333-334
on Tanganyika, 349
in Nile Valley, 349
slavery in, 296
influence in France, 271, 287, 288, 289, 310
Copal, _see_ Trade in Gums
Copra, 80
Copts, _see_ Gober
Cotton, 59, 117, 180, 181-200, _see also under_ Trade
Cousin, M. Albert, 294
Cousturier, M., 115, 309
Crampbel, Paul, 259
Crown Agents, _see_ Crown Colony System
Crown Colony system, 12, 13, 16, 17, 22, 31, 32, 33, 85, 87, 89, 92,
93, 184, 186, 235, 269, 281
Crowther, Bishop, 97
Currency, 60, 101
Dahomey, _see under_ French
Dakar, 270
Daw, Mr., J. A., 170, 183
Décrais, M., 285, 291, 302
Degama, 75
Delafosse, 173, 273
Denham, 35-51
Dennett, Mr., 289, 317
Denton, Sir George, 194
Desert, the, 38, 41, 64, 70, 111, 209, 253
Dilke, Sir Charles, 276
Dobson, Archbishop, 233
Donovan, Captain, 170
Dubois, M. Félix, 131, 137, 138
Dufferin, Marquis of, 252
Dybowski, M., 259
Ebony, 117, _see also_ Timber
Edrizi, 55
Egga, 76
Eichtal, M. d’, 132, 140
El Bekri, 55, 209
El-Haji-Omar, 129, 223, 252, 261
El-Kuti, 259
Ellis, A. B., 171
Etienne, Eugène, 250-63
Faidherbe, 143, 226, 243, 250, 252, 263
Fans, 293
Ferry, Jules, 243, 244, 249
Finances of British West Africa, 17, 18; _see also_ Appendix
of Nigeria, 17, 89, 93; _see also_ Appendix
Finances of Lagos, 267; _see also_ Appendix
of Sierra Leone, 274, 275, 284; _see also_ Appendix
of French Colonies, 266, 275; _see also_ Appendix
Flatters, 259
Fondère, M., 294
Forcados, 204
Foreign Office, 14, 26, 303
Foureau, M., 254, 259, 261
Freeman, R. Austin, 104, 201, 271
French, exploration and discovery, 238-48
trade, 4, 5, 265-75
policy, 18, 64, 249-84
in French Guinea, 81, 111, 114, 266, 274, 275, 281-84
in Dahomey, 177, 266, 267, 268, 269
in Chad region, 64, 254, 256, 257, 259, 260-64
in Western Sudan, 196, 251, 256, 257
in Senegal, 76, 81, 266, 269, 270
in French Congo, 177, 201, 263, 285-304
in Ivory Coast, 177, 266, 270, 271, 272, 273
and British, 238-48, _see also under_ Nigeria, French policy, and
French in French Congo
West African Company, 285, _see also_ Bohn
Frey, Colonel, 55
Fulani, origin of, 136-52
history of, 125-29, 130-135
in Yoruba, 125, 126, 135
in Hausa States, 47, 60, 85, 102, 125-30
in Gambia, 130, 134, 141
in Futa-Jallon, 128, 130, 133, 139, 140, 180
in Senegal, 127, 128, 132, 133, 134, 136, 252
in Western Sudan, 128, 147, 148, 253
in Gurma, 134
in Adamawa, 128
in Baghirmi, 262
in Congo Basin, 135
in Segu, 129
in Baghena, 131, 132, 133
in Bornu, 40, 128, 138
in Melle, 131, 132, 133
in Omdurman, 135
in Massina, 129, 134, 214
and Portuguese, 133
and British, 46-50, 152
and French, 134, 147, 148, 152, 252
and Hebrews, 145, 152
characteristics of, 47, 134, 146, 148
religion of, 55, 56, 127, 216, 254
language of, 70, 71, 72, 132
Fula, _see_ Fulani
Fulbe, _see_ Fulani
Fulfalde, _see_ Fulani
Futa-Jallon, 9, 14, 20, 66, 139, 245, 274
Gaboon, 298, 299
Gambia, 19, 134, 194, 196, 197, 242, 269, 278
Gambetta, 243, 244
Gando, 57, 95
Gao, 197, 210
Geary, Sir William, 280
_Générale Africaine, Société_, _see_ Congo State
Gentil, Lieut., 254, 258, 259, 260
German, trade, 4, 5, 74, 75, 193, 196, 199
agricultural committee, 23, 24, 196
Colonial advisory board, 23, 24
German Colonial Society, 29, 308
Ghana, 131
Ghanata, _see_ Walata
Gober, 53, 54, 55, 59, 125, 129
Gold Coast, 12, 13, 18, 25, 57, 183, 194, 204, 245
Gold, _see_ Mining Industry; _also under_ Trade
Goldie, Sir George, 9, 39, 68, 104
Grand Bassam, 204, 273
Green, Mrs. J. R., Foreword
Gregory, Professor, 99, 179
Grogan, Mr. H. S., 178, 179, 181, 202, 349
Ground-nut, _see under_ Trade
Guiraudon, Capt. de, 148-50
Gutta-percha, 116
Hamarua, 113
Hanno, 136, 140, 141, 142, 202
Hatton and Cookson, 300
Hausa Association, 70, 71
language, 54, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73
history, 53, 54
religion, 53, 56, 68
Hausas as manufacturers and traders, 57, 63, 67, 68, 69, 111, 117
as travellers, 57, 69, 111, 116
as soldiers, 68, 69
as slave-owners, 55, 63, 112
relations of with Fulani, 53, 55, 56, 68
Helm, Mr. E., 182
Herodotus, 35, 76
Hess, M. Jean, 290
Holt, Mr. John, 300
Horneman, 38
Houdas, M. O., 130, 132
Hourst, 22, 26
Hut-tax in Sierra Leone, _see under_ Taxation
in French Congo, _see under_ Taxation
Hutton, Mr. Arthur, 11, 20, 188
Hyksos, 140, 142, 143, 145, 146
Ibi, 111
Idah, 76
Igarras, 56, 118
Ilorin, 68, 96
Illushi, 76
Indigo, 117
In Salah, 65
International Congo Association, 309, 314-20
Islam in West Africa, 208-23
in Bornu, 209, 213
in Hausa States, 53, 55, 56, 101, 213, 214, 221
in Baghirmi, 215
in Kanem, 209, 210
in Gambia, 278
in Yoruba, 208
in Adamawa, 214
in Lagos, 213-15
in Sierra Leone, 213-15
in Futa-Jallon, 215
in Western Sudan, 209, 215, 216, 244, 254
in Kong, 220, 221
in French possessions, 215, 216, 278
Ivory Coast, 57, 206, 220, _see also under_ French
Ivory, _see under_ Trade
Jago, Consul, 64
Jalonkes, 128
Jebba, 76, 119
Johnson, Dr. O., 187
Johnston, Sir H., 70, 141, 202, 227, 228, 265, 349
Joloffs, 128, 147
Jones, Sir Alfred, 20, 188, 192, 235
Kanem, 45, 69, 209, 254, 257
Kano, 45, 46, 52, 57, 58, 59, 60, 62-67, 70, 72, 86, 111, 112, 191,
192
Kanuri, 56, 59, 70, 71, 72, 114, 128
Katamansu, battle of, 28
Katanga Co., _see_ Congo State
Katsena, 54, 55, 59, 62, 72
Kingsley, Miss Mary, 86, 124, 141, 171, 173, 232, 235, 266, 276, 353
Koelle, the Rev., 72
Kola, 57, 116
Kontagora, 98
Kotonu, 268
Krause, the Rev., 70
Kuka, 41, 43, 48, 63
Labat, 134, 240
Labour, native, 76, 77, 170-87, 197
Ordinance in Gold Coast, 13
Lagos, 18, 19, 49, 162, 164, 186, 193, 199, 201, 204, 206, 245, 267,
268, 269
Lahou, 204, 271
Lamy, Lieut.-Colonel, 254, 259, 261
Lamy, _see under_ Trade
Lander, Richard, 40, 41, 48, 51
Land-tenure, in West Africa, 170-87
in Sierra Leone, 278
in Ivory Coast, 171
in French Congo, 291, 292
in Congo State, _see_ Congo State
Lansdowne, Lord, 302, 303, 310
Lau, 111
Laveran, 163
Leather-ware, 58, 59, 60
Leo Africanus, 59, 131, 137, 209
Lepsius, Professor, 143
Leucæthiopes, _see_ Fulani
Liberia, 57, 220, 229
Liquor traffic, 179, 235
Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine, 20, 163, _see also_ Ross
Logon River, 43
Lokoja, 76
_Lomami_, _see_ Congo State
London School of Tropical Medicine, 20
Lucas, 38
Lugard, Sir Frederick, 9, 83, 85, 87, 88, 89, 99, 104, 127
Lyon, 38
Macdonald, Sir Claude, 11
MacGregor, Laird, 28, 94
Sir William, 19, 22, 32, 33, 162, 163, 164, 168, 170, 187, 189
Maclaud, Dr., 138
Mahogany, _see under_ Trade (Timber)
Maistre, M., 259
Makrizi, 210
Malaria, 12, 153-69
Manatus, 55, 211
Mandara, 39
Mandingoes, 53, 128, 131, 133, 150, 195, 211
Maritime Zone, 290
Marmol, 133
Maroba, 97
Méline, M., 247
Melle, 131, 132, 195, 210
Mendis, 69, 123, 278
Merchants, British, in West Africa, 8, 22, 23, 25, 30, 238, 239, 246,
252, 257
in French Congo, 286, 291, 298-304, 306
and liquor traffic, 235
German, in West Africa, 23, 24
in French Congo, 291
French, early exploits of, 240-42
in Senegal, 81
in Ivory Coast, 81
Mille, M. Pierre, 81, 330
Mining industry, in Gold Coast, 12, 29, 182-83, _see also_ Appendix
in Ivory Coast, 270-71
Misahöhe, 196
Missionaries, _see_ Christianity
Mitchi, 118
Mohammed-el-Kanemy, 45, 51
Mohammed Lebo, 129
Mohammedans, _see_ Islam
Moloney, Sir Alfred, 203
Mongolia, atrocities in, _see_ Congo States
Monopoly, _see_ Congo State and French in French Congo
Monteil, Lieut.-Colonel, 57, 59, 70, 96, 118, 251
Moor, Sir Ralph, 90
Moore, Francis, 130, 147
Mosis, 9, 131, 251
Mosquitoes, _see_ Malaria
Muni River, 307, 350
Murzuk, 38, 41, 42
Nachtigal, 118
Nathan, Sir Matthew, _see_ Appendix
National African Company, _see_ Niger Company
Natron, 58, 61
Navarette, 239
New Calabar, 79
N’Gaundere, 111
Niger Coast Protectorate, _see_ Nigeria
Niger Company, 9, 67, 75, 88, 90, 91, 95, 96, 111, 112, 118
Niger, _see_ Nigeria
Nigeria, discovery of Northern, 35-51
inhabitants of, 84, 180
trade of, 59, 60-66, 84, 91-93
finances of, 89, 93
administration of, 18, 19, 83-88, 255, 257, 258
forest ordinances in, 184-87
national industry in, 74, 82
and the French, 66, 85
Nikki, 9
Northcott, Lieut.-Colonel, 107, 108
Nupe, 50, 58, 61, 68, 95, 97, 104
Ogowe, 293, 299, 303
Ogute Lake, 75
Old Calabar, 79
Onitsha, 75
Orashe River, 75
Osogbo, 126, 135
Othman Fodio, 45, 53, 55, 57, 125, 126, 129, 222
Oudney, Dr., 35-51
Overweg, 70
Palm-oil industry, in Southern Nigeria, 74-82, 110
in Dahomey, 268
in Lagos, 67, 268
in Sierra Leone, 123, _see also under_ Trade
-kernels industry, in Southern Nigeria, 76
in Dahomey, 268, _see also under_ Trade
in Lagos, 268
Park, Mungo, 36, 37, 150
Paw-paw, 114, 115, 116
Peddie, Major, 37
Peuhl, _see_ Fulani
Pickersgill, Consul, 317
Pilcher, Lieut.-Colonel, 69
Pliny, 35
Polygamy, _see_ Islam
Porto Novo, 268
Portugal and the Congo
and the Fulani, _see_ Fulani
and Great Britain, _see_ Treaties
Portuguese discoveries in West Africa, 239, 240, 259
Church in West Africa, 216, 217, 218
Potash, 118
Prempreh, 26, 280
Prince Henry the Navigator, 240
Ptolemy, 141
Punitive expeditions, 19, 87, 98, 279
Puttkamer, Herr von, 96
Quadriyah, 219, 220
Rabba, 50
Rabah, 63, 64, 256, 258, 259, 261, 262
Rabinek, _see under_ Congo State
Racka, 48, 49, 50
Railways, in British West Africa, 12, 18, 22, 32, 193, 267, 284, _see
also_ Appendix
in French Guinea, 20, 32, 66, 274, _see also_ Appendix
in Dahomey, 66, 267, _see also_ Appendix
in Senegal, 270, _see also_ Appendix
in Northern Nigeria, 8, 66, _see also_ Appendix
Matadi, Stanley Pool, 37, 69, 287, 348, _see also_ Appendix
Reclus, Élisée, 118
Religion, _see_ Christianity and Islam
Richardson, James, 55, 70, 96
Rev. J., 86
Ripon, Marquis of, 12
Ritchie, 38
“Rivers,” the, _see_ Nigeria
Robinson, John A., 70
Canon, 54, 70, 71, 72, 231
Rollit, Sir Albert, 318, 323
Ross, Major R., 20, 152-69
Roume, M., 196
Rubber, in Nigeria, 67, 110, 119-24
in French Congo, 298
in Lagos, 82, 123
Rubber, in Congo State, _see_ Congo State
Russell, Lord John, 94, 103
Sahara, _see_ Desert
Salisbury, Lord, 252, 253, 297, 303
Salmon, C. S., 20, 170
Salt, 58, 62, 167
Samory, 256, 261
Sandford, General, 316
Sangha, 57, 293
Sanitation, 153-69
Sapelli, 117, 204
Sarbah, 171, 184
Schön, 70, 71
Schurz, 98
Sekondi, 204
Senegal, 25, 82, 132, 197, 243, 252, 269, 270, _see also under_ French
Senussi, 64, 257
Sette Camma, 299
Shari, 43, 44, 45, 57, 63, 215, 258, 259, 261
Shea-butter, 113
Sherbro, 82
Shongo, 76
Shuwa, 75, 180, 254, 262
Sierra Leone, 14, 18, 19, 27, 28, 74, 82, 164, 194, 201, 242, 245,
252, 274, 275, 277, 278, 279
Silver, 118
Slavery, in West Africa, 100, 218
over-sea, 228, 255, 297, 298
domestic, 94-109
in Sierra Leone, 283
in Northern Territories of the Gold Coast, 107, 108
in Nupe and Ilorin, 109
in Congo State, 296, _see also_ Congo State
the “New Slavery,” 177, 307, _see also_ Congo State
Slave-raiding, 87, 94-109, 171, 219, 319
Slaves, “White Slaves of England,” 107
Sokoto, treaties with, _see under_ Treaties
under Bello, 41, 45, 47, 49, 50, 126, _see also under_ Fulani
Songhays, 53, 55, 56, 131, 197, 209, 210, 211, 253, 236
Soninkes, 211
Stanley, Sir H. M., 297, 312, 315, 319, 321, 337
Stewart, Captain Donald, 281
Stokes, _see under_ Congo State
Strachan, Dr., 163
Strachir, Monsignor, 227
Strauch, Colonel, 315
Susus, 278, 279
Tanganyika, 349
_Tarik_, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 209, 211, 214
Taxation, in Sierra Leone, 14, 18, 27, 82, 135, 277, 278, 281, 284
in Lagos, 269
in Dahomey, 269, 279, 280
in Ashanti, 279-81
in Gambia, 280
in French Guinea, 274, 277, 278, 281-84
in Congo State, _see_ Congo State
in French Congo, 293, 295, 301
in Hausa States, 127
direct in West Africa, 280
Terrier, Auguste, 262, 302
Thomson, Joseph, 9, 39, 56, 58, 95, 97, 118, 126, 211, 221
Thys, Colonel, 37, 288, 325, 348
Tibati, 111
Tijaniyah, 129, 219
Timber, _see under_ Trade
Timbo, 139
Timbuctoo, 38, 59, 65, 128, 131, 210, 253
Tin, 118
Togoland, 193, 196, 199
Trade, British trade with British West Africa, 2, 3, 4
French West Africa, 4, 5, 6, 297
German West Africa, 4, 5
Portuguese West Africa, 4, 5
Congo State, 297
of Gambia, 4, 194
Gold Coast, 4, _see also_ Appendix
Lagos, 4, 267-69, _see also_ Appendix
Sierra Leone, 284, _see also_ Appendix
of Kano, 60, 61, 62, 65
of Nigeria, 4, 74-82, 91-93
of French possessions, 265-75
of Congo State, 286, 343-53
early in West Africa, 238-48
in ivory, 38, 61, 67, 118, 202, 203, 271, 272, 298
in Gold, 38, 63, 118, 202, 203, 271, _see also_ Mining Industry
and Appendix
in ostrich-feathers, 38
in kola, 57, 116
in benni-seed, 117
in skins, 38, 63
in “lamy,” 115
in timber, 117, 201-207, 271, 272, 298, _see also_ Appendix
in bees-wax, 67
in gums, 67, 112
in shea-butter, 113, 114
in cottons, 59, 67, 111, 269
in palm-oil, 74-82, 110, 268, 272, 298
in palm-kernels, 74-82, 268, 272
in ground-nuts, 76, 81, 194, 269, 270
in rubber, 67, 82, 110, 111, 119-124, 298, 299
piassava, 117
Treaties, Anglo-French, 24, 67, 246, 247
Anglo-German, 111
Anglo-Portuguese, 316, 318, 319
Franco-German, 111
with Fulani Emirs (Sokoto), 9, 85, 86, 95, 97, 257-58
Berlin Act, 177, 297, 299, 300, 301, 303, 306, 307, 308, 314, 318,
319, 321, 323, 343, 344, 345
Brussels Act, 303, 323, 324, 325
of Vienna, 243
Trentinian, Général de, 196
Tripoli, 33, 41, 42, 58, 62, 63, 64, 65, 213
Trotter, Captain, 94, 103
Tuareg, 53, 56, 58, 71, 85, 128, 253, 260
Tuckey, Captain, 37
Tugwell, Bishop, 86
Tukulors, 129, 131, 253, 254
Twin Rivers, 204
Ubanghi, 57, 215, 262
Uganda, 181, 227
United States, 200, 204, 309, 310, 316, 318
Unyoro, 179
Verneau, Dr., 138
Viera, 239
Villadestes, 132
Villaut de Bellefonds, 240
Vohsen, Consul, 308
Volta, 193
Wadai, 57, 64, 254, 257, 263
Wahuma, 144, 180
Wa-Kavirondo, 181
Walata, 131, 133, 134, 137, 209, 210
Waldeck-Rousseau, 244, 285
Washington, Booker T., 199
Wauters, A. J., 312
West African Frontier Force, 86
Western Sudan, 35, 129, 130, 147, 209, 210, 272
Winterbottom, 147
Woermann, 197
Yola, 111, 119
Yoruba, 193
Za Dynasty, 209
Za-Kasai, 209, 210
Zaky, _see_ Othman Fodio
Zanfara, 55
Zaria, 57
Zeg-Zeg, 54, 55
Zimmerman, Dr. A., 175
Printed by BALLANTYNE, HANSON & CO.
London & Edinburgh
*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK AFFAIRS OF WEST AFRICA ***
Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions will
be renamed.
Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright
law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works,
so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United
States without permission and without paying copyright
royalties. Special rules, set forth in the General Terms of Use part
of this license, apply to copying and distributing Project
Gutenberg™ electronic works to protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG™
concept and trademark. Project Gutenberg is a registered trademark,
and may not be used if you charge for an eBook, except by following
the terms of the trademark license, including paying royalties for use
of the Project Gutenberg trademark. If you do not charge anything for
copies of this eBook, complying with the trademark license is very
easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose such as creation
of derivative works, reports, performances and research. Project
Gutenberg eBooks may be modified and printed and given away—you may
do practically ANYTHING in the United States with eBooks not protected
by U.S. copyright law. Redistribution is subject to the trademark
license, especially commercial redistribution.
START: FULL LICENSE
THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE
PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK
To protect the Project Gutenberg™ mission of promoting the free
distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work
(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase “Project
Gutenberg”), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full
Project Gutenberg™ License available with this file or online at
www.gutenberg.org/license.
Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project Gutenberg™
electronic works
1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg™
electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to
and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property
(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all
the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or
destroy all copies of Project Gutenberg™ electronic works in your
possession. If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a
Project Gutenberg™ electronic work and you do not agree to be bound
by the terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person
or entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8.
1.B. “Project Gutenberg” is a registered trademark. It may only be
used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who
agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few
things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg™ electronic works
even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See
paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project
Gutenberg™ electronic works if you follow the terms of this
agreement and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg™
electronic works. See paragraph 1.E below.
1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation (“the
Foundation” or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection
of Project Gutenberg™ electronic works. Nearly all the individual
works in the collection are in the public domain in the United
States. If an individual work is unprotected by copyright law in the
United States and you are located in the United States, we do not
claim a right to prevent you from copying, distributing, performing,
displaying or creating derivative works based on the work as long as
all references to Project Gutenberg are removed. Of course, we hope
that you will support the Project Gutenberg™ mission of promoting
free access to electronic works by freely sharing Project Gutenberg™
works in compliance with the terms of this agreement for keeping the
Project Gutenberg™ name associated with the work. You can easily
comply with the terms of this agreement by keeping this work in the
same format with its attached full Project Gutenberg™ License when
you share it without charge with others.
1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern
what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are
in a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States,
check the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this
agreement before downloading, copying, displaying, performing,
distributing or creating derivative works based on this work or any
other Project Gutenberg™ work. The Foundation makes no
representations concerning the copyright status of any work in any
country other than the United States.
1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg:
1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other
immediate access to, the full Project Gutenberg™ License must appear
prominently whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg™ work (any work
on which the phrase “Project Gutenberg” appears, or with which the
phrase “Project Gutenberg” is associated) is accessed, displayed,
performed, viewed, copied or distributed:
This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most
other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions
whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms
of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online
at www.gutenberg.org. If you
are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws
of the country where you are located before using this eBook.
1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg™ electronic work is
derived from texts not protected by U.S. copyright law (does not
contain a notice indicating that it is posted with permission of the
copyright holder), the work can be copied and distributed to anyone in
the United States without paying any fees or charges. If you are
redistributing or providing access to a work with the phrase “Project
Gutenberg” associated with or appearing on the work, you must comply
either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 or
obtain permission for the use of the work and the Project Gutenberg™
trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or 1.E.9.
1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg™ electronic work is posted
with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution
must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any
additional terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms
will be linked to the Project Gutenberg™ License for all works
posted with the permission of the copyright holder found at the
beginning of this work.
1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg™
License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this
work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg™.
1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this
electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without
prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with
active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project
Gutenberg™ License.
1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary,
compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including
any word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access
to or distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg™ work in a format
other than “Plain Vanilla ASCII” or other format used in the official
version posted on the official Project Gutenberg™ website
(www.gutenberg.org), you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense
to the user, provide a copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means
of obtaining a copy upon request, of the work in its original “Plain
Vanilla ASCII” or other form. Any alternate format must include the
full Project Gutenberg™ License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1.
1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying,
performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg™ works
unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9.
1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing
access to or distributing Project Gutenberg™ electronic works
provided that:
• You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from
the use of Project Gutenberg™ works calculated using the method
you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is owed
to the owner of the Project Gutenberg™ trademark, but he has
agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the Project
Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments must be paid
within 60 days following each date on which you prepare (or are
legally required to prepare) your periodic tax returns. Royalty
payments should be clearly marked as such and sent to the Project
Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the address specified in
Section 4, “Information about donations to the Project Gutenberg
Literary Archive Foundation.”
• You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies
you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he
does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg™
License. You must require such a user to return or destroy all
copies of the works possessed in a physical medium and discontinue
all use of and all access to other copies of Project Gutenberg™
works.
• You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of
any money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the
electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days of
receipt of the work.
• You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free
distribution of Project Gutenberg™ works.
1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project
Gutenberg™ electronic work or group of works on different terms than
are set forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing
from the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the manager of
the Project Gutenberg™ trademark. Contact the Foundation as set
forth in Section 3 below.
1.F.
1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable
effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread
works not protected by U.S. copyright law in creating the Project
Gutenberg™ collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg™
electronic works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may
contain “Defects,” such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate
or corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other
intellectual property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or
other medium, a computer virus, or computer codes that damage or
cannot be read by your equipment.
1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the “Right
of Replacement or Refund” described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project
Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project
Gutenberg™ trademark, and any other party distributing a Project
Gutenberg™ electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all
liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal
fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT
LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE
PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 1.F.3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE
TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE
LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR
INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
DAMAGE.
1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a
defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can
receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a
written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you
received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium
with your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you
with the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in
lieu of a refund. If you received the work electronically, the person
or entity providing it to you may choose to give you a second
opportunity to receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If
the second copy is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing
without further opportunities to fix the problem.
1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth
in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you ‘AS-IS’, WITH NO
OTHER WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT
LIMITED TO WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE.
1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied
warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of
damages. If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement
violates the law of the state applicable to this agreement, the
agreement shall be interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or
limitation permitted by the applicable state law. The invalidity or
unenforceability of any provision of this agreement shall not void the
remaining provisions.
1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the
trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone
providing copies of Project Gutenberg™ electronic works in
accordance with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the
production, promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg™
electronic works, harmless from all liability, costs and expenses,
including legal fees, that arise directly or indirectly from any of
the following which you do or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this
or any Project Gutenberg™ work, (b) alteration, modification, or
additions or deletions to any Project Gutenberg™ work, and (c) any
Defect you cause.
Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg™
Project Gutenberg™ is synonymous with the free distribution of
electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of
computers including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It
exists because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations
from people in all walks of life.
Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the
assistance they need are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg™’s
goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg™ collection will
remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project
Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure
and permanent future for Project Gutenberg™ and future
generations. To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary
Archive Foundation and how your efforts and donations can help, see
Sections 3 and 4 and the Foundation information page at www.gutenberg.org.
Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation
The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non-profit
501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the
state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal
Revenue Service. The Foundation’s EIN or federal tax identification
number is 64-6221541. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg Literary
Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent permitted by
U.S. federal laws and your state’s laws.
The Foundation’s business office is located at 809 North 1500 West,
Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887. Email contact links and up
to date contact information can be found at the Foundation’s website
and official page at www.gutenberg.org/contact
Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg
Literary Archive Foundation
Project Gutenberg™ depends upon and cannot survive without widespread
public support and donations to carry out its mission of
increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be
freely distributed in machine-readable form accessible by the widest
array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations
($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt
status with the IRS.
The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating
charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United
States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a
considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up
with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations
where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To SEND
DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any particular state
visit www.gutenberg.org/donate.
While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we
have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition
against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who
approach us with offers to donate.
International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make
any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from
outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff.
Please check the Project Gutenberg web pages for current donation
methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other
ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. To
donate, please visit: www.gutenberg.org/donate.
Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg™ electronic works
Professor Michael S. Hart was the originator of the Project
Gutenberg™ concept of a library of electronic works that could be
freely shared with anyone. For forty years, he produced and
distributed Project Gutenberg™ eBooks with only a loose network of
volunteer support.
Project Gutenberg™ eBooks are often created from several printed
editions, all of which are confirmed as not protected by copyright in
the U.S. unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not
necessarily keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper
edition.
Most people start at our website which has the main PG search
facility: www.gutenberg.org.
This website includes information about Project Gutenberg™,
including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary
Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to
subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks.